How so? I'm arguing that science can determine the answer to moral problems, not that science can decide what words we use to describe what type of thing. Science doesn't decide that the tall thing with leaves on is going to be called a 'tree', but neither does philosophy, it's just the evolution of language. The fact is that some decision has to me made about tithing because the issue exists. What we call it is irrelevant, we could call it a 'fligitybit' issue, if you like. — Pseudonym

That's not what I meant. I wasn't talking about the actual string of symbols we use to refer to things. The fact that we have different languages (different symbols) that refer to the same things shows that language is arbitrary. I was talking about you mentioning that since people agree that tithing is moral, that that makes it moral. That is also arbitrary. We didn't agree that animals evolved from others by natural selection. They simply do, and did before we became aware of it and devised an explanation using language to represent it. We agreed that this is the case, not as a result of popularity, but by being made aware of the fact by observations by everyone. So again I ask you, how is tithing a moral issue without appealing to popularity?

Fine, moral issues are those types of decision which might affect another organism's goals. I have no problem with that definition, we're still on language here though, you're still just describing the family resemblance that groups together all the types of decision we call Moral. We could take your word for it, or we could ask everyone in the world what types of decision they would use the word 'moral' to cover and use some sort of standard deviation around the mean for our definition. None of this has the slightest impact on how we actually make such decisions (ethics). — Pseudonym

No, we're not still on language. Again, language itself is arbitrary. What language refers to isn't, or at least shouldn't be when we are talking about objective attributes of reality. You were appealing to popularity. I'm not.

Yes, but I'm not one of them (or at least my current theory is that I'm not, and said theory has yet to be falsified), so I don't see how this is relevant. I'm not trying to claim that the answers science would give us to moral dilemmas would also apply to Lions. — Pseudonym

It is relevant because it shows that what is good for one species isn't good for another, and it is based on the way we're designed by natural selection. There are many features we do share with these animals - like the feeling of pain.

There absolutely is, that's the point of ethical naturalism (or at least my specific brand). The way we want to feel after certain decisions is a natural fact determined by evolution, and the means to obtain that feeling is a logical cause/effect system which scientific experiment can determine the probable relations wthin. Therefore science absolutely can tell us which person to save, the one which experiments have shown will provide us with the feeling which experiments have shown we are bound to want. — Pseudonym

But about the person that dies as a result of you referencing some scientific formula? Do you think that they give a damn about science at that moment? They simply have a goal to survive and their feeling of being neglected at their moment of need would not be anything like your feeling after saving someone else. Are you saying that you wouldn't at least feel bad about the person you couldn't save? I find that hard to believe. So I don't see how science can help you feel better in this situation.

No, there are not only theories why, there are theories about what the consequences will be and how we will feel about those consequences. There are also theories demonstrating what feelings we wish to obtain and which we wish to avoid, thus we can determine which action's consequences produce the feelings we wish to obtain. — Pseudonym

That's all well and good, but you seem to be forgetting a major aspect of morality - and that is the consequences of your actions on other's feelings, not just your own. That is my point. Whose feelings matter the most?

I was talking about you mentioning that since people agree that tithing is moral, that that makes it moral. — Harry Hindu

I haven't said that (at least not deliberately). I said that tithing is a moral issue, the decision about whether to tithe is one of that group of decisions we label 'moral'. I'm not saying that tithing is a moral act because people say it is. I'm saying the decision whether to tithe or not is a moral one because people say it is. None of this has the slightest bearing on whether we should tithe or not.

I'm appealing to popular agreement to define what kinds of decisions are 'moral' ones, only for the sake of discussions about ethics. To me, they're all just decisions and science can answer them, it's an artefact of those who think morality is something else that some types of decision are put in a special group, I'd almost be happy to do away with the word entirely.

It is relevant because it shows that what is good for one species isn't good for another, and it is based on the way we're designed by natural selection. — Harry Hindu

Absolutely, and what's good for one group is not necessarily good for another competing group. Mostly it's in our best interest to co-operate, occasionally to fight. It's (probably) a conflict between wanting to secure resources for our immediate genetic kin, but not wanting to do so at the expense of making enemies who might threaten then later or killing our slightly less close genetic kin. I don't see how this is evidence of a lack of scientific answer to moral dilemmas, in fact it supports scientific explanations, which favour multiple conflicting desires, over other moral Realisms, which imply one consistent code.

I don't see how science can help you feel better in this situation. — Harry Hindu

I never claimed that science could always make you feel good. If both choices are crap, the best it can do is least crap.

you seem to be forgetting a major aspect of morality - and that is the consequences of your actions on other's feelings, not just your own. That is my point. Whose feelings matter the most? — Harry Hindu

No, the consequences on other people's feelings are often what generate our own feelings. We have mirror neurons which mimic the emotions of others, we literally feel their pain, it's an evolved mechanism, probably to aid co-operation but the jury is still out on that. We're already programmed to care about other people's feelings, it's going to happen anyway. Science can tell us how best to bring about the happiness in others we seem to want to generate (when we're not already sure how to do it).

Again, if you actually read the whole post rather than just picking a fight, — Pseudonym

Sorry if my posts sounded like picking a fight to you. I thought this was a philosophy forum. I should bow out of this thread then and not continue if this is how you summarize my questioning. It will be a waste of my time.

I'm sorry if I've offended you. I have been called just about every derogatory name under the sun in this thread just for asking the question about why Scientism is used in a derogatory sense, so it riled me to have yet another post take a combatative approach of first presuming I must be a fundamentalist supporter of Scientism "You right away defended the following quote by Putnam:..." and then be subjected to this kind of trick questioning aimed at 'catching me out' rather than constructively laying out your ideas as to what Scientism is and why it is used pejoratively, which is, completely unambiguously, the actual question.

Having said all that, it should serve as an explanation for my snappiness, not an excuse for it, so I apologise for my tone.

I haven't said that (at least not deliberately). I said that tithing is a moral issue, the decision about whether to tithe is one of that group of decisions we label 'moral'. I'm not saying that tithing is a moral act because people say it is. I'm saying the decision whether to tithe or not is a moral one because people say it is. None of this has the slightest bearing on whether we should tithe or not.

I'm appealing to popular agreement to define what kinds of decisions are 'moral' ones, only for the sake of discussions about ethics. To me, they're all just decisions and science can answer them, it's an artefact of those who think morality is something else that some types of decision are put in a special group, I'd almost be happy to do away with the word entirely. — Pseudonym

You're still appealing to popularity. I'll ask a different question: Why do people say that the decision to tithe or not is a moral one?

This is actually a question you should be asking yourself because you keep going in circles. The fact that you haven't seems to indicate that you don't intend to be intellectually honest. Do you ever play devil's advocate with your own ideas?

Whose feelings matter the most? — Harry Hindu

No, the consequences on other people's feelings are often what generate our own feelings. We have mirror neurons which mimic the emotions of others, we literally feel their pain, it's an evolved mechanism, probably to aid co-operation but the jury is still out on that. We're already programmed to care about other people's feelings, it's going to happen anyway. Science can tell us how best to bring about the happiness in others we seem to want to generate (when we're not already sure how to do it). — Pseudonym

Now it's becoming clear that you're just avoiding the questions.

I asked you whose feelings matter the most? We are not already programmed to care about other people's feelings. If we were then there would never be any moral dilemmas.

Why do people say that the decision to tithe or not is a moral one? — Harry Hindu

Because the family resemblance of decisions labelled 'moral' includes things which match the properties of the decision to tithe - namely in this case, it involves the welfare of others, possibly at one's own expense. But like any definition the term is vague. How tall exactly does a tree need to be to not be called a shrub? How many grains of sand are required for it to be a 'pile'? At what stage of hybridisation does a thing cease to be the species it was and start to become a new one? None of these questions have been answered, yet they do not prevent us from using the terms involved. I don't know exactly what determines whether a decision is a moral one or not, I don't think anyone has the authority to decide. I do know a moral decision when faced with one, in most cases. I might have trouble with ambiguous cases, as would anyone with any definition.

The fact that you haven't seems to indicate that you don't intend to be intellectually honest. — Harry Hindu

What makes you think I haven't - because I haven't come up with the answer you think is right, ergo I can't have thought about it properly? This seems to be a unnervingly common position on this thread.
It doesn't matter to me at all what name we give to these types of decision, nor what rules we use to decide which are called 'moral' and which are not. I'm happy to accept your personal definition, the definition of 'the masses' or some dictionary definition of authority. It makes not the least difference to my argument because I argue that we make moral decisions in exactly the same way as we make any other decision, therefore I do not need to define which decisions I'm talking about, i'm talking about them all.

Now it's becoming clear that you're just avoiding the questions.

I asked you whose feelings matter the most? — Harry Hindu

Our own feelings, I thought that was clear from the paragraph you quoted.

We are not already programmed to care about other people's feelings. — Harry Hindu

We categorically, unequivocally are programmed to care about other people's feelings. We have specific neurons in the brain which do just that and no other job, people with those parts of the brain damaged or missing become instantly indifferent to other people's feelings, six month old babies show concern for the welfare of others and think of appropriate solutions to those problems, you will not find a single psychological experiment no matter how contrived that shows we are indifferent to the feelings of others. I'm happy to engage with you and see if we can refine each other's ideas, but I'm not prepared to discuss philosophies based on made up facts. To paraphrase, you are entitled to your own opinion, you are not entitled to your own facts.

If we were then there would never be any moral dilemmas. — Harry Hindu

This is only true if you presume (erroneously) that our desires are complementary. As soon as you understand that our desires are conflicting, you have a model which allows for behaviour that contradicts one desire because it satisfies another. This doesn't mean that the first desire doesn't exist, just that it was, on that occasion, subsumed by the other desire. This happens rationally in the cerebral cortex. Eric Corchesne (the first neuroscientist to work out how to do fMRI scans on babies) directly observed this activity in the brain of six month old babies. He took away a toy, the child recognised the toy had been taken (sensory perception areas lit up), felt several visceral reactions (several areas of emotional response lit up), processed those feelings in the cerebral cortex, and then cried.

Now there are a whole host of problems with fMRI scanning and the relation to brain states, but is is certainly robust enough to tell the difference between visceral activity and cerebral activity. Babies definitely feel several things in response to stimuli, make some kind of rational calculation, and then feel largely only one thing (with associated behaviour).

Whatever theory you have about morality, the feelings we have for others, the way we make decisions, and how our behaviour reflects our desires has to at least fit the facts. They're vague enough to accommodate a huge range of theories at the moment, but not so vague that just anything goes.

@Michael The conversation I'm having with Harry is about Ethical Naturalism specifically. This thread is about the pejorative use of the term 'Scientism'. I don't want to lose what we've discussed, but no-one's going to find the topic who might be interested in Ethical Naturalism by looking at the thread title or tag. Is there any way Harry's comments and my responses to him could be moved to their own thread?

I am starting to wonder whether we have spoken past one another slightly. When I spoke about answering "why" questions, I was referring to the Regress problem first articulated by ancient sceptics. I'm not sure if you had that in mind in your reply.

My hypothesis is that all philosophical questions end up requiring a fundamental statement of belief, my test is to look through all the philosophical questions that have ever been asked, my hypothesis has yet to be falsified because I have yet to find a philosophical question which has an unequivocal answer not requiring some belief statement. It's not the best theory in the world, and it needs a lot more testing, but it is definitely scientific, by the definition I'm using. — Pseudonym

This is why I think we spoke past one another, because the Regress problem isn't just about philosophical issues. It is about the justification of ordinary beliefs about ourselves and the world. I say that there is a role for Philosophy at a certain stage - the justification of beliefs about my immediate surroundings, justification of the belief in other minds and unperceived existence, the justification of memory, of various patterns of inference.

This is just one place I think Philosophy has work that science cannot do. Issues of scepticism and relativism enter in, as well as idealism and antirealism. There is also the issue of why we should take scientific theories to be more credible than myths and religious legends and answering this throws up many other interesting questions.

In general, there is a space for Philosophy in examining, clarifying and where possible justifying the assumptions which people take for-granted in other contexts (or the assumptions which are necessary in those contexts). I wouldn't say a priori that no scientific experiment could deal with these issues without further philosophical claims but I've never seen it done, and it isn't the approach I find promising.

This is the really interesting bit, completely off topic, but I'd love to hear how you think this would happen, are you just hopeful, or do you have a theory as to how? Don't worry about the off-topicness, I don't think anyone's reading this any more. — Pseudonym

Essentially as follows. Justify beliefs about the world by appeal to experience (deal with the many objections against this, by doing Philosophy). Justify belief in other minds by inference (again, deal with objections). Justify the inference rules a priori. Justify memory (hopefully). If it turns out all of this cannot be done then that is a shame, but the thing to do is not just to abandon the issue. We could try to determine what the minimum number of assumptions is that we need to make in order to justify everything we want to believe. That would be to reduce the number of things we take for-granted, giving a kind of clarity and order to the mess of our pre-reflective beliefs. I think that's the role Russel saw for philosophy. Modern philosophers had that idea too, but tended to romanticize it.

Absolutely, you're getting the idea, although I sense you're just being charitable and don't actually agree with it. The sort of thing you're suggesting is exactly the way naturalists think that science can answer these questions. The only refinement I would make is that we all know people lie through their teeth when asked about personal matters like morality. I would design the experiment to see how people behave in controlled situations designed such as to best elucidate what they really believe, not just what they say they do. — Pseudonym

Ah so you do advance the doctrine about the meaning of "morally good". I'd make two points.

What question does Ethical Naturalism answer? As I understand it, it answers the question "what do people ordinarily mean by "morally good"?. It is obviously an empirical question what people mean by "morally good". So in principle scientifc methods can answer this question. I haven't seen the survey results about the matter (ask your favorite experimental philosopher about it. They are the hot new fashion!), but I gravely suspect they would not show that people mean something even close to "maximizes well-being". Many people I know adhere to deontological rules on which some things just aren't acceptable, period. My supervisor, for example, is a Kantian and sure as anything does not mean "maximizes well-being" by morally good. Moreover, large portions of the world are still religious and so likely mean something like "accords with God's will" or "is approved by God" or something like that. You say in reply that you think these people are lying and that experiments would show this. Well maybe, and maybe not. Still, in the absence of such experiments it seems that your suggestion that they are lying is a kind of ad hoc move which saves your theory about "morally good". The relevant point for this thread though is I agree with you that this semantic question can be answered by scientific methods, even if I don't think ethical Naturalism is the right answer.

What many philosophers try to do, (your interpretation of) Harris included, is move from a doctrine about the meaning of "morally good" to a doctrine about how we should live and what we should do. This move is fallacious. Suppose it turns out that everyone in the west means "maximizes well being" by "morally good". Does that entail that we should maximize well being at all costs? Its hard to see why it would. Maybe easterners have a different concept of morally good. Should we live the western way or the eastern way? The ancient greeks seemed to have a different concept to "maximizes well being" (unless they were lying!). Should we live their way or our way? I cannot see how an analysis of "morally good" can help us at all with the philosophical issue of how we should live, unless some how the correct norms for living are built into our concepts, but that sounds far fetched.

I've never understood why so many philosophers think they can draw normative conclusions from conceptual analysis. Stephen Stich calls that idea conceptual romanticism, and I'm inclined to agree with him that its just cultural bias dressed up in fancy talk of "the real meaning" and "analysis". I should say at this point that I actually find debates about the ordinary meaning of philosophical concepts quite interesting in its own right. I just don't see how it really helps answer the fundamental philosophical questions. If "how should we live?" is a philosophical question, I can't see how science helps answer it.

Perhaps coming back full circle to the main topic. It seems silly to me to just label a view "scientism" and be done with it. It might be that scientific methods can answer some philosophical questions. They've done it in the past. I can't see it happening with the questions I've flagged up here. What do you think about that?

Sorry for the delayed reply by the way.

Maybe the difference here, though a subtle one, is between an answer to the philosophical questions, and the answer. I could provide you with an answer to the question "what did you have for breakfast this morning?". I could even have that answer analysed philosophically - if I said "a bucket of pigswill', we could say that that was not a good answer, it doesn't accord with experience (not one eats pigswill), nor with intuition (I wouldn't want to eat pigswill); if I said "toast and coffee", that would be a better answer, purely on philosophical grounds. But neither are the answer, I could not possibly know the answer. Even if I had CCTV footage of you having your breakfast, I can only get more sure. But at some point in this increasing certainty, for the sake of linguistic convenience only, we say we've got the answer. That point is the point at which others agree with our results (maybe they check their CCTV footage as well, they ask a snoopy neighbour who watches you every morning and he corroborates), and at which we can repeat our results (CCTV footage is corroborated by direct observation, which is corroborated by thermal imaging, which is corroborated by the fact that two slices of bread are missing etc...). There is no such continual testing and corroboration in philosophy, so it can only ever supply an answer, never the answer.

In a sense, the argument that only science can answer questions in the objective, public domain is actually trivially true and not ground breaking at all. I could have my own justification (an answer) as to why I think you even exist, why I can trust my memory, why I think that because the laws of physics were some way yesterday they will be that way again tomorrow, but these are my private justifications. I might talk with you about them and we could have a very interesting conversation, but at no point in time could I say that my justifications had any better claim to objective truth than yours. They might be more internally consistent than yours, but who's to say that internal consistency is a measure of success?

This is the problem with philosophy answering these question, I've yet to hear anyone talk about how we know when we have an answer. I agree entirely with your list of issues that science cannot speak on (although I disagree about morality, but we'll come to that), but you've not said how you know when philosophy has an answer. Science knows when it has an answer. All the while the theory is being tested and cannot be dis-proven, it is the answer. The moment a test comes along to disprove it, it's no longer the answer. The clever thing about science is it's only ever temporary, it only ever has the answer for the time being. I just don't see the equivalent with philosophy. A few possibilities to get the ball rolling, but I'd be interested to her what you think a measure of success would be;

• The theory matches our intuition - as you've already said with morality, what we call our intuition does not seem to deliver consistent results. maybe reality isn't consistent, but if that's the case, then all we have again is an answer, not the answer. There's no reason to believe your answer will apply to me.
• The theory is internally consistent - This is promising, but if 2000 years of philosophy has shown us anything it's that lots of things can be sufficiently internally consistent to sound plausible. None of this gets at the axioms that are at the heart of the investigations.
• The ability of an argument to persuade - Take a look at the PhilPapers survey, or David Chalmers's lecture in which he presents the results. There's not been an inch of persuasive progress on any of the major questions of philosophy in 2000 years, Almost all are still split 50/50. In fact the only areas where arguments have been more persuasive than others are areas where I suspect you personally (from reading your posts) would disagree. Most philosophers think there isn't a God, and most philosophers think there is a real world external to our minds. If we accept persuasiveness as a measure of the answer, then we should at least all be atheist realists., but we're not.

Personally, I find a lot of use for the idea of philosophy as justification. Stories we can tell ourselves about why we believe what we do so as not to be "crippled with doubt" as Russell put it. But they are just stories, no one is better than any other. Charles Dickens is not a 'better' author than Emily Bronte, and Kant is not a 'better' philosopher than Hume, they're all just offering something, you either like it or you don't, there's no argument to be had as to why one it more 'right' than the other.

Modern ethics is a classic case in point. I'm an ethicist by training so I've read a considerable amount of answers to ethical problems from various angles. I can honestly say that I've not come across a single example of an ethical problem for which the answer we were all looking for cannot be shoe-horned into whatever ethical theory you care to try. Never, in my entire career have I come across a paper from an ardent supporter of any ethical school where they take on a moral dilemma and say "Wow, Kant (or whoever) gives us a really counter-intuitive answer here, I suppose we'd best follow it though", or "Nope, Kant's got nothing on this one, it didn't work". If the answer is counter-intuitive, you can guarantee that some subsequent paper will come along to show how the intuitive answer was right all along. This is why I became convinced by ethical naturalism (although I've always been a moral realist) every ethics paper I've read seems to be working backwards, it seems to be 'trying' to find the answer the author knows already is right in whatever ethical system they're applying.

Basically we seem to start off with a series of moral dilemmas where we know the parameters of the answers we're looking for ("kill the poor" isn't one of them, for example), but we don't know which exact course of action to take form all the ones that seem intuitively to be viable.
We put these dilemmas through various ethical theories of the greatest ethical philosophers of all time.
And we end up with a list of possible answers depending on which particular application of which particular ethics you've applied, that matches almost exactly the list of possible solutions our intuition delivered us at the beginning of the process.
Philosophy has done absolutely nothing to narrow down that list.
What it has done is given us reasons why we might believe in any one of the solutions, which is no small thing, I think it's really important, but it's not answering anything.

Once I accepted this phenomenon as a feature of reality (a simple belief statement, but based on empirical data, as above), then it becomes possible to at least apply science to determine which of the possible solutions might actually deliver the results we're looking for. Science can't tell us what we 'ought' to be looking for, but that doesn't seem to matter. In my experience we're all looking for roughly the same thing anyway. You mention the deontologist who does not believe in "maximising well-being", or the priest who wants only to "do God's will", but in neither case do we end up with anything we didn't know already. Deontology says nothing more than the golden rule, which it has been demonstrated even monkeys know. God's will suffers from (or perhaps benefits from) Plato's concern that God wills it because it is right. In religions, god only seems to will things that communities at the time think are right. Do you think it's a coincidence that God seems a lot less insistent on stoning adulterers and ostracising homosexuals these days?

The biggest problem with understanding ethical naturalism, and I think Harris makes this massive mistake too, is to think that what we want is in any way simple or consistent. 'What we want' is a large collection of vague and brazenly contradictory desires for particular sensations. Mapping those onto the world to work out what actions to take to achieve them is complicated. Our understanding of the world has a huge impact, our understanding of our own desires does too, as does the timescale we ask the question over. I think you've over simplified ethical naturalisms, and so has Harris. It's more like this.

We desire feelings X,Y and Z (an a hundred others, but lets call X,Y and Z the ones we've labelled 'moral objectives'), this is taken to be a brute fact and although we don't know exactly what X,Y and Z are, we can derive then by looking at the common threads of all moral behaviour, looking at brain function and applying evolutionary principles.
We learn that, in the environment we're in, doing A delivers feeling X, doing B delivers feeling Y and doing C delivers feeling Z. Again, we can test these hypotheses by the means above.
So far, so simple, but the trouble comes in three forms;

1. Change the environment and doing A no longer delivers feeling X, so actions that were moral once become less so as the environment changes (they no longer deliver feeling X, our 'moral' objective')
2. Doing A delivers feeling X in the short -term, but feeling Q in the long term (where Q is a feeling we definitely do not want). Humans apply hyperbolic discounting to desires that are in the future, to a varying degree. again this is just a brute fact, not an 'ought'. We just do apply hyperbolic discounting, like it or not.
3. Those pesky 'hundred other' desires, none of which make the slightest effort to be complimentary. We're constantly trying to balance our actions to deliver these feelings we desire despite the fact that they are not remotely complimentary.

These three factors account for all the moral variation you see in the world, different environments delivering different solutions, different levels of hyperbolic discounting and different rational solutions to competing desires. None of this changes the fact that the desires themselves are scientifically falsifiable theories, as are theories about the solutions which best meet all of them over any given time-scale.

Of course, circling back to the first part, if you don't believe in Physicalism in the first place, then all this is rubbish. If you think God made the world, then anything goes. You have to have the fundamental belief in the first place before any of this makes any sense, but personally I think everyone does. I think that's the reason why 'Scientism' is treated with such derision. people are scared it might actually be right.

:up: Very good post. Re: your point about ethical philosophers working backwards from the desired conclusion to the ethical thesis which supports it, author Heather Mac Donald (herself a conservative scholar) had an amusing line about "natural law" legal/ethical scholars, basically saying that she'll believe in natural law when its proponents offer a conclusion they didn't already want to believe.

Great discussion. A lot to think about.

When we began I thought you were maintaining that all philosophical questions could be answered by science, but when I gave you some examples of the questions I'm interested in, you agreed that science cannot answer them (with the exception of morality). Then I thought you held the weaker doctrine that any philosophical question which can be answered at all is answerable by science. But your newest post draws a distinction between the answer and an answer. You then hold that philosophy can only give an answer to the questions I'm interested in, whereas science gives the answers to other questions.

What's the difference between "the" answer and "an" answer. I think what you have in mind is that in science there are agreed upon methods of answering questions. The answer which results from using those methods is the truth. Thus, you write:

Science knows when it has an answer. All the while the theory is being tested and cannot be dis-proven, it is the answer — Pseudonym

Add in a touch of modesty, of course:

The moment a test comes along to disprove it, it's no longer the answer. The clever thing about science is it's only ever temporary, it only ever has the answer for the time being. — Pseudonym

Philosophy by contrast, isn't like this. There aren't agreed on methods for answering philosophical questions. All you get are different answers from different perspectives, taking different approaches, even interpreting the questions themselves differently. The Phil Survey shows you that much.

I agree with you, but this isn't Scientism is it? This isn't a controversial doctrine that forum members detest is it? Its just the plain empirical fact that philosophers disagree a lot and scientists don't. What puzzles me is that you seem to think that it follows from this that there is no better or worse in philosophy. Everything is equal:

Kant is not a 'better' philosopher than Hume, they're all just offering something, you either like it or you don't, there's no argument to be had as to why one it more 'right' than the other. — Pseudonym

I disagree. Philosophers can make logical mistakes, their views can be incompatible with scientific findings, they can be in tension with other views of their own, they can be contradictory or self-refuting, a philosopher might have failed to solve a problem even by his own understanding of that problem and by his own standards. In all these ways some philosophy can be better/worse than others.

Some examples. On at least one interpretation of Kant's views, many of his theses contradict orthodox views in physics (about space-time) and psychology (about conceptual diversity). Russell held (although it isn't clear whether he was right) that direct realism about perception was in contradiction with the science of perception. Anselm's original Ontological Argument treats existence as a predicate - a logical mistake, and one of Berkeley's arguments that Esse es Percipi conflates conceiving and perceiving, as well as ontology and epistemology (although I think Berkeley is ingenious in some places!). Many versions of Relativism (I think Richard Rorty's) are contradictory and self-refuting. Plantinga argues that certain versions of Naturalism are self-refuting. Descartes most famously failed to refute his own evil demon hypothesis, because he resorted (accidentally) to helping himself to premises which he himself earlier banned himself from using (there are several interpretations of Descartes and all are fascinating, but he always slips up somewhere). Russell also failed to reduce mathematics to logic, by his own standards and according to his own interpretation of the issue. Of course, philosophers will debate with each other whether any of these mistakes has really been made, but that doesn't mean no philosophy is better than any other; just that it can be hard to tell sometimes.

On to the ethical issue. The Ethical Naturalism which you are talking about in this post is different to the kind which we spoke about previously. I thought you were advocating a doctrine about the meaning of "moral goodness", since that is the view I know of which goes by that label. But in this post you don't defend that doctrine at all. Ethical Naturalism, as you are thinking of it, is a kind of anti-theory in ethics. We all already know what answers to moral dilemmas we want to give, and we all already know how we want to live our lives, so we may as well just use science to figure out the best way of doing it. Looking for an ethical theory is hollow, since philosophers always end up just bending the theories so that they give the results we want. Thus:

This is why I became convinced by ethical naturalism (although I've always been a moral realist) every ethics paper I've read seems to be working backwards, it seems to be 'trying' to find the answer the author knows already is right in whatever ethical system they're applying. — Pseudonym

Its clear that we can use science to determine how best to satisfy our desires and how best to get what we want, even in complex dilemmas. I also agree that many philosophers frustratingly bend ethical theories around their intuitions, so that it doesn't look like there is much difference in those theories, or much point having them. My only complaint is that Ethical Naturalism, I thought, was your example of science answering a philosophical question. The question it was supposed to answer was "how should we live?". But it doesn't answer that question. Sticking only with what can be scientifically established, all that can be said is "these are our wants and desires. These are the most efficient ways of achieving them". That doesn't answer the philosophical question at all. You seem to recognize this here:

Science can't tell us what we 'ought' to be looking for, but that doesn't seem to matter. In my experience we're all looking for roughly the same thing anyway. — Pseudonym

We can add this part about how "we" already know how we want to live and what we desire, but that doesn't answer the philosophical question either. The end of your first sentence is telling - "that doesn't seem to matter". Your view isn't that science can answer the philosophical question. Its that the philosophical question doesn't matter. Whether or not the question matters, the fact is that science doesn't answer it, and so we do not here have an instance of science answering a philosophical question.

In a way I think neither your Ethical Naturalism nor the intuition driven moral theorists you criticize make the same mistake - to wit - the moral theorists start with the answers they want (their intuitions if you like), build a theory out of them and say that we should live according to the theory. You say "forget the theory" and settle for the answers we are already inclined to give. Neither of these things will help a person who has risen to the level of reflection in which they wonder whether the way they are currently living is the right way to live, or whether there even is such a thing as the right way to live.

:up:

You then hold that philosophy can only give an answer to the questions I'm interested in, whereas science gives the answers to other questions. — PossibleAaran

I don't really see how this position differs from any of the previous ones in any meaningful sense. If I were to say that drawing cards at random from a deck of playing cards answers basic arithmetic problems, I don't think there's an English speaker in the world who wouldn't recognise this as false. If the question is 2+2=? and I draw a 3 of spades, that has given me an answer, but not the answer, therefore it is incorrect to say that drawing cards answers arithmetic problems. Likewise, if the question is "What is the favourite Librettist of the planet Mars?" however I answer, no-one would say that I have answered such a question despite the fact that I would have undeniably provided an answer, the question clearly has no answer.

So to say science answers all questions, science answers all questions that are answerable, and science answers all questions with the answer as opposed to an answer are all making exactly the same metaphysical claim. They are just further elaborating what is meant by it.

I agree with you, but this isn't Scientism is it? This isn't a controversial doctrine that forum members detest is it? — PossibleAaran

That's pretty much the heart of the whole thread. There isn't anyone (even the likes of Lawrence Krauss) who is saying anything more than I've just said. That science provides us with the best tools to describe objective reality. From scientists like Dawkins, Hawking, or Wolpert, to naturalist philosophers like Rosenberg, Edwards, and Harris, no-one is making any greater claim than this. That, if there is a question that can be meaningfully asked in the public domain, then either science can answer it (provide the answer) or it cannot be answered meaningfully in that domain.

That's why I'm asking the question. What is it about 'Scientism' that isn't just Naturalism (or Physicalism, or even Positivism), and what is it about it that's so detestable? I've certainly had it undeniably confirmed that people hate the position, but I haven’t yet understood why.

Its just the plain empirical fact that philosophers disagree a lot and scientists don't. What puzzles me is that you seem to think that it follows from this that there is no better or worse in philosophy. Everything is equal: — PossibleAaran

Yes, exactly that, and the reasons for it. Scientists don't just agree a lot because they are an amenable bunch, and philosophers don't just disagree a lot because they are particularly cantankerous, so why do scientists agree so manifestly more than philosophers do? Unless you are wanting to claim that it is just coincidence, it must be that there is at least something to a scientific answer which compels agreement, and that something is lacking (or at least in very short supply) in philosophical arguments.

Now, what do we mean by 'better or worse' in that context if not some form of widespread agreement among (to borrow Van Inwagen's term "epistemic peers"? A property we have just concluded philosophy lacks remarkably compared to science?

Some examples. — PossibleAaran

On at least one interpretation of Kant's views, many of his theses contradict orthodox views in physics (about space-time) and psychology (about conceptual diversity). - That is philosophy being replaced by science, there is no 'better' philosophy of space-time, there is just the science of space-time.

Russell held (although it isn't clear whether he was right) that direct realism about perception was in contradiction with the science of perception - As above, it is the science of perception that has replaced direct realism, not another philosophy, and if Russell was wrong, it will be that same science that show him to be, not a new philosophy.

Anselm's original Ontological Argument treats existence as a predicate - a logical mistake. But if you take existence to be a predicate As it is possible to do (https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/philosophy/article/is-existence-a-predicate/5E5525776149C95CB218AA50463530C7) then his argument can be believed. No-one has been proven 'better or worse' yet.

Many versions of Relativism (I think Richard Rorty's) are contradictory and self-refuting - But Rorty obviously didn't, and he is at least as rational as you or I. There are no arguments that he cannot understand, that you or I could, and yet he has reached the conclusion he has that differs from yours. It is not the case the Rorty's argument here is self refuting, only that it is possible to construct a counter argument. Show me a philosophical position for which it is not possible to construct a counter argument.

Plantinga argues that certain versions of Naturalism are self-refuting. - Again, the (perfectly rational and intellectual) proponents of those versions clearly do not think of them as self-refuting despite having access to the exact same arguments.

Descartes most famously failed to refute his own evil demon hypothesis, because he resorted (accidentally) to helping himself to premises which he himself earlier banned himself from using (there are several interpretations of Descartes and all are fascinating, but he always slips up somewhere). - Absolutely, but not 'better' philosophy has filled in the blanks he was unable to fill.

Russell also failed to reduce mathematics to logic, by his own standards and according to his own interpretation of the issue. - Again, no-one else has succeeded where he failed.

Of course, philosophers will debate with each other whether any of these mistakes has really been made, but that doesn't mean no philosophy is better than any other — PossibleAaran

I really don't see how it can mean anything other. If rational, intelligent people, in possession of exactly the same arguments nonetheless cannot agree, even close to unanimously, that any of those arguments are 'better' or 'worse', then that's about as close as you're ever going to a fact that none of these arguments are 'better' or 'worse'. It is at least close enough to a fact that an unbiased analysis would hold it to be the case for the time being.

The Ethical Naturalism which you are talking about in this post is different to the kind which we spoke about previously. I thought you were advocating a doctrine about the meaning of "moral goodness", since that is the view I know of which goes by that label. — PossibleAaran

Again, I think you're mistaking further elaboration for changing of subject. Ethical Naturalism encompasses "naturalistic forms of moral realism according to which there are objective moral facts and properties and these moral facts and properties are natural facts and properties." - SEP. Ie it is the idea that as morals are natural facts, they can be discovered by science. There is disagreement as to whether they ever will be, but not (as far as I know) over whether they theoretically can be.

What is 'morally good' is a meaningless question in that sense. It becomes a question akin to "what is a whale?" I can provide you with taxonomic reasons why a thing is a whale, but not why such a category exists at all, there are simply a number of 'things' in the world and we've decided to call some of them whales on account of the fact that they share some similarities. There's no single feature of a whale that makes it a whale. Whatever characteristic you pick, there will be the potential for some mutated offspring to be born without such a feature and we would still call it a whale. So it is with 'moral goodness'. There are simply a collection of feelings we have in response to outcomes, some of these we term 'moral goodness' on account of their similarities, but there's no definitive set of features that must be present, just a 'Family Resemblance'.

The question it was supposed to answer was "how should we live?". But it doesn't answer that question. Sticking only with what can be scientifically established, all that can be said is "these are our wants and desires. These are the most efficient ways of achieving them". That doesn't answer the philosophical question at all. — PossibleAaran

As I said earlier, the full claim, as per the normal use of the term 'answer', is only that science can answer questions to which there is an answer. Since we are determined beings without free-will sensu stricto, then the question what 'should' we do is the question of how can we most efficiently achieve our desires. Consider the alternative. Ifnot striving to achieve your desire was an available alternative what would you call the thing that motivated you to take that option? If you freely choose which desires to suppress and which to nurture, what would you call the thing that motivated you do the suppression/nurturing? We can call these motivations whatever you want, but the only question that is relevant to them is how best to achieve them.

Your view isn't that science can answer the philosophical question. Its that the philosophical question doesn't matter. Whether or not the question matters, the fact is that science doesn't answer it, and so we do not here have an instance of science answering a philosophical question. — PossibleAaran

Absolutely. Science also doesn't answer the question of what Juliet thought of Romeo's haircut, or how many years it takes for a unicorn to grow its horn. It won't answer whether we're real, or whether there's a God (in the widest sense). But neither will anything else. These questions are either meaningless or not amenable to evidence of any sort.(under Physicalism), or rely for their evidence on positions which themselves cannot be proven (Intuitionism, Physicalism, Realism, Divine Command)

Neither of these things will help a person who has risen to the level of reflection in which they wonder whether the way they are currently living is the right way to live, or whether there even is such a thing as the right way to live. — PossibleAaran

Exactly. If a rational person is asking both of those two questions, then a rational person can see that the fact that there is sufficient doubt in the latter means that they cannot, with any certainty, answer the former.

So to say science answers all questions, science answers all questions that are answerable, and science answers all questions with the answer as opposed to an answer are all making exactly the same metaphysical claim — Pseudonym

Do you think there is a scientific reason why some people choose scientific careers, rather than careers in diplomacy or the arts?

Everything you’re saying is directly out of A J Ayer, Language Truth and Logic, which insisted that the only meaningful statements were those that can be verified empirically. But when the smoke cleared, it suddenly became obvious that this too is a statement that cannot be empirically verified. It was hoist by its own petard.

The second point is that, scientism is inherently anti-philosophical in nature. It poses as philosophy, and adopts philosophical rhetorics, but ultimately it seeks to undermine philosophy by only admitting what can be definitely known, measured and assessed. The point about the Western philosophical tradition is that there has always been a place for the unknowable, for aporia, questions which really can’t be neatly resolved but need to be asked nonetheless. Whereas scientistic positivism declares all such questions out of bounds.

The second point is that, scientism is inherently anti-philosophical in nature. It poses as philosophy, and adopts philosophical rhetorics, but ultimately it seeks to undermine philosophy by only admitting what can be definitely known, measured and assessed. The point about the Western philosophical tradition is that there has always been a place for the unknowable, for aporia, questions which really can’t be neatly resolved but need to be asked nonetheless. Whereas scientistic positivism declares all such questions out of bounds. — Wayfarer

I would say the difference lies more in the quality of the evidence being accepted.

Mystics are quite happy to claim proof of their theories in terms of feelings, intuitions, revelations and surprising coincidences. You, for instance, regularly cite oceanic experiences as proof of transcendent being. All “philosophy” is empirical in the sense that the structure of explanation involves relating the particular to the general. We have a broad belief because it appears to account for many and varied impressions.

Dig into scientific positivism or instrumentalist enough and I would argue that you discover the underlying pragmatism that in fact sees even “measured evidence” for what it really is - the reading of numbers off dials.

So it is all experiential. But then it is experience rendered in mathematical signs. And this in turn is secured in the western philosophic tradition by our recognition of the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics.

You are always pointing out how Platonism seems to be trying to tell us something deep. Science actually relies on the language of numbers, the rational structure of mathematical relations. That is what it uses to harden empiricism and give experience some actual kind of transcendent status as a form of evidence.

What you feel is what you feel. It lacks objective distance as evidence. It lacks disambiguation,

Science employs number as a rational structure that gives that safe distance. It is the general of a mathematical structure that becomes related to the particular of some act of counting. And so it’s empirical evidence both accepts the subjectivity of our reality models, but also deals with that in the best quality way possible.

The fact that science wants to give everything a number rather than a feeling is the feature, not the bug.

And that was always what was distinctive about the Western metaphysical tradition that arose out of the universalisation of mathematical structure in Ancient Greece. What you call Scientism is simply what has worked best for understanding reality ever since then.

And I agree as usual that Scientism has the flaw nevertheless of being overly enamoured with bottom up construction - bottom up construction being the way mathematical operations generally have to work. Another issue.

You, for instance, regularly cite oceanic experiences as proof of transcendent being — apokrisis

Citation, please.

Another issue. — apokrisis

Actually, that’s not ‘another issue’. That is the issue that I was commenting on. Everything else in your response, is simply your issues with me, it’s got nothing to do with anything I said.

How about..

Scientism is an instrumentally doctrinal attitude of truth founded on both natural and modal principles.

How about: the belief that all philosophical questions have scientific answers.

That's illogical because science is continually reformed by philosophical models as necessary.

Do you think there is a scientific reason why some people choose scientific careers, rather than careers in diplomacy or the arts? — Wayfarer

Yes. I'm a determinist (or at least a compatibilist), so I believe there exists a scientific reason why everyone does anything. Whether that reason is sufficiently un-complex for us to ever expound it fully is another matter, but we can eliminate thousands of minor factors whose inclusion would make the model way too complex to actually use, but whose contribution to it's predictive power is only small. Thus we end up with a model which has a reasonably high predictive power but is not 100% accurate because of the minor elements we've ignored for simplicity. It's no different to the way we predict the weather, and that has proven incredibly useful despite its fuzziness.

Everything you’re saying is directly out of A J Ayer, Language Truth and Logic, which insisted that the only meaningful statements were those that can be verified empirically. But when the smoke cleared, it suddenly became obvious that this too is a statement that cannot be empirically verified. It was hoist by its own petard. — Wayfarer

We've been through this already so I'm at a loss to understand why you keep bringing it up. No-one is claiming that science can answer all philosophical questions - absolutely no-one. If you can find me a single quote form anyone accused of Scientism to the effect that science can actually answer all questions, then they deserve the pejorative term. I'd like to see them answer the question I used in my response to PA about Mars's favourite Librettist. The claim is that science can answer all questions to the extent to which they are objectively answerable by any means.

With regards to Ayer's claim (or others like it). Either;

- all metaphysical statements are meaningful (in which case Ayer's must also be meaningful)

- all metaphysical statements must be meaningless (in which case Ayer is right, but this statement itself becomes a paradox, so we'd rather not accept it)

- or, some metaphysical statements are meaningful and others not - In which case there is no logical reason why the number of metaphysical statements which can be meaningful is not one.

Meaning that it is perfectly logical to say that all metaphysical statements are meaningless apart from this metaphysical statement. The evidence for this is the lack of any other metaphysical statements which are meaningful.

The second point is that, scientism is inherently anti-philosophical in nature. It poses as philosophy, and adopts philosophical rhetorics, but ultimately it seeks to undermine philosophy by only admitting what can be definitely known, measured and assessed. The point about the Western philosophical tradition is that there has always been a place for the unknowable, for aporia, questions which really can’t be neatly resolved but need to be asked nonetheless. Whereas scientistic positivism declares all such questions out of bounds. — Wayfarer

Why do questions which cannot be resolved whose answers are unknowable need to be asked?

Neither of these things will help a person who has risen to the level of reflection in which they wonder whether the way they are currently living is the right way to live, or whether there even is such a thing as the right way to live. — PossibleAaran

Exactly. If a rational person is asking both of those two questions, then a rational person can see that the fact that there is sufficient doubt in the latter means that they cannot, with any certainty, answer the former. — Pseudonym

I can answer whether it is right for me to kill my mother; I consider both the question and the answer to be meaningful; and science has nothing to do with how I come up with the answer. Do you disagree with any of this?

hus we end up with a model which has a reasonably high predictive power but is not 100% accurate because of the minor elements we've ignored for simplicity. It's no different to the way we predict the weather, and that has proven incredibly useful despite its fuzziness. — Pseudonym

So, there's a scientific reason why I might decide to be a scientist - but we can't know what it is.

We've been through this already so I'm at a loss to understand why you keep bringing it up. — Pseudonym

Because of what you keep saying.

No-one is claiming that science can answer all philosophical questions - absolutely no-one. If you can find me a single quote form anyone accused of Scientism to the effect that science can actually answer all questions, then they deserve the pejorative term — Pseudonym

Well, here, for example:

science does not have any comment on matters of quality, other than to say that no other approach can say anything meaningful on the matter either. — Pseudonym

Emphasis in original.

Why do questions which cannot be resolved whose answers are unknowable need to be asked? — Pseudonym

Have a think about that. There are many of them in the Platonic dialogues, and they form an important part of the subject.

I will divide our issues in to three parts: the difference between scientific answers and philosophical answers; whether any philosophy is any better than any other; and whether we need to ask philosophical questions.

Scientific Answers and Philosophical Answers

You continue to press the idea that there is some serious difference between scientific answers and philosophical answers. In my post, I conceded that there is one difference - scientists agree on what methods are appropriate to answer their questions, and they agree on what results would confirm/refute their theories - at least they do this a lot more than philosophers do. Philosophers, by contrast, are always disagreeing about which methods to use, what can be taken for-granted and what can't, what counts as a good argument for what and so on. Most philosophers agree that "logic and argument" are to be used, but these methods radically underdetermine the answers in most cases, far more than in science.

In your recent post, you say that there is more to it than this:

Scientists don't just agree a lot because they are an amenable bunch, and philosophers don't just disagree a lot because they are particularly cantankerous, so why do scientists agree so manifestly more than philosophers do? Unless you are wanting to claim that it is just coincidence, it must be that there is at least something to a scientific answer which compels agreement, and that something is lacking (or at least in very short supply) in philosophical arguments. — Pseudonym

The "something" to a scientific answer is just that the methods of finding the answer have already been agreed on. If everyone agrees on how to go about answering a question and then they go about answering it in that fashion, its completely unsurprising that a lot of agreement is reached. What compels agreement in science is agreement on a broadly characterized method for answering questions and a broad agreement about what sort of thing is allowed to count as an answer. In short, what compels agreement in science is commitment to a paradigm. Philosophers rarely adopt a paradigm as a consensus, and when they do the paradigm is so abstract (and the methods contained are so modest) that it still permits substantial disagreement. What else could the "something" be? Is there something special going on that I've missed?

Is any philosophy better than any other?

Now, what do we mean by 'better or worse' in that context if not some form of widespread agreement among (to borrow Van Inwagen's term "epistemic peers"? A property we have just concluded philosophy lacks remarkably compared to science? — Pseudonym

A philosophy X is better (to some degree) than some other philosophy Y if (a) X contains fewer logical mistakes than Y, (b) X does not contradict scientific theories whilst Y does, (c) X is not contradictory and Y is, (d) X is not self-refuting and Y is, (e) X accomplish whatever aims philosophers had in developing X, whilst Y doesn't.

I'm sure there are other criteria we could come up with. Note crucially that what is meant by "better" here has nothing to do with how many people agree. Even if everyone in the world thought X was absurd and Y was self-evident, X could still be better than Y by meeting these criteria. And again, disagreement over whether these criteria are met does not entail that no philosophy is better than any other - just that it is hard to tell.

On at least one interpretation of Kant's views, many of his theses contradict orthodox views in physics (about space-time) and psychology (about conceptual diversity). - That is philosophy being replaced by science, there is no 'better' philosophy of space-time, there is just the science of space-time. — Pseudonym

No, because it isn't Kant's transcendental Idealism itself that contradicts scientific theories. Its some of his arguments for it. A philosophy obviously is better if it doesn't rely on arguments which use premises that contradict established science. Kant's philosophical system isn't just speculation about space-time. It entails some hypotheses about space-time that are contradicted by science. You can't replace transcendental Idealism with the science of space-time, any more than you can replace an apple with a paint brush.

Russell held (although it isn't clear whether he was right) that direct realism about perception was in contradiction with the science of perception - As above, it is the science of perception that has replaced direct realism, not another philosophy, and if Russell was wrong, it will be that same science that show him to be, not a new philosophy. — Pseudonym

The science of perception can't replace direct Realism (if Russell is right about this), any more than an apple can replace a paint brush. Direct Realism entails certain empirical hypotheses which Russell thought science showed to be false. But you can't just throw away direct Realism and be done with it, because - and Russell saw this too - throw away direct Realism and you are landed with all sorts of difficult questions about how we can know anything at all about the world, and how we could even meaningfully say anything about it - philosophical issues, not scientific ones. The point is that sometimes part of a philosophical system can contradict science. Throwing out that part of the system, however, will cause problems elsewhere. So it is never as simple as science replacing a refuted theory.

Anselm's original Ontological Argument treats existence as a predicate - a logical mistake. But if you take existence to be a predicate As it is possible to do (https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/philosophy/article/is-existence-a-predicate/5E5525776149C95CB218AA50463530C7) then his argument can be believed. No-one has been proven 'better or worse' yet. — Pseudonym

Its curious that you would say this, because you think that majority agreement is crucial for a philosophy being better than another. Yet, that existence is not a predicate is something that almost all philosophers agree on. Yes, I see the article you present, but its a minority position. In any case, the majority of philosophers do think that Anselm's argument makes a logical mistake whatever that mistake is. Majority agreement isn't a criterion for being better as I am thinking of it anyway, and this last point is what I would say to your point about Plantinga and Rorty too.

Descartes most famously failed to refute his own evil demon hypothesis, because he resorted (accidentally) to helping himself to premises which he himself earlier banned himself from using (there are several interpretations of Descartes and all are fascinating, but he always slips up somewhere). - Absolutely, but not 'better' philosophy has filled in the blanks he was unable to fill. — Pseudonym

Some philosophers have taken up the project started by Descartes. W.T Stace, H.H Price, Russell, Fumerton, Bonjour, to give some examples. They have all made great advances over the attempts made by Descartes, even if they have not fully succeeded in completing the project he started. So it seems they are better in that respect.

I drop the Russell example, because I don't know enough about it.

I really don't see how it can mean anything other. If rational, intelligent people, in possession of exactly the same arguments nonetheless cannot agree, even close to unanimously, that any of those arguments are 'better' or 'worse', then that's about as close as you're ever going to a fact that none of these arguments are 'better' or 'worse'. It is at least close enough to a fact that an unbiased analysis would hold it to be the case for the time being. — Pseudonym

I think you really underestimate philosophy. Philosophers tend not to agree on "the" answer to their biggest questions. But they quite often agree that a given argument for a position is fallacious or of no dialectical use. They also quite often agree that particular versions of certain philosophical theories are susceptible to serious objections. But what often happens is a series of objections are made to a theory, and then in response defenders refine their theory to avoid the objections. Sometimes a theory gets refuted outright, but only very rarely. The result is that positions get gradually refined and the logical space of positions gets narrowed over time. You cited Chalmers' PhilPapers study earlier. He has a lecture on youtube called "why isn't there more progress in Philosophy", where he makes this point about the gradual refinement of philosophical positions. He is much more persuasive than I am.

The Necessity of Philosophical Questions

Since we are determined beings without free-will sensu stricto, then the question what 'should' we do is the question of how can we most efficiently achieve our desires. — Pseudonym

Isn't Physical Determinism a Philosophical theory? Doesn't it presuppose another Philosophical Theory - Physicalism about the mind? If so, then the claim you make above presupposes philosophical theories, which by your own admission, are not better or worse than any others. You did this earlier on too. You said that there is something special about science as opposed to philosophy, which somehow makes it better at reaching objective answers to its questions. When I replied, I did so relying on a Kuhnian Philosophy of Science. If you disagree you will have to disagree with the Kuhnian Philosophy of Science and put forward some other philosophical idea. When you do that you won't be doing science. You will be doing Philosophy of Science and I can almost guarantee you that you will not be able to do this in such a way as to command majority agreement from all philosophers, or even all members of this forum, or even all members who are reading the thread. Yet, this idea of yours - that there is some serious difference between scientific answers and philosophical answers- is a crucial piece of your position. Without it I'm not even sure what your position would be. But it turns out that the only support you can give for it is the kind of thing you don't like - "an" answer, not "the" answer.

This is a theme which I've noticed by many people who say that Science can answer all questions which can be answered. Assume all of the answers to philosophical questions which are needed to make your position defensible, then claim that science can answer all questions which can be answered and that philosophy can't do anything. I agree that if determinism is true and if Physicalism about the mind is true and if science is special in using a particularly objective method and if any myriad of other philosophical views you need to defend the previously listed ones - if all of those are true then the only questions left to answer are scientific questions. But it is trivial to say that if we help ourselves to all of the answers to the most controversial philosophical questions, then science can do the rest.

I think this is why people have such a bad attitude toward people they associate with Scientism. It typically involves presupposing all of the answers to philosophical questions with one hand whilst dismissing philosophy with the other.

This ties in with 's point that we need to ask philosophical questions. We need to ask them in the sense that we just cannot help it. The biggest and most basic philosophical questions aren't just silly abstract musings that you can just ignore and get on with living. They are questions which shape how you act, how you see other people and how you see the world. They are presupposed in almost everything. Even in trying to get rid of philosophical questions you commit yourself to answers to them. And if you can't help answering these questions anyway, you may as well do so carefully and reflectively, as in Philosophy. It would be nice to get "the" answer, but it isn't the end of the world if we don't get it. Most people interested in the subject are happy if they understand the issues more clearly than before.

No disagreement on my part!

I can answer whether it is right for me to kill my mother; I consider both the question and the answer to be meaningful; and science has nothing to do with how I come up with the answer. Do you disagree with any of this? — SophistiCat

No. Did I at any point say that one could not have any desires or objectives without science telling you what they are first? If, for some disturbed reason, you actually need to answer the question "should I kill my own mother?" then science is your best tool to give you an answer (and the answer would be no), but if you don't even need to ask the question because you already have a satisfactory answer then what's science got to do with it. Are you suggesting you'd consult a philosophy text to find out the answer instead?

If the question is "should we, as a species, kill our own mothers?" from an academic perspective, then science can answer that question. The best current theory might be - 'No we should not kill our own mothers because our mothers are the source of high levels of oxytocin which we desire, killing others tends to lead to feelings which we find repellent (do not desire), even if right now it might feel good (our mother might have done something awful and we think she deserves it) then later on after we've calmed down repellent feelings will arise, etc..'. For the time being, there's no counter evidence - no large body of people who've killed their own mothers and are living happy fulfilled lives for having done so, so the theory stands.

Of course, no-one needs to ask the question because the answer is not in doubt. No-one needs to ask the question "What will happen if I throw this ball into the air?". Just because everyone already knows it will come back down again, that doesn't mean science can't answer the question in terms of gravity and mass, it just means it doesn't need to.

Your stated position is that science can answer any question that can and should be answered, and that conversely, a question that cannot be answered by science, such as what is the (morally) right thing to do, consequently isn't meaningful or answerable. Whether the answer to the question seems obvious or not doesn't come into this.

If the question is "should we, as a species, kill our own mothers?" — Pseudonym

No, that's not the question. See, your tactics when in difficulty is to propose some different question that science can answer. This will not do.

So, there's a scientific reason why I might decide to be a scientist - but we can't know what it is. — Wayfarer

Yes, just like there's a scientific answer to the question "will it rain tomorrow", but we can't know what it is. The fact that we can have a damn good guess is pretty important to most transport networks, fisheries and farming. None of these vital industries seem to be making some pedantic complaint about the fact that we can't know for certain whether it will rain tomorrow and so we might as well ask some bearded mystic to guess for us with his crystals.

When there are huge numbers of variables to calculate, the ability of the model to make accurate predictions decreases. Occasionally all these variables have equal contribution to the outcome and the model will be useless, but more often than not, most variable will have only a minor contribution and can be ignored so long as one is prepared to accept the occasional anomaly.

It's possible that a model might simply be too complex to ever be useful (or even known). It's possible that uncertainty at a quantum level might mean some models contain a genuinely random element (although this is far from certain at a macro level).

In some cases, it might even be possible that our brains might be able to make predictions about things that no scientific model has yet been able to. Our brains might already have the model hard-wired into them, but we have yet to see externally which variables it is calculating and how. I can catch a ball faster than I can do the maths calculating its trajectory, for example. But if this were the case, then science would be able to tell us. Put 100 people in a room and see if they can all catch a ball faster than they can do the maths. any claim to 'intuitive' knowledge is relatively easily tested, those that can't be tested must remain opinions, not knowledge claims.

We've been through this already so I'm at a loss to understand why you keep bringing it up. — Pseudonym


Because of what you keep saying. — Wayfarer

Right, I keep saying it, you keep trotting out the same counter argument, I refute the counter argument, then you go silent until the next time I mention it when the whole thing starts again, it's getting really tiresome. If you have anything to say about the actual counter argument I offered I'd be interested to hear it, if not, then let's just presume you disagree on some fundamental axiom and leave it at that. There's little sense in you chiming in every time I mention positivist arguments, just to remind us all that you disagree with them.

No-one is claiming that science can answer all philosophical questions - absolutely no-one. If you can find me a single quote form anyone accused of Scientism to the effect that science can actually answer all questions, then they deserve the pejorative term — Pseudonym


Well, here, for example:

science does not have any comment on matters of quality, other than to say that no other approach can say anything meaningful on the matter either. — Pseudonym — Wayfarer

This doesn't even make sense. The first claim is that no-one is claiming that science can answer all philosophical questions, the second claim is that science posits that no system can say anything meaningful on matters of quality. They're not even related. Let me see if I can make this clear;

Science can answer questions about objective reality

All questions (and therefore answers) that are not about objective reality are not matters which can form knowledge in the public domain, they are private subjective matters.

a question that cannot be answered by science, such as what is the (morally) right thing to do, consequently isn't meaningful or answerable. — SophistiCat

This is just begging the question. The question "what is the (morally) right thing to do?" is not a question which cannot be answered by science, it's a question which absolutely can be answered by science.

No, that's not the question. See, your tactics when in difficulty is to propose some different question that science can answer. This will not do. — SophistiCat

I've directly answered your question, so you can dispense with the weak defamation. Your question was "Do you disagree with any of this?". My answer was in the very first word "No". So where have I proposed some different question in order to avoid answering the one you asked?

Well, you have certainly convinced me that it is pointless to debate you.

The question "what is the (morally) right thing to do?" is not a question which cannot be answered by science, it's a question which absolutely can be answered by science. — Pseudonym

Well, your one attempt so far in this conversation has been to replace the question with a different one (which, I contend, science cannot answer either):

"should we, as a species, kill our own mothers?" — Pseudonym

What you should have written, to be consistent with what you were saying earlier, is

"Do members of our species tend to kill our mothers?"

Which is even further removed from the original question.

I think we're going round in circles, so I'd like, if it's OK, to return to the claim that I'm making as quite a bit of what you've written is actually arguing against a claim that I've never made (I don't blame you, so many people are putting words in my mouth, it's hard to keep track)

The claim I'm making is not that from first principles, scientific investigation alone can deliver you a world view. I've said countless time that I don't believe it is possible to form any view on the world without some belief statement on which to base everything. To have a scientific view of the world requires a belief in an external mind-independant reality, a belief in the continuity of physical laws into the future (Hume's problem of induction), and a belief in the meaningfulness of logical deduction and inference. Probably others as well.

The point I am making is that this makes 'Scientism' no different from any other philosophical position (which also requires a similar set of fundamental beliefs), and yet it (unlike all other philosophical positions) is treated with derision and hatred.

The other point (unrelated, but we seem to be covering it nonetheless), is that if you are a Physicalist, then it is possible to construct a model of reality by which morality is determinable by science. I've then gone on to explain how that model works if you are a physicalist (and deterministic, although I think the one necessitates the other). If you are a devout believer in Christianity, for example, none of this will be of the slightest interest to you, but then the opinion that we should not have sex before marriage because God said so is not of the slightest interest to me as an atheist either.

Which leads to my third point, that philosophical positions cannot be conclusively argued for or against. If I claim that I have a model which predicts the outcome of some physical event in objective reality (which I simply believe exists) and it does then accurately predict that outcome again and again, you would be crazy to say that my model was useless (you might nonetheless say that). It clearly works.
If, however, you make a metaphysical claim, it cannot be demonstrated to be useful, it cannot be proven to be true and so I could, without any conflict with reason, simply disagree with you. I might have to change the way I disagree with you. I might disagree with you on some grounds which do conflict with logic, but at no point will I be left with no grounds to disagree with you, the field of possible counter-arguments is infinite. This much has been proven by the fact that there has been absolutely no progress on any of the main issues since philosophy began.

This is the point that Chalmers was making (I had listened to the lecture already, but thanks for the reference anyway). That the points themselves are irresolvable, but the arguments for each get better and better, in the opinion of the people making them. I think this is one point where we have definitely got crossed wires, and I'm sure the fault is mine as I didn't see where you were going with your question. I've been arguing that no philosopher is 'better' than any other, that no one of two conflicting world views can be said to be 'better' than another, whereas I think you have been saying that arguments for a particular world view can be 'better' than previous arguments for that same world view, and that they can be made so by having to respond to counter-arguments. This I agree with. Where I disagree (possibly) is the idea that this will ever lead to one of the competing world views having to be abandoned. That hasn't happened in 2000 years of debate, I think it would be irrational to hold the view that it's going to happen in the next 2000 years of debate despite all evidence to the contrary. What will happen is the arguments themselves will get 'better', and this is, I think, What Russell meant by his view that philosophy helps us deal with those areas of life where questions cannot be properly answered (or are meaningless), it helps us give a 'better' account of why we believe a certain fundamental proposition, but it will never demonstrate that proposition to be actual knowledge.

So, to some of the points in your post;

The "something" to a scientific answer is just that the methods of finding the answer have already been agreed on. If everyone agrees on how to go about answering a question and then they go about answering it in that fashion, its completely unsurprising that a lot of agreement is reached. What compels agreement in science is agreement on a broadly characterized method for answering questions and a broad agreement about what sort of thing is allowed to count as an answer. In short, what compels agreement in science is commitment to a paradigm. — PossibleAaran

This just moves the goalposts. Now the question is why do scientists all seem able to broadly agree on a paradigm, but philosophers can't. Are be back to the fact that scientists are just more agreeable than philosophers, or is there something about the scientific paradigm they all agree on which makes it particularly compelling? But that point aside, I still do not agree with your conclusion here.
1. A paradigm does not determine the answers. Deciding that one will determine an hypothesis and test it does not, in of itself, determine what the outcome of those tests will be and yet there is huge agreement that the hypotheses of science have indeed passed the tests. The simple fact that everyone agrees they need to pas those tests does not determine that everyone would agree they have passed those tests. There is still something to be explained in why, when an hypothesis is tested (in a manner all agree it must be), there is broad agreement about whether it has passed that test.
2. I dispute the conclusion that philosophers disagree about the paradigm by which their theories are to be tested. No-one thinks the theory with the most words is best, the nicest handwriting, or the longest conclusion. It's pretty much agreed that the argument which is best is the one with fewest presumptions, fewest logical errors, contradictions etc. There are some marks for succinctness, some for erudition. These are all generally agreed upon principles. If they wern't then it would be impossible to judge philosophy degrees and the whole academic project would be abandoned. Philosophers (as you yourself argue) generally do agree on what constitutes a 'good' theory and what a 'bad' one. They agree almost unanimously on what sort of test a theory must be put to in the same way scientists do (they must do otherwise there would not be a canon of philosophical literature, nor any philosophy degrees, there would just be 'stuff people have said'), and yet they continue to disagree as to which theories have passes that test.

Is any philosophy better than any other? — PossibleAaran

I hope that my opening comments answer this point, I think we've been talking past each other on this to some extent. It is our conclusion on the significance of 'better; or 'worse' arguments that we disagree on, but I won't repeat what I've written above, I think it answers your point here.

Isn't Physical Determinism a Philosophical theory? Doesn't it presuppose another Philosophical Theory - Physicalism about the mind? If so, then the claim you make above presupposes philosophical theories, which by your own admission, are not better or worse than any others. — PossibleAaran

Hopefully, again, my opening comments will address this. I have never claimed that one must never hold a philosophical position. Indeed, I've claimed the exact opposite, that it is impossible to reach any world view without having some fundamental belief statement at its root. My claim is that no amount of argument is ever going to demonstrate that one belief statement is 'better' than another, and yet that is exactly what is being done with 'Scientism'. It is being derided as a belief which is "ridiculous", "naive" "cancerous", and "a pernicious lie", to quote directly from some responses, both here and in academic literature. That is the point I'm making.

I am not trying to prove that Scientism is true, I don't even believe it is possible to prove such a thing, to do so would be to answer a philosophical question about Physicalism and I've just argued that answering such question is (in all likelihood) impossible. All I'm trying to do is demonstrate that it is no less valid a position than any other, that is it not "ridiculous", "naive" "cancerous", and "a pernicious lie".