That's not what I meant. I wasn't talking about the actual string of symbols we use to refer to things. The fact that we have different languages (different symbols) that refer to the same things shows that language is arbitrary. I was talking about you mentioning that since people agree that tithing is moral, that that makes it moral. That is also arbitrary. We didn't agree that animals evolved from others by natural selection. They simply do, and did before we became aware of it and devised an explanation using language to represent it. We agreed that this is the case, not as a result of popularity, but by being made aware of the fact by observations by everyone. So again I ask you, how is tithing a moral issue without appealing to popularity?How so? I'm arguing that science can determine the answer to moral problems, not that science can decide what words we use to describe what type of thing. Science doesn't decide that the tall thing with leaves on is going to be called a 'tree', but neither does philosophy, it's just the evolution of language. The fact is that some decision has to me made about tithing because the issue exists. What we call it is irrelevant, we could call it a 'fligitybit' issue, if you like. — Pseudonym
No, we're not still on language. Again, language itself is arbitrary. What language refers to isn't, or at least shouldn't be when we are talking about objective attributes of reality. You were appealing to popularity. I'm not.Fine, moral issues are those types of decision which might affect another organism's goals. I have no problem with that definition, we're still on language here though, you're still just describing the family resemblance that groups together all the types of decision we call Moral. We could take your word for it, or we could ask everyone in the world what types of decision they would use the word 'moral' to cover and use some sort of standard deviation around the mean for our definition. None of this has the slightest impact on how we actually make such decisions (ethics). — Pseudonym
It is relevant because it shows that what is good for one species isn't good for another, and it is based on the way we're designed by natural selection. There are many features we do share with these animals - like the feeling of pain.Yes, but I'm not one of them (or at least my current theory is that I'm not, and said theory has yet to be falsified), so I don't see how this is relevant. I'm not trying to claim that the answers science would give us to moral dilemmas would also apply to Lions. — Pseudonym
But about the person that dies as a result of you referencing some scientific formula? Do you think that they give a damn about science at that moment? They simply have a goal to survive and their feeling of being neglected at their moment of need would not be anything like your feeling after saving someone else. Are you saying that you wouldn't at least feel bad about the person you couldn't save? I find that hard to believe. So I don't see how science can help you feel better in this situation.There absolutely is, that's the point of ethical naturalism (or at least my specific brand). The way we want to feel after certain decisions is a natural fact determined by evolution, and the means to obtain that feeling is a logical cause/effect system which scientific experiment can determine the probable relations wthin. Therefore science absolutely can tell us which person to save, the one which experiments have shown will provide us with the feeling which experiments have shown we are bound to want. — Pseudonym
That's all well and good, but you seem to be forgetting a major aspect of morality - and that is the consequences of your actions on other's feelings, not just your own. That is my point. Whose feelings matter the most?No, there are not only theories why, there are theories about what the consequences will be and how we will feel about those consequences. There are also theories demonstrating what feelings we wish to obtain and which we wish to avoid, thus we can determine which action's consequences produce the feelings we wish to obtain. — Pseudonym
I was talking about you mentioning that since people agree that tithing is moral, that that makes it moral. — Harry Hindu
It is relevant because it shows that what is good for one species isn't good for another, and it is based on the way we're designed by natural selection. — Harry Hindu
I don't see how science can help you feel better in this situation. — Harry Hindu
you seem to be forgetting a major aspect of morality - and that is the consequences of your actions on other's feelings, not just your own. That is my point. Whose feelings matter the most? — Harry Hindu
Again, if you actually read the whole post rather than just picking a fight, — Pseudonym
You're still appealing to popularity. I'll ask a different question: Why do people say that the decision to tithe or not is a moral one?I haven't said that (at least not deliberately). I said that tithing is a moral issue, the decision about whether to tithe is one of that group of decisions we label 'moral'. I'm not saying that tithing is a moral act because people say it is. I'm saying the decision whether to tithe or not is a moral one because people say it is. None of this has the slightest bearing on whether we should tithe or not.
I'm appealing to popular agreement to define what kinds of decisions are 'moral' ones, only for the sake of discussions about ethics. To me, they're all just decisions and science can answer them, it's an artefact of those who think morality is something else that some types of decision are put in a special group, I'd almost be happy to do away with the word entirely. — Pseudonym
Whose feelings matter the most? — Harry Hindu
Now it's becoming clear that you're just avoiding the questions.No, the consequences on other people's feelings are often what generate our own feelings. We have mirror neurons which mimic the emotions of others, we literally feel their pain, it's an evolved mechanism, probably to aid co-operation but the jury is still out on that. We're already programmed to care about other people's feelings, it's going to happen anyway. Science can tell us how best to bring about the happiness in others we seem to want to generate (when we're not already sure how to do it). — Pseudonym
Why do people say that the decision to tithe or not is a moral one? — Harry Hindu
The fact that you haven't seems to indicate that you don't intend to be intellectually honest. — Harry Hindu
Now it's becoming clear that you're just avoiding the questions.
I asked you whose feelings matter the most? — Harry Hindu
We are not already programmed to care about other people's feelings. — Harry Hindu
If we were then there would never be any moral dilemmas. — Harry Hindu
My hypothesis is that all philosophical questions end up requiring a fundamental statement of belief, my test is to look through all the philosophical questions that have ever been asked, my hypothesis has yet to be falsified because I have yet to find a philosophical question which has an unequivocal answer not requiring some belief statement. It's not the best theory in the world, and it needs a lot more testing, but it is definitely scientific, by the definition I'm using. — Pseudonym
This is the really interesting bit, completely off topic, but I'd love to hear how you think this would happen, are you just hopeful, or do you have a theory as to how? Don't worry about the off-topicness, I don't think anyone's reading this any more. — Pseudonym
Absolutely, you're getting the idea, although I sense you're just being charitable and don't actually agree with it. The sort of thing you're suggesting is exactly the way naturalists think that science can answer these questions. The only refinement I would make is that we all know people lie through their teeth when asked about personal matters like morality. I would design the experiment to see how people behave in controlled situations designed such as to best elucidate what they really believe, not just what they say they do. — Pseudonym
Science knows when it has an answer. All the while the theory is being tested and cannot be dis-proven, it is the answer — Pseudonym
The moment a test comes along to disprove it, it's no longer the answer. The clever thing about science is it's only ever temporary, it only ever has the answer for the time being. — Pseudonym
Kant is not a 'better' philosopher than Hume, they're all just offering something, you either like it or you don't, there's no argument to be had as to why one it more 'right' than the other. — Pseudonym
This is why I became convinced by ethical naturalism (although I've always been a moral realist) every ethics paper I've read seems to be working backwards, it seems to be 'trying' to find the answer the author knows already is right in whatever ethical system they're applying. — Pseudonym
Science can't tell us what we 'ought' to be looking for, but that doesn't seem to matter. In my experience we're all looking for roughly the same thing anyway. — Pseudonym
You then hold that philosophy can only give an answer to the questions I'm interested in, whereas science gives the answers to other questions. — PossibleAaran
I agree with you, but this isn't Scientism is it? This isn't a controversial doctrine that forum members detest is it? — PossibleAaran
Its just the plain empirical fact that philosophers disagree a lot and scientists don't. What puzzles me is that you seem to think that it follows from this that there is no better or worse in philosophy. Everything is equal: — PossibleAaran
Some examples. — PossibleAaran
Of course, philosophers will debate with each other whether any of these mistakes has really been made, but that doesn't mean no philosophy is better than any other — PossibleAaran
The Ethical Naturalism which you are talking about in this post is different to the kind which we spoke about previously. I thought you were advocating a doctrine about the meaning of "moral goodness", since that is the view I know of which goes by that label. — PossibleAaran
The question it was supposed to answer was "how should we live?". But it doesn't answer that question. Sticking only with what can be scientifically established, all that can be said is "these are our wants and desires. These are the most efficient ways of achieving them". That doesn't answer the philosophical question at all. — PossibleAaran
Your view isn't that science can answer the philosophical question. Its that the philosophical question doesn't matter. Whether or not the question matters, the fact is that science doesn't answer it, and so we do not here have an instance of science answering a philosophical question. — PossibleAaran
Neither of these things will help a person who has risen to the level of reflection in which they wonder whether the way they are currently living is the right way to live, or whether there even is such a thing as the right way to live. — PossibleAaran
So to say science answers all questions, science answers all questions that are answerable, and science answers all questions with the answer as opposed to an answer are all making exactly the same metaphysical claim — Pseudonym
The second point is that, scientism is inherently anti-philosophical in nature. It poses as philosophy, and adopts philosophical rhetorics, but ultimately it seeks to undermine philosophy by only admitting what can be definitely known, measured and assessed. The point about the Western philosophical tradition is that there has always been a place for the unknowable, for aporia, questions which really can’t be neatly resolved but need to be asked nonetheless. Whereas scientistic positivism declares all such questions out of bounds. — Wayfarer
You, for instance, regularly cite oceanic experiences as proof of transcendent being — apokrisis
Another issue. — apokrisis
Do you think there is a scientific reason why some people choose scientific careers, rather than careers in diplomacy or the arts? — Wayfarer
Everything you’re saying is directly out of A J Ayer, Language Truth and Logic, which insisted that the only meaningful statements were those that can be verified empirically. But when the smoke cleared, it suddenly became obvious that this too is a statement that cannot be empirically verified. It was hoist by its own petard. — Wayfarer
The second point is that, scientism is inherently anti-philosophical in nature. It poses as philosophy, and adopts philosophical rhetorics, but ultimately it seeks to undermine philosophy by only admitting what can be definitely known, measured and assessed. The point about the Western philosophical tradition is that there has always been a place for the unknowable, for aporia, questions which really can’t be neatly resolved but need to be asked nonetheless. Whereas scientistic positivism declares all such questions out of bounds. — Wayfarer
Neither of these things will help a person who has risen to the level of reflection in which they wonder whether the way they are currently living is the right way to live, or whether there even is such a thing as the right way to live. — PossibleAaran
Exactly. If a rational person is asking both of those two questions, then a rational person can see that the fact that there is sufficient doubt in the latter means that they cannot, with any certainty, answer the former. — Pseudonym
hus we end up with a model which has a reasonably high predictive power but is not 100% accurate because of the minor elements we've ignored for simplicity. It's no different to the way we predict the weather, and that has proven incredibly useful despite its fuzziness. — Pseudonym
We've been through this already so I'm at a loss to understand why you keep bringing it up. — Pseudonym
No-one is claiming that science can answer all philosophical questions - absolutely no-one. If you can find me a single quote form anyone accused of Scientism to the effect that science can actually answer all questions, then they deserve the pejorative term — Pseudonym
science does not have any comment on matters of quality, other than to say that no other approach can say anything meaningful on the matter either. — Pseudonym
Why do questions which cannot be resolved whose answers are unknowable need to be asked? — Pseudonym
Scientists don't just agree a lot because they are an amenable bunch, and philosophers don't just disagree a lot because they are particularly cantankerous, so why do scientists agree so manifestly more than philosophers do? Unless you are wanting to claim that it is just coincidence, it must be that there is at least something to a scientific answer which compels agreement, and that something is lacking (or at least in very short supply) in philosophical arguments. — Pseudonym
Now, what do we mean by 'better or worse' in that context if not some form of widespread agreement among (to borrow Van Inwagen's term "epistemic peers"? A property we have just concluded philosophy lacks remarkably compared to science? — Pseudonym
On at least one interpretation of Kant's views, many of his theses contradict orthodox views in physics (about space-time) and psychology (about conceptual diversity). - That is philosophy being replaced by science, there is no 'better' philosophy of space-time, there is just the science of space-time. — Pseudonym
Russell held (although it isn't clear whether he was right) that direct realism about perception was in contradiction with the science of perception - As above, it is the science of perception that has replaced direct realism, not another philosophy, and if Russell was wrong, it will be that same science that show him to be, not a new philosophy. — Pseudonym
Anselm's original Ontological Argument treats existence as a predicate - a logical mistake. But if you take existence to be a predicate As it is possible to do (https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/philosophy/article/is-existence-a-predicate/5E5525776149C95CB218AA50463530C7) then his argument can be believed. No-one has been proven 'better or worse' yet. — Pseudonym
Descartes most famously failed to refute his own evil demon hypothesis, because he resorted (accidentally) to helping himself to premises which he himself earlier banned himself from using (there are several interpretations of Descartes and all are fascinating, but he always slips up somewhere). - Absolutely, but not 'better' philosophy has filled in the blanks he was unable to fill. — Pseudonym
I really don't see how it can mean anything other. If rational, intelligent people, in possession of exactly the same arguments nonetheless cannot agree, even close to unanimously, that any of those arguments are 'better' or 'worse', then that's about as close as you're ever going to a fact that none of these arguments are 'better' or 'worse'. It is at least close enough to a fact that an unbiased analysis would hold it to be the case for the time being. — Pseudonym
Since we are determined beings without free-will sensu stricto, then the question what 'should' we do is the question of how can we most efficiently achieve our desires. — Pseudonym
I can answer whether it is right for me to kill my mother; I consider both the question and the answer to be meaningful; and science has nothing to do with how I come up with the answer. Do you disagree with any of this? — SophistiCat
If the question is "should we, as a species, kill our own mothers?" — Pseudonym
So, there's a scientific reason why I might decide to be a scientist - but we can't know what it is. — Wayfarer
We've been through this already so I'm at a loss to understand why you keep bringing it up. — Pseudonym
Because of what you keep saying. — Wayfarer
No-one is claiming that science can answer all philosophical questions - absolutely no-one. If you can find me a single quote form anyone accused of Scientism to the effect that science can actually answer all questions, then they deserve the pejorative term — Pseudonym
Well, here, for example:
science does not have any comment on matters of quality, other than to say that no other approach can say anything meaningful on the matter either. — Pseudonym — Wayfarer
a question that cannot be answered by science, such as what is the (morally) right thing to do, consequently isn't meaningful or answerable. — SophistiCat
No, that's not the question. See, your tactics when in difficulty is to propose some different question that science can answer. This will not do. — SophistiCat
The question "what is the (morally) right thing to do?" is not a question which cannot be answered by science, it's a question which absolutely can be answered by science. — Pseudonym
"should we, as a species, kill our own mothers?" — Pseudonym
The "something" to a scientific answer is just that the methods of finding the answer have already been agreed on. If everyone agrees on how to go about answering a question and then they go about answering it in that fashion, its completely unsurprising that a lot of agreement is reached. What compels agreement in science is agreement on a broadly characterized method for answering questions and a broad agreement about what sort of thing is allowed to count as an answer. In short, what compels agreement in science is commitment to a paradigm. — PossibleAaran
Is any philosophy better than any other? — PossibleAaran
Isn't Physical Determinism a Philosophical theory? Doesn't it presuppose another Philosophical Theory - Physicalism about the mind? If so, then the claim you make above presupposes philosophical theories, which by your own admission, are not better or worse than any others. — PossibleAaran
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.