Naturalism states that everything that concretely exists is entirely natural; nothing supernatural or otherwise non-natural exists. Given that we know that conscious experience exists, we must as naturalists suppose that it’s wholly natural. And given that we’re specifically materialist or physicalist naturalists (as almost all naturalists are), we must take it that conscious experience is wholly material or physical.
I would find a couple of things to quibble with here. First, if "concrete" (as opposed to "abstract") is here taken to mean something like "causally efficacious," then it doesn't necessarily follow from the premise that consciousness exists that consciousness is therefore concrete. An epiphenomenalist, for instance, would probably deny that consciousness is causally efficacious, and claim that only its attendant physical states possess such efficacy (whether, and to what degree, epiphenomenalism, can be reconciled with physicalism or naturalism is another deep question, but I at least prima facie see no contradiction between those positions).He says:
Naturalism states that everything that concretely exists is entirely natural; nothing supernatural or otherwise non-natural exists. Given that we know that conscious experience exists, we must as naturalists suppose that it’s wholly natural. And given that we’re specifically materialist or physicalist naturalists (as almost all naturalists are), we must take it that conscious experience is wholly material or physical. — Wayfarer
then an immaterial consciousness poses no problem for physicalism/naturalism (provided that said consciousness is not of a distinct "substance," or anything of the sort). — Arkady
Strawson is, of course, correct in saying that Dennett spouts learned nonsense, but he presents no alternative. — Wayfarer
I agree with much of what you're saying Wayfarer, especially the part that says that Dennett spouts a bunch of learned nonsense. However, it's not unusual, I think many of us do the same thing. — Sam26
Also what's weird about our discussion of what's material or natural, when looking at some of this stuff on the quantum level it seems to morph into the metaphysical. So there is no clear cut boundary when talking about what's metaphysical or not at a certain level of discussion. — Sam26
if physicalism is taken to be the thesis that "everything which exists is either physical or supervenes on the physical," then an immaterial consciousness poses no problem for physicalism/naturalism (provided that said consciousness is not of a distinct "substance," or anything of the sort). — Arkady
sn't Strawson advocating neutral monism with this 'review'. I place that within scare quotes because I'm not sure which books he is reviewing. — JupiterJess
What kind of alternative would you expect, or can you imagine, given that we cannot say what it means, in any exhaustive or definitive sense, to be physical, or to be real, or to exist and so on? I — Janus
Are you saying that we do have an exhaustive understanding of what it means to be physical?
Regarding the "naturalistic teleology" suggestion; do you think empirical evidence could be found to support it? In other words, can you imagine a way in which it could be rigorously tested? — Janus
It was instructive but almost painful to read. — Pierre-Normand
The idea that whoever denies the claim that being in pain must amounts to nothing else but being 'directly' acquainted with an essentially private 'pain qualia' thereby also is denying that anyone ever is in pain, of feels pain, is ridiculous. — Pierre-Normand
Anyone who has ever seen or heard or smelled anything knows what it is; anyone who has ever been in pain, or felt hungry or hot or cold or remorseful, dismayed, uncertain, or sleepy, or has suddenly remembered a missed appointment. All these things involve what are sometimes called “qualia”—that is to say, different types or qualities of conscious experience. What I am calling the Denial is the denial that anyone has ever really had any of these experiences. — Galen Strawson
The trouble is that Dennett concludes not only that there is much more behind our behavioral competencies than is revealed to the first-person point of view—which is certainly true—but that nothing whatever is revealed to the first-person point of view but a “version” of the neural machinery. In other words, when I look at the American flag, it may seem to me that there are red stripes in my subjective visual field, but that is an illusion: the only reality, of which this is “an interpreted, digested version,” is that a physical process I can’t describe is going on in my visual cortex.
I am reminded of the Marx Brothers line: “Who are you going to believe, me or your own eyes?” Dennett asks us to turn our backs on what is glaringly obvious—that in consciousness we are immediately aware of real subjective experiences of color, flavor, sound, touch, etc. that cannot be fully described in neural terms even though they have a neural cause (or perhaps have neural as well as experiential aspects). And he asks us to do this because the reality of such phenomena is incompatible with the scientific materialism that, in his view, sets the outer bounds of reality.
Very roughly speaking, supervenience is a type of relation between states or properties such that A supervenes on B just in case A states are an emergent property of B states, and a change or difference in A necessitates a change or difference in B, but not vice-versa.A lot rides on the meaning of 'supervenes' here. — Wayfarer
and a change or difference in A necessitates a change or difference in B, but not vice-versa. — Arkady
I myself am mostly on Hacker's side, of course, even though I believe his criticism of Dennett isn't always entirely fair. — Pierre-Normand
It’s too sweeping to say that ‘we cannot say what it means to be real or to exist’. What I am saying is that it seems assumed by physicalists that the nature of the physical is itself understood or defined when (as Sam26 pointed out) the very nature of matter itself is still a metaphysical puzzle. That is why ‘materialism’ tends to end up as ‘scientism’ - it amounts to little more than an allegiance to science in the place of philosophy. — Wayfarer
In respect of teleology - the question revolves around the notion of purpose or intention in the broadest sense. But a consequence of ‘eliminativism’ is that it says even our intentions are in some fundamental sense illusory - let alone whether intention is real in any cosmic sense. And I think it’s highly significant that the eliminativist attitude must insist that even our indubitable sense of first-person intentionality is an illusion. — Wayfarer
In the context of the Western philosophical tradition, I tend to favour theistic evolution - but I don’t think that ever ought to be considered an ‘empirical theory’. So the fact that it’s not an empirical theory is not an argument against it. Rather it’s a misunderstanding. — Wayfarer
What is ‘empiricism’ anyway? It comes down to acceptance of evidence that can be seen, touched, and experienced by the sense organs (augmented by instruments). So it often (and often unconsciously) excludes intuition and the ‘felt sense’ of being that is fundamental to what it means to be human. — Wayfarer
We can certainly say what it is to exist in the phenomenal sense. — Janus
Also, you don't seem to be clearly committed to theistic evolution at all; on account of your caveat "in the context of the Western philosophical tradition". — Janus
That spiritual "knowledge" is a matter of intuition and feeling; and that it is not capable of corroboration in the way that empirical observations are. I have also many times made the point that this does not mean it is "merely subjective" (although of course it is possible to, just as many do, argue that it is). — Janus
Philosophy is in a kind of middle position between religion and science. Empirical evidence cannot be used to demonstrate the truth of philosophical assertions, because where philosophical standpoints deal with empirical facts, they constitute interpretations of those facts, interpretations which those facts cannot themselves unequivocally confirm or dis-confirm. Empirical facts may be used in arguments, and appeals to plausibility may be made; but there is no definite way to establish plausibility. What each person finds convincing will depend upon their own experience and set of presuppositions. — Janus
Ah - but can we? — Wayfarer
Now I know you and others often will suggest that, whatever this principle is, it is 'immanent' within nature - but I think of 'immanent' as being one pole of a duality, namely, 'immanent and transcendent'. And in theistic philosophy, it makes no more sense to speak of something that is only or purely immanent, than to speak of a mountain range where there are no valleys. — Wayfarer
It can be corroborated within the appropriate domain of discourse. That is the meaning of a now-archaic term, the 'scientia sacra', the sacred science. — Wayfarer
What about the placebo effect, then? Those are examples of 'top-down causation' which would mitigate against a physicalist explanation, would they not? — Wayfarer
If we acknowledge the idea that what makes something what it is isn't exhausted by that it is that this thing is materially constituted of but also is defined by its functional relations to other things, and also by the pragmatic context relative to which this thing is being single out as being representative of a definite category, of instantiating some definite property, then the distinction between the low-level basis of supervenience and the higher-level supervenient domain is abolished. Complete knowledge of the intrinsic properties of the material constituents, and of they elementary mutual interactions, would still constitute an incomplete knowledge of the world since it is fully abstracting away from what it is that those material constituents are constituents of. — Pierre-Normand
A bare neutron has a half-life of about eleven and a half minutes. Over time it decays into a proton, an electron and a neutrino. However, once inside the nucleus of an atom, this basic property of the neutron ceases to function. Its integration into the higher order intelligibility of the atomic nucleus changes its properties. The higher order reality has modified the lower order constituent. Indeed if this did not happen there would be no stable atomic nuclei, no stable chemical substances, and we would not exist 1.
Hence, for instance, the low-level explanation for the putative 'event' that was the occurrence of an upward movement of a hand doesn't constitute any kind of a rival causal explanation of the intentionally described event of someone's raising her hand. — Pierre-Normand
I don't see how. Per physicalism, believing that a particular treatment is causally efficacious (which is all that the placebo effect is) has a corresponding physical state of the brain, which itself can have "downstream" causal effects, including remission of some disease or condition.What about the placebo effect, then? Those are examples of 'top-down causation' which would mitigate against a physicalist explanation, would they not? — Wayfarer
believing that a particular treatment is causally efficacious (which is all that the placebo effect is) has a corresponding physical state of the brain, — Arkady
The portion of your post which I underlined is incorrect: if mental states supervene on physical states, then the physical state which corresponds to believing that the placebo will work is different from the one which corresponds to believing that the placebo won't work; so something physical has changed.But in saying that, you’re saying a belief is physical. One minute you believe that the placebo will work - and it will, because you believe it. Then I manage to disillusion you - ‘look, it’s made of sugar’. So it won’t work. Nothing physical has changed - only your belief. Your perception has changed, your understanding of what it is, and that has consequences. — Wayfarer
Uh, I said that the neutron is not a fundamental particle because it's composed of other particles. Ergo, science does not claim it's indivisible (none of this supports theism, of course, contrary to whatever mileage your linked-to article might strive to get out of it).And, there are no ‘point-particles’ which are indivisible - atoms in the original sense, whether they’re conceived as quarks or some other entity. Physics has demonstrated the ambiguity of so-called ‘fundamental particles’ - they’re now understood as excitation in a field, not as an indivisible material unit. — Wayfarer
if mental states supervene on physical states, then the physical state which corresponds to believing that the placebo will work is different from the one which corresponds to believing that the placebo won't work; so something physical has changed. — Arkady
I said that the neutron is not a fundamental particle because it's composed of other particles. — Arkady
Yes, but what changed the physical state? What was the causal factor? It was a change in the understanding, in the perception. That is why it can be described as a 'top-down' causal sequence. Whereas if the mental was indeed supervenient on the physical, then this ought not to happen. You might expect that a pill would change perception - that is 'bottom-up' - but you wouldn't expect that a change in perception would have physiological consequences. — Wayfarer
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