I agree with much of what you're saying Wayfarer, especially the part that says that Dennett spouts a bunch of learned nonsense. However, it's not unusual, I think many of us do the same thing.

I find that much of the discussion of consciousness is just confusion, and I say this from a Wittgensteinian point of view, i.e., that much of the confusion lies in the way we discuss the issue, and the way we use many of the words/concepts involved. So we create a world view with seemingly clearly defined words, this then shuts out others who have a more expansive use of the word/concept. Now it's not always as simple as this, but this is part of the problem.

Also what's weird about our discussion of what's material or natural, when looking at some of this stuff on the quantum level it seems to morph into the metaphysical. So there is no clear cut boundary when talking about what's metaphysical or not at a certain level of discussion. So the use of words I think on some level confounds us, and this is why I think we need to be careful about being too dogmatic about some of these ideas.

He says:

Naturalism states that everything that concretely exists is entirely natural; nothing supernatural or otherwise non-natural exists. Given that we know that conscious experience exists, we must as naturalists suppose that it’s wholly natural. And given that we’re specifically materialist or physicalist naturalists (as almost all naturalists are), we must take it that conscious experience is wholly material or physical. — Wayfarer

I would find a couple of things to quibble with here. First, if "concrete" (as opposed to "abstract") is here taken to mean something like "causally efficacious," then it doesn't necessarily follow from the premise that consciousness exists that consciousness is therefore concrete. An epiphenomenalist, for instance, would probably deny that consciousness is causally efficacious, and claim that only its attendant physical states possess such efficacy (whether, and to what degree, epiphenomenalism, can be reconciled with physicalism or naturalism is another deep question, but I at least prima facie see no contradiction between those positions).

Second, if physicalism is taken to be the thesis that "everything which exists is physical," then they would indeed be committed to either denying that consciousness exists (hardly a tenable position) or claiming that consciousness is a physical phenomenon. However, if physicalism is taken to be the thesis that "everything which exists is either physical or supervenes on the physical," then an immaterial consciousness poses no problem for physicalism/naturalism (provided that said consciousness is not of a distinct "substance," or anything of the sort).

then an immaterial consciousness poses no problem for physicalism/naturalism (provided that said consciousness is not of a distinct "substance," or anything of the sort). — Arkady

I'd be interested in understanding what you mean by "...provided that said consciousness is not a distinct "substance," or anything of the sort." Do you mean by this that consciousness is not something we can point to and say, "This is consciousness," i.e., it's not like pointing to a tree and saying, "That is a tree."

It was actually in reference to substance dualism, and pretty much anything that that thesis might entail about consciousness. It might also rule out certain other positions such as Leibnizian "pre-established harmony" between the mental and the physical.

I haven't read any of that since my college days, which was quite a while ago. Wittgenstein gives me enough of a headache. Leibniz would drive me insane. :gasp:

Firstly, let me say that I accidentally "flagged" (and then quickly unflagged) your post in trying to respond, so if armed men kick down the door to your house, mea culpa (I'm actually not totally sure what flagging does...).

Yea, I know little of Wittgenstein, and I understand that he's one of the more difficult philosophers (which itself is saying something, given that I'd characterize very little of philosophy as easy reading). I read On Certainty years ago, but not the Tractatus or anything else.

Hi Wayfarer thanks for making this thread.
Isn't Strawson advocating neutral monism with this 'review'. I place that within scare quotes because I'm not sure which books he is reviewing.
I'm a little suspect on what denialism entails since it changes from philosopher to philosopher. If we are talking about qualia as atomized sense experience existing separtely from their neurological substratum then I can see why someone might deny that.
If we mean how the senses are grouped as a single first person unity then it would be difficult to argue against that. I've read quite a bit of Dennett and he doesn't appear to argue against that. Being physical should mean having physical effects on the world so consciousness should be physical in that sense because of the thousands of books about it.
I take issue to this statement in the 'review' btw : "When you reduce chemical processes to physical processes, you don’t deny that chemical processes exist."

This sounds fairly presumptuous. Because I believe many reductionists may deny that... [EDIT] well that they do not exist ontologically (everyone agrees they exist in epistemic terms).

Maybe I'll be arrested. :wink:

From the review, speaking about the "consciousness" deniers: The problem is not that they take naturalism to entail materialism—they’re right to do so. The problem is that they endorse the claim that conscious experience can’t possibly be wholly physical. They think they know this, although genuine naturalism doesn’t warrant it in any way.

I think this is the nub of the whole issue. There are different possible interpretations of the naturalist claim that consciousness is a wholly physical phenomenon; a kataphatic and an apophatic reading. The positive interpretation is that consciousness is physical, with the implication being that we know what it is to be physical. The negative interpretation is that consciousness is physical in the sense that it is not anything inherently or substantially different than everything else we understand to be physical, with the implication that we do not know (and perhaps cannot know) precisely and exhaustively what it means to be physical or material.

Also from the review:
They duly conclude that consciousness doesn’t exist. They reach this conclusion in spite of the fact that conscious experience is a wholly natural phenomenon, whose existence is more certain than any other natural phenomenon, and with which we’re directly acquainted, at least in certain fundamental respects.

Why do the Deniers ignore a long line of distinguished materialist predecessors and ally themselves with Descartes, their sworn enemy, in holding that experience can’t possibly be physical—thereby obliging themselves to endorse the Denial? The answer appears to be that they share with Descartes one very large assumption: that we know enough about the physical to be certain that experience can’t be physical.

Of course it is absurd to deny that consciousness exists. It also seems absurd to claim that it is a separate substance from physical or material reality. So, where does this leave us?

Strawson is, of course, correct in saying that Dennett spouts learned nonsense, but he presents no alternative. — Wayfarer

What kind of alternative would you expect, or can you imagine, given that we cannot say what it means, in any exhaustive or definitive sense, to be physical, or to be real, or to exist and so on? If we do not comprehensively know what it means to be physical, then how much less could we know what it means to be, and yet not to be physical?

It is on account of our general ignorance, and our propensity to rely on intuitive notions derived from linguistic reifications to inform us about what is possible or impossible, that I think such "problems", including the so-called "hard problem", are really faux-problems.

Perhaps you see an ethical dimension to physicalist and non-physicalist standpoints? I see no inherent implications, one way or the other, for religion or spirituality. To say there is a transcendent God, for example, is, for me, just to say that there is a being or spirit which transcends our understanding and experience, and is not to imply any form of metaphysical dualism.

I agree with much of what you're saying Wayfarer, especially the part that says that Dennett spouts a bunch of learned nonsense. However, it's not unusual, I think many of us do the same thing. — Sam26

Yeah but we're not tenured as 'professors of philosophy'.

Also what's weird about our discussion of what's material or natural, when looking at some of this stuff on the quantum level it seems to morph into the metaphysical. So there is no clear cut boundary when talking about what's metaphysical or not at a certain level of discussion. — Sam26

Hence the never-ending discussion of philosophy of physics on these forums. The irony is that the kind of materialism that the 'denialists' generally argue for, has actually been demolished by the hardest of the hard sciences!

Agree with your remarks on the confusion surrounding the discussion of consciousness. It's the symptom of a conflict between different, and incommensurable, domains of discourse.

if physicalism is taken to be the thesis that "everything which exists is either physical or supervenes on the physical," then an immaterial consciousness poses no problem for physicalism/naturalism (provided that said consciousness is not of a distinct "substance," or anything of the sort). — Arkady

A lot rides on the meaning of 'supervenes' here.

My analysis of 'substance' is that the meaning of the word has a completely different meaning in normal discourse than in classical philosophy. In normal discourse, 'substance' is something, conceived of, in the case of the mind, as 'an ethereal substance'. But the original meaning of substance is 'that in which attributes inhere'. In fact the Greek word translated as substance was 'ousia', which is nearer in meaning to 'being'. That does help show that the reading of 'substance' as the 'ghost in the machine' is misconceived.

Then again, Husserl criticizes Descartes precisely because Descartes tended to depict res cogitans as a kind of objective substance which could be understood naturalistically (see here).

sn't Strawson advocating neutral monism with this 'review'. I place that within scare quotes because I'm not sure which books he is reviewing. — JupiterJess

He's basically talking about Dennett, whose latest epic fantasy was published late last year. As for Strawson, he has become known as an advocate for pan-psychism, which is the subject of this thread.

What kind of alternative would you expect, or can you imagine, given that we cannot say what it means, in any exhaustive or definitive sense, to be physical, or to be real, or to exist and so on? I — Janus

I don't necessarily believe that at all. What I do say, is that the widespread acceptance of physicalism is a kind of myth - that science basically understands the nature of things, which is physical, and now what has to be done is to fill in the remaining gaps in our knowledge of the physical domain. That was the subject of Nagel's criticism in his book, Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost Certainly False. Nagel tentatively suggests a kind of 'naturalistic teleology' as an alternative.

It's not clear what you "don't necessarily believe". Are you saying that we do have an exhaustive understanding of what it means to be physical?

Regarding the "naturalistic teleology" suggestion; do you think empirical evidence could be found to support it? In other words, can you imagine a way in which it could be rigorously tested?

@Wayfarer

Thanks for linking to this. It was instructive but almost painful to read (as is, elsewhere, Strawson's uninspired defense of hard-determinism in the philosophy of free will and determinism, and his related 'debunking' of the very idea of moral responsibility). While I've come to believe Dennett to be subtly misguided in about half of the things that he says, and insightful about the other half, Strawson seems to be enmired through and though in a bottomless pit of philosophical confusion. (This is all the more regrettable since his father, Sir Peter Strawson, was one of the most profound and influential thinker in the whole history of analytic philosophy).

While I don't agree with some of the allegedly "denialist" stances on consciousness that Strawson deplores, his own characterization of the broadly Wittgensteinian strand of though that he is opposes (i.e. the so called 'philosophical behaviorism', also propounded by Gilbert Ryle, and to some degree by Dennett who was Ryle's student) boils down to an almost farcical misrepresentation of it. The idea that whoever denies the claim that being in pain must amounts to nothing else but being 'directly' acquainted with an essentially private 'pain qualia' thereby also is denying that anyone ever is in pain, of feels pain, is ridiculous.

Strawson's broad brush narration of the history of the evolution of conceptions of subjective experience in the history of psychology also is deeply flawed. As a corrective to it, I would recommend Alan Costall's From Darwin to Watson (and Cognitivism) and Back Again: The Principle of Animal-Environment Mutuality (2004), which is one of the most enlightening pieces that I have read over the last year on any topic.

Costall, just like Dennett and Strawson attempt to do, in their different ways, aims at disclosing the crypto-Cartesian assumptions that underpin much of contemporary cognitive science and philosophy of mind. Dennett and Strawson both fail, in my view, with Strawson's attempt being the most unsuccessful. Costall himself goes much further in targeting the unwarranted Cartesian assumptions that condition the thinking of philosophers and psychologists who fancy themselves to be materialist anti-Cartesians but who just repeat the same (or worse) fundamental mistakes in fancier 'materialist' ways. (One of those mistakes is the uncritical reliance on representationalism in the philosophy of perception and of thought content. This is a mistake that Dennett partially overcomes.)

(I wanted to make another specific point but it currently escapes my mind, so I'll edit this space later on)

Yeah but we're not tenured as 'professors of philosophy'. — Wayfarer

Very true.

Are you saying that we do have an exhaustive understanding of what it means to be physical?

Regarding the "naturalistic teleology" suggestion; do you think empirical evidence could be found to support it? In other words, can you imagine a way in which it could be rigorously tested? — Janus

It’s too sweeping to say that ‘we cannot say what it means to be real or to exist’. What I am saying is that it seems assumed by physicalists that the nature of the physical is itself understood or defined when (as Sam26 pointed out) the very nature of matter itself is still a metaphysical puzzle. That is why ‘materialism’ tends to end up as ‘scientism’ - it amounts to little more than an allegiance to science in the place of philosophy.

In respect of teleology - the question revolves around the notion of purpose or intention in the broadest sense. But a consequence of ‘eliminativism’ is that it says even our intentions are in some fundamental sense illusory - let alone whether intention is real in any cosmic sense. And I think it’s highly significant that the eliminativist attitude must insist that even our indubitable sense of first-person intentionality is an illusion. (Especially because an illusion is an erroneous or false interpretation of sense data, so even illusion implies an interpreting agent. A stone can’t suffer illusions.) So a natural theologian could easily argue, look, it’s an inevitable consequence that when you deny the intentional nature of creation, then you will end up undermining even the reality of the individual subject. Dennett, wittingly or not, has spent his career affirming such an argument!

In the context of the Western philosophical tradition, I tend to favour theistic evolution - but I don’t think that ever ought to be considered an ‘empirical theory’. So the fact that it’s not an empirical theory is not an argument against it. Rather it’s a misunderstanding.

What is ‘empiricism’ anyway? It comes down to acceptance of evidence that can be seen, touched, and experienced by the sense organs (augmented by instruments). So it often (and often unconsciously) excludes intuition and the ‘felt sense’ of being that is fundamental to what it means to be human. (We are after all beings.) This shows up in the many threads on this forum about whether or if existence has any purpose; it comes from the sense of life being a cosmic lottery or game of chance. And it’s endemic.

What is the point of an existential philosophy? It’s not to gain greater instrumental power, useful though it might be. It’s a ‘first person discipline’, not an objective science. That’s true even of existential atheism. But the fact that it’s not objective doesn’t mean it’s ‘merely subjective’, either. What modern culture has forgotten is the understanding of self-transcendence or self-abnegation which is fundamental to traditional philosophy and religious disciplines. This opens up a perspective which can’t be obtained through a purely objecitivist stance but which is also not simply a matter of subjective emotion. It is nearer the virtue of sagacity or philosophical detachment.

It was instructive but almost painful to read. — Pierre-Normand

Agree. I felt the same way about his essay on panpsychism. I would like to agree with him but am puzzled by the way he clings to materialism. I suppose in the modern academy, to defend anything else just carries too much baggage. (It’s the main reason I departed philosophy as an undergrad.)

The idea that whoever denies the claim that being in pain must amounts to nothing else but being 'directly' acquainted with an essentially private 'pain qualia' thereby also is denying that anyone ever is in pain, of feels pain, is ridiculous. — Pierre-Normand

Do you mean this passage?

Anyone who has ever seen or heard or smelled anything knows what it is; anyone who has ever been in pain, or felt hungry or hot or cold or remorseful, dismayed, uncertain, or sleepy, or has suddenly remembered a missed appointment. All these things involve what are sometimes called “qualia”—that is to say, different types or qualities of conscious experience. What I am calling the Denial is the denial that anyone has ever really had any of these experiences. — Galen Strawson

Because I think that *is* true of what the eliminativists (what he calls ‘denialists’) are saying.

Nagel’s review of Dennett’s latest:

The trouble is that Dennett concludes not only that there is much more behind our behavioral competencies than is revealed to the first-person point of view—which is certainly true—but that nothing whatever is revealed to the first-person point of view but a “version” of the neural machinery. In other words, when I look at the American flag, it may seem to me that there are red stripes in my subjective visual field, but that is an illusion: the only reality, of which this is “an interpreted, digested version,” is that a physical process I can’t describe is going on in my visual cortex.

I am reminded of the Marx Brothers line: “Who are you going to believe, me or your own eyes?” Dennett asks us to turn our backs on what is glaringly obvious—that in consciousness we are immediately aware of real subjective experiences of color, flavor, sound, touch, etc. that cannot be fully described in neural terms even though they have a neural cause (or perhaps have neural as well as experiential aspects). And he asks us to do this because the reality of such phenomena is incompatible with the scientific materialism that, in his view, sets the outer bounds of reality.

I think Dennett’s books turn out to be an extremely eloquent argument against the very thing that he constantly urges on us; they illustrate the persuasive power of materialism by demonstrating that even very intelligent authors will commit to frankly self-contradictory arguments to defend it. As they must, because according to Dennett, we’re no more than ‘moist robots’ (a term he has used previously only in partial jest).

@Wayfarer

Yes, we might say that eliminativists (and reductionists) about the mental, about consciousness, or about subjective experience, are "deniers" somewhat in the sense Strawson intends. But he clearly lumps them up with Wittgensteinian 'philosophical behaviorists', whose position he contrasts with his own idea that subjective experiences (and what those experiences are 'directly' experiences of) are material processes going on literally in the brain. 'Philosophical behaviorists' such as Wittgenstein, Ryle and (in certain respects) Dennett, criticize the crypto-Cartesian conception of 'qualia' conceived as substance-like objects of direct acquaintance that stand in between a cognitive subject and the world that she perceives or thinks about. It doesn't make much difference to this view whether the 'sense data' are conceived to be realized in material stuff (res extensa) or mental stuff (res cogitans). According to Wittgensteinians, as well as other 'relationalists' such as J.J. Gibson, Alan Costall, Patrick Heelan and Michel Bitbol (to name a few) consciousness is ineliminably relational and can't intelligibly be explained by reference to instrinsic properties of the brain or 'mind'.

Nagel's criticism of Dennett, which you quote, is revealing and on target. But this is a feature of Dennett's thinking where he badly fails to follow though on the consequences of his own Wittgenstainianism, and, in the interest of being a good bona fide physicalist, he aligns himself much too closely with Strawson's internalist views on mental content!

@Wayfarer By the way, Babatte Babich mentions in her preface to Heelan's book the hard time that she had had bringing to fruition an event with Peter Hacker (and Max Bennett, Dan Dennett, John Searle, and Daniel Robinson who served as a moderator). This event eventually took place and gave rise to a book. It had afforded an opportunity for Searle and Dennett to respond to the excoriating critique of their views that Bennett and Hacker had produced in two appendixes to their book The Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, which is a broadly Wittgensteinian critique of mainstream cognitive science and (Anglo-American) philosophy of mind. I myself am mostly on Hacker's side, of course, even though I believe his criticism of Dennett isn't always entirely fair.

A lot rides on the meaning of 'supervenes' here. — Wayfarer

Very roughly speaking, supervenience is a type of relation between states or properties such that A supervenes on B just in case A states are an emergent property of B states, and a change or difference in A necessitates a change or difference in B, but not vice-versa.

and a change or difference in A necessitates a change or difference in B, but not vice-versa. — Arkady

What about the placebo effect, then? Those are examples of 'top-down causation' which would mitigate against a physicalist explanation, would they not?

I myself am mostly on Hacker's side, of course, even though I believe his criticism of Dennett isn't always entirely fair. — Pierre-Normand

I have only read reviews of Hacker's book but from what I can glean, it seems entirely reasonable to me. And if the author of 'Darwin's Dangerous Idea' can dish it out, he ought to be able to take it ;-)

It’s too sweeping to say that ‘we cannot say what it means to be real or to exist’. What I am saying is that it seems assumed by physicalists that the nature of the physical is itself understood or defined when (as Sam26 pointed out) the very nature of matter itself is still a metaphysical puzzle. That is why ‘materialism’ tends to end up as ‘scientism’ - it amounts to little more than an allegiance to science in the place of philosophy. — Wayfarer

We can certainly say what it is to exist in the phenomenal sense. But metaphysics is always attempting to go beyond the merely phenomenal. You are agreeing that "the nature of matter is still a metaphysical puzzle", so you actually seem to be agreeing with me that, beyond a merely phenomenal account, "we cannot say what it means to be real or to exist".

In respect of teleology - the question revolves around the notion of purpose or intention in the broadest sense. But a consequence of ‘eliminativism’ is that it says even our intentions are in some fundamental sense illusory - let alone whether intention is real in any cosmic sense. And I think it’s highly significant that the eliminativist attitude must insist that even our indubitable sense of first-person intentionality is an illusion. — Wayfarer

Intention is coherently understandable only when it comes to conscious agents, so I would say that is "its broadest sense". Materialism/ physicalism are not necessarily eliminativistic standpoints, and that is Strawson's point of dispute with Dennett (who admittedly does seem to be an eliminativist form the few things of his I have read). So, the contention that consciousness is a natural, rather than a supernatural, a material rather than an immaterial, and a physical rather than a non-physical, process, is not necessarily an eliminativist, or a reductionist, one at all.

In the context of the Western philosophical tradition, I tend to favour theistic evolution - but I don’t think that ever ought to be considered an ‘empirical theory’. So the fact that it’s not an empirical theory is not an argument against it. Rather it’s a misunderstanding. — Wayfarer

I haven't said that "theistic evolution" is an empirical theory. It is a metaphysical theory, obviously. I have said that it is fundamentalistic to assert that such theories are empirical facts, or supportable on account of empirical facts. The only argument against it as a "theory" is that it could never be intersubjectively corroborated, although it's obviously not impossible that there could be universal agreement about it. In any case it shares that honour with all the rest of the metaphysical theories. I cannot agree with Peirce's argument for theism; that it is likely to be the standpoint that is ultimately reached by the community of enquirers; because the future is uncertain.

Also, you don't seem to be clearly committed to theistic evolution at all; on account of your caveat "in the context of the Western philosophical tradition". In any case, the tradition in all its phases, analytic, phenomenological, existential, process-oriented, and postmodern has for the most part moved away from theism.

What is ‘empiricism’ anyway? It comes down to acceptance of evidence that can be seen, touched, and experienced by the sense organs (augmented by instruments). So it often (and often unconsciously) excludes intuition and the ‘felt sense’ of being that is fundamental to what it means to be human. — Wayfarer

This is exactly what I have argued for in many of my exchanges with you. That spiritual "knowledge" is a matter of intuition and feeling; and that it is not capable of corroboration in the way that empirical observations are. I have also many times made the point that this does not necessarily mean it is "merely subjective" (although of course it is possible to, just as many do, argue that it is).

Philosophy is in a kind of middle position between religion and science. Empirical evidence cannot be used to demonstrate the truth of philosophical assertions, because where philosophical standpoints deal with empirical facts, they constitute interpretations of those facts, interpretations which those facts cannot themselves unequivocally confirm or dis-confirm. Empirical facts may be used in arguments, and appeals to plausibility may be made; but there is no definite way to establish plausibility. What each person finds convincing will depend upon their own experience and set of presuppositions.Philosophers may convince by argument; but they also may quite legitimately convince by rhetoric, I believe; the force of which can be an appeal to individual experience, as well as the individuals understanding of collective cultural experience. Soi there can be no definitive intersubjective corroboration, but there may be, and obviously very often is, inter-subjective agreement when tit comes to philosophical standpoints and religious beliefs.

We can certainly say what it is to exist in the phenomenal sense. — Janus

Ah - but can we?

Also, you don't seem to be clearly committed to theistic evolution at all; on account of your caveat "in the context of the Western philosophical tradition". — Janus

I don't profess Christianity, but I am not atheist. In the context of Western philosophy, therefore, I tend to favour theistically-oriented philosophers, in a broad-brush sense (but never intelligent design or creationism).

I find the physicalist or naturalistic accounts incredible. I'll put it like this: I don't accept that the explanatory principle of nature, is identifiable within nature. I think if it were there to be found, we would have found it.

Now I know you and others often will suggest that, whatever this principle is, it is 'immanent' within nature - but I think of 'immanent' as being one pole of a duality, namely, 'immanent and transcendent'. And in theistic philosophy, it makes no more sense to speak of something that is only or purely immanent, than to speak of a mountain range where there are no valleys.

That is one of the senses in which I do agree with traditional philosophical theology - that the 'first principle' (the 'God of the philosophers', you might say) is both within and beyond creation. But it's not an objective reality (to which I can already hear the retort 'what other kind is there?')

That spiritual "knowledge" is a matter of intuition and feeling; and that it is not capable of corroboration in the way that empirical observations are. I have also many times made the point that this does not mean it is "merely subjective" (although of course it is possible to, just as many do, argue that it is). — Janus

It can be corroborated within the appropriate domain of discourse. That is the meaning of a now-archaic term, the 'scientia sacra', the sacred science.

And this is based on the observable universality of the principles that are expressed in the various forms of the 'philosophia perennis'. But that type of observation is not 'empirical' in the sense that most will accept. First, because from the viewpoint of the practitioner, it is 'intersubjective'. Alternatively, it might be studied through the perspective of comparative religion and mythology, such as in the work of Joseph Campbell or Mircea Eliade. But that includes the acknowledgement of forms of understanding that are culturally remote from our own and that are certainly alien to the 'scientific-secular' view of life.

Philosophy is in a kind of middle position between religion and science. Empirical evidence cannot be used to demonstrate the truth of philosophical assertions, because where philosophical standpoints deal with empirical facts, they constitute interpretations of those facts, interpretations which those facts cannot themselves unequivocally confirm or dis-confirm. Empirical facts may be used in arguments, and appeals to plausibility may be made; but there is no definite way to establish plausibility. What each person finds convincing will depend upon their own experience and set of presuppositions. — Janus

Perfectly agree. I often remark, philosophy drops you at the border. What's beyond that - who is to say?

Ah - but can we? — Wayfarer

Why not?

Now I know you and others often will suggest that, whatever this principle is, it is 'immanent' within nature - but I think of 'immanent' as being one pole of a duality, namely, 'immanent and transcendent'. And in theistic philosophy, it makes no more sense to speak of something that is only or purely immanent, than to speak of a mountain range where there are no valleys. — Wayfarer

I would not agree that immanence and transcendence are polemical. For me It is all a matter of context. As I said a few posts ago, if I were to say that God is transcendent; I would mean that there is a being or spirit which is transcendent of our conscious experience, not that this being or spirit is transcendent of nature itself, because the latter would be to posit an ontological bifurcation of nature, of reality itself; it would be to posit metaphysical dualism.

It can be corroborated within the appropriate domain of discourse. That is the meaning of a now-archaic term, the 'scientia sacra', the sacred science. — Wayfarer

It is not corroboration in the sense that any suitably informed and impartial observer or participant would be forced to agree, though. This is clearly shown in the fact that different religions give different metaphysical and religious accounts. In contrast, science transcends (or at least should transcend) cultural traditions.

What about the placebo effect, then? Those are examples of 'top-down causation' which would mitigate against a physicalist explanation, would they not? — Wayfarer

Mental causation is such a widespread phenomenon that one hardly needs to appeal to such things as the placebo effect to exemplify it. I decide to raise my hand and, lo and behold, my hand rises. The decision might have been the result of a deliberative process (and hence of 'mental events') while the outcome is a material process. There would appear to be a complete explanation couched in terms of low-level material/physiological processes that explains in causal terms why it is that my hand rose there and then. Those two explanatory levels pertain to two different domains (i.e. the intentional level of description of behavior, and the physiological level of description of biological processes) that still can be construed to relate to one another by an asymmetrical supervenience relation. You might (counterfactually) have decided to raise your hand earlier, or later, or not at all, but, in such cases, some of the antecedent circumstances of the physical motion of your hand necessarily would (counterfactually) have been different. We can count 'brain states' as part of those antecedent circumstances. Those are (low-level) neurophysiological states which instantiate, or realize, the (high-level) 'reasons' (roughly construed as beliefs and desires) why you would have decided to raise your hand there and then. (I am not actually endorsing this internalist representationalist view of mental content but it is good enough for the sake of simplicity and doesn't prejudge the present argument.)

So, the mere exemplification of mental causation, as an instance of (apparent) downward-causation, in the real world isn't threatening to the supervenience story. Someone who endorses Kim's causal exclusion argument might still acknowledge that the downward-causal story in terms of mental-causation constitutes a useful coarse-grained explanation of the observed event. In spite of its usefulness, Kim would argue that such an explanation is causally redundant because the genuine cause of the 'event' that occurred, as described fine-grainedly in terms of the low-level physiological or physical description, is operative independently of the high-level characterization of the process.

It's true that if we define the outcome (such as someone's arm raising) fine-grainedly in terms of underlying physiological or physico-chemical processes then the outcome is fully determined to occur in a causal sense. From this fact, Kim derives his causal-exclusion conclusion. He argues, on the basis of supervenience, that the outcome could not have been different unless the low-level causal antecedent had been different. And hence, the low-level explanation is deemed to be complete. And hence, the high level explanation, albeit useful for making coarse-grained predictions in the absence of specific knowledge of the underlying low-level properties, is causally redundant. We may thus conclude that 'the mental' (that is, the high-level intentional/psychological functional properties that supervene of the domain of physical states) is epiphenomenal.

The conclusion is unwarranted and very few critics of Kim manage to uproot the fundamental ground of his confusion, and hence the core flaw in his argumentation, although Peter Menzies and Christian List may have come closest in my opinion.

The main flaw in Kim's conception, I think, is that he tends to tacitly and uncritically rely on a metaphysical-realist stance towards low-level material constituents and, on the other hand, on an empiricist or nominalistic stance towards high-level composite entities that are materially constituted by those low-level constituents. While the individuation criteria by means of which we single out (coarse-grainedly) the high-level entities and define their (high-level) powers and properties are somehow defined pragmatically, or theoretically, the low level constituents (such a atoms and molecules, or whatever) are assumed to be causally efficient irrespective of our categorizations of them.

This is a picture that is very strongly indebted to the modern conception of classical mechanics: of objectively real particles and the objectively real forces being exerted between them (or the force fields mediating those forces). 'Objectively real' here is meant to signify that something exists independently of contextual factors or high-level relational characterrizations. The fundamental ground for all genuine causation in the material world consists in the intrinsic properties of corpuscules, and their intrinsic powers to affects the properties of other particles. Everything else that is being defined in terms of aggregates or emergent relational properties is supervenient on this fundamental 'objective' description.

How is Kim's argument affected if we relax those metaphysical assumptions and grant the same ontological status to relational properties that we accord to (putative) intrinsic properties of elementary material constituents? It collapses entirely, on my view. And the reason for that is very simple. If we acknowledge the idea that what makes something what it is isn't exhausted by what it is that this thing is materially constituted of but also is defined by its functional relations to other things, and also by the pragmatic context relative to which this thing is being single out as being representative of a definite category, of instantiating some definite property, then the distinction between the low-level basis of supervenience and the higher-level supervenient domain is abolished. Complete knowledge of the intrinsic properties of the material constituents, and of they elementary mutual interactions, would still constitute an incomplete knowledge of the world since it is fully abstracting away from what it is that those material constituents are constituents of.

Hence, for instance, the low-level explanation for the putative 'event' that was the occurrence of an upward movement of a hand doesn't constitute any kind of a rival causal explanation of the intentionally described event of someone's raising her hand. If what makes this action the action that it is precisely is a context of prior deliberation (for instance) then such actions must be distinguished from upward motions of a hand that might be the result of a stroke, or a strong gust of wind, or whatever. It is thus quite irrelevant that a strict supervenience relation still holds between the domain of intentional behavior and the material-physical domain. The low level explanation can't compete with the high-level one because it abstracts away from the very fact that the low-level outcome (the hand motion) happens to be an instantiation of the phenomenon that we sought to explain, and hence it doesn't even begin to explain why it is that a voluntary action intelligibly occurred.

Thanks for that perceptive and meticulously argued post. I appreciate the detail you have provided as it gives me a much better understanding of the kinds of arguments that are being had about this issue, as distinct from my own idiosyncratic take on them.

If we acknowledge the idea that what makes something what it is isn't exhausted by that it is that this thing is materially constituted of but also is defined by its functional relations to other things, and also by the pragmatic context relative to which this thing is being single out as being representative of a definite category, of instantiating some definite property, then the distinction between the low-level basis of supervenience and the higher-level supervenient domain is abolished. Complete knowledge of the intrinsic properties of the material constituents, and of they elementary mutual interactions, would still constitute an incomplete knowledge of the world since it is fully abstracting away from what it is that those material constituents are constituents of. — Pierre-Normand

I am reminded of an anecdote in a critical review of Krauss' foray into philosophy:

A bare neutron has a half-life of about eleven and a half minutes. Over time it decays into a proton, an electron and a neutrino. However, once inside the nucleus of an atom, this basic property of the neutron ceases to function. Its integration into the higher order intelligibility of the atomic nucleus changes its properties. The higher order reality has modified the lower order constituent. Indeed if this did not happen there would be no stable atomic nuclei, no stable chemical substances, and we would not exist ¹.

So - top-down causation even appears to be the case in respect of physical particles themselves! So much for 'fundamental particles', eh?

Hence, for instance, the low-level explanation for the putative 'event' that was the occurrence of an upward movement of a hand doesn't constitute any kind of a rival causal explanation of the intentionally described event of someone's raising her hand. — Pierre-Normand

Yes. And to address the causal exclusion/overdetermination argument head-on, causation is contextual; there isn't some objective matter of fact about what causes what. Mental causation is in no way in competition with e.g. neurophysical causation because in each case causation is situated within an independent, self-contained explanatory scheme. Only other factors within the same explanatory context are relevant to it.

What about the placebo effect, then? Those are examples of 'top-down causation' which would mitigate against a physicalist explanation, would they not? — Wayfarer

I don't see how. Per physicalism, believing that a particular treatment is causally efficacious (which is all that the placebo effect is) has a corresponding physical state of the brain, which itself can have "downstream" causal effects, including remission of some disease or condition.

EDIT: I don't know if you did so knowingly, but your above point echoes an interesting argument made by Alvin Plantinga in one of the iterations of his Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism, wherein he invokes the concept of "semantic epiphenomenalism" (EP). EP basically states that since natural selection only "sees" the physical states of an organism (including whichever brain states attend a particular belief), then the content of beliefs cannot be selected for, only their attendant physical states

So, according to Plantinga, EP implies that a purely naturalistic evolutionary process - or, at least one for which natural selection is the primary driver, presumably - would be extremely unlikely to produce organisms with reliable cognitive faculties, meaning that the naturalist would therefore possess a defeater for every belief he holds, including in naturalistic evolution.

Circling back to the question for supervenience, which you pose above, you will recall that supervenience allows for a given mental state to be multiply realizable, meaning that non-identical physical states can in theory each realize identical mental states. I could see this posing a problem not only for the placebo effect, but for virtually every purported mind-body interaction. Let us assume the physicalist thesis that mental states (though themselves non-physical) supervene on physical states. Let us also assume that given mental state M1 can be multiply realized by two distinct physical states, P1 and P2 (perhaps in 2 different individuals, or at different times in the same individual). Let us furthermore assume that the content of M1 is "a hungry bear is chasing me." Said belief would likely lead to certain physiological reactions, including an increase in stress hormones, elevated heart rate, a "fight or flight" behavioral response, etc. But, if we posit that said effects are caused only by the belief's attendant physical states, we are left with the puzzle as to how, in principle, two distinct physical states, P1 and P2, can each be the cause of identical downstream physical effects.

A detailed examination of EEAN would take us too far afield for this thread, but it's an interesting topic, IMO.

DOUBLE EDIT: after I posted, I saw that at least some of what I touch upon has already been discussed above. Apologies both for the lengthy post and for any repetition for the readers of this thread.

So - top-down causation even appears to be the case in respect of physical particles themselves! So much for 'fundamental particles', eh? — Wayfarer

The neutron is not a fundamental particle. It is composed of quarks.

believing that a particular treatment is causally efficacious (which is all that the placebo effect is) has a corresponding physical state of the brain, — Arkady

But in saying that, you’re saying a belief is physical. One minute you believe that the placebo will work - and it will, because you believe it. Then I manage to disillusion you - ‘look, it’s made of sugar’. So it won’t work. Nothing physical has changed - only your belief. Your perception has changed, your understanding of what it is, and that has consequences.

Whereas, if the pill was an aspirin, it would have physical effects. That’s ‘bottom up causation’.

This is why mind-body medicine is an embarassment to materialism - it ought not to work.

I have looked into the evolutionary argument against naturalism, but really it’s just a refinement of ‘the argument from reason’. And that, in turn, really amounts to the argument that reason itself comprises only the relationship of ideas. A rational argument can be represented - or realised - in any number of languages or media, while the meaning remains invariant. 3>2 is the case no matter how it is represented, or who is considering it.

And, there are no ‘point-particles’ which are indivisible - atoms in the original sense, whether they’re conceived as quarks or some other entity. Physics has demonstrated the ambiguity of so-called ‘fundamental particles’ - they’re now understood as excitation in a field, not as an indivisible material unit.

But in saying that, you’re saying a belief is physical. One minute you believe that the placebo will work - and it will, because you believe it. Then I manage to disillusion you - ‘look, it’s made of sugar’. So it won’t work. Nothing physical has changed - only your belief. Your perception has changed, your understanding of what it is, and that has consequences. — Wayfarer

The portion of your post which I underlined is incorrect: if mental states supervene on physical states, then the physical state which corresponds to believing that the placebo will work is different from the one which corresponds to believing that the placebo won't work; so something physical has changed.

And, there are no ‘point-particles’ which are indivisible - atoms in the original sense, whether they’re conceived as quarks or some other entity. Physics has demonstrated the ambiguity of so-called ‘fundamental particles’ - they’re now understood as excitation in a field, not as an indivisible material unit. — Wayfarer

Uh, I said that the neutron is not a fundamental particle because it's composed of other particles. Ergo, science does not claim it's indivisible (none of this supports theism, of course, contrary to whatever mileage your linked-to article might strive to get out of it).

if mental states supervene on physical states, then the physical state which corresponds to believing that the placebo will work is different from the one which corresponds to believing that the placebo won't work; so something physical has changed. — Arkady

Yes, but what changed the physical state? What was the causal factor? It was a change in the understanding, in the perception. That is why it can be described as a 'top-down' causal sequence. Whereas if the mental was indeed supervenient on the physical, then this ought not to happen. You might expect that a pill would change perception - that is 'bottom-up' - but you wouldn't expect that a change in perception would have physiological consequences.

I said that the neutron is not a fundamental particle because it's composed of other particles. — Arkady

But aren't you saying that 'the quark' is 'the fundamental unit'? It therefore serves in the role previously assigned to 'the atom' i.e. the purported 'fundamental particle of matter'. Whereas, whether a quark, or indeed any of the denizens of the 'particle zoo', actually are 'particles' is, I think, an open question.

//ps// This question is addressed by Victor Stenger in Particles are for Real, one of the last things he wrote.

Yes, but what changed the physical state? What was the causal factor? It was a change in the understanding, in the perception. That is why it can be described as a 'top-down' causal sequence. Whereas if the mental was indeed supervenient on the physical, then this ought not to happen. You might expect that a pill would change perception - that is 'bottom-up' - but you wouldn't expect that a change in perception would have physiological consequences. — Wayfarer

Entertain for a moment the idea that all mental states have physical correlates. This would mean that all mental processes; coming to understand something, for example, would have correlated physical processes.

So, we could (in principle) look at the process of coming to understand in terms of a complex series of physical interactions that culminate in a neural state which is correlated to the phenomenological or psychological state of understanding.

We can also look at the process of coming to understand in terms of a complex series of experiences in the context of prior understandings, and so on.

Let's say these would be two different ways of understanding the same process. But the two different ways cannot be commingled; they are incommensurable. This is just the kind of way of thinking Spinoza propounds as an antidote to Descartes' substance dualism. Extensa and cogitans are two modes of the one substance. It thus makes no sense to say that a neural process caused me to understand; it was my experiences which caused me to understand, and the neural processes are its physical correlates.

Looked at this way there is no mystery to the placebo effect. The difficulties, aporias and apparent paradoxes come when we try to understand the two incommensurable ways of understanding in terms of each other. We just can't do it, and it could well be impossible in principle.