We might clear up the issue if we revisit the time factor. I submit that the judge might say "you were justified in your belief". But now, the truth is exposed, and that belief no longer qualifies as a justified belief. That's the point with the op. The falsity is exposed, yet the belief is still referred to as a justified belief.

Got it.

We might clear up the issue if we revisit the time factor. I submit that the judge might say "you were justified in your belief". But now, the truth is exposed, and that belief no longer qualifies as a justified belief. That's the point with the op. The falsity is exposed, yet the belief is still referred to as a justified belief. — Metaphysician Undercover

If the truth is exposed to us but not to him then his belief is still justified. Given the evidence available him, it is reasonable for him to believe what he does. That we can see it to be false doesn't change that.

It is reasonable for him to believe what I know is false.

If the truth is exposed to us but not to him then his belief is still justified. — Michael

No it's not, that's the point, once the belief is exposed as false it cannot be considered reasonable to hold that belief. Furthermore, it would require withholding evidence, and deception to say that his belief is justified. The judge has evidence that the documents are false, and saying that his belief is justified without revealing this evidence constitutes deception.

It is reasonable for him to believe what I know is false. — Michael

I disagree that you can honestly say this. If you know it's false, then you know that his belief is unreasonable. If you were honest, you would either let him go on with his belief which you know to be an unreasonable belief. or act to convince him that the belief is unreasonable. But I think it ought to be quite clear to you that to say that you know his belief is false, and to also think that it is reasonable for him to maintain this false belief, is to be dishonest. It is similar to what we call "rationalizing" which is a form of dishonesty, coming up with reasons to defend what one knows is wrong.

No it's not, that's the point, once the belief is exposed as false it cannot be considered reasonable to hold that belief. — Metaphysician Undercover

It isn't reasonable for me to hold that belief, but it's still reasonable for him to hold that belief.

If you know it's false, then you know that his belief is unreasonable. — Metaphysician Undercover

A belief is justified if it would be reasonable for the believer to hold the belief given the evidence available to him.

If John doesn't know that the ID is fake then it would rational of him to believe that Sarah is 16. It would be wrong to say that because I know that it's fake that John's isn't being reasonable in committing to such a belief.

A justified true belief is true knowledge. It seems logical that justified belief is then knowledge. Knowledge can be false. Therefore a justified belief can be false. If something can be some way, I don't see why one couldn't believe the thing to be so. So, a justified belief can be false, and therefore one can believe a justified belief to be false.

Seems far fetched but that might work :chin: — BlueBanana

In thinking that I agree, and in furthering this train of thought:

There’s a difference between fallibilist systems of epistemology and infallibilist systems of epistemology—although the two often seem implicitly converged in addressing knowledge. I’m one to strongly argue against infallibilism (that we can obtain knowledge guaranteed to be perfectly secure form all possible error), so I’m addressing the position I uphold, that of fallibilistic epistemology. Some homemade perspectives:

Justified and true belief is, in a sense, the ideal standard by which we declare what is and is not knowledge. It is ideal because implicit to it is the affirmation of an infallible, or ontic, truth. In practice, however, all we ever have to work with is believed to be truths. So, in practice, what we uphold to be knowledge can be specified as “believed to be true beliefs which we can justify in being ontically true” or, more briefly expressed, “justified believed truths” … which we then assume to be justified true beliefs by default of being justified in being true. (I take this to be similar enough to what you mean by “justified belief is [...] knowledge”.)

JTB—due to being ontically true—cannot hold the potential of being wrong: it is infallible. The issue here becomes whether or not one knows the given truth, in which case one can justify it, or if one is merely lucky in holding a belief that is ontically true. But, again, in practice we only have JBT—which we then assume to be JTB when in deed justified (e.g., noncontradictory to our other JBTs, etc.). We can’t guarantee that what we assume to be a true belief is in fact true; this because we are fallible in our appraisals of what is true. And, I believe, it is because of this that we must then also be capable of justifying our beliefs as true. If we can’t evidence that our beliefs are in fact true then we don’t have grounds for confidence that our beliefs are true (either due to a then resulting uncertainty or due to flagrant contradictions between the beliefs we hold within awareness at any particular time).

This summing up my current views, what you’ve termed “false knowledge” is, to me, then JBT which we take to be JTB by default which, nevertheless, is however not in fact true (though it remains fallibly justified as being true).

As an example: if Tom believes he’s seen a sheep at a distance and can justify this belief (e.g., it looks like a sheep, etc.), then, to Tom’s awareness, he holds (fallible) knowledge of there being a sheep at a distance—though, in fact (in truth), what Tom has seen is a white coated shepherd dog bred to look like sheep. When Tom approaches the sheep he discovers that what he previously took to be knowledge was wrong—for new JBTs now evidence (justify) that the animal is in fact a dog.

Even if not everything here rings true, I yet maintain that there should be first made an explicit distinction between fallible knowledge (which always holds the potential to be incorrect and thereby false in what it upholds as true belief) and infallible knowledge, which by definition is incapable of being false (specifically in that which it affirms to be true).

Maybe some of this will help … again, only meant to confirm what I interpret you as saying.

Just curious Meta...

Please state the criterion for both, what it takes to be true and what it takes to be justified... on your view.

Let's say a person is asked what is the four-dimensional solid of revolution that forms when the graph f(x,y) rotates around x,y-plane in respect to the w,z-plane. This person doesn't know a thing about mathematics, but guesses the answer anyway.

The person had a belief that ended up being true. The belief was also justified as there exists a correct answer that could be calculated. However, even I wouldn't accept that guess as knowledge. I can see that someone might claim the belief wasn't justified to the person in the example, but we can also come up with examples of cases where the person, whether they are correct or not, believe to be justified. In that case I'd claim the person does have knowledge, so to those situations I have an alternate solution: knowledge is belief that is believed to be justified, regardless of whether it's true or not and regardless of whether it's justified or not.

Even if not everything here rings true, I yet maintain that there should be first made an explicit distinction between fallible knowledge (which always holds the potential to be incorrect and thereby false in what it upholds as true belief) and infallible knowledge, which by definition is incapable of being false (specifically in that which it affirms to be true). — javra

I fully agree with your comment otherwise, but I think the distinction between these two should be made through the justification rather than the knowledge itself. One might, for example, have an infallible knowledge, which should have a certain justification, but if the person doesn't know of this justification, they can't have the knowledge and claim it to be true beyond doubt.

knowledge is belief that is believed to be justified, regardless of whether it's true or not and regardless of whether it's justified or not. — BlueBanana

This sort of leads its way into the issue of what justification is. There’s foundationalism, coherentism, or Susan Haack’s proposal of a hybrid, which I favor (I’ve yet to find reason to take other theories of justification seriously). All the same, if truth has no bearing on justification, then I so far find that the term “justification” would be devoid of meaning.

I’ll elaborate a little: Imo, justification is the process of evidencing that addressed to be just. To be just can hold two meanings: just in terms of facticity and just in terms of morality. When it comes to propositional knowledge, to justify a belief is to evidence how the belief’s contents are factually just (not morally just). This, in turn, entails that justification is about evidencing a belief to be true (with truth loosely meaning “conformity to that which is factually just”—which to me encompasses correspondence theory of truth).

So if knowledge is belief that is believed to be justified, it would then need to be belied to be true. So then when we discover that our believed to be justified beliefs are not true, then they cease to be knowledge for us.

Also, doesn’t a belief need to be to some extent justified by oneself in order for one to believe it to be justified by oneself?



All too true. The issue as you pointed out is one of demonstrability. To add an example, one can hold an intuitive certainty about something—a gut feeling—and this belief can in fact be infallibly true, or infallibly correct (when ontically appraised from some supposedly omniscient perspective). But—as you’ve mentioned—if one has no means of evidencing this gut-felt certitude to be infallible, one would have no means of knowing whether or not it in fact is infallible.

But this then to me signifies that we can’t have infallible knowledge, since knowledge in part requires that it be justified. To be in possession of infallible knowledge seems to me to require that one is also in possession of a demonstrably infallible justification for that which one believes (again, with justification to me being an evidencing that that addressed is factually just).

To be more explicit, I take infallibilism to be about demonstrably infallible believed truths (Descartes comes to mind as an infallibilist, for that’s what he was searching for prior to commencing his methodological doubt; he had faith that he could demonstrate infallible believed truths). Fallibilism—as I see it at least—is like holding a null hypothesis that all of one’s knowledge is infallible despite not having infallible justification for this which, as a null hypothesis, will always then hold the potential of being falsified … thereby making all knowledge fallible from the get go.

So one could unknowingly hold infallible beliefs at any time. But without being able to infallibly justify any particular instantiation of this, one then could never be in possession of infallible knowledge (for one wouldn’t be able to appraise whether or not one’s beliefs are infallible). More to the point, because justification is an intrinsic aspect of propositional knowledge, devoid of infallible justification one cannot then have infallible knowledge. No?

Its late for me and I’m a bit tired; hoping I didn’t misinterpret your latest posts.

This sort of leads its way into the issue of what justification is. There’s foundationalism, coherentism, or Susan Haack’s proposal of a hybrid, which I favor (I’ve yet to find reason to take other theories of justification seriously). — javra

I don't think so because if the knowledge doesn't depend on the justification, only whether one believes the belief to be justified, it only matters what stance the person in the example takes.

All the same, if truth has no bearing on justification, then I so far find that the term “justification” would be devoid of meaning. — javra

Justification is evidence, not proof (although the evidence can be proof as well). Based on that, truth has some bearing on justification, but both unjustified true beliefs and justified false beliefs are possibilities, so I don't exactly see what you mean by that "“justification” would be devoid of meaning". As you stated, there exist countless of definitions for it and opinions on what is justification, but the conclusion I draw is that whatever is that, it's not entirely dependent on truth.

So if knowledge is belief that is believed to be justified, it would then need to be belied to be true. — javra

Knowledge clearly needs to be believed to be true, but I think that's a part of the definition, not a conclusion of it. Knowledge is a belief that is believed to be both true and justified, but a belief that is believed to be justified isn't necessarily believed to be true.

Also, doesn’t a belief need to be to some extent justified by oneself in order for one to believe it to be justified by oneself? — javra

In theory, yes. In practice I don't think there's a limit to how irrational a person can be. I also think, however, that people can be objective and that doesn't necessarily contradict the irrationality, so there could very well exist a person that has an unjustified belief that they don't believe to be justified but still believe to be true.

All too true. The issue as you pointed out is one of demonstrability. To add an example, one can hold an intuitive certainty about something—a gut feeling—and this belief can in fact be infallibly true, or infallibly correct (when ontically appraised from some supposedly omniscient perspective). But—as you’ve mentioned—if one has no means of evidencing this gut-felt certitude to be infallible, one would have no means of knowing whether or not it in fact is infallible. — javra

Whoa, I didn't consider this at all to be honest - that one could have infallible knowledge with justification that isn't infallible. I'd actually like to define this as knowledge so I'd go as far as to say that the person does have an infallible knowledge about the fact, but they do not have knowledge, only a belief, that the knowledge is, in fact, infallible.

As I stated somewhere earlier in this thread, I try to make definitions that describe colloquial uses, and that knowledge is in colloquial sense never certain is the very reason I'm using my idea of false knowledge. This leads to basically that when one believes to know something (that is, they believe to have a justified true belief) instead of knowing that they only believe that information, they must know that thing. Because of this, it must be that as the person in your example believes their belief to be true and infallible, they do know that which their intuition tells them. What I'm not sure about is whether intuition, which I think is a valid justification, can justify intuition. Objectively the answer would be no, thus "they do not have knowledge, only a belief, that the knowledge is, in fact, infallible", but as I also said, people are irrational.

It isn't reasonable for me to hold that belief, but it's still reasonable for him to hold that belief. — Michael

So you're saying that if a person has reasons for one's belief, even if those reasons involve falsities, then that belief is reasonable? The problem is, that I always have reasons for my beliefs, and I think that others do too, but that doesn't make the beliefs reasonable. If those reasons include falsities then clearly my belief is unreasonable, despite the fact that I have reasons for that belief.

A belief is justified if it would be reasonable for the believer to hold the belief given the evidence available to him. — Michael

I don't agree with that. If I hold evidence that makes your belief unreasonable, then it's very clear that it's not reasonable for you to hold that belief. This is what justification is all about, discussing these beliefs and working out the unreasonableness which lies there. If I had the attitude that it was reasonable for you to hold false beliefs, then I would never be inclined to convince you of the reality of the situation. It is through confronting such unreasonableness that beliefs get justified.

If John doesn't know that the ID is fake then it would rational of him to believe that Sarah is 16. It would be wrong to say that because I know that it's fake that John's isn't being reasonable in committing to such a belief. — Michael

Not only is John being unreasonable but so are you. John is committed to a belief which you know is false, and is proceeding in activity which you know is wrong. You are claiming that it is reasonable for John to hold such a belief, and therefore reasonable for him to be proceeding in a wrong activity. If you do not designate his actions as unreasonable you will not be inclined to prevent him from proceeding with the wrongful actions. If you designate his actions as wrong, then to prevent him from proceeding, you will need to back this up with reasons, showing that his beliefs are unreasonable. If you truly belief his beliefs are reasonable, you have no recourse. So it is completely counterproductive, and unreasonable to think that John is being reasonable by committing to such a false belief. And I don't believe that anyone can honestly say that committing to a false belief is a reasonable thing to do.

So you're saying that if a person has reasons for one's belief, even if those reasons involve falsities, then that belief is reasonable? — Metaphysician Undercover

Being reasonable isn't the same thing as having reasons.

If those reasons include falsities then clearly my belief is unreasonable — Metaphysician Undercover

Earlier you agreed though that in the medieval times it was reasonable with the given evidence to believe that the Earth was flat.

If I hold evidence that makes your belief unreasonable, then it's very clear that it's not reasonable for you to hold that belief. — Metaphysician Undercover

I can't see any self-consistent way in which it matters whether anyone holds that evidence.

If I had the attitude that it was reasonable for you to hold false beliefs, then I would never be inclined to convince you of the reality of the situation. It is through confronting such unreasonableness that beliefs get justified. — Metaphysician Undercover

In that situation you'd present the evidence to that person, after which the belief would no longer be reasonable. The person is justified in believing what they believe, but the belief itself is not within the knowledge you have justified, so you change the circumstances so that the person is no longer justified in believing what you think is a false belief.

Not only is John being unreasonable but so are you. John is committed to a belief which you know is false, and is proceeding in activity which you know is wrong. You are claiming that it is reasonable for John to hold such a belief, and therefore reasonable for him to be proceeding in a wrong activity. If you do not designate his actions as unreasonable you will not be inclined to prevent him from proceeding with the wrongful actions. If you designate his actions as wrong, then to prevent him from proceeding, you will need to back this up with reasons, showing that his beliefs are unreasonable. If you truly belief his beliefs are reasonable, you have no recourse. So it is completely counterproductive, and unreasonable to think that John is being reasonable by committing to such a false belief. And I don't believe that anyone can honestly say that committing to a false belief is a reasonable thing to do. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're conflating moral justification and epistemological justification, and also jumping into unjustified conclusions regarding what actions to take with unreasonable beliefs considered.

Seems like there’s something in the way here, though I’m not sure what it is. As you’ve mentioned, (fallible) justification is about (imperfectly) evidencing something to be the case, not about (absolute) proof. Then the implicit question is, “justified to be true to whom?” To the individual, to a cohort of those concerned in the matter, or, else, in an absolute sense as viewed from some supposed omniscient perspective? To the individual and the cohort, justification will always be fallible; from the latter ideal perspective, it will be infallible, i.e. serve as absolute proof.

To readdress a former example, that there is a sheep in the field is justified to Tom as a true belief—and is therefore fallible knowledge to Tom. But it is not factually justified as a true belief to the shepherd (and to us) who knows that what Tom was looking at was in fact a shepherd dog in the field. (Tangentially, the shepherd (or else us the onlookers) might find Tom’s presumption morally justified—else stated, understandable, and thereby not deserving of reprimand even if wrong—but the shepherd will nonetheless not find Tom’s belief to be factually justified, this due to being based on Tom’s false belief of having seen a sheep). To complete the example, the shepherd’s knowledge on this matter, though outstanding, is nevertheless fallible as well—this because it is not literally omniscient.

Hence, given Tom’s limited information, Tom has valid but fallible knowledge of there being a sheep in the field. If Tom doesn’t approach the animal or talk to any shepherd, that’s all he will ever know about what he saw in the field. And when Tom tells his friend about it, his friend will have no reason to doubt that Tom has knowledge of there having been a sheep in this one field.

The shepherd (as also applies to us the onlookers) also holds limited information—and is thereby not infallible due to not being omniscient. But he holds more information on this topic than does Tom. So both the shepherd and us the onlookers hold valid but fallible knowledge of Tom not knowing that there is a sheep in the field, this due to our knowing that Tom was wrong in what he thought he saw.

To Tom, his belief is justified (to the best of his awareness). For clarity, Tom here factually holds justifications for his belief being true—for he has no info that would evidence any of his other beliefs which he uses as justification to be false.

To the shepherd, Tom’s belief is not factually justified (to be technically correct, also to the best of his awareness), due to the belief being based either on false premises or illusory experiences.

(A problem however emerges when one wants to affirm that a believed to be justified belief is not justified from an omniscient perspective—for no sentient being is endowed with this perspective in practice.)

Longwinded but this serves as a background to this conclusion: Wherever knowledge is upheld, relative to the individual(s) who so uphold, knowledge will always be factually justified to be true.

The property of truth doesn’t follow from the property of being justifiable; rather the reverse applies. If a belief is true, it will then necessarily also be to some extent justifiable. Untrue beliefs will not be factually justifiable (at least given sufficient enquiry into the matter and a sufficiently large body of information being obtained). So if one can’t justify a belief, it evidences the belief to either be uncertain or to be certainly false.

To that extent, both unjustified true beliefs and justified false beliefs would not be propositional knowledge whenever they are known to so be, this to whomever knows them to so be (this latter instantiation of “to know” is referencing knowledge via acquaintance/experience, maybe to greater extent than propositional knowledge … it would all be contingent on the particular examples).

So—while one can try to argue that knowledge is beliefs believed to be justified and true irrespective of whether or not they are in fact justified and true (this from an omniscient perspective?)—I’m maintaining that in practice knowledge will always be justified and true to the best awareness of the knowers … and will be so maintained to be until evidenced otherwise.

If an individual stubbornly maintains an irrational belief to be true and justified as true (e.g., the belief that Earth is hollow … believe it or not, I’ve heard this one before), while it will be considered knowledge to the individual, it will not be knowledge to us. That it is a “belief that is believed to be justified” is insufficient to make it knowledge to us. What would make this belief knowledge to us is a justification for this belief that would evidence this belief to be true (this in light of the many things we already (fallibly) know, such that gravity requires mass, thereby entailing that a hollowed planet would be devoid of the gravity we experientially know our planet to have).

We would hypothetically concede to this being knowledge only because we’d then come to believe that it is true on account of the justifications provided. Yes, it would then be a believed to be true and justified belief—but it’s status as knowledge would be fully contingent on these beliefs of being true and justified. Hence, I’m maintaining, whether or not a belief is (fallibly) true and (fallibly) justified is pivotal to what knowledge is.

Ah, just saw your usage of epistemic justification contra my usage of factual justification. I like it.

Whoa, I didn't consider this at all to be honest - that one could have infallible knowledge with justification that isn't infallible. [...] — BlueBanana

Right, but I don’t endorse the term of “infallible knowledge” in this case for the reasons I previously tried to provide. If knowledge is not a lucky guess, then one cannot have infallible knowledge—not unless one infallibly demonstrates it to so be "infallible belief that is infallibly true and is infallibly justified as being true".

On the other hand, one can luckily guess a conclusion which is ontically true and, in so being, which is factually correct and, thereby, perfectly devoid of error--hence, which is infallible. If one can’t justify this conclusion, though, it would not be knowledge. Where it gets trickier is: If one can justify that some conclusion is ontically true—but not infallibly justify the conclusion to so be—one would then have only fallible knowledge of an ontic truth, but not infallible knowledge.

Why would this conclusion not properly fit the stance of a fallibilistic epistemology? (From previous exchanges, we both agree with epistemology being fallible.)

As I stated somewhere earlier in this thread, I try to make definitions that describe colloquial uses, and that knowledge is in colloquial sense never certain is the very reason I'm using my idea of false knowledge. This leads to basically that when one believes to know something (that is, they believe to have a justified true belief) instead of knowing that they only believe that information, they must know that thing. — BlueBanana

I fully agree with this.

Because of this, it must be that as the person in your example believes their belief to be true and infallible, they do know that which their intuition tells them. — BlueBanana

But an somewhat unclear about this. Whenever we believe things--and are not then uncertain about them--we then hold a subjective certainty that our beliefs are true. But mere subjective certainty does not then imply that one holds knowledge of what one is confident about. I can be certain that the universe is most properly depicted by a cyclical model, but this in itself is not knowledge of the universe so being--not unless I can justify this certainty to be ontically true (which I can't).

What I'm not sure about is whether intuition, which I think is a valid justification, can justify intuition. — BlueBanana

Interesting issue. To me an intuition is an apprehension of awareness. This is in parallel to physiological perceptions being apprehensions of awareness. Foundationalism would hold that these immediate apprehensions of awareness are self-evident truths (though I'm not certain about how it typically addresses intuitions). The rebuttal is that they could be illusion, hallucination, or delusion. So, to me, that's where Haack's foundherentism shines. But I'll leave this open for some other post, if this topic of justification gets further addressed.

To the individual and the cohort, justification will always be fallible — javra

Not always: one can always know their own existence. Mathematics and logic can also be argued on. I also think the context matters, as some information can be said to be infallible with specific premises, like that we can generally speaking trust our perceptions. Considering "I think, therefore I am" to be the only certainly justified belief and the only infallible knowledge won't get one far and I think no meaningful conclusions can be drawn from that.

Longwinded but this serves as a background to this conclusion: Wherever knowledge is upheld, relative to the individual(s) who so uphold, knowledge will always be factually justified to be true. — javra

What about the situations where people might disagree on whether the evidence justifies a belief? If Tom believes that there's a sheep on the field, but we know that he neither has seen or believes to have seen a sheep there, but instead thinks "I have a glass of water, therefore there must be a sheep on the field outside", I wouldn't consider the belief unjustified to me, but also relative to Tom. He'd of course believe the belief to be justified, and thus it would count as (false) knowledge.

The property of truth doesn’t follow from the property of being justifiable; rather the reverse applies. If a belief is true, it will then necessarily also be to some extent justifiable. — javra

Certain justification considered? If the Russell's teapot existed there'd be no justification for individuals of it.

So—while one can try to argue that knowledge is beliefs believed to be justified and true irrespective of whether or not they are in fact justified and true (this from an omniscient perspective?)—I’m maintaining that in practice knowledge will always be justified and true to the best awareness of the knowers … and will be so maintained to be until evidenced otherwise.

If an individual stubbornly maintains an irrational belief to be true and justified as true (e.g., the belief that Earth is hollow … believe it or not, I’ve heard this one before), while it will be considered knowledge to the individual, it will not be knowledge to us. That it is a “belief that is believed to be justified” is insufficient to make it knowledge to us. What would make this belief knowledge to us is a justification for this belief that would evidence this belief to be true (this in light of the many things we already (fallibly) know, such that gravity requires mass, thereby entailing that a hollowed planet would be devoid of the gravity we experientially know our planet to have). — javra

First I'd like to say that the hollow Earth theory is a poor choice of example, as it makes a lot more sense than for example the flat Earth theory: you can conclude the Earth is round by simple everyday observations, but to know Earth's exact size, mass, density and gravitational effect we do need to rely on the words of the scientists.

More on topic, I find the view peculiar in that it allows false knowledge but does not really allow its practical usage. Basically it gives individuals the possibility of belief that their knowledge has a chance of being incorrect, but the hollow Earth model is, although stupid, like the idea of evil daemon deceiving us, theoretical possibility, like the idea of evil daemon deceiving us. This is why I'd prefer to define irrational beliefs, when believed by other to be justified, to be knowledge, that one then has a belief about that the knowledge is false.

Right, but I don’t endorse the term of “infallible knowledge” in this case for the reasons I previously tried to provide. If knowledge is not a lucky guess, then one cannot have infallible knowledge—not unless one infallibly demonstrates it to so be "infallible belief that is infallibly true and is infallibly justified as being true". — javra

I'd say that depends on the situation, there are some specific cases of individual holding infallible knowledge. Generally speaking I see what you mean though, I might have accidentally used "infallible" there to mean the same as "certain" in its colloquial meaning.

Whenever we believe things--and are not then uncertain about them--we then hold a subjective certainty that our beliefs are true. — javra

That seems logical but I also can't quite agree. I feel like there's a jump between the colloquial sense of uncertainty and absolute certainty. There surely are many people that believe their beliefs to be certainly true, but I for one see in most of my beliefs the slight theoretical possibility of being wrong, even though I wouldn't claim to be uncertain about them in any way.

Furthermore, on the connection to knowledge, even though denying that a belief believed to be certain needs to be justified sounds exactly like a thing I'd personally do, I have to say it'd be a rare exception. If you are certain of the shape of the Universe, I think you have a justified reason for that belief.

Being reasonable isn't the same thing as having reasons. — BlueBanana

Then we ought to differentiate between these two. But Michael seems to be arguing that if there are reasons for a belief then the belief is reasonable. I think that a belief which is known to be incorrect cannot be reasonable.

Earlier you agreed though that in the medieval times it was reasonable with the given evidence to believe that the Earth was flat. — BlueBanana

If I said that, then I misspoke. I don't think that it's reasonable for anyone to believe that the earth is flat. I probably implied that they thought it was reasonable, and that's why they believed it. They thought it was justified, so for them it was justified. I do not think it was reasonable for them to believe this, because I think that it is not a reasonable thing to believe, so I do not think it was justified. They are a different people from us.

In that situation you'd present the evidence to that person, after which the belief would no longer be reasonable. The person is justified in believing what they believe, but the belief itself is not within the knowledge you have justified, so you change the circumstances so that the person is no longer justified in believing what you think is a false belief. — BlueBanana

That the person does not have the evidence to demonstrate that the incorrect belief is incorrect, does not make the incorrect belief justified. So it is impossible for us to say that the incorrect belief which the person holds, or held, is justified. The person, and others may have held the belief as justified, but we now see this was wrong, and they were not justified in holding that belief.

You're conflating moral justification and epistemological justification, and also jumping into unjustified conclusions regarding what actions to take with unreasonable beliefs considered. — BlueBanana

These moral and legal examples were Michael's examples of justification. I find Michael's argued position to be downright abhorrent. Michael is trying to deny the true nature of mistake; that to make a mistake is to do something wrong; and to do something wrong is inherently irrational; by arguing that it may be reasonable and justified to do something wrong, if the incorrect beliefs which lead to the wrongdoing, the mistake, can be supported by evidence. So for example, if a police officer shoots an unarmed, innocent civilian, this mistake might be reasonable and justified, if the reasons for officer's incorrect belief that the unarmed civilian was an armed criminal, can be supported with evidence.

But this is simply to not face up to the fact that a mistake is a mistake; and that to make a mistake is to do something wrong; and to do something wrong is to do something which is inherently irrational. So instead of facing up to our mistakes, we might try to rationalize them, insisting that the irrational belief which lead to the mistake was really rational and justified. But this is nothing but contradiction, and so this entire argued perspective is nothing but an abhorrently detestable attempt at deception.

Please state the criterion for both, what it takes to be true and what it takes to be justified... on your view. — creativesoul

I cannot state any such "criterion", but I'll say that truth is based in honesty, so a true belief is an honest representation of what one thinks. Justification is a demonstration of the correctness of one's belief. So if I make a true representation of what I think, concerning a particular issue, and I manage to demonstrate the correctness of this belief, that is a justified true belief.

Please state the criterion for both, what it takes to be true and what it takes to be justified... on your view.
— creativesoul

I cannot state any such "criterion"... — Metaphysician Undercover

I rest my case.

So you're saying that if a person has reasons for one's belief, even if those reasons involve falsities, then that belief is reasonable? — Metaphysician Undercover

It's a soundness/validity kind of thing. Reasons that actually support the conclusion, if imperfectly, are what we want, not just any old stuff.

We distinguish between how well a claim supports a conclusion and whether that claim is itself factual.

Do you not understand the distinction, or do you reject it for some reason?

"She looks twenty," is indeed a reason to believe she's of the age of consent, but maybe not a very good reason.

So we can never state that any belief is justified or reasonable because we can't be sure about hwhether they are true or not?

Not always: one can always know their own existence. Mathematics and logic can also be argued on. I also think the context matters, as some information can be said to be infallible with specific premises, like that we can generally speaking trust our perceptions. Considering "I think, therefore I am" to be the only certainly justified belief and the only infallible knowledge won't get one far and I think no meaningful conclusions can be drawn from that. — BlueBanana

But of course one can always fallibly know about one’s own existence, that 1 and 1 equates to 2, etc. In your statement though I read the implicit affirmation that knowledge is infallible in order for it to be real/true knowledge. Reminds me of my take on why so many philosophical skeptics in history maintained that there can be no knowledge: because to others knowledge is always taken to entail infallibility.

To be clear, by “infallible” I don’t intend “infallible for all intended purposes” of “infallible given the conditions X, Y, and Z” but, instead, that which is “perfectly secure from all possible error”. I duly uphold that the argument for the law of noncontradiction is abnormally strong to an extreme—or at least that it can be—but I as of yet don’t know of an infallible justification for it. Because there is no justification that is perfectly secure form all possible error that either you or me (or anyone else that we’ve ever heard of) can evidence for the law of noncontradiction, the law of noncontradiction then will not be perfectly secure form all possible error as far as we can evidence. It is thereby fallible—i.e. holds some capacity of being wrong, regardless of how miniscule and utterly insignificant this capacity might be. Which is not to say that it is therefore false.

Then, 1 and 1 being equivalent to 2 could potentially entail that 1 and 1 does not equate to 2 at the same time and in the same way. This is acknowledgedly aberrant. But since there is no infallible justification for the law of noncontradiction, contradictions could then be instances of non-erroneous reasoning in ways in which our limited (non-omniscient) minds can’t currently fathom. This is my short-cut argument for 1 + 1 = 2 being fallible—and not infallible—knowledge (for it could be that 1 + 1 is also not equal to 2 … iff contradictions were not errors of reasoning … which we can’t infallibly evidence one way or another). This, though, doesn’t make it untrue that 1 + 1 = 2 and only 2. Our notion of 1 + 1 = 2 could well be an ontic truth, and thereby infallibly correct, but I’m not holding my breath for anybody to demonstrate its literal infallibility.

As to Descartes’ cogito ergo sum, Descartes took the “I think” proposition for granted, without demonstrating its infallibility. In fact, the thought he refers to could conceivably be caused by some given other than himself—the “I” he is addressing—such as by the evil demons we’ve all since Descartes time have become so accustomed to … or else the thoughts could be utterly uncaused in all senses (a block-universe model could account for this). Were any of these alternatives to describe that which is true, the proposition “I think” would then be false. As with 1 + 1 = 2 however, this isn’t to say that “I think” is therefore false. But it is not an infallible premise, or proposition, or conclusion form which other infallible conclusions—namely, that of “I am”—can be drawn.

In short, knowledge pertaining to non-omniscient first person points of view will always be fallible, regardless of what it may be about. I can argue this one further if needed. Simply present an instantiation of what is supposed to be infallible knowledge. :razz:

Though, because justification can be strong and weak, so too can knowledge be strong and weak. We hold strong knowledge that we are earthlings (right up there with BIVs, say rather than all 7(?) billion of us being extraterrestrial offspring) … as well as that 1 + 1 = 2 and that we are/exist. We hold comparatively weak knowledge of what the weather will be like in a few days from now (but we generally still know something about it).

That all knowledge is theoretically capable of being wrong, again, does not then mean that all our knowledge therefore is wrong (it could in fact depict that which is ontically true). Only that it is fallible, sometimes to an exceedingly insignificant degree—this outside of philosophical contemplations such as those regarding the nature of knowledge.

What about the situations where people might disagree on whether the evidence justifies a belief? — BlueBanana

In these cases, these very same people would disagree on whether or not knowledge is had. My quoted statement states that where knowledge is had it will always be (fallibly) epistemically justified to be true. Where there is disagreement about the validity of justification, however, there will then also be disagreement on there being knowledge.

If the Russell's teapot existed there'd be no justification for individuals of it. — BlueBanana

A good point. Poorly worded on my part. Here I meant that truths are always justifiable in principle. For example, if a teapot floats in space between the Earth and Mars, it will be capable of being evidenced to so be given a sufficiently large body of acquired information and analysis of this information. So too with there being a needle in a haystack. But, yes, we were talking in context of knowledge being justifiable true belief in practice. What I was getting at, in retrospect, is a little more complex, and it deals in large part with what I take to be ontological themes. To not seem like a charlatan: Ontic givens will, I uphold, not be mutually exclusive (will not be contradictory) and will cohere with each other when sufficiently related … akin to saying that the cosmos is a whole (it in fact gets more complex due to ontic randomness/indeterminacy being, imo, part of the picture, but to keep this on the brief side …). Truths, then, by virtue of conforming to ontic givens in one way or another, shall then hold similar properties: they shall not contradict and will cohere when sufficiently related. I won’t try to justify this here; its more than a mouthful even if I haven’t missed the mark. But then, if so, to justify a truth is to show how it is noncontradictory to other established truths (with those of direct experience being paramount, though fallible; here invoking foundationalism) and, with this, how it coheres into sufficiently related truths (here invoking coherentism). So truths are then always justifiable, at least in principle. But, in retrospect, my bad for bringing this up. It’s a topic for a different thread, maybe. And, again, good call on what I previously said. Yes, some beliefs which are ontically true cannot be justified in practice.

First I'd like to say that the hollow Earth theory is a poor choice of example [...] — BlueBanana

I personally like the hollowed Earth example. The Earth is either hollow or it is not; they can’t both be true (and even if contradictions were to be non-erroneous reasoning, we wouldn’t be able to make any sense out of them anyway). Even when knowledge is specified as “believed to be true beliefs epistemically justified in being ontically true” it would still pivot around ontic truth … thereby being upheld to be justified true belief (till evidenced to in fact be untrue, were such time to ever present itself … it might never do). It could be that my expressions/understandings are off base—in which case I’m very grateful for the criticism—but, to me, propositional knowledge then entails that that which is known is always assumed to be ontically true. Then, because those who know the earth to be hollow hold contradictory positions to those who know the earth to be solid, at least one of these two maintained instances of knowledge will be false. Justifications for the Earth being solid far outweigh justifications for the Earth being hollow (e.g., tectonic plate movements caused by convection currents of magma explain earthquakes … earthquakes being something which the hollow Earth model cannot as coherently justify).

Now that I think of it, this turns out to be a fairly good example of the complexities involved with knowledge. But I’ll leave it as it is unless there’s greater interest in this example.

More on topic, I find the view peculiar in that it allows false knowledge but does not really allow its practical usage. Basically it gives individuals the possibility of belief that their knowledge has a chance of being incorrect, but the hollow Earth model is, although stupid, like the idea of evil daemon deceiving us, theoretical possibility, like the idea of evil daemon deceiving us. This is why I'd prefer to define irrational beliefs, when believed by other to be justified, to be knowledge, that one then has a belief about that the knowledge is false. — BlueBanana

I’m so far not getting this. While I haven’t myself explicitly made use of the phrasing “false knowledge”, I can understand it in this way: false knowledge is not knowledge because it is false. This in parallel to a false truth (e.g., a lie) not being truth because it is false.

That seems logical but I also can't quite agree. I feel like there's a jump between the colloquial sense of uncertainty and absolute certainty. — BlueBanana

My take is that if we don’t find a means to amalgamate common sense uses of certainty (as in, “I’m sort’a certain that […]” or “my certainty of […] is strong”) with philosophical certainty, then we deprive ourselves of a term (and corresponding concept) used for “not being uncertain about” within realms of philosophy of mind. What I meant was that to believe X is to not be uncertain about X (therefore, to not be uncertain that our beliefs concerning X are true)—and not that it means “believing belief X to be (philosophically/absolutely) certain”.

... And now, without further ado, I'm off to bed. Man, I'll try to keep my posts shorter next time around. No promises though.

It's a soundness/validity kind of thing. Reasons that actually support the conclusion, if imperfectly, are what we want, not just any old stuff.

We distinguish between how well a claim supports a conclusion and whether that claim is itself factual.

Do you not understand the distinction, or do you reject it for some reason? — Srap Tasmaner

That tells me nothing. What we're talking about is falsities which support the conclusion. If someone is going to use a falsity to support a conclusion, they''ll probably use one which supports it well.

So we can never state that any belief is justified or reasonable because we can't be sure about hwhether they are true or not? — BlueBanana

Why would you say that? We can always make those claims, and often do. What I am saying is that if one makes such a claim, and is later proven wrong, then that person ought to admit to having been wrong, admit that the belief was unreasonable and unjustified, instead of trying to claim that the wrong belief really was "justified" or "reasonable", supported by other wrong beliefs. Such a failure to admit to having been wrong creates contradiction in what is meant by "reasonable" and "justified", and this allows deception to be reasonable and justified.

I rest my case. — creativesoul

You could probably state such criteria, but you've already demonstrated that you'd be wrong. I prefer to maintain integrity, not insisting on the correctness of something already proven to be wrong.

Why would you say that? We can always make those claims, and often do. — Metaphysician Undercover

There's always a possibility of being wrong, so can you claim that your belief is justified if that claim isn't justified? Then you couldn't make that claim. In your belief, you can't have an idea that can't be justified and be justified in making the claim that it is justified simply as the belief justified by the justification is believed to be justified.

If someone is going to use a falsity to support a conclusion, they''ll probably use one which supports it well — Metaphysician Undercover

Hmmm.

Here's another way to look at the issue. The word "reason" is ambiguous in an interesting way: we reason from our knowledge of effects to their causes and call those beliefs about effects our "reasons" for our belief about their causes; on the other hand, the cause is the "reason" for the effects. That I can see an iceberg is my reason for believing it's right in front of me; that an iceberg is right in front of me is the reason I can see it. We strive to perfect our conditionals, to believe that we can see iceberg right in front of us if, and only if, it's right in front of us. Thus our reasoning would be not a groping about in the dark, but our way of discovering the true structure of the universe, the real connections between things. We want to believe the universe is itself rational, has a rational structure, a structure we can come to understand through reasoning, a process of matching the movements of our minds to the movements of the universe without.

The interesting case is when we hold reasonable beliefs but derive from them a conclusion that turns out to be false. What has gone wrong? We have a choice: we could give up the vision sketched above, draw in our horns a bit, and take reason to be something we do, setting aside faith in the rational structure of the universe; or we could say that we must've failed, that reasoning that reaches a false conclusion cannot be "true reasoning" -- that the premises must only appear to support the conclusion but could not really support it.

Responses to Gettier along the lines of, "Well, he had a false belief -- garbage in, garbage out," rather miss the point, I think. Do we allow falsehoods to have real connections? Traditional logic says yes, valid but unsound, But how can this be? If our reasoning mirrors the rationality of the universe, those connections must also be only seemings, conditionals that cannot ever be perfected, for there is no truth underlying them.

But of course one can always fallibly know about one’s own existence — javra

For that belief to exist one would have to exist to believe it. Similarly

As to Descartes’ cogito ergo sum, Descartes took the “I think” proposition for granted, without demonstrating its infallibility. In fact, the thought he refers to could conceivably be caused by some given other than himself—the “I” he is addressing—such as by the evil demons we’ve all since Descartes time have become so accustomed to … or else the thoughts could be utterly uncaused in all senses (a block-universe model could account for this). Were any of these alternatives to describe that which is true, the proposition “I think” would then be false. — javra

in Descartes' argument, it's not the cause of the thought that is relevant. Even if the thought was thought by the evil demon, the one that holds the belief about thinking it, the one that is conscious of the thought and experiences it, must exist in order to do so.

I can agree on mathematics and most of logic being fallible though.

In these cases, these very same people would disagree on whether or not knowledge is had. My quoted statement states that where knowledge is had it will always be (fallibly) epistemically justified to be true. Where there is disagreement about the validity of justification, however, there will then also be disagreement on there being knowledge. — javra

I see this theory making sense: I've defined knowledge as a belief believed by the believer to be true and justified, and if I've understood you correctly, in that view the definition would be equivalent to that knowledge is a belief believed believed to be justified and believed by the believer to be true and justified.

A good point. Poorly worded on my part. Here I meant that truths are always justifiable in principle. For example, if a teapot floats in space between the Earth and Mars, it will be capable of being evidenced to so be given a sufficiently large body of acquired information and analysis of this information. So too with there being a needle in a haystack. — javra

Ah, yes, in Russell's example the teapot is too small to have been perceived. But what if the teapot is not only small, but also invisible and does not interact with the Universe in any way - it can't be perceived and does not influence anything? How could its existence be proven even in theory?

But, in retrospect, my bad for bringing this up. — javra

Not a problem at all.

Pragmatist. I solve the problem by the inclusion of a fourth parameter:

Knowledge is justified, unfalisfied, true belief.

Gettier doesn't impress me. The fact we missed this detail is likely coincidental or even imaginary.