We might clear up the issue if we revisit the time factor. I submit that the judge might say "you were justified in your belief". But now, the truth is exposed, and that belief no longer qualifies as a justified belief. That's the point with the op. The falsity is exposed, yet the belief is still referred to as a justified belief. — Metaphysician Undercover
If the truth is exposed to us but not to him then his belief is still justified. — Michael
It is reasonable for him to believe what I know is false. — Michael
No it's not, that's the point, once the belief is exposed as false it cannot be considered reasonable to hold that belief. — Metaphysician Undercover
If you know it's false, then you know that his belief is unreasonable. — Metaphysician Undercover
A justified true belief is true knowledge. It seems logical that justified belief is then knowledge. Knowledge can be false. Therefore a justified belief can be false. If something can be some way, I don't see why one couldn't believe the thing to be so. So, a justified belief can be false, and therefore one can believe a justified belief to be false.
Seems far fetched but that might work :chin: — BlueBanana
Even if not everything here rings true, I yet maintain that there should be first made an explicit distinction between fallible knowledge (which always holds the potential to be incorrect and thereby false in what it upholds as true belief) and infallible knowledge, which by definition is incapable of being false (specifically in that which it affirms to be true). — javra
knowledge is belief that is believed to be justified, regardless of whether it's true or not and regardless of whether it's justified or not. — BlueBanana
This sort of leads its way into the issue of what justification is. There’s foundationalism, coherentism, or Susan Haack’s proposal of a hybrid, which I favor (I’ve yet to find reason to take other theories of justification seriously). — javra
All the same, if truth has no bearing on justification, then I so far find that the term “justification” would be devoid of meaning. — javra
So if knowledge is belief that is believed to be justified, it would then need to be belied to be true. — javra
Also, doesn’t a belief need to be to some extent justified by oneself in order for one to believe it to be justified by oneself? — javra
All too true. The issue as you pointed out is one of demonstrability. To add an example, one can hold an intuitive certainty about something—a gut feeling—and this belief can in fact be infallibly true, or infallibly correct (when ontically appraised from some supposedly omniscient perspective). But—as you’ve mentioned—if one has no means of evidencing this gut-felt certitude to be infallible, one would have no means of knowing whether or not it in fact is infallible. — javra
It isn't reasonable for me to hold that belief, but it's still reasonable for him to hold that belief. — Michael
A belief is justified if it would be reasonable for the believer to hold the belief given the evidence available to him. — Michael
If John doesn't know that the ID is fake then it would rational of him to believe that Sarah is 16. It would be wrong to say that because I know that it's fake that John's isn't being reasonable in committing to such a belief. — Michael
So you're saying that if a person has reasons for one's belief, even if those reasons involve falsities, then that belief is reasonable? — Metaphysician Undercover
If those reasons include falsities then clearly my belief is unreasonable — Metaphysician Undercover
If I hold evidence that makes your belief unreasonable, then it's very clear that it's not reasonable for you to hold that belief. — Metaphysician Undercover
If I had the attitude that it was reasonable for you to hold false beliefs, then I would never be inclined to convince you of the reality of the situation. It is through confronting such unreasonableness that beliefs get justified. — Metaphysician Undercover
Not only is John being unreasonable but so are you. John is committed to a belief which you know is false, and is proceeding in activity which you know is wrong. You are claiming that it is reasonable for John to hold such a belief, and therefore reasonable for him to be proceeding in a wrong activity. If you do not designate his actions as unreasonable you will not be inclined to prevent him from proceeding with the wrongful actions. If you designate his actions as wrong, then to prevent him from proceeding, you will need to back this up with reasons, showing that his beliefs are unreasonable. If you truly belief his beliefs are reasonable, you have no recourse. So it is completely counterproductive, and unreasonable to think that John is being reasonable by committing to such a false belief. And I don't believe that anyone can honestly say that committing to a false belief is a reasonable thing to do. — Metaphysician Undercover
Whoa, I didn't consider this at all to be honest - that one could have infallible knowledge with justification that isn't infallible. [...] — BlueBanana
As I stated somewhere earlier in this thread, I try to make definitions that describe colloquial uses, and that knowledge is in colloquial sense never certain is the very reason I'm using my idea of false knowledge. This leads to basically that when one believes to know something (that is, they believe to have a justified true belief) instead of knowing that they only believe that information, they must know that thing. — BlueBanana
Because of this, it must be that as the person in your example believes their belief to be true and infallible, they do know that which their intuition tells them. — BlueBanana
What I'm not sure about is whether intuition, which I think is a valid justification, can justify intuition. — BlueBanana
To the individual and the cohort, justification will always be fallible — javra
Longwinded but this serves as a background to this conclusion: Wherever knowledge is upheld, relative to the individual(s) who so uphold, knowledge will always be factually justified to be true. — javra
The property of truth doesn’t follow from the property of being justifiable; rather the reverse applies. If a belief is true, it will then necessarily also be to some extent justifiable. — javra
So—while one can try to argue that knowledge is beliefs believed to be justified and true irrespective of whether or not they are in fact justified and true (this from an omniscient perspective?)—I’m maintaining that in practice knowledge will always be justified and true to the best awareness of the knowers … and will be so maintained to be until evidenced otherwise.
If an individual stubbornly maintains an irrational belief to be true and justified as true (e.g., the belief that Earth is hollow … believe it or not, I’ve heard this one before), while it will be considered knowledge to the individual, it will not be knowledge to us. That it is a “belief that is believed to be justified” is insufficient to make it knowledge to us. What would make this belief knowledge to us is a justification for this belief that would evidence this belief to be true (this in light of the many things we already (fallibly) know, such that gravity requires mass, thereby entailing that a hollowed planet would be devoid of the gravity we experientially know our planet to have). — javra
Right, but I don’t endorse the term of “infallible knowledge” in this case for the reasons I previously tried to provide. If knowledge is not a lucky guess, then one cannot have infallible knowledge—not unless one infallibly demonstrates it to so be "infallible belief that is infallibly true and is infallibly justified as being true". — javra
Whenever we believe things--and are not then uncertain about them--we then hold a subjective certainty that our beliefs are true. — javra
Being reasonable isn't the same thing as having reasons. — BlueBanana
Earlier you agreed though that in the medieval times it was reasonable with the given evidence to believe that the Earth was flat. — BlueBanana
In that situation you'd present the evidence to that person, after which the belief would no longer be reasonable. The person is justified in believing what they believe, but the belief itself is not within the knowledge you have justified, so you change the circumstances so that the person is no longer justified in believing what you think is a false belief. — BlueBanana
You're conflating moral justification and epistemological justification, and also jumping into unjustified conclusions regarding what actions to take with unreasonable beliefs considered. — BlueBanana
Please state the criterion for both, what it takes to be true and what it takes to be justified... on your view. — creativesoul
Please state the criterion for both, what it takes to be true and what it takes to be justified... on your view.
— creativesoul
I cannot state any such "criterion"... — Metaphysician Undercover
So you're saying that if a person has reasons for one's belief, even if those reasons involve falsities, then that belief is reasonable? — Metaphysician Undercover
Not always: one can always know their own existence. Mathematics and logic can also be argued on. I also think the context matters, as some information can be said to be infallible with specific premises, like that we can generally speaking trust our perceptions. Considering "I think, therefore I am" to be the only certainly justified belief and the only infallible knowledge won't get one far and I think no meaningful conclusions can be drawn from that. — BlueBanana
What about the situations where people might disagree on whether the evidence justifies a belief? — BlueBanana
If the Russell's teapot existed there'd be no justification for individuals of it. — BlueBanana
First I'd like to say that the hollow Earth theory is a poor choice of example [...] — BlueBanana
More on topic, I find the view peculiar in that it allows false knowledge but does not really allow its practical usage. Basically it gives individuals the possibility of belief that their knowledge has a chance of being incorrect, but the hollow Earth model is, although stupid, like the idea of evil daemon deceiving us, theoretical possibility, like the idea of evil daemon deceiving us. This is why I'd prefer to define irrational beliefs, when believed by other to be justified, to be knowledge, that one then has a belief about that the knowledge is false. — BlueBanana
That seems logical but I also can't quite agree. I feel like there's a jump between the colloquial sense of uncertainty and absolute certainty. — BlueBanana
It's a soundness/validity kind of thing. Reasons that actually support the conclusion, if imperfectly, are what we want, not just any old stuff.
We distinguish between how well a claim supports a conclusion and whether that claim is itself factual.
Do you not understand the distinction, or do you reject it for some reason? — Srap Tasmaner
So we can never state that any belief is justified or reasonable because we can't be sure about hwhether they are true or not? — BlueBanana
I rest my case. — creativesoul
Why would you say that? We can always make those claims, and often do. — Metaphysician Undercover
If someone is going to use a falsity to support a conclusion, they''ll probably use one which supports it well — Metaphysician Undercover
But of course one can always fallibly know about one’s own existence — javra
As to Descartes’ cogito ergo sum, Descartes took the “I think” proposition for granted, without demonstrating its infallibility. In fact, the thought he refers to could conceivably be caused by some given other than himself—the “I” he is addressing—such as by the evil demons we’ve all since Descartes time have become so accustomed to … or else the thoughts could be utterly uncaused in all senses (a block-universe model could account for this). Were any of these alternatives to describe that which is true, the proposition “I think” would then be false. — javra
In these cases, these very same people would disagree on whether or not knowledge is had. My quoted statement states that where knowledge is had it will always be (fallibly) epistemically justified to be true. Where there is disagreement about the validity of justification, however, there will then also be disagreement on there being knowledge. — javra
A good point. Poorly worded on my part. Here I meant that truths are always justifiable in principle. For example, if a teapot floats in space between the Earth and Mars, it will be capable of being evidenced to so be given a sufficiently large body of acquired information and analysis of this information. So too with there being a needle in a haystack. — javra
But, in retrospect, my bad for bringing this up. — javra
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