Pigeons can learn what to choose in order to get what comes after... Classic post hoc ergo prompter hoc 'reasoning'... the attribution of causality. One of the most rudimentary kinds of thought and belief.

They know nothing of right angles.

They make an association, draw a correlation, make a connection between their own behaviour and what happens afterwards...

With Banno I agree that no language, no concept. — creativesoul

Cuckoo. :eyes:

That's like saying "no juicer, no fruit". A juicer is a tool that is used to express fruit juice, just as language is a tool that is used to express concepts.

Think of a concept as a container. The container is akin to a name/identity. The conceptual understanding is everything falling under that name/identity. As before, our concepts point towards something, so they're abstract understanding. I would argue against any notion of anything close to that when/where there has been and/or is no language. — creativesoul

You're making no sense. A concept can't be both a name and an abstract understanding, and the one is not like the other in notable respects. Make your mind up.

The proper distinction is between a concept and its expression in language. You appear to be confusing the two.

Concepts precede language. Therefore it's not true that there has never been the one without the other.

Earlier Sam mentioned confusion between our linguistic representation (reports) and what we're reporting upon. — creativesoul

Ah, so I'm neither the only one, nor the first one, to raise the issue. You seem to be suffering from this very confusion.

However, we cannot claim that our reports are equivalent to the belief itself. That is my issue with claiming that belief is a relation between a proposition/statement and the believer. The only relation that non-linguistic beasties have with that is one we make. — creativesoul

I agree with this Creative. So it appears that you agree with the idea (extrapolating from what you stated) that we can observe beliefs in animals and in pre-linguuistic man, and even in our own actions on a daily basis. This is what I believe Wittgenstein was saying in some of my early quotes, i.e., we can show our beliefs in our actions apart from language. Language is just another medium of expression, and I'm here equating expression as being twofold, in that it also includes one's actions apart from language.

I agree with the point that the only relation that a non-linguistic animal could have with a proposition is one that we make, but that doesn't seem to go against what Banno himself has said on this. Note that he said that what we're talking of can be placed in a general form as a relation between someone and a proposition. He invited us to think of this as setting up a basic structure or grammar for belief.

Is there anything more to a concept - any concept - than is found in our use of it in language?

If so, what?
— Banno

I think you first have to show that concepts even partially reduce to language use (before you ask what else?)

I think you first have to show that concepts even partially reduce to language use (before you ask what else?) — frank

:up:

They know nothing of right angles. — creativesoul

They know what they look like in a general enough fashion to agree with us about particular instances.

Their behaviour demonstrates a concept. And an ambiguous scene will test the degree of their belief.

I can only say that when I read these posts that language necessarily precedes concepts, I wonder how it is that I reject those arguments fully understanding the basis of my rejection well before I've articulated that basis linguistically. You guys might be describing the way your mind works, or maybe you wish simply to deny something that challenges your worldview, but I find the discussion just so clearly inconsistent with experience. I conceptualize nonlinguistically and find myself searching for words to express those concepts. If you don't, good for you, but I know no other way to do it.

I conceptualize nonlinguistically and find myself searching for words to express those concepts. — Hanover

Yep. And for those pushing a tight identification of thought/belief :) with the human-only power of grammatical speech, that question usually leads to the argument that there is a further hidden level of mentalese - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Language_of_thought_hypothesis

But the alternative - some kind of Hebbian or Behaviourist associationism - has its own serious problems. The "nonlinguistic" part of your searching for words has to have some flavour of a Hebbian network competition. And that we would have completely in common with animals.

Yet neither extreme could get it right all on its own. Hence why a semiotic approach is needed which can marry the two halves of the puzzle.

I'm increasingly convinced that beliefs are a folk-psychological back-construct; that they are an invention that serves, however poorly, our attempts to explain what we do; but which does not correspond to anything real. — Banno

I'm deeply sympathetic to this view, Banno. I'm not sure though that I'd want to say beliefs are not real, or that concepts aren't real. They're just not, you know, objects. I think they're more in the space of habits or rules, the sort of thing Ryle leaned on with all his talk of dispositions.

If you like, you can say that I believed the chair I was about to sit in would not disappear, and that as I sit here typing I continue to believe it. I've been believing it all day. There's just no call for saying this. It's an explanation in search of a problem, but otherwise not different in kind from belief ascriptions that do serve a purpose.

[Edited, left out "no".]

Since my last post had no takers, I’ll expand a little on what I previously posted so it doesn’t seem so trite.

If there is no semantic difference between a maintained trust that and a belief that then, as per common experience, trust precedes linguistic expression. Much as Bonno hates the topic of perception, trust, for example, is inherent to all perception—trust that what we seem to smell, taste, hear, touch, and (the ever so popular) see is as we perceive it to be. If you see a red cup, you believe that there is a red cup you see. No language is required for this; indeed, to require that instances of language precedes all such instances of belief would be to push the limits of credibility, imo.

Our pets maintain trust that we are not out to kill them as would their natural predators or adversaries—a more complex, conceptual trust than that inherent to perception. (This being an example I find glaring, though numerous other examples can also be argued.) In measure to their degree of intellect, animals can become surprised or bewildered—these being reactions to when that which is trusted to be is not as one trusted it to be.

Acknowledgedly, defining belief in terms of maintained trust (again, both in terms of “that” and not in terms of “in”) then pushes the philosophical question further back into what trust is. Though in my view not the easiest of topics to tackle, I take it that no one would argue that trust, as linguistic concept, has no ontically present referent within cognition. Nevertheless, so defining does evidence that beliefs (and if beliefs are thoughts, then thoughts as well) are not necessarily contingent upon language … as others here have also mentioned.

And again, if you disagree with belief-that being nothing more, and nothing less, than a maintained trust-that, be direct about your reasons for disagreement.

"Trust that ..." sounds pretty close to "expectation that ..." I think this is all to the good, Javra. Fits comfortably with my ridiculous chair that I continually trust will not disappear whilst I sit upon it. I think this is the right place to look for belief.

Hey, thank you for the feedback. Yea, that belief is a form of trust has been my working hypothesis for a while now, and I can’t so far find anything wrong with it.

To stir up the waters a bit on this issue of trust: Yes, to trust-that is to hold some form of expectation, I agree. Interesting to me is that expectations also seem intimately related to forethought, at least in more intelligent animals. While trust and forethought don’t to me appear to be synonymous (rather, forethought appears to me to occur with a foundation of multiple beliefs (improperly stated, "trusts")), putting my behavioral evolution hat on, I could maintain an argument that something from which our trust and expectation descends can also be found in some pre-linguistic form in at least some unicellular organisms; for example, in trusting/expecting that that is prey and not predator, or vice versa.

This ties into a more philosophically biological approach to trust/belief that I’m also working with as a hypothesis: some trust is genetically inherited in our behavioral phenotype (perceptual trust would be one example), some is acquired via experience (i.e., learned), and some is enactive (as in actively choosing to trust/believe this rather than that … which can subsequently become learned and, eventually, habitual).

Still curious, though, to see if there something I’m mistaking in the “a maintained trust that” – “belief that” equivalency. For example, this understanding of belief doesn’t seem to sit well with Ancient Greek notions of belief … but not knowing my Ancient Greek, I haven’t yet discerned what might be missing, this when it comes to terms such as “dogma” (a stubbornly held belief/trust?).

But in terms of this thread, yes, I too uphold that beliefs can be non-linguistic.

Heavy.

How do you tell that someone has understood that concept?

"Ah, sure, he uses a proper lift on heavy objects, keeping his back straight; and he asks for help when things are too heavy for him. And he uses the word properly. But does he understand the concept?"

Yes, because there is nothing more to understanding the concept than using a proper lift on heavy objects, keeping your back straight; asking for help when things are too heavy. And using the word properly.

"No, Banno - there is in addition an irreducible, invisible thing-in-the-mind had by those who understand 'heavy' - the concept of heavy."

"No, Banno - there is in addition an irreducible, invisible thing-in-the-mind had by those who understand 'heavy' - the concept of heavy."

And when you and I both understand "heavy", we have the same concept in our minds? Is there one concept, shared, or is there one concept each?

And if there is one concept that we all share, what sort of thing could it be?

But if we have one concept each, how can it be the same concept? How is "heavy" for me the same as "heavy" for you?

Interesting that "trust" and "true" have the same root. As does "tree".

"No, Banno - there is in addition an irreducible, invisible thing-in-the-mind had by those who understand 'heavy' - the concept of heavy." — Banno

You forgot to mention the "irreducible, invisible thing-in-the-mind" which is a sense of things being surprising or unsurprising in relation to "heaviness" revealing behaviour.

If someone is asked to lift a fake weight, will they show they had a belief in terms of a state of trust not being maintained? (As @javra very astutely points out.) And if the weight is as heavy as it naively looks from experience, will there instead be a sense that things are just how they were conceived?

- as javra suggests? — apokrisis

Why the question mark? :smile:
Yea, that's how I've been thinking about it so far.

Interesting that — Banno

No it isn't.

Why the question mark? — javra

My misleading punctuation has been fixed. :grin:

Yes, because there is nothing more to understanding the concept than using a proper lift on heavy objects, keeping your back straight; asking for help when things are too heavy. And using the word properly. — Banno

Grasping the concept is the concept? Somebody isn't using the word "concept" correctly.

And if there is one concept that we all share, what sort of thing could it be? — Banno

A student told Socrates, "I can't imagine what the moon might be other than a giant ball of cheese. Therefore, it is a giant ball of cheese." Socrates is said to have claimed that it was the best argument he had ever heard.

Trust is indeed pre-linguistic, for in addition to an agents' trusting it's own physiological sensory perception, during language acquisition, the student trusts the truthfulness of the teacher. That is... the student has no ability to doubt that that is a tree...

There needs to be a fair amount of proper quantification/qualification in these... our accounts. Some belief is prior to language. Some not. Some trust is prior to language. Some not.

It all depends upon the content. That is, it all depends upon what, exactly, the agent in question is drawing correlations, connections, and/or associations between.

Banno...

If you think that my notion of belief is some thing in the mind, you've gotten me wrong. The mind is necessary but terribly insufficient. The content of thought and belief(mind) is neither objective nor subjective, external nor internal, mind nor body....

It is all of these things, either as necessary preconditions or actual content...

Concepts are linguistic. Some point to things that exist in their entirety prior to our becoming aware of them... Do not confuse the concept with what it takes account of... The same is true of some thought and belief, some meaning as well...

With Banno I agree that no language, no concept.
— creativesoul

Cuckoo. :eyes:

That's like saying "no juicer, no fruit". A juicer is a tool that is used to express fruit juice, just as language is a tool that is used to express concepts. — Sapientia

Only if one falls for false analogies...

A better one would be no fruit, no fruit juice...

creative

Think of a concept as a container. The container is akin to a name/identity. The conceptual understanding is everything falling under that name/identity. As before, our concepts point towards something, so they're abstract understanding. I would argue against any notion of anything close to that when/where there has been and/or is no language.

Sapientia

You're making no sense. A concept can't be both a name and an abstract understanding, and the one is not like the other in notable respects. Make your mind up.

Whether or not I am making sense is determined by the framework I'm using, not yours.

Name a concept that is prior to language. I would say that unless all concepts are prior to language, your assertion needs to be properly quantified/qualified.

Fairness. That's a concept. Justice, yet another. Love, yet one more. Much like belief and thought and all sorts of other names, some of them point towards that which exists in it's entirety prior to our discovery/awareness of it. Causality is one such thing.

Sapentia

The proper distinction is between a concept and its expression in language. You appear to be confusing the two.

Appearances can be deceiving.

Sapentia

Concepts precede language. Therefore it's not true that there has never been the one without the other.

Some of our conceptual understanding is of that which exists in it's entirety prior to our awareness of it. Causality. Physiological sensory perception. Meaning(some). The presupposition of truth. Thought and belief(some)... etc.

Concepts are linguistic. — creativesoul

I'm telling you that I comprehend concepts nonlinguistically, so it's sort of silly for you to tell me I'm not, don't you think?

If I told you there were no computers, should it matter to me that you report to me you're using a computer?

I also agree that what's leads us astray is that we are using language to talk about the beliefs on non-linguistic animals, including pre-linguistic man. However, I'm not sure what you mean by "...having a belief that is not meaningful to the creature," i.e., maybe you mean in terms of language, it's not meaningful to the creature? — Sam26

If the content of belief is propositional, then the content of non-linguistic creatures belief is meaningless to them. That is also assuming that propositions are prior to language. They must be if belief content is propositional and non-linguistic creatures have belief. At any rate, such a position finds itself in quite a jam, for it claims that non-linguistic creature's belief content is meaningless to the creature or that propositional content is prior to language...

You seem to be saying what I was saying a while back, i.e., that people seem to be confusing beliefs, the linguistic expression of beliefs, with an act that shows the belief apart from language. There is no way for these creatures to understand the belief as we understand the belief, since the belief as we are expressing them are necessarily linguistic. They have no concept called belief. So part of the problem is that our talk of these beliefs is a necessary function of language, which in turn leads to the assumption that the belief itself, as shown in the animal/human, is a necessary function of language. It is a necessary function of language if we are to express beliefs using language, but that doesn't mean that an act cannot show a belief apart from a linguistic understanding.

We agree here. The difficulty is parsing out what exactly is the content of the belief. It must be something meaningful to the believer. No doubt about that. None whatsoever. Jack's belief must be meaningful to Jack.

Another way to think of this, is when we talk about the Earth having one moon, we can only do this in language, i.e., the concept has an instance in reality. So the concept has a referent (i.e., the object Earth) quite apart from the concept and the linguistic use. In the same way, there is a referent to the word belief, viz., particular actions that an animal expresses in life. We see these same actions (a kind of referent) in us, i.e., in our daily actions. I open the door, shows the belief that a door is there, regardless of any expression of the belief in language. So the action is the referent, granted, it is different from the referent Earth, but it's still part of reality as something that is instantiated. Thus, these acts are referred to in language by the concept belief/s. Just as we use the concept Earth to refer to the object. Maybe this helps, not sure.

I don't think that I would agree with this bit. Referents are about one 'kind' of meaning. While all thought and belief must be meaningful to the believer(otherwise how does it possibly count as such), I'm not too keen upon referents being prior to language.

I'm telling you that I comprehend concepts nonlinguistically, so it's sort of silly for you to tell me I'm not, don't you think? — Hanover

Name them, and we can parse this out...

My position doesn't require mentalese...

My position doesn't require mentalese... — creativesoul

Yes. It doesn't seem to require or involve an explanation in any form.

I don't think that I would agree with this bit. Referents are about one 'kind' of meaning. While all thought and belief must be meaningful to the believer(otherwise how does it possibly count as such), I'm not too keen upon referents being prior to language. — creativesoul

lol You don't like referent, and I don't like the phrase "meaningful to the believer." It's interesting, at points I think there is agreement, then someone will spell in more detail what they mean, and I'm again confused about what their talking about.

All I'm going to say is there are beliefs that refer to actions apart from statements/propositions, and leave it at that.