The question "what is the (morally) right thing to do?" is not a question which cannot be answered by science, it's a question which absolutely can be answered by science. — Pseudonym


Well, your one attempt so far in this conversation has been to replace the question with a different one (which, I contend, science cannot answer either): — SophistiCat

I've written, or responded to, 14 pages of posts , half of which have been about the position that science provide solutions to moral dilemmas. If you're going to continue down this line of personal insult then I've no interest in discussing things with you. I have not made "one attempt" I've expounded at great length exactly why I think the question "what is the (morally) right thing to do?" can be answered by science, if you can't be bothered to read it or engage with any of the arguments, then I've no time for you.

What you should have written, to be consistent with what you were saying earlier, is

"Do members of our species tend to kill our mothers?" — SophistiCat

No, that would just be a description of our actions, not of their consequences. If you want to be pedantic, what I should have written is "Do any of our species kill their own mothers, if they do, what are the consequences on their psychological state, what sort of psychological states do our species strive to achieve and so does a theory that killing ones own mother will lead to desirable psychological states seem useful?" That is what the word 'should' means to me. I can't think of any other meaning of the term without begging the question and presuming that there is some external measure of morality to which we are compelled to aspire. 'Should' is not a categorical word, it is a hypothetical one, Moore showed that pretty conclusively. One 'should' do X if one wishes to achieve y. It simply makes no grammatical or logical sense to ask what one 'should' do without the context of an objective. Ethical naturalism is simply the claim that the objective is already set by our natures and so all that is left to discuss is how best to achieve it in various contexts.

Why do questions which cannot be resolved whose answers are unknowable need to be asked?

Do you see Nietzsche as a philosopher who contributed to our understanding of the world? Because Nietzsche's main contribution is asking questions that cannot reasonably be resolved. Would you dismiss Nietzsche based on this?

I only know of one great scientist that has said silly, dismissive things about philosophy, and he hasn't been mentioned in this thread yet, so I won't mention him (and in any case the thing he said was much less dogmatic and generalising than the sort of thing Hawking or Krauss have said). — andrewk

Richard Feynmann.

Do you see Nietzsche as a philosopher who contributed to our understanding of the world? — Nop

No. The vast majority of people haven’t read Nietzche and they don't seem to be doing markedly worse at living than the tiny minority who have. There are also some people who I have no reason to doubt the intelligence of (Bertrand Russell, for example) who have read Nietzche and still feel their understanding of the world to be completely unaffected by the experience.

Would you dismiss Nietzsche based on this? — Nop

Yes

To put it another way, saying that there needs to be a movement demanding we do not kill for no reason is like having a movement advising that we eat when hungry. Yes, there are some people who do not eat when hungry, there are people with eating disorders who will not eat even though they are hungry, but we do not need a movement to advocate eating just because of a minority whose faculties are not working properly for whatever reason. — Pseudonym

Interesting. However, you miss telling us that even if we were to have a movement advocating eating when hungry, it doesn't thereby follow that more people would eat when hungry than already do now. In other words, it is not proven that advocating something will get the results desired.

No. The vast majority of people haven’t read Nietzche and they don't seem to be doing markedly worse at living than the tiny minority who have. There are also some people who I have no reason to doubt the intelligence of (Bertrand Russell, for example) who have read Nietzche and still feel their understanding of the world to be completely unaffected by the experience.

If the discipline of philosophy is characterized as being concerned with questions, not answers, would you dismiss the discipline of philosophy? In addition, lets say that hypothetically, Russels's paradox regarding set theory fundamentally cannot be resolved, would you be consistent and say that you would dismiss Russels's paradox, as you do with Nietzsche?

I have read most of this thread, and @Pseudonym has been running circles around at least @Wayfarer and @StreetlightX. That moment with the Quine quote was quite hilarious, I must admit :lol: And this is coming from someone who is completely against scientism, and doesn't even think science is that valuable to begin with.

I agree entirely, it is an act of philosophy to say that philosophy is dead, but I don't see this as any more contradictory than Wittgenstein's 'ladder'. Not all philosophical statements can be true without making each one pointless (unless we accept your 'philosophy as comfort' idea, which I will come back to), not all philosophical statements can be false as that would itself be a philosophical statement and so paradoxical (again, we could argue about whether that's actually a problem, but let's presume it is for now). — Pseudonym

Okay, I get what you're saying. Positivism, or the claim that science can answer, say, moral questions better than philosophy and other disciplines would be a philosophical claim, but just like other philosophical claims, it excludes other possibilities. My issue is then, how does one arrive to accept positivism as true? Clearly, it is not something that can be empirically determined, granted that it is a philosophical position, and not a scientific one itself.

I don't think that "philosophy is dead" is something to be laughed out of court or dismissed. I think it is a serious statement, that ought to be taken seriously.

The book 'The Grand Design', in which the "philosophy is dead" statement was made, goes on to explain Hawking how feels the answers to questions like "why are we here?" are correctly answered by a deductive nomological model. — Pseudonym

However, the issue is that Hawking does NOT take it seriously. He does not prove why we ought to think that philosophy is dead. Quite the contrary, he proves how ignorant he is when he, for example, states that Epicurus argued against atomism - Epicurus, of course, being a famous materialist and atomist.

If the 'purpose' of philosophy is to comfort people, then show me a paper marked on its ability to do so. — Pseudonym

Why must something be reproducible to be valid? If there is a paper on it, it means that we have the capacity to reproduce results, such as comforting people. But the issue is that people are extremely complex, intractably so, if I may say that, so we have no way to "reproduce" any of this comfort giving when it comes to people. Everyone's situation is different, it's not like we're dealing with atoms, all of which behave in the same predictable ways. The situations with people are extremely complex, so it makes little sense to expect philosophy to provide reproducible results in comforting people.

The point I am making is that this makes 'Scientism' no different from any other philosophical position (which also requires a similar set of fundamental beliefs), and yet it (unlike all other philosophical positions) is treated with derision and hatred. — Pseudonym

Yes, if the person in question cannot provide reasons for so believing, then it ought to be treated with derision. Many scientific materialists here have laughable arguments. I've debated a few of them, so I know. You seem to be somewhat more sophisticated than the "God does not exist and religion is a fairy tale" BS of some atheists, so we'll see. But people like Lawrence Krauss (for example) are laughable. They cannot even articulate their position, that's how confused it is.

I am not trying to prove that Scientism is true, I don't even believe it is possible to prove such a thing, to do so would be to answer a philosophical question about Physicalism and I've just argued that answering such question is (in all likelihood) impossible. — Pseudonym

If you cannot provide an account for why you choose Scientism over other belief systems, then you are being irrational. You ought to suspend judgement if all positions are equally likely.

My issue is then, how does one arrive to accept positivism as true? Clearly, it is not something that can be empirically determined, granted that it is a philosophical position, and not a scientific one itself. — Agustino

Absolutely, I don't see how it is possible to accept any metaphysical statement as true unless it transpires to be an empirical statement. Even then 'true' is just a temporary label meaning 'usefully predictive for the time being'. Physicalism is a belief which cannot be justified. I think there are logical arguments which lead directly from Physicalism to Naturalism, but they require that one agrees with the authority of logic, which itself is a belief statement.

He does not prove why we ought to think that philosophy is dead. Quite the contrary, he proves how ignorant he is when he, for example, states that Epicurus argued against atomism - Epicurus, of course, being a famous materialist and atomist. — Agustino

This, I think is a common criticism (not entirely unreasonable), but is a type of category error. Peter Van Inwagen said something once along the lines of "the only facts in philosophy are who said what, when". Hawking is without doubt quite ignorant of those facts, but this need have absolutely no bearing on his ability to make rational arguments without begging the question. If philosophy is useless, then why would his ignorance of it minutae be relevant? Philosophers seem quite confident in arguing that science cannot answer questions of morality, for example, without knowing all there is to know about neuroscience.

Why must something be reproducible to be valid? If there is a paper on it, it means that we have the capacity to reproduce results, such as comforting people. But the issue is that people are extremely complex, intractably so, if I may say that, so we have no way to "reproduce" any of this comfort giving when it comes to people. Everyone's situation is different, it's not like we're dealing with atoms, all of which behave in the same predictable ways. The situations with people are extremely complex, so it makes little sense to expect philosophy to provide reproducible results in comforting people. — Agustino

I agree, and I do personally think that a good role for philosophy is to comfort people (although I have some reservations too), and of course if it is to play this role it will not necessarily be able to prove it can do so. The comment I made was not aimed at this proposition. It was meant to point out that the whole of academia, and much amateur philosophy clearly does not see it this way, otherwise there would be no failing as a philosopher.

Yes, if the person in question cannot provide reasons for so believing, then it ought to be treated with derision. Many scientific materialists here have laughable arguments. I've debated a few of them, so I know. You seem to be somewhat more sophisticated than the "God does not exist and religion is a fairy tale" BS of some atheists, so we'll see. But people like Lawrence Krauss (for example) are laughable. They cannot even articulate their position, that's how confused it is. — Agustino

I think perhaps we can agree there are laughably bad reasons for believing something on both sides of the argument, but if it works for them personally, then I don't think we have much authority to dismiss it. I like the justifications for my beliefs to be a certain way, others are happier with less substance to their stories. I'm not sure we're in a position to judge. If someone comes to me wanting to test their justification, their story, then I'm happy to try and persuade them of mine. It helps them with their goal, and it helps me with mine. Laurence Krauss puts his justifications out there with a self-righteousness I find quite unpleasant, but there's been bad blood on both sides so his belligerence is not entirely self-made.

you cannot provide an account for why you choose Scientism over other belief systems, then you are being irrational. You ought to suspend judgement if all positions are equally likely. — Agustino

You are confusing proving with providing an account. I think over the last 15 pages I have provided something of an account of why I am a Naturalist (although that want the intention of my original post). What I don't believe is possible is to prove that my account is correct,and I simply don't believe it is possible to suspend judgement.

Even then 'true' is just a temporary label meaning 'usefully predictive for the time being'. — Pseudonym

So perhaps then we should delve deeply into truth. What does it mean for a proposition to be true? And is all truth limited to propositional truth?

You seem to suggest that 'true' means 'usefully predictive for the time being'. When I tell you that I have $100 in my wallet, is the truth of this proposition granted by its usefulness? If so, what is usefulness? Is it usefulness to me? Usefulness to who exactly?

Physicalism is a belief which cannot be justified. — Pseudonym

Right, as are the other metaphysical beliefs. Is your belief that "metaphysical beliefs cannot be justified" itself a justified belief? If not why should we prefer it, as opposed to the opposite?

If philosophy is useless, then why would his ignorance of it minutae be relevant? — Pseudonym

I am sure that you will agree that in order to determine if something is useless, you must go into it, you must investigate it, and do so seriously. Otherwise how can you know if it is useless? We do not start from assumptions like "philosophy is dead" or "philosophy is useless" - we must rather argue to them. And to argue to them, we have to engage with philosophy - we have to show that we have engaged with it, and it has proven to be futile.

Philosophers seem quite confident in arguing that science cannot answer questions of morality, for example, without knowing all there is to know about neuroscience. — Pseudonym

That should be seen as a problem for those philosophers who want to say that neuroscience cannot provide any help in resolving moral conundrums.

I agree, and I do personally think that a good role for philosophy is to comfort people (although I have some reservations too), and of course if it is to play this role it will not necessarily be able to prove it can do so. — Pseudonym

Who would be able to prove that philosophy is playing such a role, and what would proof consist in?

I think perhaps we can agree there are laughably bad reasons for believing something on both sides of the argument, but if it works for them personally, then I don't think we have much authority to dismiss it. — Pseudonym

Suppose there is a man who has cancer, and he refuses all medical treatments, and claims that eating grass will cure him of cancer. And he eats grass and he is indeed cured of cancer (let's say it is spontaneous remission). It clearly worked for him personally, in that he did reach the result he was aiming for. What will we say if he now intends to market and promote his idea to other cancer patients?

You are confusing proving with providing an account. — Pseudonym

What would it mean to prove that naturalism is true? What does that even mean?

I think over the last 15 pages I have provided something of an account of why I am a Naturalist (although that want the intention of my original post). — Pseudonym

No, I have not actually seen you provide an account for it. You have merely been arguing that it's a possibility, there is nothing incoherent or contradictory in being a naturalist. Sure, there isn't. But you haven't provided any reason for why anyone, including yourself, should be a naturalist as opposed to, for example, a Cartesian dualist.

and I simply don't believe it is possible to suspend judgement. — Pseudonym

Why not? If you perceive so clearly as you say you do that metaphysical propositions cannot be true, why is it that you cannot suspend judgement with regards to their truth, but rather prefer to choose one position amongst the available range?

Scientism is the optimistic belief that everything will eventually be explained by science, and thus leaves no room for the ineffable. It is usually held by non-scientists who who wish to attack metaphysical beliefs. It is based on induction:

In the past many things were not understood.
Science has explained many of these things.
Therefore, in the future science will explain things that are currently not understood.

Scientism is problematic in two main areas: Firstly, It doesn't take account of the fact the scientific theory is 'best' explanation rather than 'definitive' explanation. Most scientists accept the heuristic aspect of their work and proceed from ignorance. Exponents of scientism focus on the achievements of science instead of its limited nature.

Secondly, it doesn't take account of the human limitation for understanding and is thus absurdly anthropocentric. Most scientists are acutely aware that scientific knowledge is theoretically limited by the questions that be formulated about it. What can ultimately be known by humans is not the same as complete knowledge of the universe.

Richard Feynman. — Agustino

Bingo! :grin:

When I tell you that I have $100 in my wallet, is the truth of this proposition granted by its usefulness? If so, what is usefulness? Is it usefulness to me? Usefulness to who exactly? — Agustino

Yes, I believe so. I can't think of any other reason why I would be interested in the veracity of the statement unless I intend to do something about it, and so it is useful for me to be able to include your wealth in my calculations. Useful to the person holding the theory, of course.

Right, as are the other metaphysical beliefs. Is your belief that "metaphysical beliefs cannot be justified" itself a justified belief? If not why should we prefer it, as opposed to the opposite? — Agustino

No, I think that;s a sound empirical theory. There are no metaphysical beliefs which have been proven to be true, there currently is no mechanism by which a metaphysical belief could be proven true, it's a good scientific theory to hold, therefore, that metaphysical beliefs cannot be proven true.

I am sure that you will agree that in order to determine if something is useless, you must go into it, you must investigate it, and do so seriously. Otherwise how can you know if it is useless? — Agustino

I didn't say we should not investigate it, but it is not necessary to know all of its details, otherwise you're setting up an unfalsifiable premise (popular among philosophers). Anyone criticising philosophy can be automatically disregarded without having to actually engage with their arguments on the grounds of some canonical detail they were unaware of. "Ah, but did you not know that Kant accidentally misspelled 'Zwecke' in the first draft of the Critique of Practical Reason? No? Well I don't have to take any notice of anything you say then, you obviously know nothing about philosophy", it's a lazy cop out. If there's a sound argument against what Hawking has said, it should be easy to make, there should be no need to brandish his poor reading of Epicurus, only correct it.

That should be seen as a problem for those philosophers who want to say that neuroscience cannot provide any help in resolving moral conundrums. — Agustino

Yes, but it isn't. If it were, we would have to declare the whole of ethics a closed subject. Philosophers are no longer allowed to discuss it because they are not fully immersed in the details of neuroscience, and neuroscientists are not allowed to talk about it because they are not fully read up on philosophy. Metaphysics is out of the window too, unless all metaphysicians are fully trained quantum physicists, and physicists are expert metaphysicians, no-one is entitled to comment. Philosophy of mind goes the same way, as does epistemology. So what's left to discuss?

Alternatively, we could just take people's statements seriously and if some lack of knowledge on their part is actually undermining their argument, we can point that out. If it isn't then we can stop using it as a stick to beat them with in order to avoid actually having to engage with them.

Who would be able to prove that philosophy is playing such a role, and what would proof consist in? — Agustino

Nobody and nothing, I'm fairly certain that it would be unprovable. If there is even a single person who derives some comfort from some philosophy, then it has achieved that task.

Suppose there is a man who has cancer, and he refuses all medical treatments, and claims that eating grass will cure him of cancer. And he eats grass and he is indeed cured of cancer (let's say it is spontaneous remission). It clearly worked for him personally, in that he did reach the result he was aiming for. What will we say if he now intends to market and promote his idea to other cancer patients? — Agustino

This is basic science, we hold a theory that eating grass cures cancer, we test that theory in controlled trials during which we find out it doesn't, end of story.

What would it mean to prove that naturalism is true? What does that even mean? — Agustino

This is the same trick that SLX used, I thought you were above that. What does it even mean to ask what does it mean? What would the answer to the question "what does it mean?" be like? What does it even mean to 'be like' something? What does 'something' even mean? What are questions anyway? How do we know when we have answers? What do we even mean by 'answer'?... I presume you're wearing a black polo-neck, a beret, and chain-smoking in a French cafe whilst asking this?

No, I have not actually seen you provide an account for it. You have merely been arguing that it's a possibility, there is nothing incoherent or contradictory in being a naturalist — Agustino

That is an account of it. The best we can do with a belief that cannot be proven is demonstrate that it is not self-contradictory or incoherent. As PA pointed out in his post (though we got slightly crossed wire over argument vs. conclusion), it's just about the only thing we can say about a philosophical argument, that it is not incoherent or contradictory.

But you haven't provided any reason for why anyone, including yourself, should be a naturalist as opposed to, for example, a Cartesian dualist. — Agustino

That's because there isn't one. I've been saying this in different ways for the past 10 pages, but perhaps I've not been clear enough because it's a paradigm that people seem to struggle to get out of. It does not go - argument->testing of argument->conclusion. It goes conclusion (the thing you've already decided to believe)->argument (to justify that belief)->testing/refinement of that argument (by debating with others). The only point at which one might change their world-view if if the testing/refinement of their justification for it went so badly it could not be repaired. This rarely happens.

I have no intention of providing reasons why someone should be a Naturalist, that would be a complete waste of my time. I simply don't believe that people derive their world-views from the strength of the argument in favour of it. They justify the world-view they've already decided they want. If I had some absolutely watertight argument for Naturalism that was so powerful that people would feel stupid believing anything else, then I might go on that mission, but I don't.

Why not? If you perceive so clearly as you say you do that metaphysical propositions cannot be true, why is it that you cannot suspend judgement with regards to their truth, but rather prefer to choose one position amongst the available range? — Agustino

I just can't. I believe this to because we have evolved to form models of the world and our brains simply do this without any concious thought. Suspending judgement until it is needed is a dangerous tactic, it means that when a decision is needed, you have to slow your brain down to decide what model of the world it's going to use. If you're on a runaway train and it's about to hit a broken bridge, you'd better decide pretty quickly if you're a realist, if you're going to take Hume's problem of induction as sorted, if you're going to believe the scientific account of physical forces, you can't be working all this stuff out as the train plunges off the cliff.

What does it even mean to ask what does it mean? What would the answer to the question "what does it mean?" be like? What does it even mean to 'be like' something? What does 'something' even mean? What are questions anyway? How do we know when we have answers? What do we even mean by 'answer'?. — Pseudonym

Excellent questions! Much better than most of waffle most of this thread has so far been.

Now you're on @Pseudonym's side once @Agustino joins in. :rofl: Why is this jig so familiar?

You really need to reread the context of my 'being on Psudeonym's side'. :)

I remember post after post where you ripped him/her to shreds. Was that some sort of Darth Vader tactic that I was unaware of?

But what is an 'excellent' question? What is a 'question' at all, and how could it possibly be excellent, what is it excelling in? How do we know what a 'question' is meant to achieve such that we can tell it is excelling in it's task? Can a question have an objective at all? What do we mean by 'objective'? What do we mean by 'have'? What do we mean by 'mean'?... Oh look, we're back where we started.

Uh, really, read the context. You're embarrassing yourself somewhat.

Oh, then show me. Clearly my memory is "deplorable" (is that a nifty enough word for your ivy-league standard?)

But what is an 'excellent' question? What is a 'question' at all, and how could it possibly be excellent, what is it excelling in? How do we know what a 'question' is meant to achieve such that we can tell it is excelling in it's task? Can a question have an objective at all? What do we mean by 'objective'? What do we mean by 'have'? What do we mean by 'mean'? — Pseudonym

Yes, keep going, soon enough you might actually have an inkling of how philosophy operates.

By the way, do you only respond to posts that allow you an opportunity to look smart? For instance, I'm waiting on a reply from you in the thread named "What is the difference between gnoseology and epistemology"?

No, I only respond to posts that are worth responding to.

Oh, clearly :love: your posts are so scintillatingly devoid of emotional appeal, it's simply seductive.

Yes, keep going, soon enough you might actually have an inkling of how philosophy operates. — StreetlightX

Do I get the beret and the black polo-neck yet?

Nah, lad, but yer close. Oh so close. Do keep tryin'

Do I get the beret and the black polo-neck yet? — Pseudonym

Hemlock perhaps? Your questions are exemplary Socratic ones, after all (the bloke who founded, y'know, Western Philosophy).

Actually, ya do seem so close. What causes ya' ta' brake'off saw?

Hemlock perhaps? Your questions are exemplary Socratic ones, after all (the bloke who founded, y'know, Western Philosophy). — StreetlightX

Toga, sandals and beard it is then.

Pseudonym, if the discipline of philosophy is characterized as being concerned with questions, not answers, would you dismiss the discipline of philosophy? In addition, lets say that hypothetically, Russels's paradox regarding set theory fundamentally cannot be resolved, would you be consistent and say that you would dismiss Russels's paradox, as you do with Nietzsche on the same grounds?

Pseudonym, if the discipline of philosophy is characterized as being concerned with questions, not answers, would you dismiss the discipline of philosophy? — Nop

No, but;
a) That is clearly not the case. Philosophical literature is not a series of questions (at least not since Plato) it is either a series of propositions supported by arguments from axioms, or a series of counter-arguments to dispute a previous proposition.
b) Even if that were the case, there would still be little point in the discipline as a whole unless it had some objective measure of success at asking the 'right' questions or 'better' questions, otherwise we can all ask questions, no need for a separate discipline dedicated to it.

In addition, lets say that hypothetically, Russels's paradox regarding set theory fundamentally cannot be resolved, would you be consistent and say that you would dismiss Russels's paradox, as you do with Nietzsche on the same grounds? — Nop

Russell dismissed Russell's paradox, that's the point. He set out to provide a justification for our belief in mathematics and failed (by his own admission) to do so. Nietzche (and his supporters) think he had a sound justification for his philosophy which rendered other philosophies false. That's an entirely different claim. The if you want to put them on the same footing you have to describe Nietzsche as having set out to justify a certain type of Nihilism but failed by his own admission to do so. Then I would say they could both be dismissed on the same grounds, but that's clearly not what happened.