I agree that deterministic theories are context-dependent.
What I do not understand however is how can something like "free agency" arise from deterministic processes (or a combination between deterministic and random processes). But as you said, this is normal since no theory has ever explained it :wink: — boundless
I, too, disagree with Tegmark's Platonism. But I disagree with computabilism because I think that, for example, the "workings" of our minds cannot be explained in computabilistic terms. At the same time however our theories to be both consistent and complete must be computable. This shows, however, the limits of physics IMO. (and of course I did not mean to "lower" the importance of it with this observation :wink: ) — boundless
I observe it, being part of it. Indeed, I could not observe it from outside, lacking a particular ‘it’ to observe. It could be simulated, but then it is the simulation being observed, not the structure itself.
Again, I reach for the simplest cases like 2+2=4, which has no particular, but the relation between 2+2 and 4 exists, particular or not. I can simulate (perform the addition) to observe this, but doing so is just for the benefit of the performer of the operation and has no effect on the truth of the relation. — noAxioms
I don’t really claim anything one way or the other on universals. I need to see how this fits in, since you seem to lean on the problem of universals as a counter-argument to my idea here. — noAxioms
I rescind this. The position does stake a claim here, that the universe is a universal, and that it does not have Platonic existence since that would be something concrete.I don’t really claim anything one way or the other on universals. I need to see how this fits in, since you seem to lean on the problem of universals as a counter-argument to my idea here. — noAxioms
Then the position I am proposing is not compatible with the Aristotelian position. To frame what I am proposing in such terms is to say that our universe is a (non-Platonic) universal with no necessary particulars. For it to be a particular, said particular would need to be in (relative-to) some container universe which again would be a universal at its foundations.The Aristotelian position is that cases like '2+2=4' derive from concrete particulars, they don't have an independent existence. For example, there are two apples in the basket and I add two more. By generalizing from apples to any object and abstracting away physical constraints, we derive a formal rule for adding things without limit. — Andrew M
I am absolutely not proposing Platonic existence for what I see to be universals.This is an empirical account of mathematics that doesn't require positing a Platonic existence for abstract mathematical entities.
Interestingly, both "idealist" and "materialist" philosophies tend to say that the "first cause" (or "first principle") is something that is "simple", has infinite potentialities etc. — boundless
Anyway, Aristotle's argument is sound. — boundless
If it is true, then a "double-aspect" is heavily implied. — boundless
In this theory, free-will seems well explained. — boundless
In your view the universe had a beginning? I agree that speaking about something "before time" is illogical ("before" is a temporal relation and outside time speaking of "before" or "after" is meaningless), but at the same time, to me it seems that this model requires that time had no "beginning" due to the fact that potentialities and actualities cannot be separated. — boundless
Just for curiosity: do you know online sources that explain well the cosmological argument of Aristotle? I am very curious to learn about his philosophy after this discussion :grin: — boundless
Anyway, thank you very much for the interesting discussion we had so far :blush: ... and thanks in advance for the reply! — boundless
I rescind this. The position does stake a claim here, that the universe is a universal, and that it does not have Platonic existence since that would be something concrete. — noAxioms
In Platonic realism, universals do not exist in the way that ordinary physical objects exist ... Platonic realism holds that universals do exist in a broad, abstract sense... — Platonic realism - Wikipedia
Then the position I am proposing is not compatible with the Aristotelian position. To frame what I am proposing in such terms is to say that our universe is a (non-Platonic) universal with no necessary particulars. For it to be a particular, said particular would need to be in (relative-to) some container universe which again would be a universal at its foundations. — noAxioms
As for the apples, I don't see how 2+2=4 would necessarily not be the case just because there are no apples (or any other concrete particular) to instantiate the relationship. — noAxioms
Being abstract and immaterial is just a relation to our universe. To the number 7, the moon is abstract, as is 'red'.No, Platonic existence is abstract and immaterial. — Andrew M
Seems not necessarily so. Our knowledge of the truth of it (an epistemological thing) stems from interaction with particulars, but I was after the truth of it, not our knowledge of the truth of it or what meaning 2+2=4 has to us.The meaning of '2+2=4' derives from particulars — Andrew M
Almost everything seems to be a relation. — noAxioms
I have a hard time coming up with an example of a property. — noAxioms
Anyway, thank you for the interesting discussion! — boundless
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