Sorry, I have to go. Hope you have a good day.

It's difficult for people to get away from the idea that a concept represents something in the head/mind. It's even difficult for those of us who have studied Wittgenstein to do it, let alone those who don't understand Wittgenstein. Most of the confusions on this forum are the result of not understanding the nature of language, which is why I bring it up in almost every discussion.

The problem, and it's something that Wittgenstein only dealt with on the periphery, is that we know that something is going on in the mind/brain, i.e., we have conscious awareness. However, this has to be separated from how language (concepts, words, statements, etc.) are learned. The learning of a language is a social thing, and it follows that the rules of grammar, etc., are also social. I learn pain behavior by using it correctly within a linguistic setting. I don't learn pain behavior from my own pains, or by somehow pointing to some internal thing that is associated with the pain. This is hard for some people to grasp, and it has to do with several of Wittgenstein's ideas, viz., the problem of a private language, and the idea of rule-following and making a mistake.

To tackle the problem and the confusions that result is a monumental task, unraveling linguistic confusions is not easy to do. Even if you explain it, which I've done many times, people will not see it; and even those of us who claim to have insight are subject to the same problems. We are also subject to taking some of Wittgenstein's ideas and carrying them too far.

There's only so much you can say Banno, which is why I tend to disengage with some people. What happens is that you end up just repeating yourself over and over. It's not personal, it's just sometimes a waste of time.

Most of the confusions on this forum are the result of not understanding the nature of language, which is why I bring it up in almost every discussion. — Sam26

:up:

I don't think you're denying that nothing is going on in the head, only that when it comes to language, it's not dependent on what's going in the head. Is that correct? — Sam26

This isn't as precise as I would like it to be, viz., the phrase "...it's not dependent on what's going on in the head." This may be where Banno and I disagree, I'm not sure. There is a sense where language is dependent on minds, i.e., without minds/brains there would be no language. This however, has to be separated from the mistaken idea that language points to something internal, or that the concepts, words, and statements, are internal. So there is a dependence on the internal nature of one's mind/brain to get the ball rolling, but once language starts to roll it's nature is almost entirely social.

This however, has to be separated from the mistaken idea that language points to something internal, or that the concepts, words, and statements, are internal. — Sam26

A little reflection reveals that concepts (think math) have to be something more than mental objects.

And to your comment that language is learned socially, do you disagree with Chomsky's view on that?

We are also subject to taking some of Wittgenstein's ideas and carrying them too far. — Sam26

...the internal nature of one's mind/brain... — Sam26

I'm tempted to say that while the brain might be in the head, the mind isn't - at least not entirely.

In a way that is an (extreme?) outcome of Wittgenstein's view.

Three ways of making the wrong move:

1. When I pushed that pawn, I was kicking myself because I knew I had to move my king first.

2. When I pushed that pawn, I was thinking you had to capture. Totally missed that check in-between.

3. When I pushed that pawn, I was thinking about that girl I saw at the bookstore today.

In chess, there's a strong sense in which these are all the same move and the differences are only a matter of curiosity. Interesting maybe, but irrelevant to the game itself. I lose in every case.

Is talking like this? How much or how little like this?

I'm tempted to say that while the brain might be in the head, the mind isn't - at least not entirely.

In a way that is an (extreme?) outcome of Wittgenstein's view. — Banno

I don't understand your points here. Banno, one or two sentences aren't going to explain these ideas. :nerd:

I don't understand your points here. Banno, one or two sentences aren't going to explain these ideas. :nerd: — Sam26

Indeed; but that's all there is. They are as yet only half-composed, hinted at and ill-defended. THis thread is a doing, not an expounding, of philosophy. :smile:

If we followed Hanover here and agreed that the meaning of our words is a subjective item of some sort, we would have no basis for claiming that you, I and Hanover meant the same thing, as Hanover says. — Banno

Of course we'd have a basis for claiming that we were using the words to refer to the same things. I'd see that when I saw a beetle run by, you would say, "hey, there goes a beetle." I would infer that your phenomenal impression was just as mine was based upon your behavior. And you needn't say "hey, there goes a beetle." Maybe you'd scream, flinch, or whatever. I would draw a conclusion as to what your internal mental impression was based upon your behavior, linguistic or otherwise. As to the question of whether my phenomenal impression of the beetle was similar to yours, I could not know that for sure, but that is simply the inherent limitation of a first person account - it can't be placed into the second person. My guess is that you see beetle as I do, simply because we're all humans of similar structure and we seem to similar reactions to the beetle.

Hanover might see beliefs as things in the head that we can reference. But you and I see them as tools used in producing explanations, and various other activities. — Banno

I see a belief as a thing in my head I can reference, yet you see it as a tool that you can use. So, that thing you call a belief you reference is a tool. I presume you acknowledge the belief is in your head. It's not on the table, right? So, this means that you see a belief as a thing in your head that you can reference and you call this thing a tool. I'm not sure what the distinction is you wish to make, except you wish to call beliefs tools.

Of course we'd have a basis for claiming that we were using the words to refer to the same things. I'd see that when I saw a beetle run by, you would say, "hey, there goes a beetle." I would infer that your phenomenal impression was just as mine was based upon your behavior. And you needn't say "hey, there goes a beetle." Maybe you'd scream, flinch, or whatever. I would draw a conclusion as to what your internal mental impression was based upon your behavior, linguistic or otherwise. As to the question of whether my phenomenal impression of the beetle was similar to yours, I could not know that for sure, but that is simply the inherent limitation of a first person account - it can't be placed into the second person. My guess is that you see beetle as I do, simply because we're all humans of similar structure and we seem to similar reactions to the beetle. — Hanover

We both see the beetle.

We do not both see your mental furniture.

We both see the beetle.

We do not both see your mental furniture. — Banno

We both have phenomenal states. I experience mine, you yours. How the beetle looks without reference to how it looks to someone is incoherent.

I see a belief as a thing in my head I can reference, — Hanover

Suppose that your belief changes over time, but that you do not notice.

It what sense can your belief be said to be the very same, over time? It ceases to have any individuality.

We both have phenomenal states. I experience mine, you yours. How the beetle looks without reference to how it looks to someone is incoherent. — Hanover

Funny thing is, ofttimes when we both look at the same thing, we agree as to the details.

It's the privacy of your imagined "phenomenal states" that leads you astray here.

I learn pain behavior by using it correctly within a linguistic setting. I don't learn pain behavior from my own pains, — Sam26

And suppose this empirical declaration is wrong? This really isn't philosophy anymore. It's just a strange claim about how people learn. I do in fact know that you're in pain when your behavior is consistent with my own, and it all happens outside a linguistic setting.

We both have phenomenal states. I experience mine, you yours. — Hanover

Is the phenomenal state the belief itself? When you see the beetle scuttle under the porch, is your belief that he's there identical to your phenomenal state of imagining the beetle there in the dark?

Suppose that your belief changes over time, but that you do not notice.

It what sense can your belief be said to be the very same, over time? It ceases to have any individuality. — Banno

Suppose the paint on your house fades over time yet you do not notice? In what sense can the paint be said to be the very same over time?

Funny thing is, ofttimes when we both look at the same thing, we agree as to the details.

It's the privacy of your imagined "phenomenal states" that leads you astray here. — Banno

It shouldn't be funny that two genetically similar beings arive at the same phenomenal states in response to the same external stimuli. That is assumed, of course, but I don't know that a bat would see the world as I do.

Is the phenomenal state the belief itself? When you see the beetle scuttle under the porch, is your belief that he's there identical to your phenomenal state of imagining the beetle there in the dark? — Srap Tasmaner

My belief is a phenomenal state I suppose. Believing there's a beetle under the porch differs from seeing the beetle.

Is the phenomenal state the belief itself? When you see the beetle scuttle under the porch, is your belief that he's there identical to your phenomenal state of imagining the beetle there in the dark? — Srap Tasmaner

This is the question. A belief is truth apt. It's a proposition. What sort of thing is a proposition? We don't know that anymore than we know what matter fundamentally is. It can't be a mental object though.

My belief is a phenomenal state I suppose — Hanover

Hmmm.

That's introspection, surely. Doesn't your belief that you live in the great state of Georgia persist when you happen not to be thinking about it?

That's introspection, surely. Doesn't your belief that you live in the great state of Georgia persist when you happen not to be thinking about it? — Srap Tasmaner

It exists in a different sense when I am thinking about than when I'm not, but to the extent the same data and rationality exists over time that causes me to believe I live in Georgia, I continue to have that same belief in some sense even when I'm not actually presently experiencing that belief.

It exists in a different sense when I am thinking about than when I'm not, but to the extent the same data and rationality exists over time that causes me to believe I live in Georgia, I continue to have that same belief in some sense even when I'm not actually presently experiencing that belief. — Hanover

I'm not following this at all.

I have other things to compare the paint to. You have nothing with which to compare your private mental furniture, except more private mental furniture.

It drops out of the discussion; and in so doing, drops out of any rational discourse. It is irrelevant.

I'm not following this at all. — Srap Tasmaner

Ok, I'll try again.

I'm currently thinking about my belief that I live in the state of Georgia. We'll call this Phenomenal State 1.

I'm sitting around eating popcorn and watching cartoons, not thinking about where I live. We'll call this Phenomenal State 2.

Do I believe that I live in Georgia while in State 2? Sure, I guess, only because I have the same reasons to believe it when I'm thinking about it even when I'm not, but State 1 is different from State 2.

It shouldn't be funny that two genetically similar beings arise at the same phenomenal states in response to the same external stimuli. — Hanover

SO you accept a reality external to your phenomenal experience. Not all hope is lost, then.

I have other things to compare the paint to. You have nothing with which to compare your private mental furniture, except more private mental furniture. — Banno

Sure, you can go back and compare your current house to some old paint samples you kept in your basement to see if it faded, unless of course the samples faded too, much like my memory might have faded. We should have kept better care of our measuring sticks I suppose, but I very well might be convinced that all our measuring sticks had been altered if they were inconsistent with how I remembered them to be.

It drops out of the discussion; and in so doing, drops out of any rational discourse. It is irrelevant. — Banno

What drops out and what's irrelevant?

SO you accept a reality external to your phenomenal experience. Not all hope is lost, then. — Banno

I've not argued idealism. I've just insisted there are phenomenal states, a claim you seem to deny.

because I have the same reasons to believe it when I'm thinking about it even when I'm not — Hanover

Even if you're not thinking about those reasons? And is holding a belief the same as having reasons for holding it? Are you still talking about the belief existing in different senses, some phenomenal some not?

Even if you're not thinking about those reasons? And is holding a belief the same as having reasons for holding it? Are you still talking about the belief existing in different senses, some phenomenal some not? — Srap Tasmaner

If I never had the present moment phenomenal state (State 1), then I could never be said to have believed that I lived in Georgia. It is required that at some point I have held the belief to say that I currently hold the belief. To say I have the belief now even when not thinking about it is simply to claim I previously held the belief and haven't changed my mind. And it's doubtful I'll change my mind if I have no basis.