We get morality from reason and empathy — NKBJ

Are you saying these things are not natural? Are you not selecting natural attributes you are assuming are good?

I don't think reason and empathy lead anywhere near a moral society or Utopia. I think reason and empathy are more likely to lead to antinatalism, nihilistic view points and a negative view of the essential cruelty and arbitrariness of life.

If you are rejecting carnivore behaviour and death then you're rejecting life imo. I think( as was discussed in an article I linked to earlier ) a better goal is to have a more pragmatic morality based on a realistic view of human attributes. Unfortunately I am not convinced we can morally reason our way out of our dilemma and become Utopian or anything near.

The naturalistic fallacy is a well-established logical fallacy in the discipline — NKBJ

I don't have to accept an alleged fallacy if I can prove to myself it doesn't make sense. In the literature I have read it is usually accepted that this idea of G. E. Moore leads to moral non naturalism which as I say is puzzling because I can't see any other source for moral claims.

People only use the most trivial version of the fallacy without realising it is just an extension of Hume's Is-Ought problem and the idea that you can't get values from nature.

I have specifically pointed out they are being killed for food and not for fun. It is not wrong to kill another species for food. Humans even eat each other in famine as a means of survival. — Andrew4Handel

So it's only right to be a cannibal when there's a famine? How more arbitrary can you get?

I don't agree with the concept of a naturalistic fallacy because... where else but nature can we get moral guidance from?

There are all sorts of other possible sources of moral guidance, reason for one. To argue that you know of no alternatives to nature as a source of moral guidance and that therefore, nature is a reliable source of moral guidance and is the only source, is rather problematic. A lack of imagined alternatives doesn't establish the one thing you can think of as the correct or only one.

Consider a simple and common alternative, one that is flawed for sure, but often accepted: What maximizes pleasure and minimizes suffering is good. This criterion of goodness is quite different from the naturalness criterion and seems a possible contender. It could be that the natural state (simply the way things are or have been?) is full of suffering and that some unnatural state ought to be pursued as it might well mean the betterment of ourselves or the world in general. But then why is pleasure necessarily good and suffering necessarily not good? And then there is the question of higher and lower pleasure, or suffering that serves a higher pleasure, and so on. And if there is higher and lower pleasure, what determines the higher and the lower? Surely something other than pleasure!

And in what way is nature a source of moral guidance? How ought we to read its commandments? If something is demonstrated by nature, should we feel free to follow that example? Is what is natural for any living thing perfectly okay for us? Should we take sharks as role models? Is that a state we want to aspire to? Similarly, should we take our primitive ancestors as role models? How about even our recent ancestors? If they did a thing, does the very fact of their having done it make it good and something we ought to do as well? If not, why not? And what are we appealing to when we make our evaluations here? Nature? Something else?

Why is the naturalistic fallacy a fallacy? Basically, it isn't at all clear that X is good necessarily follows from X is natural. Something needs to fill that gap and show why the natural is always good.

Can we find counterexamples, something that is arguably natural but yet is generally considered evil? What about rape? What about war? What about pain? Suffering? Death? Cancer? Migraines? Male domination of women? Basically anything that has actually happened that is bad?

How do we decide what is natural? Historical precedence? If we have some criterion of naturalness, we should dispense with naturalness and then look at that criterion more directly. Suppose we say that what has been done for at least a thousand years is what we should consider natural, or that what we did "back when we were still animals" is what we should consider natural. Then to say that what is natural is what is good is to say that what has been done for at least a thousand years or what our animal ancestors did is what is good for us to do always. See where this is likely to go? We are headed for trouble, aren't we?

People often talk about such things as our tooth structure as evidence of what we should be eating. To show that we "evolved to eat meat" or otherwise is simply to show that at some point in the past, our species did such and such and managed to survive and propagate the species while doing this or partly by means of this practice. So would we then be wise to argue that whatever aided the survival of our ancestors is automatically okay for us?

Besides, "evolved to X" or "are made to do X" or "meant for X" all imply some kind of teleology. There is an implicit "in order to" or "so that" involved. This implies some kind of mind with intentions and aims and a plan behind these things, in which case, we might be half-consciously appealing to God as being the hidden link between goodness and naturalness, as God surely wouldn't disapprove of what he made us to do. Isn't this really the hidden idea or feeling behind the naturalness justification of meat eating or abstention? "That we have teeth shows that we are meant to/supposed to/made to eat meat." "If God gave us X, surely he can't justly condemn us for using it!" In a nature without God where the physical is causally closed, there is no "meant to" or "should" implied in our physical structure, is there? Is it clear that we always ought to do what is suggested by the structure of our bodies, which resulted presumably from selective pressures and circumstances to which we are no longer subject? If our hands originally evolved while we lived in an arboreal environment and selective pressures drove us into the trees, does that mean we should live in the trees still? Is there anything wrong with dispensing with that and using our hands for other things? If we can survive in other ways, is there any reason we shouldn't?

Is the mere fact that we can survive in a certain way justification for living that way? Does can imply ought? Or is it at least the case that can implies no ought not? If we were able to survive in a certain fashion in the past, does that mean that we should never say no to that behavior?

And if what is natural is good, is what is unnatural then evil or at least never good? That opens a pandora's box, doesn't it? Isn't that how some people argue for the condemnation of homosexuals, among other things?

Is it impossible for something unnatural to be good? If something unnatural can be good, then how we evaluate it as good must be independent of whether or not it is natural. Consider modern medicine. Should we continue to practice it? Why or why not? Is nature your only guide in considering this question?

And what does it mean for something to be natural anyway? Perhaps one could say that anything that actually happens is by definition natural. In that case, if what is natural is what is good, then everything that can and does happen is therefore good. Surely you can think of things that actually happen that you feel are bad.

Is it possible for anything unnatural to actually exist?

If everything that does happen is good, any question of goodness seems completely pointless, especially if we accept ought implies can, which would rule out any goods that don't happen. Everything you do would automatically be good, no matter your choices, no matter the consequences.

Or is it the case that humanity marks a break with nature? Can humans do things unnatural? If so, what is the source of this power? If we have any such powers, perhaps you might look there for other sources of moral guidance, since nature then isn't the only thing at work.

You could also say that while it might be natural for humans at a certain level of development or with a certain level of awareness to eat meat, it might be unnatural for humans to eat meat under other circumstances, perhaps at higher levels of development. Or it might simply be natural for certain kinds of people to reject eating meat.

It isn't clear to me at all why it would be the case that if something is natural, it is therefore necessarily good. That's why it is fallacious reasoning. The conclusion doesn't follow from the premises.

I think the concept of nature itself is a rather problematic one to begin with. So is the concept of goodness or value. Both of these are issues that require much examination. So to say that what is natural is therefore good cries out for a whole lot of deeper examination.

Also, to accept that what is natural is therefore good implies that you accept the idea of the natural and also the idea of the good, presumably an objective good. In order to predicate the goodness of the natural, you have to accept that nature has this property of goodness. Where does it get that property? How do you know that nature is good? Aren't you then appealing to something outside of nature in order to answer the question of whether or not nature is good? I am reminded of the question in Euthyphro. Is it good because God wills it or does God will it because it it is good? Is it good because nature produces it or does nature produce it because it is good? Give that one some thought!

And isn't saying that something is good because it is natural sort of along the lines of saying that this is the way it always has been done in the past and is therefore the way it should always be done in the future? Why can't it be a good thing in some cases for traditions to be rejected and for people to change their ways? For one thing, we don't have a fixed nature, do we? Aren't we continually changing? Notice the word nature in there. If our very nature is malleable, how does this affect the consideration? Or is the way we were the way we always have to be? If we are malleable in nature, should our past nature be used as a guide for evaluating where we ought to go in the future? Is there no other possible consideration? Such a guiding principle would seem to recommend against change period. Might not new ways be better ways? Is moral progress impossible? If it is, we must look outside of descriptions of our past behavior for advice about how we ought to live.

I think all asserting a naturalistic fallacy does, is lead to moral nihilism. It could only be sustained by a supernaturalistic morality.

I hope you aren't implicitly making the argument that because asserting that the natural fallacy is a true fallacy would lead to moral nihilism, it is therefore not a fallacy. It could be that moral nihilism is the correct position! That can't be ruled out right off the bat, can it?

Also, why does it necessarily lead to moral nihilism? All we are doing when we assert that the naturalistic fallacy is a proper fallacy is denying that something's being natural necessarily establishes its being good. We haven't ruled out other ways of estimating value. To establish moral nihilism, wouldn't you need to rule out the possibility of any objective value? It isn't clear that a lack of necessary connection between the natural and the good also necessarily negates the possibility of value being in some sense real.

If what is natural is indeed what is good, why is there a necessary connection between these things? Why is nature good? Or, at least, why is it the case that what is natural cannot be bad?

I think that until someone can demonstrate a strong connection between naturalness and goodness, we can safely dispense with the idea that the naturalness criterion can be used to justify eating meat or abstaining from eating meat.

Why is the naturalistic fallacy a fallacy? Basically, it isn't at all clear that X is good necessarily follows from X is natural. — petrichor

That naturalistic fallacy has been used in relation to homosexuality because people said homosexuality is bad because it is unnatural.

But then due to the naturalistic fallacy you can't argue homosexuality is good just because it is widespread in nature.

So invoking this fallacy helps neither side of the argument. I think the fact that homosexuality is found in other animals solves disputes about it such as the claim that it's a choice and the discovery of a gay gene (complex) would further prove it wasn't a choice. So you just have to turn to nature to resolve a moral dispute.

So referring to that actually happens in nature is really the only realistic referee to what is the case. Because there is no other further, ideal moral dimension we have found to arbitrate moral claims. I don't see reason as a moral or non natural domain either. Reason is limited by what is the case.

How do we decide what is natural? — petrichor

I consider natural just to refer to anything that happens in nature as opposed to a supernatural realm that we either have no access to or doesn't exist

I think that until someone can demonstrate a strong connection between naturalness and goodness, we can safely dispense with the idea that the naturalness criterion can be used to justify eating meat or abstaining from eating meat. — petrichor

It is not the case that everything that is natural is good but that things that are good are natural processes.
For example if you enjoy being alive then there are a vast amount of natural process like bio-mechanisms in each cell that are keeping you a live. So it seems crazy to value being alive yet place no value on these countless natural things keeping you alive.

I don't think you can value anything without placing value on the nature that allows it to happen, even our minds and reason are argued to be a product of nature so we are reasoning within the limitations of a natural framework.

I think once you consider improving nature you enter a black hole as there are so many things you might want to improve and conflicting desires. There is no objective way to improve reality for everyone.

It would be nice if carnivores didn't exist but that would mean Lions etc would cease to exist. Lots of things would cease to exist or be greatly altered if we tried improving everything.
Personally I'm not having children I don't endorse life and have had lots of horrible experiences so I have no reason to have a positive outlook or seek to continue and progress this game of life.I think we need to confront our own morality and hope something better is on the side. It would be a real slap in the face for me if this was the only life I got to lead.

Finally I think the reason there are factory farms is because people are having lots of offspring and the general endorsement of procreation is the source of most "moral" evil.

People often talk about such things as our tooth structure as evidence of what we should be eating. To show that we "evolved to eat meat" or otherwise is simply to show that at some point in the past, our species did such and such and managed to survive and propagate the species while doing this or partly by means of this practice. So would we then be wise to argue that whatever aided the survival of our ancestors is automatically okay for us? — petrichor

That argument stems from an inability to realize that evolution is on going and does not stop. For whatever reason it is challenging for some to understand that our species can evolve away from a dependence on meat. I've been vegetarian for about five years, but after some months when I started I mistakenly ate some chicken soup and was dying for the next day as though I had food poisoning. On an individual basis and a short period of time, that sort of biological response is a product of a body that changes itself over the time. And I think it is a testament to our bodily limits that obesity is such an issue in much of the Western world where red meat in particular is so available in the market. Our body isn't built for excessive consumption of fatty meats, and I think many vegetarians and vegans would argue that we aren't built for any consumption of meat.

So invoking this fallacy helps neither side of the argument. — Andrew4Handel

It's not supposed to help either side of the argument--you're supposed to avoid trying to derive an ought from an is altogether no matter what side you're on....

So invoking this fallacy helps neither side of the argument. — Andrew4Handel

It's not supposed to help either side of the argument--you're supposed to avoid trying to derive an ought from an is altogether no matter what side you're on....

But then due to the naturalistic fallacy you can't argue homosexuality is good just because it is widespread in nature.

I don't think it makes sense to argue that anything is good just because it is widespread in nature. It isn't at all clear why there would be any necessary connection between frequent occurence and goodness. For one thing, I think we can all find counterexamples to the argument that X occurs widely and is therefore good.

You can use fallacious argument if you like for pure rhetorical purposes. This is common practice. But if you want to get closer to truth, fallacies must be avoided. It doesn't matter whether you like the conclusions of a fallacious argument or find a fallacious argument useful in persuasion. If the conclusion doesn't clearly follow from the premises, the premises simply cannot be used to justify the claim. If you allow arguments where conclusions don't obviously follow from the premises, pretty much any conclusion could be claimed to be a consequence of pretty much any premise.

You can use fallacious argument if you like for pure rhetorical purposes. This is common practice. But if you want to get closer to truth, fallacies must be avoided. It doesn't matter whether you like the conclusions of a fallacious argument or find a fallacious argument useful in persuasion. If the conclusion doesn't clearly follow from the premises, the premises simply cannot be used to justify the claim. If you allow arguments where conclusions don't obviously follow from the premises, pretty much any conclusion could be claimed to be a consequence of pretty much any premise — petrichor

:up:

premise 1: What is A is B.

premise 2: X is A.

conclusion: Therefore, X is B.

This is a valid argument form. The conclusion follows.

premise 1: What is natural is good.

premise 2: X is natural.

Conclusion: Therefore, X is good.

This is valid in form. The problem is in premise 1. It isn't clear that what is natural is good. Is this premise true? Why should I believe it? Another argument is needed to show the connection.

premise 1: What is A is good.

premise 2: Everything natural is A.

conclusion: Therefore, everything natural is good.

What is A? That's the missing connection. Why is what is natural also good? In order to show that natural things are good things, it seems to me that you are going to have to appeal to some principle other than naturalness to show why the natural is good. And before we can decide whether or not natural things are good, we need to know what goodness is! Do you know what it is?

It is not the case that everything that is natural is good but that things that are good are natural processes. — Andrew4Handel

Okay, so all A are B, but not all B are A. That's fine. All dogs are mammals, but not all mammals are dogs. All good things are natural, but not all natural things are good. This last seems to be what you are saying. But first of all, if some natural things can be not good, then you can't say that something is natural and that it is therefore good, since not all natural things are good things. If your position is instead that all good things are natural, this won't help make the case that any X is good. It is backwards. Here is what that argument might look like:

What is good is natural

Eating meat is natural

Therefore, eating meat is good

Even if the premises are true, the form of this argument is not valid. Here is the form in question:

All A are B
X is B
Therefore, X is A

This is invalid. Let's plug some other things in there, with true premises, to show this more clearly. We get an absurd conclusion.

Every dog is a mammal.

Elephants are mammals.

Therefore, elephants are dogs.

If it is the case that all good things are natural, but not all natural things are good, it is completely pointless to talk about whether or not something is natural when trying to show that it is good, since some natural things might well be non-good, and this something in question might well be one of these natural but non-good things.

Also, if you claim that all good things are natural, can you not think of any good things that are unnatural? Does anything actually happen in reality that is unnatural in the way that you understand nature? Some people consider what humans do to mark a break with nature, so for example, they say that plastic is unnatural or C-sections are unnatural or brain chip implants are unnatural. Do you agree with that line of thinking? If you do, are no such unnatural things good? If there are unnatural good things, they would be exceptions to your claim that all good things are natural. If everything that actually happens is natural, well, then, everything humans do is natural, no matter what that might be, and it is pointless to try to show that it happens elsewhere in nature.

If you do accept that common idea that what humans do can be unnatural, and you also accept your claim that all good things are natural, then since unnatural things are not good, then all unnatural human activity would have to be non-good.

When people argue about whether or not meat-eating or homosexuality or whatever is natural, this seems to always implicitly involve an understanding of the concept of the natural that allows that some things that humans do can be unnatural. If not, then what are they talking about? In the other case, so what if something is unnatural? Even if eating meat or abstaining or practicing homosexuality or something else is unnatural, I don't see why that automatically makes it bad. I don't see any reason to believe that just because it is unnatural, it must therefore be non-good. In other words, I don't see why I should accept your claim that all good things are natural. Why can't some unnatural things also be good?

I consider natural just to refer to anything that happens in nature as opposed to a supernatural realm that we either have no access to or doesn't exist — Andrew4Handel

First of all, it seems tautological or circular to say that what is natural is what happens in nature. What is nature? Does anything happen not in nature?

Do you see yet how all this talk of whether or not something is natural is basically irrelevant to the question of its goodness?

Do you see yet how all this talk of whether or not something is natural is basically irrelevant to the question of its goodness? — petrichor

I think that it is arbitrary what you define as natural. I don't think the phrase natural picks out a concrete concept but then I didn't coin the naturalistic fallacy.

I am not claiming eating meat is good because it is natural because at this point we are just discussing where goodness comes from. The only point I want to make here is that there is not another realm for goodness (or pleasure to come from)

I don't see the point of having a morality that doesn't reference the real world. I think harm might be a more objective property than the good but I don't think reality can be wrong because there appears to be no right way to act in nature and that is to say no teleology.

I believe unnatural often means man made and/or deviating from natures supposed purpose. The point then is that some things originated solely from humans and we can be held accountable for them.

It is obviously a tricky and lengthy topic but I think a lot of these labels can reflect personal or social ideologies and biases.

My reasoning is that if something is a necessary part of nature there is no reason to alienate ourself from it. On the other hand if we try and radically alter our environment and minds and bodies then that to me is a rejection of nature. I don't think veganism is a rejection of nature but its morals are. I believe vegans have a distorted and sometimes anthropomorphic view of nature(biology etc) partly because I think nature is innately harmful and cannot be improved.

I can see no reason why we should alter our bodies and use supplements to make ourselves as if Herbivores. To me that is an unnecessary sacrifice. (To an imaginary moral standard/realm)

But as I have said from near the beginning I am a moral nihilist and I find no moral claims convincing.

If I was looking for someone to ultimately blame for harm it would be whatever force created life.

Speaking as a homosexual myself I think that finding homosexuality in nature is a positive thing for people who have faced prejudice and persecution and vilification.

It is the equivalent to the support any minority gets to discover they are not alone or alien or not an aberration but just a part of nature, your own normal.

you're supposed to avoid trying to derive an ought from an is altogether no matter what side you're on.... — NKBJ

I am not sure I accept the idea that an ought can never derive from an is. Let me explain. It is hard to see why an ought would follow from an objective state of affairs. But what if we take seriously the idea that subjective experience is real? I think part of the problem stems from the fact that many over the years have acted as though what is objective and third-person verifiable is real and what is subjective is somehow not real. When we say that something is objective, we seem to mean that it is "really out there", beyond our imaginations, beyond our dreams, beyond our hallucinations, or in other words, beyond the seemings or appearances in our subjective experience. This is problematic. It opposes the subjective to the real.

My subjective experience is as real as anything. I really do experience pain and so on. My pains are real. And they really do hurt. We need be careful though. To say that my subjective experience is real is not to also say that appearance equals reality. For example, I can hallucinate that there is a tiger in my room. My hallucination doesn't correspond to the reality beyond my mind. In other words, there is no real tiger in my room. But my experience is real in the sense that there really is an experience of having that hallucination. My experiences might not reflect reality, but the experiences themselves are really happening and are part of reality. And in a sense, they are objective. Joe really does feel pain. Joe's pains are real. Joe really does dream of winged rhinos. The experience is real. And Joe's experiences are happening beyond the appearances in my mind. They are in that sense, along with rocks, "out there" in the real world.

What does all this have to do with morality? What are we to do with a situation where, for example, someone is torturing a child? We tend to say that this is bad and that this child's suffering matters. Why? Is there really no more to this than my distaste for it, or maybe an evolved, instinctive response of mine to the sound of a child screaming? No, I tend to think that this child's suffering matters regardless of whether it bothers me or not. It would matter even if nobody existed but the torturer and the child. Even if I feel nothing when witnessing it, it is still bad. The badness of it simply doesn't rely on my feelings about it. It seems that the fact that the child's well-being matters to the child, beyond my concern, is possibly a factor. That child's suffering is real. It is not an illusion that the child is suffering. There seems to be something about such suffering that intrinsically involves badness, intolerability, or some kind of ought-not. Subjective states are different from objective states of affairs in this way. They seem to be intrinsically value-laden. It doesn't seem possible to separate the feeling of intense pain from some sense of intolerability or badness. Perhaps pain, in itself, is sort of a real ought-not. When you stab me, the hurt is real. The injury is real. You have added to the intolerability in the world. Maybe, somehow, we can here find the beginnings of a connection between what is and what ought to be.

If the very nature of pain is that it is a sort of ought-not, then if a pain is, an ought-not is.

Isn't pain curious? Notice how when you have a really bad headache, you can't seem to simply observe it as a pure sensation without also suffering from it. It seems that to the extent that it loses its intolerability, it ceases to be a pain or simply ceases altogether, as if it is, in itself, a state of intolerability. Might we say that if pain is real, there is a sense in which intolerability, or badness, is part of reality and is therefore objective?

Some experiential qualities like blueness are real, in that we really do experience them. Blue experiences are part of reality. But they seem not to carry an intrinsic desirability or undesirability the way pain and pleasure seem to.

But then some pleasures seem to us bad or shallow or sacharrine or whatever, and indulgence in pleasure seems problematic in some ways. And some pain seems beneficial. This certainly complicates what I am saying.

I am not quite sure how to think about it properly, but there is a sense in which I think that the suffering of the child really matters, objectively, that somehow the very mattering of it is part of reality. It matters regardless of whether I care or not, whether it matters to me or not. At the very least, it matters to that child. That child's interests are violated or harmed. Are her interests real? Is there really a better and a worse for her, even beyond her own feeling about it? Isn't it truly better for a child to be happy and thriving than to be harmed and incapacitated? My strong intuition says yes. Some conditions in the world really are better than others. But how to justify this rationally? I am not sure. Here, I am rather baffled, quite honestly. But it seems obviously absurd to me when I consider that it might be the case that no particular state of affairs in the world can ever rightly be considered better than any other. For now, I guess, I'll hold to it as an intuition not rationally justified, and risk being in error.

If we deny the reality of subjective experience, of selves, of interests, and all the rest, obviously, all of this sounds like nonsense. But I find it absurd to deny that which I experience so directly in every moment. I take subjectivity seriously. And I suspect that maybe such things as selves and interests belonging to them might have a sort of reality not usually recognized. It might even be that selves have rights. Maybe selves properly belong to themselves.

Getting back to the issue of the ethics of eating animals, I have often had the feeling that it isn't simply a problem of causing them pain, as we could conceivably raise them for food, enslave them, or otherwise take possession of and exploit them while causing them no pain, perhaps even while causing them intense, continuous pleasure with drugs or brain implants. Still, something seems not right about all of this to me. I don't think it would be right for us to do this to a group of humans. Why is it okay with animals?

My feeling is that to the extent that a being is a self and has interests of its own, it simply doesn't belong to me to do with as I please. It has a sort of autonomy that I have no right to violate.

I once saw a pig being pulled by the ears down a ramp, off a truck, toward the spot where it was to have its throat cut, after which it woud be cooked and served as food. When the men were pulling it by its ears, it was squealing loudly and resisting the forward motion with its feet. Its will was clearly being violated. The pig had interests! I found myself thinking that part of what is wrong here is that the people were taking what was not rightly theirs, and were violating the interests, or perhaps even rights, of another sentient being.

Something struck me about the killing. Before the killing, there was a self, a set of interests belonging to that self, goods, bads, fears, perhaps hopes, and so on, and after the killing, there was only tissue. This subjective world had been destroyed and now there was only food, only flesh. Previously, there was an objective and a subjective in that pig. After, there was only the material, just a bunch of physical resources to be incorporated into other bodies.

This, I think, is also reflected in how we talk about meat. We call the living animal a pig. We call what remains after it is killed and cut to pieces pork. Cows become beef. Sheep become mutton. Is this is a way for us to insulate ourselves from the reality of what we are doing when we eat these animals? We don't eat cows. We eat this stuff called beef. But notice that we only seem to do this with higher mammals that we regularly eat. We don't do it with chicken or fish.

I think eating animals is a kind of theft, a kind of dishonorable banditry, worse than parasitism. To overpower another self and to forcibly take for yourself what it has labored to collect and build, and to totally disregard its interests, especially when this isn't necessary for you, especially when it is for the sake of your pleasure, is evil.

Most would consider it evil for a kid to go out on Halloween and knock over another kid and steal all his candy. How is predation any different in principle?

Why do we admire predators and despise parasites? It is because, I think, at some instinctual level, we admire power. Our default, evolved, animal values are as Nietzsche described as the sort of power-based morality that preceded Christianity. The more powerful is the better. This is partly because some of our animal ancestors were polygynous mammals with a certain kind of power hierarchy with an alpha male at the top. And we were arboreal. And to be higher in the trees was better. And those with higher status were literally higher in the trees, eating the choicest fruit, safe from predators. Our whole vertical value dimension seems to stem from this instinctual pattern. Higher is better. Stronger gets you higher. Stronger is better. God is the strongest and also the best. And God is the highest. Heaven is at the very top and Hell is at the very bottom. Good people go up. Bad people go down. The word aristocrat literally derives from "best". The upper class rules over the lower class. Elevated people stand above lowly people. High-brow versus low-brow. Feeling high versus feeling low. Moving on up versus falling to rock bottom. Notice also that at the bottom of a dense forest, it is nearly dark. And there are reptiles and cats and things down there that might eat you. At the very top of the forest is sky and sun and birds. Look familiar? Heaven and Hell. Notice our cities, with the wealthy up in their towers and the untouchables down on the street, exposed to the elements. And they deserve it, right? We tend to see a dimension of virtue associated with vertical position. Contempt is a kind of looking-down.

Humans killing and eating cows or rabbits is just another case of the strong stealing from the weak. We admire a lion in the way it masterfully takes down its weaker prey. What about a mugger robbing an old lady? Why is he not similarly admirable? Who is worse, a parasite or a thief? Predators are thieves. That is their strategy for survival. It is one of a number of successful strategies. One can be a thief and also be a biological success. Many successful businesses are based on predation.

Much warfare is the predation of one superorganism upon another. One nation eats another weaker one and steals its resources. Many early societies saw nothing wrong with this, largely because of the tribal mentality, our people being the only real people, the others being fair game or put there for our use. Our interests first! Isn't that what drives the thief? Me first. My family first. My tribe first. My nation first.

Predation is profiting from the misfortune of another.

But if we want to get at what ought to be the case objectively, we need to look at everyone's interests. We have to evaluate the situation from beyond our own perspective, as if we don't know which of the parties involved we happen to be. What ought to happen in a situation, what is for the best period, is the case regardless of which of the persons involved I happen to be. The difference between my personal preferences and what really ought to be the case beyond appeal to my personal preferences requires this sort of view-from-nowhere appraisal of the situation and of the relative values of different outcomes.

Should I eat the porpoise? I meet my needs and serve my interests, but what about the interests of the porpoise? Or is it the case that no non-humans have any interests? If we have interests and they don't, what makes for this difference? If I were that porpoise, what then? Should the human eat the porpoise? What if I don't know whether I am the human or the porpoise? How would I answer? What if the human could survive just as well by eating beans, assuming bean plants have no consciousness and thus no interests? Then we seem to be weighing the added momentary pleasure for the human of eating porpoise over beans against all the interests of the porpoise and any other sentient being whose interests are tied to the well-being of that porpoise, such as that porpoise's friends and family. The small, momentary, added pleasure for the human seems pretty petty by comparison, doesn't it? That rich, beautiful creature enjoying its life, with its complex inner universe of feeling and its playful life in the sea is something that alive, is of far more value than it is reduced to some rubbery stuff to chew for a human, all its complexity lost, its inner world destroyed, its relationships severed, its friends left bereaved, its future annihilated.

In light of consideration of the porpoise's end of things, or even of the overall value in the world, what do humans who justify eating that porpoise sound like when saying that they will continue to eat porpoise because it tastes good? Totally oblivious to anything but crass, short-term self-interest. In other words, rather unaware and lacking in moral development. Reptiles have a similar level of regard for interests beyond their own.

I have often thought that the very definition of evil is to not merely cause, but to literally enjoy the misfortune of another being, especially to enjoy that misfortune for its own sake. It is the very opposite of love. In the way I see it, justifying your harm to another being by the pleasure you derive from your exploitation of that being or the complete theft of everything belonging to that being, is almost the worst possible justification. What would we say to a pedophile who says that he will continue molesting children because he enjoys it and insists that his enjoyment is enough to justify his behavior?

If you believe that you have no choice but to do something that harms another, but you regret it and it pains you to do it, it is a little more forgivable.

If it is the case that you must eat meat to survive, then we have another matter to explore. For one thing, we have to justify your survival in the first place before we can justify your eating that meat in order to survive. Why is it good that you should continue living? Is the value of your life greater than that of all the beings you destroy in order to live? And is there no way to live without diminishing the harm you do? If your life does have greater value and there is no way to reduce your harm, then perhaps you have justification for continuing.

But of course, as many a vegetarian or vegan has demonstrated, it is possible to survive without eating meat. Can one achieve optimal health on a vegan diet? That is another question. If not, then we have to determine the value of that added health and decide if overall, in the world, it is more important to have a human with ideal health than to have all the animals that he might eat spend their lives unmolested by him.

I think that unconsciously, most people think meat-eating is okay because of a kind of cultural inertia, with underlying beliefs and attitudes that derive from a primitive religious worldview in which God put all of the plants and animals here for our use (usually our local tribe). And why did he give us sharp teeth and an appetite for meat if he didn't approve of us eating it? After all, we sacrificed animals to the gods! God likes meat too! That wonderful aroma of the burnt offering rising to Heaven! We are made in God's image after all! He is like us! He is our Father! As the bumper sticker says, "If God didn't want us to eat animals, why'd he make 'em out of meat?" All the stuff on the earth is what he gave to us, right? And meat wouldn't taste so good if we weren't meant to eat it!

Most of our unexamined ideas of good and bad are probably unconsciously about being a good-boy/girl for Mommy and Daddy, God just being the parent or alpha male pattern projected onto the sky. We grow up as children with "good" and 'bad" being associated with behavior approved of or disapproved of by parents, and punished and rewarded. So at some level, we approach questions of good or bad with all of that unconsciously at work. Will Daddy get mad? If not, it's okay. Should I shoot the squirrels? Daddy says "good shot!" if I do! Or at least, Daddy doesn't get mad. And since good and bad derive from Dad's approval/disapproval, if there is no Dad, then everything must be okay, right? "If God does not exist, everything is permitted." And here we get the thoughtless moral nihilism of the atheist. If there is no big judge in the sky to disapprove of my actions, then I can do no wrong. Is that really so?

And we imagine that God, with all his might, must be right, and so if he made us to eat meat, as our bodies and instincts seem to indicate, how could he justly disapprove? Isn't this what many seem to be thinking at some level, even atheists, perhaps while not being quite conscious of it?

Also, if we are instinctually driven to do something, we are biased to think it good. There is a positive valuation attached to our experience of it. Eating meat feels good. So it can't be all bad, can it? Yum! Yum!

But if we are ready to grow up and assume responsibility for our choices and evaluate the situation according to what is actually for the best, considering the interests of all parties involved and the overall beauty, richness, and goodness in the world, things start to look rather different.

I think that it is arbitrary what you define as natural. I don't think the phrase natural picks out a concrete concept but then I didn't coin the naturalistic fallacy. — Andrew4Handel

Sure, it is rather arbitrary. But if you yourself are going to appeal to this concept in some way, you need to clarify what you mean by it and be consistent. The people who call others out for committing the error that is the naturalistic fallacy are not the ones guilty of appealing to nature. They are responding to those who wrongly appeal to nature.

If someone attacks homosexuality by saying that it is unnatural and then someone else defends it by trying to show that it is indeed natural, the latter appears to be accepting the former's idea that if something is unnatural, it is bad. If they don't accept this, why this defense? Why not just say "So what if it is?" to the claim that it is unnatural? It isn't clear that its being natural or unnatural has anything at all to do with whether or not it is good!

The only point I want to make here is that there is not another realm for goodness (or pleasure to come from) — Andrew4Handel

That depends on what you consider nature to include. If you consider nature to include everything that is actually real or true, that might include ideal numbers, absolute beauty, subjective states, the intolerability of pain, the pythagorean theorem, and all sorts of things. Objective value could be part of reality. If you consider nature to include only what is physical, objective, third-person verifiable, testable, measurable, concrete, and so on, then there might indeed be something outside of that to appeal to. And if that is all you'll permit as real, you might find it hard to justify anything like value and will likely end up with an Alex Rosenberg style moral nihilism, where you see everything as nothing more than valueless collections of fermions and bosons and ask how it is possible for one arrangement of fermions and bosons to be better than another. Jews being gassed versus Jews thriving unmolested are then just one particular arrangement of fermions and bosons compared to another, no arrangement being any better or worse than another. Either way, it is just particles occupying certain positions in the void!

I am not claiming eating meat is good because it is natural because at this point we are just discussing where goodness comes from. — Andrew4Handel

I don't think I took you to be making that claim. I took you to reject the idea of the naturalistic fallacy and I was defending the idea of the naturalistic fallacy by saying some things showing why it is problematic for people to argue that eating meat is good because it is natural or homosexuality is bad because it is unnatural. What I was attacking wasn't in every case what you were saying, but what others often say. I was in part trying to show that you should accept the naturalistic fallacy as being a true fallacy, as representing a kind of faulty thinking. Naturalness shouldn't be used to justify or condemn anything.

I believe unnatural often means man made and/or deviating from natures supposed purpose. The point then is that some things originated solely from humans and we can be held accountable for them. — Andrew4Handel

Yes. That's how many seem to understand it. And here we have all that crypto-theological stuff. God made us to do such and such and will get mad at us if we deviate from his intentions.

My reasoning is that if something is a necessary part of nature there is no reason to alienate ourself from it. — Andrew4Handel

Is this sound reasoning? What is the connection between something being natural and something being okay?

What does it mean for it to be a necessary part of nature? Suppose it is a necessary part of nature for some eagles to survive by pulling goats off of cliffs. Does that justify you doing the same? Just because you can find examples of animals doing something, that makes it good for you? Why? And if you can't find any examples of animals doing something, does that mean it is wrong for you to do it? Why? I simply don't see the fact of animals doing or not doing something as a relevant consideration for whether or not we ought to do it.

Also, when you do the thing an animal does, you aren't doing the same thing really. And you are probably doing what you do for far different reasons. If you kill a gazelle, that isn't the same thing as a lion killing a gazelle. Lions can't subsist on beans, for one thing, as you can, nor are they even in a position to examine their behavior and evaluate its goodness. Your awareness and rationality, and presumably freedom, shoulders you with moral responsibility that a lion can't be reasonably expected to carry. And with a lion, it is less of a question of ought, as lions don't make such considerations. We do. Lions simply do eat gazelles and will continue to do so as long they can. The question of whether or not lions should be allowed to kill gazelles might be a question for us to ask though! ;)

A human killing a gazelle probably is doing it for sheer sport and trophy anyway. Pretty crass, if you ask me!

What if a human just goes around biting and tearing apart every living thing he comes across? And what if he defends his action by pointing out that sharks behave in this way and that it is therefore natural? Yes, sharks do do that and their doing that is part of nature. Why does that make it okay for you? And does its being natural for shark make it natural for you?

I think nature is innately harmful and cannot be improved. — Andrew4Handel

Then why are you looking to nature to justify human activity? And if harmfulness is real and can be predicated of nature, doesn't that open another can of worms? Doesn't that point to a domain of objective value? By what measuring stick are you finding nature to be in some sense bad? What are you appealing to?

I can see no reason why we should alter our bodies and use supplements to make ourselves as if Herbivores. To me that is an unnecessary sacrifice. (To an imaginary moral standard/realm) — Andrew4Handel

Why would we have to alter our bodies or even use supplements? And aren't supplements just food? Is pea protein concentrate any less real or natural than beef jerky? Why? And our diet is flexible. We can be carnivores, herbivores, or omnivores.

And as for reasons, I can think of more than a few for becoming a vegan. For one, not violating the autonomy of or doing harm to other sentient beings. For another, reducing your carbon footprint.

I was a vegan for a number of years and probably will become one again. I never had to become inhuman or unnatural, not that it would obviously be a bad thing to do so. The most difficult part is dealing with a world that relies heavily on animal products. It is hard to eat out with friends for example. And meat-eaters complain about judgmental vegetarians and vegans, but you should try to be a vegan among meat-eaters in rural America. You'll encounter some serious judgment, even hate, even threats of violence. I am sure it is not as bad as the way homosexuals are treated, but it can be trying for sure. You constantly have to justify your food choices. People will attack you for it. They sneer. They call you a freak or a nutjob. Even my own brother speaks of "those vegan nutcases" to me, knowing that I was a vegan for a long time. I've been in sporting goods stores where the walls are full of t-shirts and bumper stickers talking shit about people who care about animal rights. These are the same stores with boar heads on the walls.

But as I have said from near the beginning I am a moral nihilist and I find no moral claims convincing.

If I was looking for someone to ultimately blame for harm it would be whatever force created life. — Andrew4Handel

It is strange to hear such thoughts coming from a person who was defending the idea that moral claims can be defended by use of appeals to nature, that to say something is natural is therefore good. In rejecting the naturalistic fallacy, you seem to be defending appeals to nature as establishing goodness.

I think that finding homosexuality in nature is a positive thing for people who have faced prejudice and persecution and vilification. — Andrew4Handel

Why? Because people call it unnatural? Because at some level you agree with their feeling that unnatural things must be bad?

It is the equivalent to the support any minority gets to discover they are not alone or alien or not an aberration but just a part of nature, your own normal. — Andrew4Handel

Yes, it is comforting to be normal, to be not unusual, to feel a sense of belonging, to not be seen as a freak. This is typical and it is instinctual. It is understandable. There is the warmth of feeling yourself to have a safe place in the group. Our primitive ancestors might have died if they weren't accepted by the group, so we evolved feelings of discomfort when we perceive signs of the disapproval of the group. But such feelings don't justify rejecting the naturalistic fallacy. They don't justify a claim that all natural things are good things or that all unnatural things are bad things. After all, many deviations from normality come to be seen as positive. Socrates certainly wasn't normal. And I don't think you'll find any examples of animals in nature behaving like him! And his people killed him! Was his behavior then something we ought never to imitate? Was it really bad? If we need to find animals doing something to consider it okay, what about doing mathematics? Any animals doing that? Looking through telescopes? Enjoying a beer over a campfire?

Is your comfort partly derived from the idea that finding it in nature, where there is presumably no choice, shows that it is probably not your choice either, and is the way you were born, and is therefore nature's or even God's responsibility and not yours, thus freeing you of any taint of possible sin and assuaging you of guilt? After all, you grew up in a culture that calls it a sin. You are made to feel that what you do is evil and is frowned upon by God Almighty. Your very parents might have disapproved or regarded it as sinful or aberrant. And sin is seen as depending on free will, there only being moral responsibility where there is choice. Maybe that contributes to the eagerness to show that it is not a choice. Perhaps?

Something's being automatic and not chosen seems to remove it from the realm of should and shouldn't, doesn't it? You can't justly be called a bad boy for being short or having brown eyes, right? It's not my fault!

But suppose it is a choice. Maybe it really isn't, but suppose it is. What then? Does that really open it up to be rightly considered a sin? On what grounds? Its chosenness alone doesn't confer this, as we often consider some chosen things to be laudable. What makes a behavior evil? The disapproval of the herd? An old, superstition-riddled book full of primitive ideas from a pre-rational and pre-scientific era (when people thought thunder was the angry gesture of an annoyed and powerful guy in the sky) saying bad things about it and claiming that a big man in the sky disapproves? These are people who also thought they could cleanse their sins by offering a bloody substitute to the bloodthirsty gods in order to appease those abusive monsters. To this day some people try to pass their guilt into chickens or other animals, which are then sacrificed. This creature will die in my place! What madness! The theology surrounding the death of Jesus and its salvific capacity is another example of this kind of crazy thinking. God was pissed and needed blood! But he so loved the world that he gave his only begotten son! (read: sacrificed his only or firstborn son as was the greatest sacrifice sometimes offered to the gods by men) And by feeding the blood of his son to himself, he appeased himself and bought our pardon. Our guilt passed into Jesus. And the Father is consubsantial with the Son, and is in some sense the same being. So basically, he sacrificed himself to himself to buy himself off to not punish us. But he is going to punish most of us anyway for not believing in this in exactly the right way or demonstrating it with the proper rituals and professions of faith.

I hope that the beliefs of the same people who believe this crap don't disturb your sleep. These are people who still believe in the efficacy of blood sacrifices to appease big angry men in the sky who are annoyed by the activities of the noisy humans on the ground. Very primitive people thought this way. Why are things going badly for me? I must have done something to offend the powerful spirits that command the forces affecting me. So I must offer them something and say some soothing, apologetic things. "Ooh you are so big! So absolutely huge! We are all very impressed down here! Please don't put us on the barbecue! Please don't boil us in hot fat! We offer you gifts! We praise you! Glory, glory to thee oh all-powerful one! Please have mercy on us! We submit to thee! We kneel! We show submission! We say uncle! Uncle! Uncle! Please don't hurt us! You are good! You are the greatest! We serve no other! Please stop hurting us! Please stop! We'll pay more! We'll be your slave! We'll do anything!" This is the way you talk to a benevolent entity?

Why is homosexuality bad? Is it that it is non-procreative? So what?!! Many heterosexuals practice non-procreative sex and most don't call it an abomination. Infertile heterosexuals who are Christians are not condemned for having sex, at least inside marriage. And many heterosexuals practice most of the same physical acts, including anal and oral sex, and they don't suffer the same stigma. People are just looney about this stuff and are probably driven by some kind of primitive instinct to attack it. Or maybe much of this attitude comes from the culture. The Greeks didn't find it so bothersome. Much of it seems to be based in religious taboo for whatever reason. And I think we can safely reject the abomination of human thought that is Christian theology! How they can believe their theology and also that their God is just and good at the same time, especially with Hell and eternal torment there for finite sins such as masturbation, I can't begin to imagine. Yes, masturbation has been considered a mortal sin, one warranting your eternal damnation! A world in which their God doesn't exist and death is just the end would be better than one in which most people go to eternal torment in the fires of Hell, especially for such small and innocent things! That being the case, how can their God be good?

Be at ease about their charges of sin. They project their own guilt complexes. They probably masturbate and worry about God disapproving. They protest too much! Their religion is basically all about their guilt. They are some neurotic people! Why the hurricans and the floods? People have displeased God and he is punishing them! What a bunch of nonsense!

The question of whether or not homosexuality is bad or good must be evaluated on grounds other than its naturalness. It must be asked whether or not it causes harm to non-consenting sentient beings. Does it violate anyone's autonomy? Rape certainly does, whether heterosexual or homosexual. But does homosexuality involve any such harms? I don't see that it does. Some sexual acts might involve some such violation, but heterosexual sex is probably more likely to have it with all its male domination of women.

What makes something evil, in my estimation, is that it makes life hell for other sentient beings. What Christians do to homosexuals is evil if anything is. What was done during the Spanish Inquisition was evil beyond all imagination, and it was done in the name of God! They should listen to the golden rule given by their Jesus. I've rarely seen more stones thrown than by the Christians who claim to follow the wise man who told them to throw no stones and to judge not. They are the ones who want to condemn. Hell for those who are not them is their fantasy. Many of them are sick puppies! Don't listen to them! Their Jesus did supposedly have some nice things to say though! If only they would listen to those things! Be nice! Isn't that basically what his message was? If only they would hear it. And I think that applies to our treatment of animals as well.

Be nice! Respect the interests and autonomy of others! Treat any other sentient being not merely as a means, but also as an end. That includes animals.

I am not sure I accept the idea that an ought can never derive from an is. Let me explain. It is hard to see why an ought would follow from an objective state of affairs. But what if we take seriously the idea that subjective experience is real? — petrichor

One reason you can't derive an ought from an is, is because you really never do, even when it looks like you are. You are simply failing to put a tacit assumption into words.

For instance:
P1: Hitting hurts.
C: One ought not hit others.

Really should be formulated as such:
P1: Hitting hurts.
P2: One ought not hurt others.
C: One ought not hit others.

(I realize that there are exceptions about necessity that theoretically need to be included in a full argument for this, but you get the gist.)
In attempting to derive an ought from an is, you are almost always including tacit value judgement and ought-claims. So you really aren't deriving an ought from an is.

Subjective experience is of course real, but that does not make recognizing them as real subjective: You have a headache is an objective statement about something subjectively experienced. Almost all people share the capacities for these subjective experiences, so we can objectively make claims about what states of being are okay to evoke in others.

I agree with much of what you say in your post about meat eating and warfare, but I think you veered away from your initial questioning of the is-ought-gap. Perhaps you could explain to me more clearly why you think it is bridgeable? (Unless of course my above explanation of it's unbridgeability is satisfactory to you :)).

Speaking as a homosexual myself I think that finding homosexuality in nature is a positive thing for people who have faced prejudice and persecution and vilification. — Andrew4Handel

You may find it normalizing, and that's great if it helps you emotionally--but it still doesn't make it right or wrong. Ethically, the "naturalness" of homosexuality (or anything else) simply doesn't matter.

If only evolutionary natural things were good, we'd have to give up on all progress of civilization and live in caves without heating, medicine, the arts, etc, etc.

And again: rape, murder, incest, cannibalism, stealing, and so on all occur in nature. They are not good, and we should not engage in these things.

What does matter morally are arguments like: it doesn't affect anyone but the two consenting adults involved (or shouldn't); and it makes those two people happy.

Again: so because humans must die (and death is never "nice") it is therefore okay to kill them? — NKBJ

Where are you getting that from? And what's the relevance to what was said in the quote that you were replying to? The point, as I understood it, was that they'll likely have a better life and a better death this way than they would in nature, and I think that that's a good point which deserves a proper answer. (And there is such a thing as a better death, and you know it).

So it's only right to be a cannibal when there's a famine? How more arbitrary can you get? — Buxtebuddha

That's not arbitrary at all. It's parallel in law would be mitigating factors.

Where are you getting that from? And what's the relevance to what was said in the quote that you were replying to? The point, as I understood it, was that they'll likely have a better life and a better death this way than they would in nature, and I think that that's a good point which deserves a proper answer. (And there is such a thing as a better death, and you know it). — Sapientia

You say that all animals must die anyway, and use that to justify killing them for food/our own pleasure.
a)Don't pretend we're killing the billions of cows, pigs, and chickens we eat every year for their own good.
b) Some deaths may be preferable to others, but living is preferable to either.
c) it is not for us to decide for the animal when it should die. Counter example: someone you know has cancer and will die a painful death. Are you allowed to put him/her out of his/her misery when s/he doesn't wish to die yet?

You may find it normalizing, and that's great if it helps you emotionally--but it still doesn't make it right or wrong. Ethically, the "naturalness" of homosexuality (or anything else) simply doesn't matter. — NKBJ

If something happens in nature I don't see how it can be wrong. This is a problem for morality in general.

I am certainly not saying what happens in nature is good. Goodness is a problematic characteristic which seems the most subjective of the values.

I am not sure exactly what was meant by "ought equals can" but it seems to me to say moral obligations cannot be impossible to achieve such as things we can't physically or mentally do. This means that expecting a gay person to change his or her sexuality is problematic if it is fixed by nature. So in this sense nature makes moral condemnations of homosexuality defunct.

However this invokes the naturalistic fallacy because the idea that morality cannot makes us do things that are naturally impossible is setting morality in a purely natural setting.

Deterministic positions suggest that certain things if not everything are either very hard or impossible to control. some natural/genetic traits would be harder to manage and total determinism would deny and self control.

Ii think if it was easy to refrain from eaten meat and if a vegan diet was equally delicious and enticing to a vegan one it would be easy for people to change.

You say that all animals must die anyway, and use that to justify killing them for food/our own pleasure. — NKBJ

I think you're confusing me with someone else.

a) Don't pretend we're killing the billions of cows, pigs, and chickens we eat every year for their own good. — NKBJ

I don't. Don't pretend that it doesn't end up in their best interest, in light of the consequences, in some cases, regardless of the motive.

b) Some deaths may be preferable to others, but living is preferable to either. — NKBJ

Oh good, so presumably you agree with the point that was made about an extended lifespan in captivity versus a shorter lifespan in nature.

c) It is not for us to decide for the animal when it should die. — NKBJ

Says you. And it's okay if they die of natural causes, then?

Counter example: someone you know has cancer and will die a painful death. Are you allowed to put him/her out of his/her misery when s/he doesn't wish to die yet? — NKBJ

Not a counterexample. You can't compare some chicken on a farm somewhere with someone I know having cancer. Talk about ridiculous!

If only evolutionary natural things were good, — NKBJ

I am not talking about things that are good via nature but things that are innate via nature. For example most animals can kill but I don't think most animals have an innate drive to kill unless they are carnivores or in exceptional circumstances.

There are degrees to which a behaviour is innate and because of this it limits the amount of condemnation and morality you can apply to this behaviour.

Just like the legal notion of mitigating circumstances. I am not saying humans cannot manage meat eating but carnivorous and omnivorous behaviour is more innate in nature than some other behaviours.

It is not for us to decide for the animal when it should die. Counter example: someone you know has cancer and will die a painful death. Are you allowed to put him/her out of his/her misery when s/he doesn't wish to die yet? — NKBJ

That is what routinely happens to pets because ill animals cannot talk. Also Doctors often cause the death of a patient by decisions about their medical care in life or death circumstances.

Imagine if we didn't intervene in any human lives most humans would die quickly. If their parents didn't care for them they would die shortly after birth.

Leaving animals to natures mercy is not clearly the most ethical thing. If you wanted to be really ethical you could intervene in natural famines and try and make all animal deaths quick and painless (although that would be improbable) But not interfering with nature is certainly not ensuring an animal will thrive and have maximum well being. (For example where an animal is being eaten alive it seems the persons watching should shoot the animal to give it a quicker death.

Ironically most of these eaten alive videos are filmed in nature reserves/safaris where we are trying to preserve nature.

And before we can decide whether or not natural things are good, we need to know what goodness is! Do you know what it is? — petrichor

I am not committed to a a notion of goodness I am just dismissing the naturalistic fallacy and arguing that nature is a guide to some things. Obviously a Doctor ought to learn how the heart works before performing heart surgery because that heart has a function and his job would be rendered futile if it didn't reference a model of how a heart best functions.

I think a notion of goodness such as what causes least harm will have to reference nature because harm is natural/biological. I think if we want to minimise harm we have to do it with reference to what nature/reality/biology provides us. It may be that nature can't give us the kind of goodness we idealise.

Lots of people including my self suffer distress from reality not living up to our expectations and fantasies.

, I tend to think that this child's suffering matters regardless of whether it bothers me or not. It would matter even if nobody existed but the torturer and the child. — petrichor

How would you know that the child's suffering mattered if it didn't bother you at all?

Perhaps pain, in itself, is sort of a real ought-not — petrichor

Pain is essential for survival. People with congenital pain deficit die younger and cause themselves lots of injury. Pain is often in indication of injury.

Pain is created by nature it is not something humans invented. Pain is another "natural" thing that exists whether we moralise about it or not. As I said earlier rejecting these type of things ends with us rejecting nature.

I am an antinatalist so I will not be causing more pain after I am dead because there is no human life without pain. But it is not a clear moral guide and a lot of it is a result of illness and embodiment.