We're getting into what could be interesting territory...

What is the criterion, minimally, that counts as belief? Are there a set of necessary and sufficient conditions? Is that the best way to put it?

Again, we look to known examples, and we look for common denominators. Isolate those and see if it's enough to constitute belief.

I know it's awfully tempting to say that knowing how to use the word "belief" shows that one knows what belief is, but that's just asinine...

There's a thread on this very forum entitled "Belief(not just religious belief) ought be abolished"...

That author clearly has no clue what belief is and the role that it plays in his/her own worldview...

People in some circles talk of something being "refined"...

We have refined palates and other 'tastes'(personal preferences). In order to qualify as such, the person must have an ability to discriminate between examples of a certain kind. Wines come immediately to mind. Wine tasters seek to identify the ingredients of different wines which allows them to determine the origen of that particular wine. To do this, the taster must not only have a refined palate, in order to identify any particular unique ingredients and methods, but they must also have some knowledge regarding which parts of the world, and/or which wineries uses and/or used those particular ingredients and methods in addition to the timeframe that they were in use.

It's all correlation.

Physiological sensory perception. Spatio-temporal distinction. Something to become significant/symbolized. Something to become sign/symbol. An agent with the ability to make a connection; draw a correlation; and/or associate between the two(sign/symbol and/or significant/symbolized).

Does anyone here have an example of anything ever thought, believed, written, and/or spoken that does not consist of these basic elemental constituents? Of course not. Any example would consist of language use. So, that's not very helpful. Does this set of basic elemental constituents require language? I mean, is there anything in that set that is existentially dependent upon language?

I think not.

Does our ability to acquire knowledge of this set require language?

Of course.

What's missing?

If we grant the adequacy of that criterion for belief, we still face a difficulty distinguishing between a creature that is simply responding to it's environment(stimulus/response) and one that is attributing meaning(which is what happens when the criterion is satisfied). All belief formation counts as stimulus/response, but not the other way around. What is the difference without special pleading? It's the attribution of meaning; the drawing of correlations; the belief formation itself. How can we tell that that has happened?

Holding/having expectation certainly warrants that conclusion.

I find it quite problematic to look at every conception of the term belief as a means for 'understanding the concept'(scare-quoted intentionally). It's almost as if you're planting the seeds of equivocation. Sure, all the different uses need to be looked at in order to understand all the different accepted usages(sensible conceptions; language games; linguistic constructs; conceptual schemes). — creativesoul

All I'm saying is that the concept belief should be looked at in terms of how it's used in language, which include language-games, and in turn gives us a clearer picture of where we might be going wrong in our analysis of the word belief. In terms of equivocation, one could also say that of Wittgenstein's many examples of how words are used in various contexts. Some words are even used in contradictory ways, i.e., in one context they mean one thing, and in another context something quite the opposite.

We're in agreement on that Sam. Well, aside from the fact that you've implied that there is only one concept of "belief". I just wanted to avoid falling into equivocation...

The individual who has the belief holds that the proposition is true.
This is, if you like, the significance of a belief statement. It follows from Moore's paradox, in which someone is assume to believe something that they hold not to be true. For example:

"I believe the world is flat, but the world is not flat".

While this is difficult to set out as a clear contradiction, there is something deeply unhappy about it. The conclusion is that one thinks that what one believes is indeed true.

Note that Moore's paradox is in the first person. "John believes the world is flat, but the world is not flat" is not paradoxical - John is just wrong. "John believes that the world is flat and John believes the world is not flat" - John is inconsistent.

The perforative paradox comes about only when expressed in the first person. — Banno

One might think it so trivial that it is not worth saying: to believe some proposition is to believe that proposition to be true.

That is, talk of belief requires talk of truth.

One might be tempted, perhaps by pragmatism or by Bayesian thoughts, to replace that with measures of probability. You might think yourself only 99.99% certain that the cat is on the mat, and suppose thereby that you have banished truth. But of course, one is also thereby 99.99% certain that "the cat is on the mat" is true.

The banishment is an illusion.

So they saw the same movie, but had different experiences, meaning they had distinctly different phenomenal states as the result of observing the same object. Whose phenomenal state best represented reality? — Hanover

There's so much here that is muddled, much of the muddle caused by equating different experiences with different phenomenal states, while trying to maintain that phenomenal states are both open for discussion and yet ineffable.

I noticed a bit of discussion about propositions.

There is no such thing as a proposition, of course. It's a philosophical reification used to stand in for a bunch of other things. It would be better to talk in terms of statement, but that in itself will lead to much wandering up garden paths.

There are statements. These are things we do with words. We invent propositions so that we can talk about statements in French as expressing the same thing as statements in English, and statements in your mouth saying the same thing as statements in my mouth, and so on. Breaking that down, one is left with a bunch of statements with the same truth conditions. Any of these can be taken as the corresponding proposition.

Austin talked of words that gain their meaning - use - mostly by being contrasted with their opposite. His example was real.

"it's not a fake; it's real"
"it's not a mirage, it's real!"
It's not a mistake - it's real"

and so on.

Belief can be understood in a similar fashion, as gaining it's meaning from the contrast between a true belief and a false belief. That is, the important aspect of belief is that sometimes we think that something is the case, and yet it is not.

We bring belief into the discourse in order to make sense of such errors.

There are statements. These are things we do with words. We invent propositions so that we can talk about statements in French as expressing the same thing as statements in English, and statements in your mouth saying the same thing as statements in my mouth, and so on. Breaking that down, one is left with a bunch of statements with the same truth conditions. Any of these can be taken as the corresponding proposition. — Banno

Oddly you say there are no propositions, and then the last two sentences assert that there are propositions ("same truth conditions").

Better: I know how to use "proposition", so I know what it is. No need for metaphysics.

You understood. Well done.

So we have talked about two ways that beliefs are used; the first was in explaining actions, the second is in contrasting the true against the false.

Using beliefs to help explain actions is fraught with difficulties. Basically one can use a belief together with a desire in order to explain what someone has done. Such an explanation will be sufficient, but that's it. So for example knowing someone's beliefs and desires is insufficient to predict their future behaviour with much certainty; and one can be wrong about concluding that a certain belief led to a certain action.

And contrasting true belief against false belief allows us to enter into language games that correct errors.

If the world were transparent in such a way that we never made statements that are false, we would have no need for beliefs.

There's so much here that is muddled, much of the muddle caused by equating different experiences with different phenomenal states, while trying to maintain that phenomenal states are both open for discussion and yet ineffable. — Banno

But different phenomenal states can - and, in at least some cases, do - result in different experiences. Right? Even if the external set up for the experience is the same, my experience and your experience can differ in certain respects, even if we both had an experience of, say, watching a film, or of eating Marmite on toast, or what have you.

I've retraced the exchange between you and Hanover to some extent, and I can't quite tell whether you have a genuine disagreement or whether you're just talking past each other. Do you both agree that it's different in some respects, but the same - or similar - in others; and that it's shared with regard to some aspects, like the film being watched, but unshared with regard other aspects, like private thoughts and feelings which have not been expressed?

...my experience and your experience can differ in certain respects, even if we both had an experience of, say, watching a film, or of eating Marmite on toast, or what have you. — Sapientia

If they are ineffable, how could you know this?

If they are ineffable, how could you know this? — Banno

He said word "can," not must. He says nothing of knowing the beetle.

But, what is the evidence that my beetle is different than yours? We've already established that the Vietnam vet's experience of the movie is different from the child's.

There's so much here that is muddled, much of the muddle caused by equating different experiences with different phenomenal states, while trying to maintain that phenomenal states are both open for discussion and yet ineffable. — Banno

No muddle, just your failure to analyze the phenomenal state, which is all part of the artificial limitation you place on analysis of the internal state. Your position, as far as I can tell, wishes to deny any relevance to the internal state, and so you hardly wish to embark on discussing it.

Not being so limited, I will tell you what the phenomenal state is. It is the full experience of what I am experiencing. I find incoherent the idea that there is a direct stream of data entering my conscious, unaffected by the mechanisms of my mind, which include anything from visual distortions, personal biases, mood, and perhaps even affected by what I ate for breakfast. That being the case, I have every reason to believe that my internal state varies from yours. I also fully understand that language is a very limited way of expressing oneself and what goes on in one's mind. I know this because I compare the words I speak to what I'm actually thinking and I realize that what I say is a limited sketch of my full thoughts.

I find incoherent the idea that there is a direct stream of data entering my conscious, unaffected by the mechanisms of my mind, which include anything from visual distortions, personal biases, mood, and perhaps even affected by what I ate for breakfast. That being the case, I have every reason to believe that my internal state varies from yours. — Hanover

It also varies from itself. If it is so unique that you cannot speak of it, then it is only because you've yet to find the words for doing so. Look to others, for despite the fact that our states vary from each other and themselves, we all have the same ones. The more refined one's ability to talk about their own thought and belief, the more refined one's thought and belief become... It's a funny thing about the affect/effects of language on thought and belief.

I also fully understand that language is a very limited way of expressing oneself and what goes on in one's mind. I know this because I compare the words I speak to what I'm actually thinking and I realize that what I say is a limited sketch of my full thoughts. — Hanover

It doesn't follow from the fact that we do not speak aloud all our thoughts that we could not.

And contrasting true belief against false belief allows us to enter into language games that correct errors.

If the world were transparent in such a way that we never made statements that are false, we would have no need for beliefs. — Banno

If all our belief were true, there would be no need to discriminate between true/false belief. But... not all our belief is true.

Creatures with the ability to think about their own thought and belief - and those without - are capable of having true and false belief. Only the former can become aware of it.

Belief presupposes truth.

It also varies from itself. If it is so unique that you cannot speak of it, then it is only because you've yet to find the words for doing so. — creativesoul

It can be done, but it just never has been done? I could start describing my phenomenal state now, looking out the window, hearing the rain, smelling the smells, thinking various thoughts, have various stresses, etc. and after thousands and thousands of pages, I'd still have left something out and you would not experience my experience. You'd just sort of know about it.

Look to others, for despite the fact that our states vary from each other and themselves, we all have the same ones. — creativesoul

How do you know what their beetle looks like?

The more refined one's ability to talk about their own thought and belief, the more refined one's thought and belief become... It's a funny thing about the affect/effects of language on thought and belief. — creativesoul

Perhaps. Sometimes our statements of our beliefs are wrong. But I do agree that the more we think about something, the more we understand it. That's how thought works, but I'm not committed to the idea that all thought must be performed by the tool of language.

It doesn't follow from the fact that we do not speak aloud all our thoughts that we could not. — creativesoul

Such is the theory that given an infinite amount of time we could precisely describe a single thought. Like I said, maybe, but I doubt it.

It also varies from itself. If it is so unique that you cannot speak of it, then it is only because you've yet to find the words for doing so.
— creativesoul

It can be done, but it just never has been done? I could start describing my phenomenal state now, looking out the window, hearing the rain, smelling the smells, thinking various thoughts, have various stresses, etc. and after thousands and thousands of pages, I'd still have left something out and you would not experience my experience. You'd just sort of know about it. — Hanover

Well, seeing how thought and belief formation is an ongoing process, there's always something more to speak about. That's another matter altogether.

What's at stake here is whether or not our thought and belief are ineffable.

Is that the same phenomenal state all the way through those thousands of pages?

Of course, if your experience includes only your thought and belief and all that that is existentially dependent upon, then no one else could have your experience, by definition. How does this line of thinking help our understanding?

Look to others, for despite the fact that our states vary from each other and themselves, we all have the same ones.
— creativesoul

How do you know what their beetle looks like? — Hanover

They open their box. I look inside. Let the box be language use. Let my looking inside be my drawing the same meaningful connections.

But I do agree that the more we think about something, the more we understand it. That's how thought works, but I'm not committed to the idea that all thought must be performed by the tool of language. — Hanover

There's agreement, but not what you've indicated.

I would say that it is not always the case that the more one thinks about something, the more one understands it:That's not how thought works. Often, the more one thinks about something, the more confused s/he becomes. To be clear, it can be the case though. I'm just attempting to keep this appropriately tempered.

I would not say that all thought and belief must be performed by language. We agree there.

He said word "can," not must. He says nothing of knowing the beetle. — Hanover

SO they are not ineffable? Then what is the problem?

We've already established that the Vietnam vet's experience of the movie is different from the child's. — Hanover

Again, if that is the case then their experiences are not ineffable.

So what is the problem?

I can't quite tell whether you have a genuine disagreement or whether you're just talking past each other. — Sapientia

Neither can I. Hanover seems to think I deny internal experiences. I don't. I'm saying that if they can not be shared, spoken about, then they are irrelevant. Hanover seems to disagree with that, but then examples he gives are all of shared experiences. He appears to want to keep his ineffability yet speak it, too.

Your position, as far as I can tell, wishes to deny any relevance to the internal state, and so you hardly wish to embark on discussing it. — Hanover

My beetle is red. Yours?

If all our belief were true, there would be no need to discriminate between true/false belief. But... not all our belief is true. — creativesoul

Yes.

Creatures with the ability to think about their own thought and belief - and those without - are capable of having true and false belief. Only the former can become aware of it. — creativesoul

Hence belief and language go together.

Belief presupposes truth. — creativesoul

Yes - and falsehood.