. Question: Kant famously denied knowledge to make room for faith. It's clear to me he denied scientific knowledge (of speculative matters) to make room for faith. I argue he did not in any way deny or intend to deny practical knowledge with respect to faith; indeed, he needed it to ground faith. Yes?

Kant denied the rationalistic arguments for the existence of God, he did not deny God. He denied the possibility of religious knowledge in order to safeguard faith, "in order to make room for faith". He did not challenge the intelligibility of religious doctrine, just that their truth or falsity could be known.

Faith for Kant is justified consent which is rooted the needs of practical life where faith binds us to morality through our free acts of the will. His linking of morality/religion gives (practical) knowledge a distinctively intersubjective status, where we legislate for all members of the 'Kingdom of Ends"

I'm not very well versed in that aspect of Kant (I've only really delved into him from a narrow angle on his epistemology as such), but my understanding is that he denied that scientific (which in contemporary terms meant demonstrable-with-certainty) knowledge was possible about speculative/faith matters, yes; but I'm not sure what he thought the relation of practical knowledge was to faith. Off the top of my head I'd say you're probably right, and I don't see any reason why they would clash in terms of his philosophy.

No problem here, for me. Umm, maybe one. If the phenomenal is mind-dependent, then what does "experienced phenomena" mean? — tim wood

We do not need to hold concrete particulars of sight in order to contemplate sight in abstract terms. Same applies for the concrete particulars of hearing, taste, touch, smell, proprioception, etc., i.e. to all phenomena. For example, we could contemplate visual phenomena in abstract ways as manifesting from multiple vantages—e.g. an ant’s, a cat’s, and a human’s—toward any particular object without needing to invoke particular examples of the sight all three of these beings concretely see.

Hence, by “experienced phenomena” I was intending to distinguish phenomena as it is directly experienced from the same phenomena as it can be abstractly thought about with or without concrete examples.

I understand that there could yet be confusions all the same with the Kantian notions of phenomena—as in, within Kantianism, abstractions are experienced phenomena too (although not in the original ancient sense of phenomena, in which abstractions devoid of concrete examples would be experienced noumena). Still, the experience of that which is seen is not the same as the experience of an abstract contemplation regarding the contents of sight in general which is devoid of visualized concrete particulars.

So, in immediate experience, the green leaf seen is a direct presentation of the green leaf out there. In abstract contemplation, however, my seeing of a green leaf is a re-presentation of the object out there which to me and all other like sentience results in a green appearance. The former is what occurs in what I termed “experienced phenomena”. The latter is what occurs when we abstractly contemplate the nature of phenomena.

An old thought just came to me, one can apply issues of phenomena on an impartiality spectrum—such that most partial is fully limited to what is for the individual and only for the individual and what is most impartial equally is for all sentient beings regardless of type, degree, and quality of awareness.

At the most partial level, it is the phenomena I perceive. Less partially, it is the phenomena which we perceive—and the inclusivity of this “we” will indicate the degree of impartiality relative the the most partial perspective of the “I” when solely addressed. For example, this "we" could be one and one’s buddy, one’s group(s), one’s total species, all mammals, etc. Lastly, that which is equally applicable to all sentience is most impartial relative to any particular sentience.

Replace “impartiality” with “objectivity”—as can be quite validly done—and you can then address objective phenomena … as long as this objectivity is not addressed in terms of an absolute but, instead, in terms of being relative to the inclusiveness of all sentient beings addressed.

From this, we then can validly address objects as objectively manifesting and as holding objective phenomenal properties relative to the human species. Whichever properties are present to other species of life will then be more impartial/objective … until we arrive at things such as natural laws that address without any contradiction why things are as they are--such as why the moon’s presence needs to be even were all sentience to be sleeping due to the many causal factors which the moon manifests upon everything else, from ocean tides to, if I'm not mistaken, at least some circadian rhythms which occur even when we’re sleeping. — javra

I think this is descriptive of the stance of natural sciences, is it not? This is not a criticism but a reflection on what actually is being analysed.

To elucidate: I have previously cited a passage from Bryan Magee's book on Schopenhauer, which can be understood as a criticism of scientific realism (an example here.)

However, even though this appears to be an idealist argument, I add that within the context of this kind of analysis, we're considering mind as THE mind - not your mind, or my mind, but a h. sapiens mind. So this means that it's not idealist in the sense that many would naturally assume, i.e. dependent on an individual mind. It's more that, as you and I are instances of a kind, namely, h. sapiens, then we share a certain reality. But that reality is not wholly or simply objective, given, or 'out there'. Whereas, because of the way moderns tend to parse experience, it is naturally presumed that what is 'out there' are material or energetic phenomena, whilst 'mind' is 'in here' as a private or subjective realm.

Then there's the fact that we're culturally-modern English-speaking humans as well. So there's a biological factor - h. sapiens have certain biologically-endowed attributes - but also cultural factors, such as mental constructs, paradigms, belief systems, and so on, which inform judgement.

And within that whole complex, there are greater and lesser 'degrees of objectivity' - that is what science is especially useful for finding out. Because science agrees on a method, and on common units of measurement, and a way of checking results and so on, science is able to discover things which are true from the most general possible viewpoint. And that, I think, is what you're referring to when you say 'we then can validly address objects as objectively manifesting and as holding objective phenomenal properties relative to the human species.'

But I think 'transcendental philosophies' wish to go beyond even that. I suppose you could say, Kant tried to show that you couldn't go beyond it, in the sense of knowing or demonstrating what could be beyond it, other than by showing that what we think we know of a supposedly purely external or objective domain, is in some sense constituted by the knowing of it.

I think this is descriptive of the stance of natural sciences, is it not? — Wayfarer

Your comments seem about right to me.

That stated, to my mind, the concept of objectivity which I’ve tried to articulate does not of itself make an ontological commitment regarding whether or not minds as we know them—or even any conception of Mind with a capital “M”—are required for the physical to be. In other words, I currently believe it can equally apply to systems of idealism as much as it can apply to systems of physicalism. Notwithstanding, yes, what I previously described does very much take into account the objectivity of the empirical sciences, this due to these sciences being phenomena founded (i.e., empirical).

Yet the same principle of objectivity as impartiality can also be applied to non-Kantian notions of noumena, as in basic geometric forms and rudimentary mathematical relations between quantities which are only capable of being apprehended by the intellect—and can so be in purely abstract forms. Or to the principles of thought.

And, from the stance of my own beliefs: It would be a stretch—and I’m not interested in here arguing for the case—but one can also apply this objectivity-impartially equivalence to the notion of an objective good—in the Platonic and Neo-Platonic sense. To give an overall gist of this approach: what do all sentience desire/intent/want? This can wind its way toward what Buddhists address as a liberation from suffering—or, imo more formally, from obstructions to one’s will being fulfilled as one intends it fulfilled. Then there’s the issue of what such state of fully (or at least optimally) liberated being might ontically be and, once appraised, how it might be best pursued. As one example—a bit spiritual for the atheistic folks, I would assume—this could be a state of perfect non-duality; e.g., Buddhist notions of Nirvana or Neo-Platonic notions of “the One”. None of this is here conclusive, obviously; but, again, the impartiality/objectivity equivalence makes such sort of thinking feasible to me. For example, all subjects (or partial, ego-centric beings) are subjects of both physical objectivity/impartiality to which they conform—this being the world we experience phenomenally (e.g., truth being a conforming of beliefs and statements to that which objectivity is)—as well as being subjects to metaphysical objectivity/impartiality—this being quite a bit harder to succinctly specify in any meaningful way, but to me a) it is by definition not itself a subject, b) it incorporates the striven for end of liberation from suffering previously mentioned, and c) it is an Aristotelian-like telos/final cause via which the physical world is in large part determined in a manner fully compatible with the freewill of agents. Anyway, it’s what I’m working on … and it’s quite the headache. What can I say, a well supported value theory is important to me.

I mentioned this to try to illustrate that this notion of objectivity I’ve been working with in no way specifies what might otherwise be termed scientism—I won’t address scientific realism other than to say that any scientific realism that cannot properly incorporate value theory misses the mark, imo--but yes, imo, it is very much in tune with what the empirical sciences seek and often discover in their endeavors.

It seemed to me to especially fit into the nature of objective phenomena that was being discussed in the thread.

Apropos, having looked at the link you’ve provided, what do you make of Kant’s theorizing of the Nebular hypothesis? To me it so far indicates that he did not take the view that minds as we know them need to be in order for the physical to be. I’m speculating without any evidence that maybe he held some form of pan-something (panpsychism, pansemiosis, something) as a precursor to what we now can more readily talk about, this as an aspect of his transcendental idealism. Wouldn’t mind hearing about differing opinions on Kant’s upholding of the solar system’s formation in such manner … if it doesn’t deviate too much from the thread’s theme.

For instance, the word "tree", though it is used by the sentient being to represent the external thing, is not at all similar to the visual image. The thing which represents is not at all similar to the thing represented. So we ought not think that the external thing which we call 'tree" is even similar to the visual image which represents it in sense perception. — Metaphysician Undercover

There's a distinction to be made between represent and re-present. Clearly the word tree represents the tree, but does not present it. In other words you are correct: the word "tree" probably is not similar to the external thing we call a tree. Question: is that lack of resemblance problematic or categorical? That is, since you're so clear that the external whatever-it-is-if-it-is is not what we make of it, then how do you know what it isn't?

A long question is possible here - who needs that? Maybe this: what do you make of the idea, that I call Kantian, of practical knowledge, and that it is dependable? My own view is to grant that (in terms of vision) we do not see the tree in all of its glory, but what we do see is accurate, its deficiencies more-or-less understood. Practical knowledge is, then, an assurance. And for the most part - the practical part - it doesn't even need an asterisk. So, practical knowledge, yes? Or no?

At the most partial level, it is the phenomena I perceive. Less partially, it is the phenomena which we perceive—and the inclusivity of this “we” will indicate the degree of impartiality relative the the most partial perspective of the “I” when solely addressed. For example, this "we" could be one and one’s buddy, one’s group(s), one’s total species, all mammals, etc. Lastly, that which is equally applicable to all sentience is most impartial relative to any particular sentience.

Replace “impartiality” with “objectivity”—as can be quite validly done—and you can then address objective phenomena … as long as this objectivity is not addressed in terms of an absolute but, instead, in terms of being relative to the inclusiveness of all sentient beings addressed.

I think that there has to be some sort of kind of progression, a semiotic which I don't think is caught in the conception of a spectrum. We all start with the phenomenal... we learn a language which combines phenomenal sounds with mental meanings and enables our ability to communicate of our ideas with others, this is the basis for developing ideals which enable us to immediate categorize the phenomenal as well as enabling our scientific determination of the underling reasons why the phenomenal (physical or mental) appears as it does.

If the tree-in-itself really is as we perceive it, then we've gained, but not more than we already have. If it isn't, well, first question would be, how do we know it isn't. Second, what difference does it make? — tim wood

I think this is too black and white. It fails to capture the possibility that the tree is really in accordance with my perceiving of it, but that it does not consist merely in my perceiving of it. MU likewise speaks dualistically when he asks whether the perception is caused by the phenomenon or caused by the percipient. Why must it be one or the other? The perception is the relation or interaction between the phenomenon and the percipient from the percipient's point of view. The whole is the condition for the actuality of perception, and perception is just one part of the activity of the whole.

That is, since you're so clear that the external whatever-it-is-if-it-is is not what we make of it, then how do you know what it isn't? — tim wood

I'm not saying that the external whatever it is is not what we make of it. I said it's not necessarily similar to how we represent it, just like the word "tree" is not similar to a tree. So I don't get your question. I know that "tree" is not "grass", because these two representations are different. I also know that my perception of a tree is different from my perception of grass. So I can say that the tree is not grass. But this does not mean that the tree, as it is, is not completely different from my perception of a tree, like the word "tree' is completely different from my perception of a tree.

A long question is possible here - who needs that? Maybe this: what do you make of the idea, that I call Kantian, of practical knowledge, and that it is dependable? My own view is to grant that (in terms of vision) we do not see the tree in all of its glory, but what we do see is accurate, its deficiencies more-or-less understood. Practical knowledge is, then, an assurance. And for the most part - the practical part - it doesn't even need an asterisk. So, practical knowledge, yes? Or no? — tim wood

No, I don't agree with this at all. What we see of the tree is not accurate at all. Science tells us that the tree consists of all sorts of different molecules, each of which have different atoms themselves composed of different parts. We don't see this at all. The tree looks completely solid yet science tells me that there is much space between the parts

Furthermore, what you call "practical knowledge" is limited by its relation to the particular application, and is therefore extremely incomplete, deficient. For example, ancient people might have had enough knowledge concerning trees to dry the wood and use it to make fires. Yes, practical knowledge is dependable, dry the wood and use it for fuel. But this tells us nothing about shaping the wood and using it to build houses and furniture. This requires further knowledge. Beyond this comes the knowledge that we can make paper out of wood, and now we can do all sorts of things with wood fibre and the various molecules which can be separated out of the wood. So practical knowledge doesn't get us anywhere beyond the particular activity which is being carried out. We need theoretical knowledge to dream up all sorts of new things that we can do. That is why we need to think beyond what is immediately evident to our senses.

So, practical knowledge, yes? Or no?
— tim wood

No, I don't agree with this at all. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok. MU: is there any such thing as a tree?

A tree is a type, therefore "tree" is conceptual. I may judge something as being a tree, or you may judge something as being a tree, but how would such a judgement make it a tree?

A remarkably obtuse and unresponsive answer. One more try, can you affirm that there is any thing at all? Or do you say that nothing exists?

Why do I need to say either one? And of what use would such an answer be? Let's first decide what it means to be, to exist, then the question "does anything exist" might be meaningful.