Kant denied the rationalistic arguments for the existence of God, he did not deny God. He denied the possibility of religious knowledge in order to safeguard faith, "in order to make room for faith". He did not challenge the intelligibility of religious doctrine, just that their truth or falsity could be known.. Question: Kant famously denied knowledge to make room for faith. It's clear to me he denied scientific knowledge (of speculative matters) to make room for faith. I argue he did not in any way deny or intend to deny practical knowledge with respect to faith; indeed, he needed it to ground faith. Yes?
No problem here, for me. Umm, maybe one. If the phenomenal is mind-dependent, then what does "experienced phenomena" mean? — tim wood
An old thought just came to me, one can apply issues of phenomena on an impartiality spectrum—such that most partial is fully limited to what is for the individual and only for the individual and what is most impartial equally is for all sentient beings regardless of type, degree, and quality of awareness.
At the most partial level, it is the phenomena I perceive. Less partially, it is the phenomena which we perceive—and the inclusivity of this “we” will indicate the degree of impartiality relative the the most partial perspective of the “I” when solely addressed. For example, this "we" could be one and one’s buddy, one’s group(s), one’s total species, all mammals, etc. Lastly, that which is equally applicable to all sentience is most impartial relative to any particular sentience.
Replace “impartiality” with “objectivity”—as can be quite validly done—and you can then address objective phenomena … as long as this objectivity is not addressed in terms of an absolute but, instead, in terms of being relative to the inclusiveness of all sentient beings addressed.
From this, we then can validly address objects as objectively manifesting and as holding objective phenomenal properties relative to the human species. Whichever properties are present to other species of life will then be more impartial/objective … until we arrive at things such as natural laws that address without any contradiction why things are as they are--such as why the moon’s presence needs to be even were all sentience to be sleeping due to the many causal factors which the moon manifests upon everything else, from ocean tides to, if I'm not mistaken, at least some circadian rhythms which occur even when we’re sleeping. — javra
I think this is descriptive of the stance of natural sciences, is it not? — Wayfarer
For instance, the word "tree", though it is used by the sentient being to represent the external thing, is not at all similar to the visual image. The thing which represents is not at all similar to the thing represented. So we ought not think that the external thing which we call 'tree" is even similar to the visual image which represents it in sense perception. — Metaphysician Undercover
At the most partial level, it is the phenomena I perceive. Less partially, it is the phenomena which we perceive—and the inclusivity of this “we” will indicate the degree of impartiality relative the the most partial perspective of the “I” when solely addressed. For example, this "we" could be one and one’s buddy, one’s group(s), one’s total species, all mammals, etc. Lastly, that which is equally applicable to all sentience is most impartial relative to any particular sentience.
Replace “impartiality” with “objectivity”—as can be quite validly done—and you can then address objective phenomena … as long as this objectivity is not addressed in terms of an absolute but, instead, in terms of being relative to the inclusiveness of all sentient beings addressed.
If the tree-in-itself really is as we perceive it, then we've gained, but not more than we already have. If it isn't, well, first question would be, how do we know it isn't. Second, what difference does it make? — tim wood
That is, since you're so clear that the external whatever-it-is-if-it-is is not what we make of it, then how do you know what it isn't? — tim wood
A long question is possible here - who needs that? Maybe this: what do you make of the idea, that I call Kantian, of practical knowledge, and that it is dependable? My own view is to grant that (in terms of vision) we do not see the tree in all of its glory, but what we do see is accurate, its deficiencies more-or-less understood. Practical knowledge is, then, an assurance. And for the most part - the practical part - it doesn't even need an asterisk. So, practical knowledge, yes? Or no? — tim wood
So, practical knowledge, yes? Or no?
— tim wood
No, I don't agree with this at all. — Metaphysician Undercover
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