Again, note the if: IF the phenomenal experience is ineffable, then it is irrelevant to the discussion. — Banno

Can I believe that the content of the experience, its qualia as the kids say, is ineffable, but the fact of whether the experience took place at all is effable, and relevant?

For instance, suppose I believe that what a piece of music sounds like cannot be put into words, not in English anyway. Whatever. I could still ask you to put on my headphones and listen to something and say if you liked it. I expect you to have an experience I don't expect you to be able to put into words, but you and I will have no trouble at all determining whether you had the experience. Is that inconsistent?

Well, I reject the noumena/phenomena distinction dues to it's untenability. I could argue for that, but I suspect you've seen such arguments before. So...

I don't know if you can have a phenomenal state of a ball. Is the ball your phenomenal state? What's the difference between the ball and your phenomenal state?

What is irrelevant to the discussion isn't the phenomena, but the noumena. The ball is irrelevant, not the experience of it.

I don't know if you can have a phenomenal state of a ball. Is the ball your phenomenal state? What's the difference between the ball and your phenomenal state? — creativesoul

To deny the distinction is idealism. Is that where you are on this?

If one cannot talk about their experience, then they do not know how to talk about it.

Some music makes me feel good. I like it. Isn't that all one needs to know how to say after listening to an unfamiliar composition for the first time? Is that somehow insufficient and/or inadequate for being effable?

There are varying levels of complexity within our experience. These levels are directly effected/affected by language acquisition. After language use has begun in earnest, not only are we in the middle of events, but we're also thinking about these events in a more organized and complex fashion. The increase in complexity includes thinking about ourselves and others. Thinking about ourselves is limited to and/or delimited by how we've learned to talk about ourselves and others.

Saying "I have a dream" doesn't make a whole lot of sense(in and of itself) if that is all that's said. I mean, it makes sense, just the amount of sense is determined solely by the ability to talk about it in a meaningful and coherent manner.

Ahem... the number of correlations.

I don't know if you can have a phenomenal state of a ball. Is the ball your phenomenal state? What's the difference between the ball and your phenomenal state?
— creativesoul

To deny the distinction is idealism. Is that where you are on this? — Hanover

I am at a place where I would like for you to clearly set out the distinction, particularly seeing how it is your expression that has lead us to where we are in the discussion. It's an odd expression. I deny the game altogether, but was curious to see if you could make more sense of it than what I've seen.

Nope. We can't talk about the music; then you share your headphones with me, and show it to me. Our world now includes the tune. We can talk about the syncopation, the melody, and so on. Or, that bit after she stops singing, if you want something simpler.

What is there to experience(aside from confusion resulting from not knowing how to put one's thought into satisfactory words) that is ineffable?

I think belief, as a philosophical subject, is overrated.

What purpose does it serve but to confound the issue?

It is knowledge we seek and implicit in that is our wish to believe truths/facts about our world. We sometimes believe lies/falsehoods but what we shouldn't forget is that we think/assume these lies to be truths.

Belief, as a subject of study, must include knowledge itself and that renders belief redundant.

That's why beliefs are propositional attitudes - they have to be about stuff.

That's why they involve an individual - they have to be about what an agent does. — Banno

Makes sense.

Frank, do you think that being conscious and having 'phenomenal states" are the same? — Banno

Does the study of consciousness exclude anything that happens when we're asleep? I'm not sure I know how dissect consciousness. It seems unified to me.

Nope. We can't talk about the music; then you share your headphones with me, and show it to me. Our world now includes the tune. We can talk about the syncopation, the melody, and so on. Or, that bit after she stops singing, if you want something simpler. — Banno

Why is it so controversial to admit that language offers only a limited glimpse into one's phenomenal state? Language is a camera of limited resolution and while you can snap photos of whatever you'd like, it's inherently limited. It will never fully reflect the original. You say just keep moving the camera around, get more shots, different angles. I say it'll never happen.

If they are ineffable, how could you know this? — Banno

I didn't suggest that they're ineffable, and I don't think that they are. That question does not address anything in my comment.

I am at a place where I would like for you to clearly set out the distinction, particularly seeing how it is your expression that has lead us to where we are in the discussion. It's an odd expression. I deny the game altogether, but was curious to see if you could make more sense of it than what I've seen. — creativesoul

Well, it's an interesting question. I'd say the ball is an external object knowable as your phenomenal state. I don't deny external reality and consider a dream state of a ball distinct from an awake state, not in terms simply of clarity, but in terms of the former being of an objective thing externally.

I'm open to criticisms if it, but am not ready to slip into idealism just yet.

Well, it's an interesting question. I'd say the ball is an external object knowable as your phenomenal state. I don't deny external reality and consider a dream state of a ball distinct from an awake state, not in terms simply of clarity, but in terms of the former being of an objective thing externally. — Hanover

A distinction could be made between phenomenal experiences obtained via the physiological senses and those phenomenal experiences obtained via the imagination. “(Phenomenal) experiences obtained via the physiological senses”, or something shorter to the same effect, would rule out dream states, I'm thinking.

If it’s of any benefit to the effable/ineffable divide, this to me is in parallel to the rational/arational divide … where “arational” is that which occurs beyond, or outside, the realm of conscious reasoning (and not “irrational”, meaning erroneous reasoning).

Our immediate comprehension of a directly perceived object is always, of itself in the very moment of experience, an arational occurrence—for it happens in manners that do not consist of consciously occurring explanations, provided causes, or provided motives for the immediate occurrence of awareness. In other words, our immediate awareness of the object is an instance of that which occurs beyond or outside the realm of consciously occurring reasoning.

This however, does not entail that our immediate awareness of objects, which of itself occurs arationally, cannot be rationally accounted for. It occurs be-cause of this and that explanation, cause, or motive. The provision of which will make our experiences rational (and the belief in the potential to so provide reasons for will then imply the belief that everything is rational without exception … although glitches such as that of “why being rather than nonbeing” might occur).

Same then with what’s ineffable—hence, beyond expression in words. It always holds the potential to be expressed via words, however imperfectly or improperly, but first the ineffable given must be to some extent commonly shared. We can’t, for example, properly convey what experience is to anyone who has never held first-hand awareness of experience (as in, to a philosophical zombie … can’t think of other examples). What experience is will then of itself be beyond expression via words—you’re either endowed with nonlinguistic knowledge of it via acquaintance or you’re not (aka, or you’re a p-zombie).

But this doesn’t mean that we can’t imperfectly address this commonly shared given via words—which will either conform to or deviate from this commonly shared, otherwise ineffable given (i.e., words that can either express truths or falsities in relation to what phenomenal experience is). Then, as previously mentioned by others, not all experiences are commonly held. We can talk about certain complex emotions or certain obscure concepts at length; this doesn’t then mean that a) we can obtain an adequate understanding of what is addressed strictly via words in all such cases (especially where we cannot related due to lack of shared emotions or concepts) or b) that the word(s) used will be perfectly equivalent to that which it specifies (thereby making that specified beyond expression via words, at least in some ways, which is in itself significant). E.g., the heck did Gnostics have gnosis about, anyway? Elephino. Or, could Van Gogh [Goya had his own issues] express via words what he felt and thought when he deprived himself of that one ear? Nope, not to me at least; I don’t care how long his essay on this might have been.

Why is it so controversial to admit that language offers only a limited glimpse into one's phenomenal state? Language is a camera of limited resolution and while you can snap photos of whatever you'd like, it's inherently limited. It will never fully reflect the original. You say just keep moving the camera around, get more shots, different angles. I say it'll never happen. — Hanover

I know that this was directed at Banno, however this is the fatal flaw of Kant being put on display... but with a twist of wording. Earlier you claimed that the noumena was irrelevant. I ignored that claim, although it is clearly wrong when one is speaking in terms of phenomena.

In the above, phenomenal states are being treated like Kant's noumena and language like Kant's phenomena. The same criticism applies...

One cannot know that language does not fully reflect one's original phenomenal state unless one knows exactly what that original state consists of and/or is. Such knowledge requires comparison between the two. There can be no comparison between the phenomenal state(Noumena) and the description of the state(phenomena) unless one knows what both consist in/of.

It's untenable.

The noumenal(in this case your notion of phenomenal states) drops off as irrelevant.

I was working through this earlier in my head actually. The distiction I think is that where I agree that your phenomena is noumenal to me, my phenomena, which is articulated by me through language, is known by me with certainty. I can know the correctness of my language in representing my phenomena. I can't ever know if my phenomena is closely related to the noumena though.

I can see my beetle. You can't. The incoherence arises when we attempt to describe the beetle without reference to it's non-subjective appearance.

You see Hanover, on my view there is no clear distinction to be drawn and maintained between language and some phenomenal states after language acquisition/use has begun in earnest. Certain terms bring about phenomenal states. We can all probably put forth examples of these sorts of triggers.

If it is the case that your phenomenal states are known by you with certainty, then you can put them into words, unless what is certain is that you're confused about the state. If that is the case then, to nod towards javra, you must be able to find another who has shared the experience you're grappling with that is capable of putting it into acceptable words.

In the US, there has been a long standing struggle with racism and equality. In order for me(I'm not black) to be able to have the fullest understanding of what it's like to be a black man in America, I would have to be a black man in America. I'm not. Thus, I cannot have the fullest understanding of that. However, I can have black friends and family. I can listen to them and what they say about being black in America.

If they express a deeply felt emotional impact resulting from being looked at and treated suspiciously by police officers when they're just doing what they're supposed to be doing, then I cannot possibly have the fullest understanding of what it's like to be in that situation, unless I've actually been in it. If I've been in it a couple of times, then I cannot possibly know what it is like to have been in it hundreds of times. Being in that situation a couple of times will not have the same impact that being in that situation hundreds of times will have. I can imagine what it would be like to have to deal with that over and over again by virtue of knowing what it's like to have to deal with it once, and having a friend tell me all about what it's like to deal with it hundreds of times.

If my black friends and family have come to acceptable terms with their own experience then they can put the experience and it's impact upon them into words that I can understand. I can see and hear for myself the remnants of those experiences during the conversation(something sorely missing from online discourse).

Oh, as a side note... but imperative to understanding here. There is no such thing as a complete understanding of one's own experience. Or, conversely every understanding is complete. It's constantly being revisited, reviewed, and thus added to. A nod to Banno earlier when he mentioned how the phenomenal state grows...

A terribly ill-conceived notion, this 'phenomenal state' business...

I can see my beetle. You can't. The incoherence arises when we attempt to describe the beetle without reference to it's non-subjective appearance — Hanover

Well, no. The incoherence is a consequence of the framework being used. I can talk about stuff without issue, until I attempt to compare that with something I cannot know about... by definition.

A distinction could be made between phenomenal experiences obtained via the physiological senses and those phenomenal experiences obtained via the imagination. “(Phenomenal) experiences obtained via the physiological senses”, or something shorter to the same effect, would rule out dream states, I'm thinking. — javra

I'm thinking that this dubiously presupposes that imagination is possible without physiological sensory perception. Imagination requires physiological sensory perception. Thus, dreams are obtained via physiological sensory perception. It's the notion of experience which is the source of problems. Most of those who argue along those lines, also employ the subjective/objective dichotomy as a means for doing so. Experience consists of things that are neither and/or both. Thus, the dichotomy is inherently incapable of taking proper account of experience.

@Sapientia; @Srap Tasmaner; @creativesoul; @Hanover; @frank; @javra


"F" the ineffable. I've set out why I choose not to consider phenomenal states; most replies here don't seriously address what was set out. The rest makes no link to the topic of this thread.

This is a thread about belief.

Back to error.

Truth results from falsehood. If every statement were true we would have no need to note that they were true. It is because some statements are false that we need to distinguish them from the ones that are true.

We need belief because we sometimes give assent to and act on statements that are false. There is a mismatch between what we do or say and what is the case. We can deal with this by using belief.

Hence belief becomes and explanation for our actions, such that when we act erroneously, we might explain it by noting that we held a false belief. — Banno

Well Banno. I've offered you three separate replies to that already(the error approach). I'd like for you to reply.

We need belief because we sometimes give assent to and act on statements that are false. There is a mismatch between what we do or say and what is the case. We can deal with this by using belief. — Banno

You've got it backwards. We don't use belief. That statement is a belief.

Hence belief becomes and explanation for our actions, such that when we act erroneously, we might explain it by noting that we held a false belief. — Banno

That doesn't answer anything. That explanation is a usage of belief, not its origin or reason of existence.

Hence belief becomes and explanation for our actions, such that when we act erroneously, we might explain it by noting that we held a false belief. — Banno

Our belief explains all of our intentional conduct regardless of whether we achieved a desired or undesired result. We don't need any statements to have beliefs and we don't need any truth values to have beliefs. We can have beliefs without language. Beliefs are internal states worthy of discussing and some internal states are ineffable.

"F" the ineffable. I've set out why I choose not to consider phenomenal states — Banno

I've set out why I choose to consider phenomenal states and why the effable is not in need of F'ing.

Where I think this conversation might be interesting is if the question were posed in the hypothetical as "Suppose we were prohibited from considering phenomenal states when trying to explain language usage, how would that be done." That might get the conversation where you want it, as opposed to everyone telling you phenomenal states are necessary to explain language usage. I say this because you seem fairly fixed in your opinion that phenomenal states shouldn't be referenced and then become frustrated in others' failure to play by your rules.

Banno seems to be pointing out that our usage of "belief" helps explain being mistaken. I would agree.

Our belief explains all of our intentional conduct regardless of whether we achieved a desired or undesired result. We don't need any statements to have beliefs and we don't need any truth values to have beliefs. We can have beliefs without language. Beliefs are internal states worthy of discussing and some internal states are ineffable. — Hanover

I would argue against the claim that beliefs are internal states, and actually have(sort of). Earlier you offered reasoning for your claim, but failed to notice the consequences of it. I quoted the relevant claims, and put forth the conclusion...

"Then beliefs are not phenomenal states". You neglected to address it.

I would agree that some belief is ineffable, but only in the sense that sometimes creatures cannot talk about their own mental ongoings.

No examples of ineffable belief can be spoken of any further, lest it would cease being ineffable. The ineffable is an empty concept. A name without a thing. It derives it's meaning purely from our knowing what it means to be able to talk about stuff. It would be utterly meaningless if that were not the case.

Because the ineffable cannot be spoken about, it falls to the wayside of discourse.

The issues with your notion of "belief" Hanover are clear. Aside from what's been said directly above, you say that it cannot be spoken of, yet you speak of it. You call it a "phenomenal state". You compare this state with/to language about the state. The language you're using is Kant's. However, you're not using it in the same sense that he did. If you were, your notion of belief would be parallel to his notion of Noumena, and our talk of belief would be parallel to phenomena. As a result, your notion of "belief" would fall by the wayside... that which cannot be talked about... isn't.

It's a notion that serves only to delimit what can be said. The unknown and/or unknowable 'realm', by definition. It is certainly not helpful. It doesn't help us to understand belief.

Ok.

All that being said, there is much agreement here as well. Although I love a good argument, let's stick to the agreement for a bit and see where it goes. I've listed it below...

Our belief explains all of our intentional conduct regardless of whether we achieved a desired or undesired result...

Strictly speaking our belief does not 'explain' anything at all. I suspect you can agree with our saying that intentional behaviour is belief-based.

We don't need any statements to have beliefs...

We don't need any truth values to have beliefs...

We can have beliefs without language...

I would agree with all three of the above claims, but with an important qualification/quantification. Qualify/quantify the term "beliefs" with "some".

I would agree that some belief is ineffable, but only in the sense that sometimes creatures cannot talk about their own mental ongoings. — creativesoul

Well, the only creature that can talk about his mental ongoings to any extent are humans.

No examples of ineffable belief can be spoken of any further, lest it would cease being ineffable. — creativesoul

This is just incorrect, yet it keeps getting reasserted. It is entirely logical to say that my belief in freedom is ineffable, it evoking a feeling in me I can't describe. Just because I can name it hardly means I can describe it. I can also say that I have a phenomenal state that I can tell you about, but only to an extent, the rest being ineffable. I can sketch you how my father looked, but I cannot present to you all the details. I just lack the language or art skills (and they are one in the same) to show you exactly.

The language you're using is Kant's. However, you're not using it in the same sense that he did. If you were, your notion of belief would be parallel to his notion of Noumena, and our talk of belief would be parallel to phenomena. As a result, your notion of "belief" would fall by the wayside... that which cannot be talked about... isn't. — creativesoul

This is just wrong. The noumenal realm is unknowable period. I cannot speak of the rock outside of my experience of the rock because it is incoherent to reference a rock with none of the subjectively imposed properties of a rock. No matter how I look at the rock, it will be from my perspective, and since there is no such thing as a perspectiveless perspective (the noumenal realm), I can't know the rock.

On the other hand, my phenomenal state of the rock is knowable to me. I can speak of it. You can't. You can't speak of it because you can't see inside my head and see and feel my thoughts. The noumenal perspective is God's perspective, which no one can have. The phenomenal view is my personal view, which only I can have.

I can see my own beetle. You can't. No one can see the beetle as what it is as the thing in itself.

I have long since agreed that a creature can have beliefs that they do not know how to describe. You want to call that "ineffable", be my guest. You want to carry around the weight of a bunch of empty concepts, be my guest. I'll pass.

There were four other statements of agreement as well. Care to go there?

This is just wrong. The noumenal realm is unknowable period. I cannot speak of the rock outside of my experience of the rock because it is incoherent to reference a rock with none of the subjectively imposed properties of a rock. No matter how I look at the rock, it will be from my perspective, and since there is no such thing as a perspectiveless perspective (the noumenal realm), I can't know the rock.

On the other hand, my phenomenal state of the rock is knowable to me. I can speak of it. You can't. You can't speak of it because you can't see inside my head and see and feel my thoughts. The noumenal perspective is God's perspective, which no one can have. The phenomenal view is my personal view, which only I can have.

I can see my own beetle. You can't. No one can see the beetle as what it is as the thing in itself. — Hanover

For me Hanover this is where so many people go wrong. I see this error being made in a variety of contexts, especially religious contexts. It also arises in talk about consciousness, so I don't want to make it seem that it's just a religious error.

Much of this has to do with how it is that we mean something by a word or statement, i.e., how does meaning arise in language. I've talked about this before, but it's very important if we are to get clear on some of these problems.

If it's true that language derives it's meaning in social contexts, then it follows that meaning is not a private endeavor. If I make it a private endeavor, then it loses its sense. This of course gets back to Wittgenstein's example of the beetle in a box. If we use the term beetle to describe something that only I can experience, then it necessarily follows that what each of us means by beetle is senseless. The thing in the box has no way of gaining a foothold in an objective reality, i.e., there is no way for anyone to objectively know what each of us are referring to. Note how this compares to our use of the word pain in reference to our pain. The concept pain has something to latch onto, viz., pain behavior. It's the pain behavior that gives meaning to the word pain, it's not my particular pain, it's not my subjective experience. This is not to deny that there are subjective experiences, but it denies that subjective experiences give meaning to words or concepts.

You said, "...it is incoherent to reference a rock with none of the subjectively imposed properties of a rock." Actually this is backwards, i.e., it's incoherent to talk about a rock in strictly subjective terms. You seem to think that your private experiences govern meaning, but that's impossible given how language forms. Language is governed by rules, and rules only make sense in social contexts. Social contexts not only show us when we are following a rule, but also show us when we are making a mistake. There is no such thing as having a completely private rule, because there would be no way to tell when you're making a mistake.

You also said, "my phenomenal state of the rock is knowable to me," but this is also an incorrect use of what it means to know. Knowing is not a completely private matter. It would not make sense to answer the question of how you know, by pointing to some internal state, or noumenal experience. The term or concept know would lose all its meaning, again it would be senseless. One can see this is so by looking at what follows from such a statement. Anything that I deem as knowledge, would be by definition knowledge. It's as if I have some privileged point of view.

I think that's it's less a misunderstanding on my part of your position than it is a knowing rejection of it. That is to say, I could argue your side if I wanted to, meaning I get it, I just reject it.

This is not to deny that there are subjective experiences, but it denies that subjective experiences give meaning to words or concepts. — Sam26

Sure, it denies it, but it's wrong to deny it. It's just the case that what happens is that I have a phenomenal state that results in a behavioral state that results in a particular linguistic use. I'm not entirely comfortable separating the linguistic use from the behavioral state either. Saying "Ouch, I'm in pain" while showing behavioral signs of not being in pain, relay sarcasm, as it's the holistic behavior (which includes sounds and gestures and anything else) that determines meaning. Writing "my dog has fleas" is no more linguistic than if I used hieroglyphics or if I painted a picture of my dogs with fleas. They are all symbolic representations of thought, and we can impose whatever rules we want on the
symbolism and those grammatical rules (for example) will be just more symbols.

That is to say, we have 3 options:

1. Phenomenal state --> Behavior ---> Language
2. Behavior --> Language
3. Phenomenal state --> Language/behavior

I take it that you accept #2, where behavior alone is what yields language (begging the question of what yielded the behavior).
I take it that you think I accept #1, where the phenomenal state causes the behavior and the behavior causes the language.
I'm suggesting I accept #3, where your phenomenal state causes language directly because there is no difference between language and behavior. They are one in the same. So how do I know that your behavior, whatever it might be, is representative of the same internal state as mine when you exhibit it? I don't. I assume it. It seems likely. But is my experience of pain like that of a spider's? I doubt it, despite its wiggling around like I might if I were in pain.

You also said, "my phenomenal state of the rock is knowable to me," but this is also an incorrect use of what it means to know. Knowing is not a completely private matter. It would not make sense to answer the question of how you know, by pointing to some internal state, or noumenal experience. The term or concept know would lose all its meaning, again it would be senseless. One can see this is so by looking at what follows from such a statement. — Sam26

And so when the dog barks at the door, he doesn't know there's an intruder in the yard, but you hear his bark and do know there is because you have the ability to know, but not the dog? Bizarre conclusion it seems.

My position would be that the dog formed an opinion based upon the behavior he witnessed and knew there was an intruder. You heard the bark and knew there was an intruder. You yelled out "there is an intruder" and someone else knew there was an intruder. All of this began in a dog's furry head as a belief without language. I'd actually even say that the man walking into the yard was a statement "there is an intruder in the yard" as much as if the man said "I am an intruder."