But that isn't what measuring devices are supposed to do in the Copenhagen interpretation is it? The stuff is there. It just doesnt have any location and so forth.

So the quantum idealist (if that's what they should be called) are realists in the sense you're using. — frank

I would classify the Copenhagen Interpretation as anti-realist since it doesn't provide an explanation of what is going on, just probabilities. Bohr's view, as far as I can tell, was that it was meaningless to talk about objects prior to measurement.

Berkeley denied the existence of substance - so whatever account you have of it cannot possibly accord with Berkelean idealism. — ProcastinationTomorrow

Berkeley was rejecting Locke's material objects (and representationalism). But Aristotle's substance is more like Berkeley's sensible objects, except situated in the world not mind. And I agree with Berkeley's empiricism, rejection of Cartesian dualism and rejection of Lockean primary/secondary qualities.

Yeah.

It’s a terribly confusing topic, but this book is well written. The author tries hard to make the key ideas clear, as well as to give a detailed sense of the history, which is as interesting as the science. I was shocked to learn how much twisting and spinning the Copenhagen crowd did to protect their baby, including stunting the careers of some top physicists who didn’t want to go along.

I wouldn’t necessarily give full credence to some of the stated history in this book, because it is unflattering to some big names, except for the fact that I had just finished reading Heisenberg’s Physics and Philosophy (trying to read, is more like it), and it made me wonder if Heisenberg actually understood what he, Bohr and friends were selling - his language was so convoluted that it made me wonder if he really had any clear sense of the measurement problem.

I’m not done with the What is Real, but it is likely going to tell me that Bell was the central figure in foundational thinking re. Copenhagen. Bell concluded that Einstein was right, that the moon is there when nobody is looking, but that Einstein was also wrong, because the world is inherently non-local. It’s an interesting read. I have read a number of your ideas, and I’m pretty sure you would enjoy it. And it bears directly on the present conversation.

I don't see a good argument to conclude idealism from QM. — Moliere

I do have to concur that I'm not sure of any necessary relevance to tying in QM with Idealism, except insofar as any given theoretical physicist, playing metaphysicist, might consider that as a way to advance one's specific theory to make it congruent with metaphysics, insofar as possible.

If I may be excused here for copying my comment from another thread, I see no necessity for evoking QM, in a version of Idealism, as follows: In this variation of Idealism, Mind becomes an apparent plurality of individuated, 'dissociated' loci or iterations of itself, an essentially cognitive event. Meanwhile, there is still some ultimate state it is like to be the Unitary Mind, which its human self-expressions, normally focused in their veiled imaginal, phenomenal, experiential state, might at least approximate as a samadhi state awareness, wherein the maya-spell is dispelled, revealing a pure Awareness or Beingness or Knowingness, or some such descriptor for the nameless. I suppose this could also be equated with the triune attributes of Brahman, satchitananda, i.e. Being/Consciousness/Bliss. Beyond that we're headed into noumenon territory, where I must bow to the opening lines of the Tao Te Ching about the ineffability of the Eternal Tao.

Schopenhauer takes an interesting route to multiplicity. Check him out.

Yes, I have delved into Schopenhauer, though not as deeply as one might. Since we're sharing links, you and others inclined toward Idealism may be interested in this take on multiplicity ... Plotinus and the Problem of Absolute Self-Consciousness

I wouldn't say I'm inclined toward idealism. I don't really have an inclination. :)

Ok, fine, sit on the fence -- may be a wise choice. In my case, it may well be that metaphysical curiosity will kill this 'cat', so to speak. But then, in keeping with the QM theme that has sustained this thread, one could ask, as per Schrodinger, is the cat dead or alive? And what the hell, apparently I do have 9 lives ... albeit I may be working on my last one by now :wink:

Idealistic monism is a mirror image of physicalism. Instead of consciousness being emergent, matter is. Or matter is complete privation of the Good (wasn't that Plotinus' view?) Any which way we cut it, matter is a problem for idealism in the same way consciousness pesters physicalism.

What benefit do you see in idealism?

In the variation of Idealism I lean toward, Unitary Mind is the ontological primitive, so there can be no 'prior to' that state -- being trans-spatiotemporal there is no point of origin or causation, thus no emergence needed. I'm not quite yet sure what physicalism posits as the ontological primitive, but it surely isn't consciousness, hence having to explain its emergence. So that would seem to be a significant distinction. And doesn't even physicalism have to draw the line somewhere? Otherwise one is left with having to endlessly explain whatever exists, in terms of whatever existed before that, ad infinitum.

As for matter being a problem for Idealism, well that depends on how to interpret the experience of whatever it is one conceives matter to be. Unlike physicalism, Idealism does not consider it to be a mind-independent substance 'out there,' but rather the phenomenal image or appearance of some cognitive emanations/thought forms, akin to Plato's ideas/forms. To me, the problem for Idealism is to explain how Unitary Mind individuates, or 'dissociates' into a multiplicity of finite loci or iterations of mind, to which those 'emanations' come to appear as their experiential, phenomenal content -- such as how it feels to watch an exquisitely beautiful sunset. But whatever Idealism's explanation for that mystery, it seems it would have to be an entirely cognitive event, otherwise what could be the tangible substrate from which any apparently separate form could emanate. Buddhism's take on this seeming dilemma is that emptiness, or formlessness, is not other than form, but that's a whole other metaphysical/spiritual exploration and inquiry into non-duality.

I have read a number of your ideas, and I’m pretty sure you would enjoy it. And it bears directly on the present conversation. — Torbill

Thanks! I really appreciate the feedback. The Becker book is definitely being added to my 'to read' list.

To me, the problem for Idealism is to explain how Unitary Mind individuates, or 'dissociates' into a multiplicity of finite loci or iterations of mind, to which those 'emanations' come to appear as their experiential, phenomenal content -- such as how it feels to watch an exquisitely beautiful sunset — snowleopard

Again, have a read of this article.. This is not fringe or alternative science - Fuchs is a physics academic. His one-liner is that “Quantum mechanics is a law of thought.” He says that the probability wave 'encodes the probabilities for the outcomes of any measurements an observer might perform' but without actually describing something objectively real.

'But how, we might ask, does a measurement here affect the outcome of a measurement a second observer will make over there? In fact, it doesn’t. Since the wavefunction doesn’t belong to the system itself, each observer has his/her own. My wavefunction doesn’t have to align with yours....QBism treats the wave function as a description of a single observer’s subjective knowledge. It resolves all of the quantum paradoxes, but at the not insignificant cost of anything we might call “reality.”

I think this exposes a very deep assumption: namely, we assume that reality is 'out there', whilst the subjective world is 'internal' and 'private'. So what is 'out there' is said to be 'objective' which is 'the same for everyone' - whereas this approach is calling that into question.

[cont]...However, I can't see how there can't be a kind of 'pre-established harmony' between all the individual subjects who are measuring the same thing. Even if it's true that the wave-function is describing a law of thought, we are all sufficiently alike at the level of such measurements so that it will not tend to produce divergent results when made by different individuals. Or so I would have thought.

Incidentally a comment from Kastrup's blog:

Bernardo KastrupFriday, October 30, 2015 1:41:00 PM

Hi Matthew,
I explore more of this in an upcoming book titled "More Than Allegory." It's a book about religious myths but, in Part III, I take an opportunity to return to the measurement problem with a more specific and detailed perspective. The book should be out early next year! To anticipate it, I can say that I am sympathetic to the QBism interpretation, for reasons that I can't really explain in a comment but are clear in the book.
Cheers, B.

As for matter being a problem for Idealism, well that depends on how to interpret the experience of whatever it is one conceives matter to be. — snowleopard

It's a logical problem.

Again, the Idealist take on this is that there is an existing state in itself that remains in the absence of a finite locus of mind, and yet exists as an emanation of some some source that transcends that finite locus of mind, while at the same time not being separate from it. In other words, a model of a self-observing cosmos, as per Wheeler ... — snow leopard

This would seem confused becasue it's basically stating realism.

The realist poses there is an existing states itself (the object "independent" form experience- it is not the experience, but a different object), which exists as something that transcends the finite locus of a mind (the infinite definition of an existing state in concept, such that it is defined even when a finite mind is absent), while at the same time the given state is never separate form the finite mind (the finite mind that experiences the definition of the state in question is always in relation. The mind has an understanding of what the state is in these instances).

And such experiences are involve descriptions of states of the universe, making them "models of the universe" to part of the universe that observes (part of) the universe.

When the realist talks about the mountain that exists when on-one is looking, they are describing these elements of the state itself, that it and its form transcends finite consciousness and that our experiences are just their own seeing of the part of the world in question.

Measurement may be understood to be an activity of minds, and the commonality of the characteristics of minds could plausibly give rise to a "pre-established harmony" when it comes to the forms and procedures of measurement; but it wouldn't seem to be able to explain the commonality of the content of what is measured if there is nothing independent of the measuring minds that is being measured. Unless of course, what is being measured is a product, not of individual minds, but of Mind; but then this would be subjective idealism (with the ultimate 'subject' being God or Universal Mind or Collective Mind or some such).

but it wouldn't seem to be able to explain the commonality of the content of what is measured if there is nothing independent of the measuring minds that is being measured. — Janus

But I think that still assumes that there is thought 'in here' which corresponds with something 'out there' - that thought is one thing, and the object another - so it’s the division between mental and physical again. And the problem lies with taking ‘the external object’ to be real in its own right, in other words, insisting that only ‘the object’ is real - which is, to all intents, what ‘materialism’ means. And I think that’s why physics has undermined materialism - by throwing into doubt the status of the presumed ‘ultimate object’. Hence all the talk, in this subject, of ‘battles over reality’ and ‘struggles for the soul of science’ and so on.

But QBism argues that reality has an irreducibly subjective aspect, that it always includes the observer:

quantum mechanics is not about how the world is without us; instead it’s precisely about us in the world. The subject matter of the theory is not the world or us but us-within-the-world, the interface between the two. ...

QBism would say, it’s not that the world is built up from stuff on “the outside” as the Greeks would have had it. Nor is it built up from stuff on “the inside” as the idealists, like George Berkeley and Eddington, would have it. Rather, the stuff of the world is in the character of what each of us encounters every living moment — stuff that is neither inside nor outside, but prior to the very notion of a cut between the two at all.

Actually the nearest analogy I can think of is Buddhist abhidharma - that what is real are ‘dharmas’ which are moments of experience [which bears a resemblance to Whitehead’s ‘actual occasions’]. But they’re not ‘atoms’ in the sense of enduring physical entities.

Thanks for the suggested article; I will get around to it. I actually read More Than Allegory a while back, and don't off hand recall the mention of QBism, so I expect it was quite incidental. Overall it was not a science-based exposition of Idealism, but mostly to do with the psychological implications, so not the one to read for its QM implications. I did enjoy it though.

Not sure we're on the same page here, in terms of what I was trying to convey. But that may be that I didn't make it explicit enough. I don't have time to go over it right now, so let me get back to you on that.

It's a logical problem. — frank

@frank Somehow I missed this snippet last night. These days, as the physicalist paradigm seems to be melting away before my eyes, I must concede that the mystical is more and more supplanting the logical, as it becomes my felt sense that what I'm experiencing is some 'self'-perpetuating Dream -- I know not how else to word it -- which this individual version of a self is somehow sharing with all these other such selves. And really, I've no idea how this could be. :)

'We are such stuff as dreams are made of.'

Yes, could it be perchance that WS was positing idealism? :wink:

but it wouldn't seem to be able to explain the commonality of the content of what is measured if there is nothing independent of the measuring minds that is being measured. — Janus


But I think that still assumes that there is thought 'in here' which corresponds with something 'out there' - that thought is one thing, and the object another - so it’s the division between mental and physical again. — Wayfarer

Well, in the passage I was responding to you spoke of "individual subjects who are measuring the same thing". And you often say things like "measuring is an activity of a mind". So, I was trying to address this in terms of your own language. If you speak of "individual subjects" I would presume you mean "individual minds", and the term "individual' indicates that those minds are not one and the same mind. The thing being measured obviously cannot be identical to any one of the measuring minds, since they have already been defined as different from one another.

I don't think "in here' and "out there" specifically come into it at all; except in the obvious logical sense that if one thing is different to another then they must be 'external' to one another.

The point is that if the minds are all different, separate minds, then the commonality of the content of what they measure can only be explained in terms of something independent of all of them, and which they all have access to, unless you want to posit a 'level' on which they are not actually individual minds at all. But this would be to invoke the idea of a universal or collective mind, which was one of the options i already mentioned.

Actually the nearest analogy I can think of is Buddhist abhidharma - that what is real are ‘dharmas’ which are moments of experience [which bears a resemblance to Whitehead’s ‘actual occasions’]. But they’re not ‘atoms’ in the sense of enduring physical entities. — Wayfarer

Yes, but Whitehead's actual occasions are all external to, or transcendent of, one another and that is what allows them to be defined as fundamental entities. Whitehead's system still requires God to unify all the actual occasions, or to put it another way, to eternalize their temporality. Even under the aspect of eternity all things are one in the same and yet, paradoxically, eternally different.

If you speak of "individual subjects" I would presume you mean "individual minds", and the term "individual' indicates that those minds are not one and the same mind. The thing being measured obviously cannot be identical to any one of the measuring minds, since they have already been defined as different from one another. — Janus

But isn't the whole point of mathematics and standard units of measurement and shared meanings to facilitate this? Isn't that what culture and language do? When you and I look at a collection of objects, there are X objects, regardless of your or my opinion of the matter. What you think about them or whether you like them or not, is another thing altogether, but their number is not a matter of opinion.

The point is that if the minds are all different, separate minds, then the commonality of the content of what they measure can only be explained in terms of something independent of all of them, and which they all have access to — Janus

For example: number. Recall that (rather acrimonious) exchange from a few months back, when I was trying to make the point in respect of Einstein - that whilst the Pythagorean Theorem is not dependent on the individual mind, it can nevertheless only be comprehended by a mind? Recall that Einstein said:

I cannot prove scientifically that Truth must be conceived as a Truth that is valid independent of humanity; but I believe it firmly. I believe, for instance, that the Pythagorean theorem in geometry states something that is approximately true, independent of the existence of man.

So the point I am making is that, until intelligence has evolved to a certain point, then the Pythagorean theorem (among many other things!) can't be grasped or understood at all. So I question that it's 'independent of humanity', when it is the distinctive attribute of h. sapiens to be able to grasp these very kinds of truth. It can only be grasped by a mind, ergo, is not actually 'mind-independent'. That is close to the meaning of 'objective idealism'.

So - it's not a 'universal mind' or 'collective intelligence' in the sense of being a single entity, but in the sense that any mind will work according to these principles. That is what 'reason' is, after all, isn't it? You can't ask 'which version of the Pythagorean Theorem do you mean'? (There was a thread I created on the previous forum, 'A Unity which is not an Entity' which explored this idea.)

put me on to a very interesting book, The Phenomena of Awareness: Husserl, Cantor, Jung, Cecile Tougas. (Intending to borrow from library today.) Have a quick scan of the beginning of Chapter 2, 'The Equal', in the Amazon Preview. It makes a point that we have often discussed here, albeit much more clearly than I have been able to make it.

But isn't the whole point of mathematics and standard units of measurement and shared meanings to facilitate this? Isn't that what culture and language do? When you and I look at a collection of objects, there are X objects, regardless of your or my opinion of the matter. What you think about them or whether you like them or not, is another thing altogether, but their number is not a matter of opinion. — Wayfarer

Yes, but the "standard units of measurement and shared meanings" do not determine how many objects there are. Units of measurement and shared meanings determine the forms of measurement and meanings but not the content, and that has been precisely my point.

What is it that determines the content, that determines how many objects there are?

‘How many objects there are’ is a given; what number and language provide is a common way of counting and measuring said objects. This is why numerical logic is one of the foundations of scientific method. And how could it be otherwise?

The point is that if the minds are all different, separate minds, then the commonality of the content of what they measure can only be explained in terms of something independent of all of them, and which they all have access to, unless you want to posit a 'level' on which they are not actually individual minds at all. — Janus

As far as I’m concerned, I had addressed this point. An example of ‘something which is independent of them, but which they have access to’, is number. Your mind and my mind are not the same mind, but if we consider the same mathematical unit, then in that respect we arrive at the very same understanding. This is the subject of the passage in the Touglas book that I mentioned above.

You still seem to be missing the point here. The "something which is independent of them, but which they have access to" is not number, per se, because number per se cannot determine how many objects there are in any particular grouping. You might say that number makes it generally possible that there could be different groupings, with different numbers and kinds of objects; but on the other hand the concept of number only arises because there are different groupings of similar or different kinds of objects. What requires explanation is the fact that when we are confronted with a group of objects we can agree on precisely how many there are in that specific group.

Of course agreement is made generally possible by our common conception of number, but it is the actual number of objects in a particular group of objects which is the determinant in any particular case. The metaphysical question is as to what that actual number of objects consists in. If it is independent of all our minds, which you have already acknowledged, then it must be independent of mind altogether or it must be determined by a universal or collective mind. What other possibilities can you imagine?

The only attempt at an answer that you have offered is that how many objects there are is a given. What does that mean? What makes such givenness possible. This is the metaphysical question to which materialism is one answer and idealism is another. The way I see it these are really two forms of realism. There is also neutral monism, but what would that entail? Is there another possible answer that isn't some form of realism?