I think that's it's less a misunderstanding on my part of your position than it is a knowing rejection of it. That is to say, I could argue your side if I wanted to, meaning I get it, I just reject it. — Hanover

That's fine, but I think this idea of meaning that you have has been thoroughly debunked by Wittgenstein. It's not even close Hanover.

That is to say, we have 3 options:

1. Phenomenal state --> Behavior ---> Language
2. Behavior --> Language
3. Phenomenal state --> Language/behavior

I take it that you accept #2, where behavior alone is what yields language (begging the question of what yielded the behavior). — Hanover

No, I'm not saying that behavior alone is what yields language. In fact, I don't accept any of these conditions as necessary for meaning. I'm saying that certain words/concepts, not all, get their meaning based on certain behaviors. In particular, the concept pain gets its meaning from pain behavior, otherwise there would be nothing for the word pain to latch on to, in terms of sharing what we mean by pain. How would we know if someone was using the word correctly?

It seems to me that you're saying that our internal states, however you might want to describe them, are a necessary condition for meaning. After all, you might say, how can we mean anything without this internal thing expressing itself (rhetorical)? This is the way I see the confusion. There is the internal me, the subjective me and my experiences, I don't deny this, and neither does Wittgenstein. What is denied is that meaning is dependent upon this internal self, and since one cannot have a private language, one cannot have private meaning.

If you want to say that language is dependent upon minds, then of course that follows, but you're saying that meaning is dependent upon minds, which is much different. Meaning is developed amongst people, i.e., two or more people working together to share concepts. It's an agreement to go on in a certain way, to proceed based on rules of use. This doesn't deny our subjective experiences, it denies how the internal mind is expressed via language, and to our point, how meaning is derived.

No, I'm not saying that behavior alone is what yields language. — Sam26

I can only imagine how frustrating it is to talk to me about this because you keep repeating what you're saying and I seem to be non-responsive, right? I say that because I feel the exact same way. You and @Banno seem to be so non-responsive that I wonder if we're just on a completely different wavelength (which our lack of communication despite using shared words forms somewhat of an irony). Distinguish between language and behavior. That was the gist of my post. Language is just a conveyance of meaning from one being to another, and saying "come here," giving a come hither look, or the most subtle of expressions are all the same thing. I just candidly don't know where your distinctions are.

In particular, the concept pain gets its meaning from pain behavior, otherwise there would be nothing for the word pain to latch on to, in terms of sharing what we mean by pain. How would we know if someone was using the word correctly? — Sam26

This just makes no sense at all. It's not the concept of pain that gets its meaning from pain behavior, it's the word "pain" that gets its meaning from that. But if you're asking what pain is, it's the hurt I feel. But to the extent you're just saying that I can't know what a dog is without someone saying "dog" and pointing at a dog, I disagree. I simply wouldn't know that you called dogs that until that was somehow communicated to me.

What is denied is that meaning is dependent upon this internal self, and since one cannot have a private language, one cannot have private meaning. — Sam26

Like I said, I get the conclusions that follow from the denial of the private language. I just don't accept there are no private languages. I fully understand that my private language might be irrelevant to the public, but I'll never follow you guys equating irrelevant with non-existent.

Meaning is developed amongst people, i.e., two or more people working together to share concepts. It's an agreement to go on in a certain way, to proceed based on rules of use. — Sam26

These generalities drive me crazy. Meaning of what? If you want to say the meaning of the word "dog" is developed among people trying to communicate, that's pragmatically true, and should I develop a word I use privately, it would be odd and an irrelevant practice. But if you're saying that meaning generally cannot occur outside the public, as if Robison Crusoe could not derive the meaning of any of the events unfolding upon him because he lacked anyone to share any of the new events around him, I have no earthly idea what you mean by "meaning."

It strikes me honestly as if this isn't philosophy at all, but some attempt at explaining how words are used and why we need not worry about metaphysics and the things that confuse us. It's a pragmatic approach that relies upon behaviorism to somehow satisfy those who find the intangible aspects of philosophy antiquated and unhelpful. I feel fairly comfortable in my assessment provided in this final paragraph. Other than this, I doubt we agree on much else.

I'm assuming when I say certain things that you understand some of the Philosophical Investigations, but maybe I shouldn't assume that.

Assume I know nothing.

I think the best way to understand much of what's been said in this thread, and in other threads is to have a good understanding of Wittgenstein's PI. The only way to do this is to start a thread on the PI, but the problem is, it takes a lot of work. Then once you have a clear understanding of the PI, whether you agree or not, it will put you in a better position to understand these kinds of linguistic arguments. The PI doesn't solve everything, obviously, but it does make things a bit clearer.

Hence belief becomes and explanation for our actions, such that when we act erroneously, we might explain it by noting that we held a false belief. — Banno

Are you saying that the concept of belief serves no purpose beyond explaining acting on error?

It's interesting to ponder the relationship between belief and action. Suppose a person lacks the courage of their conviction. Maybe their belief is a sham.

Perfect Banno. The difference between our accounts is clear.

That doesn't follow, but I suspect you know that already. — creativesoul

What doesn't follow?

Are you saying that the concept of belief serves no purpose beyond explaining acting on error? — frank

Not at all. Firstly, the concept of concepts is a mess. SO instead I'm looking at what we do in making use of beliefs.

To believe something is to act as if it is true. This includes making appropriate use of language.
By introducing belief, we can make sense of folk who act erroneously. They act as if such-and-such is true, but such-and-such is actually false.

Consider the difference between "the world is flat" and "Mad Mike Hughes believes the world is flat".

Belief is a grammatical construction (a language game, if you prefer) that allows us to entertain error in our conversations.

Philosophical problems - of the sort @Hanover is stuck with, and many others - arise when folk think that the grammatical construct is the name of a piece of head-stuff, of mental furniture. They suppose that because we talk of beliefs we must have beliefs somewhere in our heads. They think because we invented a noun there must be a something we have named.

It's interesting to ponder the relationship between belief and action. Suppose a person lacks the courage of their conviction. Maybe their belief is a sham. — frank

A corollary of the error theory I propose is that we can explain actions - although not all that well.

So to explain why he launched himself in a self-built rocket, buggering his back, we say "Mad Mike Hughes believes the world is flat, and he wanted to prove it by flying in a rocket".

What this means is that Mad Mike acts as if the world is flat. What this does not mean is that there is a thing in Mad Mike's head that is a belief that the world is flat.

We can apply this to Jack, my cat, too. Jack acts as if there is no food in the bowl. That does not mean that Jack has a no-food-in-bowl thing in his mind. The whole conversation about animal belief is based on a misunderstanding of the grammar of belief.

What this means is that Mad Mike acts as if the world is flat. What this does not mean is that there is a thing in Mad Mike's head that is a belief that the world is flat. — Banno

That the world is flat is a proposition. It's an abstract object. It is not a mental object.

What could it mean to say that a proposition is an object? A proposition is not an object in the sense that this laptop is an object.

So what sort of object is it? If it is abstract and yet not mental, where is it?

My suggestion follows Wittgenstein and Austin and others in pointing out that propositions are not objects so much as things we do; and hence, the above questions are not intended to elicit an answer, but to have you re-think your position.

Forget about meaning and look at use; the whole question "what is a proposition" dissipates.

Ok. I just think you're overlooking what you're giving up in terms of the requirements of communication. You're letting an ontological tail wag the dog. I prefer to go the other way. What can't I do without? And let ontology flow from there as it will.

There's a type of discussion that goes "but that's ontology, not communication, and therefore it is wrong". The details are never fleshed out. So I ignore it.

There's a theory of communication that goes: I have head-stuff. I turn it into words. You hear it. You turn it into your own head-stuff.

It's wrong, too.

Carry on. :)

If all our belief were true, there would be no need to discriminate between true/false belief. But... not all our belief is true.
— creativesoul

Yes.

Creatures with the ability to think about their own thought and belief - and those without - are capable of having true and false belief. Only the former can become aware of it.
— creativesoul

Hence belief and language go together.
— Banno

Perfect Banno. The difference between our accounts is clear.

That doesn't follow, but I suspect you know that already. — creativesoul

"Belief and language go together" doesn't follow from "Creatures with the ability to think about their own thought and belief - and those without - are capable of having true and false belief" and "Only the former can become aware of it."

To believe something is to act as if it is true. This includes making appropriate use of language.

By introducing belief, we can make sense of folk who act erroneously. They act as if such-and-such is true, but such-and-such is actually false.

Consider the difference between "the world is flat" and "Mad Mike Hughes believes the world is flat".

Belief is a grammatical construction (a language game, if you prefer) that allows us to entertain error in our conversations... — Banno

Here, the "such and such" and the "something" are both statements. To believe 'something' is to act as if it is true. Note here that "it" - when taken account of by us - is a statement(often called a "belief statement").

We're thinking about Mad Mike Hughes' belief.

A corollary of the error theory I propose is that we can explain actions - although not all that well.

So to explain why he launched himself in a self-built rocket, buggering his back, we say "Mad Mike Hughes believes the world is flat, and he wanted to prove it by flying in a rocket".

What this means is that Mad Mike acts as if the world is flat. What this does not mean is that there is a thing in Mad Mike's head that is a belief that the world is flat.

We can apply this to Jack, my cat, too. Jack acts as if there is no food in the bowl. That does not mean that Jack has a no-food-in-bowl thing in his mind. The whole conversation about animal belief is based on a misunderstanding of the grammar of belief. — Banno

We can lose the notion that belief has a location. We cannot afford to lose the distinction between belief and thinking about belief.

What does "Jack acts as if there is no food in the bowl" mean if Jack does not believe that there is no food in the bowl?

To believe something is to act as if it is true. This includes making appropriate use of language. — Banno

This is an empirical statement, not a philosophical one, and not one that is logically deducible. It is a statement about the world, and I suppose you know it by introspection. It must be, as you've certainly not looked in my head or my thoughts and know how I form beliefs. I'm telling you, whether you wish to believe me or not, that I have beliefs with no language at all.

To say otherwise is just false. It's like your telling me the sky is green. It's just not.

This is an empirical statement, not a philosophical one, and not one that is logically deducible. It is a statement about the world, and I suppose you know it by introspection. It must be, as you've certainly not looked in my head or my thoughts and know how I form beliefs. I'm telling you, whether you wish to believe me or not, that I have beliefs with no language at all. — Hanover

Thank you. This is a most thought provoking reply - even though it goes back to things we already covered, it shows stuff that needs explaining.

Now, how does the corrected post look to you?

The removal of the portion I responded to does dramatically (for me at least) change the nature of your claim.

My objection has been all along that what you've been saying simply does not comport to my reality, and I just couldn't accept it, regardless of the pragmatic import of your position. That is, I'm constantly being told under your account that I can't intuit things, that I can't know something without first articulating it linguistically, and that I cannot really understand something prior to my village of idiots weighing in on it. It was an odd theory, suggesting that language was this necessary thing that was required for all sorts of ideas and beliefs. It also seemed that language had a brittle definition, requiring it be some complex system of symbols like English or French, but it could not be a dog barking at the mailman. It was so odd, I felt it unworthy really of consideration, yet it seemed to be taken seriously by many of you, and so I was left with the irony of there being this ineffable theory that could not be conveyed by you to me that denied ineffability.

And so now you are only saying "By introducing belief, we can make sense of folk who act erroneously. They act as if such-and-such is true, but such-and-such is actually false." And so I am now to see that you're simply a man looking for the definition of "belief" in certain contexts, trying to see why a group of philosophers might want to create and invoke that term. It matters not what it going on in the person's head that might constitute "belief," but it simply matters what the community of speakers means by it. In other words, you're not philosophizing so much as you're trying to figure out the meaning of a word through use, which makes sense to the extent there's really no other way to do it, considering you can't look inside my head and pull out my phenomenal state. There would be no way for you to confirm if my use of the term were consistent from time to time without a behavioral correlate. It all does make sense, but I must think I'm still missing something because this just appears to be a behaviorist's guide to finding meaning, which is dandy for those who feel they've received an adequate answer without delving into the elusive workings of the mind, but it's hard to convince those who think questions about consciousness constitute THE central questions of all of philosophy.

Well, I find it unacceptable for one to pursue a path of language use while denying that "belief" names some thing, at least in some senses of the term.



This "phenomenal state"...

I find myself wondering what it consists of. That's what I cannot seem to get a straight answer to.

Hanover...

Can you help me out?

A very young child, say crawling on fours still, can learn that touching fire hurts by touching fire. They do not learn that "touching fire hurts" is a true statement. Statements are utterly meaningless to the child.

We can talk about the child's belief in any number of ways. We use statements to take account of the child's belief. The child acts as if it felt pain after touching the fire. The child acts as if it is scared to touch the fire again. The child acts as if it believes that touching fire hurts. The child is not making a knowledge claim. The child is not stating his/her belief. The child believes that touching fire hurts none-the-less, and s/he does so without language.

What this shows us is that there are some beliefs that clearly do not require language. That is, there are some beliefs that can be formed and held by a non-linguistic creature. Not all belief is existentially dependent upon language.

So...

We clearly have the need to draw and maintain a distinction between our reports of the child's belief and the child's belief. That distinction needs fleshed out... filled in, as it were. We know what our reports consist of, but what is the content of the child's belief? What does it consist of? Certainly not a statement. Certainly not our report of it. That's a start...

The child's belief must be meaningful, in some way or other, to the child, and it cannot consist of statements. Let's assess the situation...

None of the following - the child, the fire, and the behaviour - are existentially dependent upon language. The child draws a correlation, connection, and/or association(all of those work) between it's behaviour and the pain that followed. The child's ability to do that is existentially dependent upon some things, but language isn't one of them. That is precisely what that child's belief consists of. The child has attributed meaning by virtue of drawing these correlations between the fire and his/herself. The child has recognized/attributed causality. The child's belief presupposes truth(as correspondence with fact/reality) by virtue of all correlation presupposing the existence it's own content(regardless of subsequent qualification as 'imaginary', 'real', or otherwise). The child's belief is also true.

There you have it folks:The initial attribution(origen) of meaning, the presupposition of truth as correspondence(origen), and the recognition/attribution of causality are all accounted for and/or necessary for rudimentary(pre and/or non-linguistic) belief formation itself(this one anyway).

Language follows suit.

What did I miss?

So we say that Jack acts as if he believes the food bowl is empty. Jack behaves in such a way that has, in the past, led to Banno feeding him. Jack has drawn a correlation between his bahaviour and what happens afterwards. He believes that doing this or that results in getting what he wants(food). Jack has no disposition towards statements, ours notwithstanding. Jack does have belief. It only follows that belief does not consist in/of an attitude and/or disposition towards a statement. If Banno ignores Jack, and doesn't offer food, then Jack's belief is false. If Banno feeds Jack, then Jack's belief is true. Jack is not predicting the future. Rather, he is showing his belief by virtue of showing that he has expectations as a result of his belief.

Sometimes, Jack's belief is true. Thus, either true belief does not require truth, or truth does not require language. The latter is clearly the case. Conceptions of "truth"(senses of the term if one prefers) require language. Correspondence with fact/reality does not. So, there is one sense of the term "truth" that points towards something that is not existentially contingent upon language, and it works exclusively with the notion of belief I'm putting forth.

Truth is relevant here because all belief presupposes it's own correspondence with/to fact/reality somewhere along the line... non-linguistic creatures' belief is not exempt here(as earlier explained).

The reason why "is true" becomes a redundant use of language is because all belief presupposes it's own truth. That doesn't make correspondence with fact/reality redundant. To say something or other "is true" is to express one's belief(assuming sincerity, of course). "Is true" is not equivalent to truth. Rather it is an expression of belief, and belief is necessary but insufficient for truth. We all know this. Actually, that may be quite a controversial claim on it's face, but agreement would come if pressed. Truth emerges via thought and belief. In that way belief is necessary for truth. That is not to say that in order for 'X' to be true, it must be believed by someone or other. It is to say that without belief formation, there is neither 'X' nor truth.

This is relevant because the redundancy advocates treat "is true" as if it's equivalent to truth. That's a mistake though. It's not. "Is true" is a bi-product of thought and belief expression, which is in turn a product of thought and belief formation accompanied by language. "Is true" becomes redundant because belief presupposes truth(it's own correspondence with/to fact/reality), and if a speaker believes what they say then adding "is true" to a belief statement adds nothing more than superfluous language use. It's unnecessary and adds nothing meaningful to an already honest statement.

I'm actually leaning towards the conclusion that what is happening between Jack and Banno is a rudimentary sort of language. I find myself observing my own cats' behaviours in light of all this philosophizing we do here, and other non-linguistic creatures around 'the farm' as well. It's interesting, to say the least.

At any rate, much like Jack, my own cat is clearly attempting to get me to do something that she wants me to do. She is making a concerted attempt at changing the way things are so that they become more to her liking. She cannot know that she is doing this. She cannot think in these ways, for she has no language capable of isolating here own thought and belief as a means for thinking more about it. We do. I mean, that's what language allows here. She can, however, have wants and some idea or other about how to get something that she wants. Her so called 'ideas' consist entirely of her belief system, and it's rudimentary, to say the least.

So, if Jack is expressing his belief that Banno will feed him if he behaves in a certain way, then his expression will consist entirely in/of his behaviour. If Banno correctly attributes meaning to Jack's behavioural expressions, then both Banno and Jack will have drawn the same correlations between the behaviour and food(getting fed). Banno can know what Jack wants, and not oblige. Banno can know what Jack wants and oblige. That is, Banno can draw the same correlations, and thus meaning would be shared, regardless of whether or not Banno actually did what Jack wanted.

It's hard to arrive at this particular example of shared meaning, and deny language.

That's a concession of sorts Banno...

:wink:

The child is not making a knowledge claim. The child is not stating his/her belief. — creativesoul

I deny this. Unless you define "statement" as an utterance in a formal language, I fail to see why crying doesn't count as a symbolic representation of pain, but an utterance of "ouch" does. These theories of language must define language.

This "phenomenal state"...

I find myself wondering what it consists of. That's what I cannot seem to get a straight answer to. — creativesoul

You're asking what the "mind" substance is?

My objection has been all along that what you've been saying simply does not comport to my reality, and I just couldn't accept it, regardless of the pragmatic import of your position. That is, I'm constantly being told under your account that I can't intuit things, that I can't know something without first articulating it linguistically, and that I cannot really understand something prior to my village of idiots weighing in on it. It was an odd theory, suggesting that language was this necessary thing that was required for all sorts of ideas and beliefs. It also seemed that language had a brittle definition, requiring it be some complex system of symbols like English or French, but it could not be a dog barking at the mailman. It was so odd, I felt it unworthy really of consideration, yet it seemed to be taken seriously by many of you, and so I was left with the irony of there being this ineffable theory that could not be conveyed by you to me that denied ineffability. — Hanover

Hey Hanover. I know that the above isn't a reply to me, however seeing that I have a healthy respect for Banno's position, I am one of the ones who take it seriously. Let's see if I can make the best of this opportunity.

I have several different concerns here. I'm not entirely sure that the above quote show an adequate understanding of what's going on here, particularly between the viewpoint you've put forth and what Banno has been (mainly)arguing for as long as I've been reading him(and you too for that matter, assuming you're the same "Hanover" as on the old forum).

To put it bluntly: I think both of you are about half right, because you're all the way wrong in the same way. Neither of you draw and maintain the pivotal meaningful distinction between thought and belief and thinking about thought and belief. Particularly what they both are existentially dependent upon, and what they consist of.

The child is not making a knowledge claim. The child is not stating his/her belief.
— creativesoul

I deny this. Unless you define "statement" as an utterance in a formal language, I fail to see why crying doesn't count as a symbolic representation of pain, but an utterance of "ouch" does. These theories of language must define language. — Hanover

It counts to you as a symbolic representation of pain. If the child is not crying as a means to state their belief, then they're not making a statement. You've drawn connections between crying and pain. Thus, the crying 'symbolizes' the pain... to you.

Unless the child has drawn the same connections between crying and pain, there is no such symbolization at hand in the child's thought/belief. The same holds good of an utterance of "ouch". That is sometimes not a representation of pain at all, particularly to the one in pain. It can be, but doesn't have to be. If there is no connection made between the crying or the "ouch" and the pain by the one who's in pain, there can be no justifiable symbolic representation attributed by us to them.

Such representation requires something to be symbol("ouch" and crying in this case), something to be symbolized(the pain, in this case) and a creature who has drawn a correlation, connection, and/or association between the two... anything less, and there is no such symbolism at work...

This "phenomenal state"...

I find myself wondering what it consists of. That's what I cannot seem to get a straight answer to.
— creativesoul

You're asking what the "mind" substance is? — Hanover

Uh. No.

I'm asking you to justify your claims, particularly the ones involving "phenomenal states". I'm asking you to set out the criterion which - when met by a candidate - would count minimally at least, as being a phenomenal state.

What does it consist of? What is it existentially dependent upon?

We can look towards an angry person, and know by their behaviour that they are in an angry state of mind. That is, the anger is strongly influencing what they say and do.

That's not belief, rather it's a result thereof. Belief has efficacy.

Is it a phenomenal state?

Placebo proves beyond a reasonable doubt that belief has efficacy... and can be quite powerful in it's manifestations/instantiations...