I think I'd like to take this offline and start a new thread since it only has small bearing on Wayfarer's OP. The relational QM bit was very relevant, and is a good answer to the OP, but what I'm pushing here goes way beyond the confines of QM, and thus seems off-topic. I want relational everything.
Give me a day or two to frame it. — noAxioms
I guess it was far longer than a day or two, but I wanted to attempt some research first. I found some dubious leads. The Stanford entry on Relativism doesn’t really go into it. It’s mostly about relativism of morals, aesthetics, truth and such. There is section 4.2 concerning conceptual relativism, but it seems to be again a form of idealism on concepts, not necessarily mind.I'll leave the rest for now and we can pick it up in the new thread. — Andrew M
OK, I am on track with that one. We’re not talking epistemology.We need to draw a clear line between ontology and epistemology. Ontology regards the existence of facts and objects, while epistemology regards whether we can know them or not, and if objectively or subjectively.
Here I must disagree, and this seems to be the point of my OP here. He says the only alternative to an objective reality is one relative to (or supervenes on) human mind. How very anthropocentric. Ontological relativism means relative to anything, but not supervening on that thing.Ontologically, either you're a realist or an anti-realist. Either you accept facts are real independently of the "human mind" (realist), i.e. objective, or you accept that reality is only subjective (anti-realist).
Things exist only in relation to something (anything) else. There is no objective existence of anything, thus solving the problem of why existence exists. It doesn’t. — noAxioms
So I started with something like Ontic Structural Realism, except without the objective realism. The universe is a mathematical structure and things within it are real to each other. It is not platonic realsim. Numbers are abstract (not real) to us, but relate (are real) to each other. 7 exists in relation to 9, or to the set of integers, but our universe is not existent in relation to them any more than numbers are real to us. 13 is prime, and doesn’t require objective existence to be prime. Similarly, we don’t require objective existence to relate to other parts of the structure. This is a key concept, demonstrating why objective ontology (or lack of it) makes no difference in the relations between different parts of the same structure. — noAxioms
"Ontologically, either you're a realist or an anti-realist. Either you accept facts are real independently of the "human mind" (realist), i.e. objective, or you accept that reality is only subjective (anti-realist)." [from Research Gate]
Here I must disagree, and this seems to be the point of my OP here. He says the only alternative to an objective reality is one relative to (or supervenes on) human mind. How very anthropocentric. Ontological relativism means relative to anything, but not supervening on that thing. — noAxioms
So I noticed the question presumes there is something. What if there wasn’t? What empirical difference would that make? While difficult to get past the bias that there needs to be something, it turns out there is no difference. — noAxioms
7 exists in relation to 9, or to the set of integers, but our universe is not existent in relation to them any more than numbers are real to us. — noAxioms
While difficult to get past the bias that there needs to be something, it turns out there is no difference. — noAxioms
The universe is a mathematical structure and things within it are real to each other. It is not platonic realsim. Numbers are abstract (not real) to us, but relate (are real) to each other. 7 exists in relation to 9, or to the set of integers, but our universe is not existent in relation to them any more than numbers are real to us. 13 is prime, and doesn’t require objective existence to be prime. Similarly, we don’t require objective existence to relate to other parts of the structure. This is a key concept, demonstrating why objective ontology (or lack of it) makes no difference in the relations between different parts of the same structure. — noAxioms
Absolute, sure. I mean as opposed to exists-in-relation-to, not as opposed to 'subjective'.By "objective" here, do you mean "absolute"? — Andrew M
Platonic realism says they have absolute or objective existence in a third realm of abstract things. The relativist view says they are real only to each other. This is independent of matter, sure. Something like the color red (universal) has existence under platonism, but is probably not independent of mind/matter since the 'red' is pretty meaningless outside that context. I explored platonism (lower case) for a while, but it is still a position of absolute reality.On your view, numbers seem to have an existence independent of matter (and mind) which would qualify as Platonic realism about universals.
This view is not the objective/subjective axis either, so your initial comment is relevant. Absolute/relative is the axis in question here. Einstein's theory of relativity works on all sides of the objective/subjective axis, so it doesn't necessarily seem to be a realist theory. It is a relational theory, but not an ontological one. Time is relative to a reference frame, and there is no absolute time. Similarly, I am proposing that ontology is relative to something, but not anything in particular. It is not limited to being relative only to consciousness, but that is one valid thing to which the relation can be expressed. Idealism is a subset of relational ontology.I agree that absolute/relative is a different axis to realist/anti-realist (objective/subjective). Einstein's theory of relativity is a realist theory, for example.
Ontologically, either you're a realist or an anti-realist. Either you accept facts are real independently of the "human mind" (realist), i.e. objective, or you accept that reality is only subjective (anti-realist)
Ontologically, either you're a realist or an anti-realist.
You are presuming the very bias of which I spoke in my quote taken above. This view stands in opposition to that premise, so asserting it is just begging a different position. Demonstrate why it leads to contradiction, without at any point presuming this absolute realist premise.So I noticed the question presumes there is something. What if there wasn’t? What empirical difference would that make? While difficult to get past the bias that there needs to be something, it turns out there is no difference.
— noAxioms
The fact that the question can be asked rules out the possibility of there not being simply nothing. There could be no empirical anything if there were not anything to begin with. And it turns out that in order for someone to be around to even ask this question relies on there long having been a causal sequence that seems inextricably interconnected with what exists now. — Wayfarer
So I noticed the question presumes there is something. What if there wasn’t? What empirical difference would that make? While difficult to get past the bias that there needs to be something, it turns out there is no difference. — noAxioms
I exist in relation to my thoughts. "I exist" (in any absolute sense) does not follow from that. This is pretty straight-forward relativism, except it is ontology this time, a topic rarely covered. Usually it is about morals or aesthetics or something. But a relativist would say that just because it is not objectively wrong to do act X, it doesn't follow that it isn't wrong. I still bear responsibility for doing X in the context in which X is wrong. Similarly I exist in relation to my thoughts despite absence of absolute existence.There is a difference, since you exist. — TimeLine
Tegmark did a pretty good job of demonstrating how our universe could be nothing more than such a mathematical structure. I think he then went a bit into Plato territory and presumed the existence of this structure. Not sure of this, since the structure itself is all that matters, and that doesn't change with ontology. A square still has 4 equal angles whether it has platonic existence or is just abstract.I am having trouble distinguishing this 'clear line' between epistemology and ontology vis-a-vis this mathematical structure and you would need to explain this further. The problem I am having is that mathematics is our way of interpreting the world and not that mathematics itself exists outside of us. It is a useful heuristic we created to translate the patterns of physics and nature using numbers. This physical reality exists independent of you and I, but for you to claim this physical reality is a mathematical structure imposes the very invention of describing the universe you seek to avoid and thus quasi-empirical, particularly since mathematics is limited in articulating all possible realities in a cohesive formal system. Is realism and constructivism mutually exclusive? I have my reservations with mathematical realism and you would need to do somewhat better, however alluring Tegmark or Plato are.
Well, it has a name relative to me, but it isn't a mathematical structure. Nothing is the lack of anything. There is no thing that has objective existence, not even the fact of there not being anything. Not only is the set of things that exist an empty set, but that set itself doesn't exist.This Leibniz question of 'why is there something rather than nothing?' it seems can't be answered unless we first agree on what precisely is meant by the terms 'nothing' and 'something.' As for the idea of 'nothing', the very act of giving it a name -- i.e. a 'mathematical structure' -- seems to render it as 'something', in an abstract sort of way. — snowleopard
We are talking about it in the context of this current Earth state which part of the structure that is this universe. I've attempted to illustrate just above how that is not impossible just because the structure itself exists no more than does the square that nevertheless has relations.And talking about it at all implies some 'state' that can think and talk about it, therefore denying its nothingness. In a sense the question could be reframed as: why is there something that can conceive of 'nothing vs something' as opposed to there not being anything that can conceive ... aka 'the hard problem' and hence the attempt to resolve it with Idealism, positing the primacy of Mind.
Will read the post, and hope it contains the sort of analysis that attempts to demonstrate the inconsistency for which I am seeking.Buddhism addresses this seeming paradox, or dilemma, with its revelation that emptiness, or formlessness, or no-'thingness', is not other than form, which seems to imply an ontological primitive that must account for both, but then is unwilling to apply a name to whatever that is, perhaps recognizing that language, being a subject/object modality, is inadequate to resolve the apparent duality.
What I'm getting at here in a very cursory sort of way, is elaborated upon in the following blog post, which is surely of relevance and interest here: The Inconsistency of Nothing. Subjective or Objective?
What is real for us is each other and the moon, but none of that is just 'reality' since that is not a relation, so they're not the same.What is "real", and is "reality" which must be for us, the same as the "real". — Cavacava
Try to say it fast!. Kindly rephrase a bit. Got lost there. Sounds like an argument I might have expressed in opposition to idealism.How we know what we know must precede what we know, even if what we know provides the conditions for how we know.
No?
'Realist', unqualified typically refers to the position that there is an existence independent of human mind. Anything else would need qualification, so idealism is 'realism of mind', and a theist is a realist of God, and a presentist is a realist of a preferred present.Ontologically, either you're a realist or an anti-realist.
So why not a 'real' Mind that emanates its 'real' ideations, being in essence not-two, as per Idealism? — snowleopard
Those are all relational observations. Subjective observation has zero access to absolute reality, else platonism would not be philosophy, but would be empirically verified one way or the other by noting if something like numbers actually exist.There is of course something. There's you and I, and the world which we inhabit, and everything in it. This is known, at least in part, empirically. I can see people and other stuff. — Sapientia
The nonexistent structure would still have those relations. There is something to see.If there was nothing, however, I wouldn't see people or other stuff or anything at all, because there would be nothing there to see. It would be impossible.
Isn't that what a bias is? You know it, but can't demonstrate it without presuming it. I've given examples of how structures have relations independent of their ontology. To assert that an abstract square does not have right angles unless instantiated seems to be just that, an assertion that is a different interpretation. Show why it is a contradiction of logic for the angles of an abstract square to be right angles, or why the analogy is invalid.You can call it "bias", but it's what I know.
How we know what we know must precede what we know, even if what we know provides the conditions for how we know.
'Realist', unqualified typically refers to the position that there is an existence independent of human mind. Anything else would need qualification, so idealism is 'realism of mind', and a theist is a realist of God, and a presentist is a realist of a preferred present. — noAxioms
I found that all my views have come from exploring two simple questions, one of which is “Why is there something, not nothing?”. This seeming paradox has been brought up in many threads, including the cosmological argument for God, but they all seem like rationalizations. So I noticed the question presumes there is something. What if there wasn’t? What empirical difference would that make? While difficult to get past the bias that there needs to be something, it turns out there is no difference. — noAxioms
A curious thing about the ontological problem is its simplicity. It can be put in three Anglo-Saxon monosyllables: ‘What is there?’ It can be answered, moreover, in a word—‘Everything’—and everyone will accept this answer as true. However, this is merely to say that there is what there is. There remains room for disagreement over cases; and so the issue has stayed alive down the centuries.
What empirical difference would that make? That question does not make sense. If there is empirical evidence, then there is something. If not, then there could still be something that is not evident empirically. Being quantified by the senses does not give some thing existence. Experiences are representations of things and are not necessary for the existence of those things.I found that all my views have come from exploring two simple questions, one of which is “Why is there something, not nothing?”. This seeming paradox has been brought up in many threads, including the cosmological argument for God, but they all seem like rationalizations. So I noticed the question presumes there is something. What if there wasn’t? What empirical difference would that make? While difficult to get past the bias that there needs to be something, it turns out there is no difference. — noAxioms
How can relativism say that there is nothing more than some thing (like a mathematical structure)? It seems to me that in order for relativism to hold true, then the mathematical structure would need a non-mathematical structure in relation to it to exist and to say that it is a mathematical structure. In other words, relativism leads to an dualistic infinite regress. Realism does not seem to have that problem when it implies a final cause.Tegmark did a pretty good job of demonstrating how our universe could be nothing more than such a mathematical structure. I think he then went a bit into Plato territory and presumed the existence of this structure. Not sure of this, since the structure itself is all that matters, and that doesn't change with ontology. A square still has 4 equal angles whether it has platonic existence or is just abstract. — noAxioms
Any time you talk about some thing that exists independent of our senses you are implying that it has an objective existence. By Tegmark claiming that everything is nothing more than a mathematical structure, he has implied that the mathematical structure is not dependent on other things to exist, then it must have an objective existence. In order to say that nothing is objective, you'd have jump head-first in the the bottomless pit of infinite regress.Well, it has a name relative to me, but it isn't a mathematical structure. Nothing is the lack of anything. There is no thing that has objective existence, not even the fact of there not being anything. Not only is the set of things that exist an empty set, but that set itself doesn't exist. — noAxioms
Those are all relational observations. — noAxioms
Subjective observation has zero access to absolute reality, else platonism would not be philosophy, but would be empirically verified one way or the other by noting if something like numbers actually exist. — noAxioms
The nonexistent structure would still have those relations. There is something to see. — noAxioms
Isn't that what a bias is? — noAxioms
You know it, but can't demonstrate it without presuming it. — noAxioms
I've given examples of how structures have relations independent of their ontology. To assert that an abstract square does not have right angles unless instantiated seems to be just that, an assertion that is a different interpretation. Show why it is a contradiction of logic for the angles of an abstract square to be right angles, or why the analogy is invalid. — noAxioms
I think the assumption "there is nothing", would need to be supported, and this would be impossible to support. All the evidence indicates that there is something... — Metaphysician Undercover
For once, we agree. — Sapientia
This sounds reasonable. Suppose I have decided on a relational stance on ontology. From that I am forming the conditions of our epistemology.How we know what we know is epistemic (the starting point as Descartes showed), it must precede (in time) what we know, our ontology, but once we have decided on our ontological stance, then we can understand how it formed the conditions of our epistemology. — Cavacava
I would have perhaps worded it as "Not anything is", and I'm not asserting it, but just asserting the viability of it.I think the assumption "there is nothing", would need to be supported, and this would be impossible to support. — Metaphysician Undercover
But that evidence is based on only relations, so the premise of "there is something" is unfounded since the same empirical evidence is had in either interpretation.All the evidence indicates that there is something, therefore "there is something" is a more sound premise than "there is nothing". And, "there is something" is the premise which supports the cosmological argument. — Metaphysician Undercover
would have perhaps worded it as "Not anything is", and I'm not asserting it, but just asserting the viability of it. — noAxioms
But that evidence is based on only relations, so the premise of "there is something" is unfounded since the same empirical evidence is had in either interpretation. — noAxioms
Pretty much agree. That the universe is a mathematical structure (and is not merely modeled by one) is not new. The latter half seems to be what I've been exploring, and one which I have not necessarily seen litterature, let alone even a name for the stance.This post has two components, one is an attempt to sketch the construction of a ridiculously inclusive mathematical object which serves as the background 'model of things' in the OP, and the other attempts to situate what an ontology is in relation to the ridiculously inclusive object. — fdrake
Good so far, but the particulars you speak of here are components of the structure. The structure itself seems to be neither a particular nor a universal. Earth exists as a particular within my simplified uni-world QM model. It exists in relation to the structure, although not completely. It has no absolute coordinates for instance, only relative coordinates, and for that reason it is arguably a universal of sorts. I probably digress from where you're going with this.If you take any particular, there will be various different types of relation that apply to it. Every event can be related to any other event through the relations of antecedence and subsequence - occurred before and after interpreted as an ordering relation. Each proposition can be related to every other proposition through the relation of consistency partitioning arbitrary well formed logical formulae into consistent and inconsistent models. I think it's reasonable to posit that every particular can be related to every other particular in some way, and all relations can be related (and so on).
I think I followed that, even if I could not have written it.Imagine that we have access to the set of all particulars and every n-ary (generalised) relation between them (a construction similar to this but allowing 2-morphisms to map to 1-morphisms and introducing such 'cross' relations of arbitrary order and scope). This collection is a mathematical abstraction, but let's say that all of its elements are as real as any other, and every concrete particular and every relation between concrete particulars and abstract particulars (including all higher n-ary relations thereof) is contained within it. This is essentially the universe as considered in the OP. It's a jumble of everything in the broadest possible (or at least ridiculously broad) mathematised sense of a jumble of everything. Unsurprisingly that kind of object is not well understood.
OK. I have only an objective description of the mathematical abstraction, so the B-series wording seems more appropriate. "The rock is rolling down the hill at time X" is better than the use of 'currently' which carries implications of time not being part of the abstraction, but something within which the abstraction exists. The whole idea is that the fundamental abstraction doesn't exist in any deeper abstraction.Examples of elements in the jumble to remove the jargon - rocks are in it, the relationship between rocks and hills as 'currently rolling down' are in it, the relation between 'currently rolling down' and every possible physics-based description are in it, the individual rock's relation to every physics-based descriptions are in it, the rock's relationship to the mathematical abstraction of a group are in it.
OK, "Everything" is just a tautology then. Of course. But what if that list is empty, and there isn't even a list? So poorly answered. Mine was simply that it makes no difference, at least not to the relations.The abstract relationships between groups and every possible pairing and sub-pairing between these abstractions and rocks are in it. Everything in it is considered as an object in the same sense. Is anything interesting gained by asserting the existence of the whole thing or denying it? Probably not, as Quine noted:
A curious thing about the ontological problem is its simplicity. It can be put in three Anglo-Saxon monosyllables: ‘What is there?’ It can be answered, moreover, in a word—‘Everything’—and everyone will accept this answer as true. However, this is merely to say that there is what there is. There remains room for disagreement over cases; and so the issue has stayed alive down the centuries.
I didn't quote your entire post, but it doesn't sound like you're trying to disagree with this view, but attempting to formalize it and see where it fits into works done by several others.Unfortunately, the task of ontology is not to decide whether the giant jumble object exists or does not exist, it is to filter what obtains (questions of relation) and how/why it does so. In this formal sense a question of whether something exists in any sense is really only answerable to the sense in which it operates - Pegasus and a stick operate differently, who cares what we call existent and not, the operational difference suffices.
This makes sense. I've had my ontology expressed as a version of existential quantification, but I'm not sure if that term applies to the sort of structures of which we might be a part. So there is still ontology, but it isn't able to be simplified to "what is there?".Ontology neither begins nor ends with a decision on what exists, it concerns itself with the hows and whys of those things. So when you say 'it doesn't matter whether it exists or it doesn't' - you're missing the sense of why in question. Even if it doesn't matter there's still a hell of a lot of work to do interpreting the thing.
I think I'm also saying that existence of things is not necessary for the experience of those things. Only a relationship between the experiencer and the experienced. Without the experiencer, relationships might still exist between things, but experience-of isn't one of those relations. The moon still caused tides without humans to experience that, but those prehistoric tides never existed in relation to human experience.Experiences are representations of things and are not necessary for the existence of those things. — Harry Hindu
I didn't say that. I don't say the structure is, since there is nothing for it to be in relation to.How can relativism say that there is nothing more than some thing (like a mathematical structure)? — Harry Hindu
Just non-idealistic existence, but the negation of objective existence is not existence necessarily in relation to our senses. I pointed this out in my second post.Any time you talk about some thing that exists independent of our senses you are implying that it has an objective existence. — Harry Hindu
They don't need other things to exist since they don't exist. The structure simply has these relations, and those relations are independent of the existence of the structure.If things need other things to exist and those things are defined by their relationships with other things, why would relationships themselves be excempt from this rule? Wouldn't relationships need the existence of non-relationships to exist as relationships? — Harry Hindu
What could I have possibly done wrong to deserve this? Now the next point the premise "that there is something" supports the cosmological argument. You still agree? — Metaphysician Undercover
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