So you really didn't deal with my argument - that even pre-conception, a reason for having kids is that you could expect it would make you less egotistical as a result. The desire to be less selfish could be a valid reason. — apokrisis
Huh? I'm not disputing your moral right to hold absolutist antinatalist beliefs. — apokrisis
Are you an Objectivist? To say that selfishness can be morally good is the move Ayn Rand made. To me, that obliterates meaningful distinctions between different motives. If all actions are selfish then no actions are compassionate. The latter becomes a meaningless category. Or, if you admit of the category but not of the word to describe it ("compassion"), then we're missing a word to describe a certain class of motivated actions. And in that case, I would say that compassion is already a fine word for that.
My understanding of a selfish action is that it is inherently instrumental, being performed for the benefit of oneself. Your definition of selfish action is far too literal, being "that which is performed by a self or ego." Seeing as all human actions are performed by human selves, it follows that all human actions are selfish. But again, this fails to disambiguate the real difference between actions performed for the benefit of oneself and those performed for the benefit of others. — Thorongil
As I have said, procreation cannot (at least on naturalism) ever be performed for the benefit of another, since there is no child on whose behalf one is acting. The objection raised earlier that one could act for the benefit of one's wife who wants to procreate doesn't work, since her reasons cannot but be selfish.
Would you say there are motivations which do not fall into these two categories? — Moliere
The motive behind such actions is better described as "I do them because I like them", and there ends the chain of reasons. — Moliere
As I have said, procreation cannot (at least on naturalism) ever be performed for the benefit of another, since there is no child on whose behalf one is acting. — Thorongil
There is a third category of action, yes, which refers to malicious actions. Thus:
Compassion = moral.
Self interest = amoral.
Malice = immoral.
But then they are by definition self-interested, and in that sense I disagree with you — Thorongil
However, the object of such pursuits may have intrinsic worth (e.g. philosophy is done for the sake of finding truth, which is intrinsically valuable), so in that sense I agree with you. — Thorongil
To me, that obliterates meaningful distinctions between different motives. If all actions are selfish then no actions are compassionate. The latter becomes a meaningless category. — Thorongil
Alright, but then you do agree with the point that the instrumentality of action is not something intrinsic to self-interested action, right? — Moliere
So what say you about life? Intrinsic worth or naw? — Moliere
No? I'm not sure I'm following this. — Thorongil
I said this earlier: "my natalist interlocutor needs to establish that creating life is good, not that life is good. I could grant for the sake of argument that life is intrinsically good (or that happiness is intrinsically good), but that wouldn't in itself prove that creating it is good." — Thorongil
hence it would fall in the middle category of your schema. — Moliere
But it wouldn't be for some end-goal that I do philosophy. Whether I attain truth or not is irrelevant to my motivation of doing philosophy. — Moliere
Actions are the bearers of the terms "good", "amoral", or "bad". What seems to be the case is that actions which fall in the good category are actions which are motivated in a particular direction: for-the-other. Categorically bad actions are against-the-other. Amoral actions are for-the-self. — Moliere
Also, the basic argument is that good actions are for-the-other, before birth there is no other, therefore the act of having children before there are children can not be good. That all follows definitionally from what I see. — Moliere
The question is, is there some kind of rejoinder to this argument? — Moliere
You were a utilitarian, though, weren't you? — Thorongil
I've come to see consequentialist theories as inherently intra-worldly and incapable of acting as any fundamental ethic — darthbarracuda
you cannot do anything to what which doesn't exist. — Thorongil
think you are confusing motivation, which is always future directed to that which is not yet, with the cause of action, which must be already in existence. — unenlightened
Right, I get this. There is no confusion. I have spoken of procreation, the action. — Thorongil
What is it about an ethic being "intra-worldly" that makes it insufficient? — Thorongil
And the action can have the motive of creating a new person that does not yet exist, for one's own sake or for theirs. — unenlightened
Thinking about it here, what is lurking behind my objection to this reasoning seems to be Hume's guillotine: that one cannot derive an ought from an is. So my objection is that one cannot go from the claim "being is intrinsically good" to "therefore, one ought to procreate."
If Hume's guillotine fails and it is licit to derive an ought from an is, then I will have to admit that procreation is a supererogatory good (morally good, but not required, as in a duty), assuming that being is good. I don't assume that, though. — Thorongil
Yes, but if the action cannot be compassionate then the motive cannot be either. In the case of procreation, because the action cannot be compassionate, for the reason that the cause of the action doesn't exist, then the motive cannot be compassion, even if the procreator claims it to be. — Thorongil
You're floundering. — unenlightened
Actions are actions, and are motivated by selfishness or compassion. The cause of the action is the motive, and the motive is an imagined consequence. — unenlightened
Now it's my turn to accuse you of being confused. Specifically, you seem to be confusing a motive with an intention. — Thorongil
Reread that last sentence — Thorongil
Your second sentence above doesn't negate the first. You do have a goal in pursuing philosophy: the truth. That makes philosophy instrumental. Whether you obtain the truth as a result of doing philosophy is irrelevant as to whether philosophy is instrumental. You could fail to obtain truth and philosophy would still be instrumental, as per your own definition. — Thorongil
That is effectively the question of the thread! — Thorongil
One might say that, prima facie, if being is intrinsically good, then it is good to procreate. Thinking about it here, what is lurking behind my objection to this reasoning seems to be Hume's guillotine: that one cannot derive an ought from an is. So my objection is that one cannot go from the claim "being is intrinsically good" to "therefore, one ought to procreate."
If Hume's guillotine fails and it is licit to derive an ought from an is, then I will have to admit that procreation is a supererogatory good (morally good, but not required, as in a duty), assuming that being is good. I don't assume that, though.
Maybe you are making the point that all choices serve the interest of some ego - even the desire to be egoless. Ah, sweet paradox! — apokrisis
But remember my ultimate position is that the self itself is a social construct. — apokrisis
"Being a good parent", for the utilitarian, is something that does not have value independent of the principle of utility. This is nonsense, in my opinion. — darthbarracuda
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.