No it isn't. If it were, then it would be impossible for anywhere else to be the capital, which it isn't. Paris is not defined as the capital of France, although it is the capital. — The Great Whatever

Go and look up "Paris" in the dictionary then and see if "capital of France" is not one of the definitions you find there.

Read Kripke's remarks about Nixon in NN. They make the same point I'm making here, contradict what you're saying, and are integral to the point he's making and the notion of rigid designation.

I don't know what you mean. Can it be false right now that Paris is not the capital of France? Well, no, since it is. Can it be false right now that it's sunny in some location? Well, it either is sunny or it isn't, so it either can or it can't be, but I don't know which one.

Perhaps you're talking about epistemic modality, something along the lines of as far as I/we know, it might be sunny versus France might be the capital of Paris. But this is simply not what is at issue in determining whether a proposition is empirical.

Dictionaries often provide supplementary information about individuals outside of their definitions, and the definition of Paris is a certain city; to get people to see which city that is, it is appropriate to provide a descrition of it, like 'the capital of France,' even though this description is itself contingent.

If Paris were not the capital of France, it would not stop being Paris. Ergo it cannot be that the definition of 'Paris' includes its being the capital of France. There is no logical contradiction in saying that Paris is not the capital of France. Moreover, if another city became the capital of France, it would not become Paris. None of this should be controversial.

Yeh this comes from the way you think about mathematics. It's easier rather then to view things as an arbitrary distinction, to try to see where Kant is coming from, to see why he may have an issue with synthetic knowledge.

Kant didn't have the kind of axioms of arithmetic we have today. That isn't the way they worked out that 7+5 = 12.
But further I think the axioms are in some way secondary. Most people know that 7 + 5 = 12 without even knowing that it can be derived from axioms, or what the axioms may be. If we created a formal structure for proving arithmetic and it showed that 7+5 = 11, that we had been wrong the whole time about it equaling 12, we would reject that formal structure before questioning our intuitions.

So it's a question of how we actually know it, how are we justified in our complete certainty that this is a necessary truth.

I think it's also easier when using his other examples, like triangle have 180 degrees. We can prove it in an abstract way, by using examples of a triangle that is meant to stand in for all other triangles etc. It's an operation we can do in our minds, but what gives us the ability to be so certain that the triangle that I draw on a piece of paper will all have that property.

I don't know what you mean. Can it be false right now that Paris is not the capital of France? Well, no, since it is. Can it be false right now that it's sunny in some location? Well, it either is sunny or it isn't, so it either can or it can't be, but I don't know which one. — The Great Whatever

I'm talking about statements. It cannot be, strictly speaking, true or false that it is sunny right now in some location. It can be the case that it is sunny right now, and a statement that it is sunny right now can be true or false right now. But we know that the statement 'Paris is the capital of France' cannot possibly be false right now if nothing has changed regarding the designated status of Paris . Whether some statement that I make right now about it being sunny in some location right now is true or false is a different case because it has nothing to do with human designation.

I'm sorry, I can't follow you. I don't see any difference between the two. Both talk about contingent facts that can be verified or falsified empirically.

the statement 'Paris is the capital of France' cannot possibly be false right now if nothing has changed regarding the designated status of Paris . — John

In other words, 'Paris is the capital of France' cannot be false given that Paris is the capital of France.

I don't agree; under the current and past definition it is the capital of France. Definitions, just like designations, can change. It could never be the case that Paris was never the capital of France, whereas it could be the case that the sun never shone at some location; and that is the point that goes to the difference I have been trying to show.

I don't agree; under the current and past definition it is the capital of France. — John

Paris is not the capital of France according to any definition. It is the capital as a matter of fact.

Yeh I don't get the views that Paris is necessarily the Capital of France, if we are using Kripke's modal logic.

Yeh I don't get the views that Paris is necessarily the Capital of France, if we are using Kripke's modal logic. — shmik

Yeah, same

If you like; whereas "the sun is shining at some place and time" can be false given that it has nothing to do with what humans have designated in terms of names. I am astonished that others can not see that Paris being the capital of France is a different kind of fact than the kinds of merely empirical facts that can be confirmed or confirmed by the senses.

Read Kripke's remarks about Nixon in NN. They make the same point I'm making here, contradict what you're saying, and are integral to the point he's making and the notion of rigid designation. — The Great Whatever

Yep. Kripke says "Possible worlds are stipulated, not discovered." I told you there's a duck/rabbit aspect to this. I told you that all you have to do is decide that the object you're calling "France" must have Paris as its capital. This is not an absurd thing to do. That's exactly what you might do if you're distinguishing the actual France from an alternate one.

Can we also do what you're describing, and say that having Paris as its capital is not essential? Of course. But there's no reason we have to do that.

So in regard to John's point, you should say..

"Well, if you're thinking of the actual France, then yes... it must have Paris as its capital. You're right, John." Sincerely, The Great Whatever.

Well I think others here are equally astonished at your position.

So as you say, 'Paris is the capital of France' cannot be false given that Paris is the capital of France, but what is given here is a matter of fact that could have been otherwise.

It is a designated fact not a merely empirical fact. What experiment could you run to determine its truth or falsity that did not involve reading something that someone has written, and hence did not involve semantics? By contrast, if we were together inside a house and you said that the sun is shining outside I could just go and look to see if what you said was true.

I told you that all you have to do is decide that the object you're calling "France" must have Paris as its capital. — Mongrel

No, this is not decided, not even according to Kripke. Kripke has certain controversial and strong views about which properties are essential to objects, but he takes these to be matters of metaphysics, not agreement or stipulation: such as, a table might essentially be made of certain physical constituents, or a person might essentially have some DNA. These are independent of his semantic thesis about proper names, however, and highly controversial, and I think not even Kripke would venture to say that Paris is essentially the capital of France.

According to Kripke, the name 'Paris' rigidly designates a certain individual, viz. a city. When stipulating a possible world, we say things like, 'If Paris hadn't been the capital of France...' Since we are using the word 'Paris,' which rigidly designates, even in this stipulated counterfactual scenario, we are still talking about Paris, hence why we use the word 'Paris.' We do not imagine if some other city might not have been the capital, we imagine if Paris, i.e. that very city, were different from what it was. This is what Kripke means in saying that possible worlds are not distant regions or alternate realities, but stipulated objects, and in stipulating, we stipulate that we are talking about Paris, that very city that the name 'Paris' refers to in all worlds.

Regardless of all of this, it's not a matter of linguistic stipulation what properties are essential to an individual, if any.

Are you under the impression that you cannot 'just go look' and see that Paris is the capital of France? Being a capital comes with certain empirical manifestations, like being the center of certain political activities.

So you honestly can see no distinction between bare empirical propositions, and the empirical methods of confirming or dis-confirming them, and "Paris is the capital of France"?

I don't really understand the question to be honest. You're saying that because Paris is the capital of France merely by decree, it is somehow less an empirical fact than that the sun is currently not shining on Paris?

If you go to Paris there is nothing you could see that could confirm that it is the capital of France. If you go outside and look you can confirm whether or not the sun is shining. "Vive la difference"!

Regardless of all of this, it's not a matter of linguistic stipulation what properties are essential to an individual, if any. — The Great Whatever

I agree. So does Kripke. He says we identify essential properties by testing the limits of imagination.

And clearly, we can imagine Paris not being the capital of France, so I don't see what the problem is.

Sure, there is? There are capitol buildings and government functions. Do you really think being a capital consists in nothing other than people calling it the capital or saying it is? That there is no empirical aspect of the city from which you could determine it's the capital?

But if being a capital did consist in "nothing other than people calling it the capital or saying it is," it could still be an empirical fact that Paris is the capital of France. Similarly, 'The mayor of Paris is called Anne' can be empirically confirmed.

I agree with you, but wouldn't it remain empirical even if capitolhood were nothing more than an agreed upon designation? Say people nominated cities for position x solely for murky spiritual reasons.

Edit: looks like jamalrob beat me to it

You're still not getting the difference. There could be nothing immediately obvious to your eyes that would confirm that Paris is the capital, analogous to how basic empirical propositions can be obviously true or false . Even if you see 'The Capital of France' written somewhere that could still be false, or referring to something else or some other city. How do you know Paris is the capital of France in the first place? It's because everyone agrees that it is so, isn't it? And that agreement is a semantic not an empirical matter ( although of course it is in a sense an empirical matter that people agree). Paris could only cease to be the capital if people decided they didn't want it to be thought to be such any longer, isn't it? People are not agreeing that Paris is the capital because it has been empirically demonstrated to them in any way that is obvious to their senses.

And clearly, we can imagine Paris not being the capital of France, so I don't see what the problem is. — The Great Whatever

Yes we can. When we do that, we're using something else to identify France. Something else is being called essential.

I guess my question to you would be this: what in your view is essential about France? Do you see this as being something you learned about it aposteriori?

Paris as the capital is inessential, baguettes are essential. Simple.

Certainly there is an empirical component to such facts (of course because they are about real people and/ or places) but that doesn't change the fact that they are not basic empirical facts like "the sun is shining". there is much more of semantic contingency to them.

Washington DC was not always the capital of the US. Was the US not the US when philadelphia was the capital? Or is it no longer the US now that DC is? Or is the particular location of the capital of France essential to Francehood in a way the capital of the US is not essential to UShood?