Yeah, idk, I could go to Paris too and talk to people. For sure, a change of capitals would be a social fact, but I don't see how that changes things. I agree sight is involved in one case, not in the other, but I don't think sight is the sine qua non of the empirical. Do you?ou wouldn't necessarily see "rays" (unless there were clouds or mist about), you'd see the sun shining if it was shining. Checking the news is fine, but as I have argued that introduces the semantic element, because you couldn't tell just by looking at the paper, whether New York is the capital of Paris or not; you'd have to read it. — John
My view is in keeping with Scott Soames' explanation of Kripke's views. Maybe you could add his comments to your tons. — Mongrel
I own and have read the two volumes of his Philosophical Analysis in the 20th Century, as well as several of his papers. Although I disagree with Soames on some topics (mainly regarding the metaphysics of propositions, and his views on philosophical method), it never had seemed to me that his reading of Kripke was amiss. It's possible that you misread him too. — Pierre-Normand
Cool. Maybe you could point out where I'm wrong. — Mongrel
Actually, I do think it's important to understand that for something to be empirical does not imply the exclusion of language, symbolic meaning, concepts, and all that. — jamalrob
I did already in the first post from mine that you quoted. I explained where you may have gone wrong, though I may have mistargeted my comment at John. Early on in the thread you had commented that: "There is no possible world that contains the thing we've named "France" which has a capital that isn't Paris. That's Kripke's necessary aposteriori in a nutshell." This may involve the incorrect slide from one claim of de re necessity to another one, for one could maybe make the case that there isn't a possible world in which Paris is the capital of some country other than France. But your own statement (regarding France) would not follow from that, and it would still be false. — Pierre-Normand
Yes. It would be true if Paris is an essential property of France.You also claimed that "The actual France (whose capital is Paris) can not be identical to an alternate France (whose capital is Caen). That's pretty basic. It's two different objects." This would only be true if having Paris as a capital were an essential property of France. You seemed to have been running together numerical identity and indiscernability. — Pierre-Normand
In putting your case too strongly I think you went wrong. — jamalrob
EDIT: actually I don't agree that analytic-synthetic is a spectrum, although I'm sympathetic to the idea that a priori-empirical is a spectrum. — jamalrob
If you disagree that the essence of France is matter of stipulation, then could you explain how you understand the essence of France (as something not stipulated) and how that fits in with N&N? — Mongrel
. It falls under the sortal concept 'country' or 'nation state'. So, maybe, falling under such a concept is an essential property France has. — Pierre-Normand
So, again... you're using the word claim. What is a claim?However, to claim that having Paris as its capital is an essential property of France seems to do violence to our ordinary conception of what France is. — Pierre-Normand
Think so? Let's ponder a possible world in which France is, in fact, a province of a nation known as the European Union. It's not a country any more than North Carolina is. Do you want to try again or do you already see where this is headed? — Mongrel
In any case, Paris being its capital (either the capital of the province or the capital of the country) would still be contingent. — Pierre-Normand
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