, that's not much of an argument either, although at least it has a premise and a conclusion, even if it's not clear how they are related to each other. In any case, Corvus is right that the point isn't just about our moon, it's about existence in general, and whether things that are not actually being perceived exist or not. Occidental commonsense screams "of course they do", but what passes for commonsense in the West might not be true (I started another discussion on this point 'Commonsense versus physics').If no one is looking at the Moon, the word ËXIST' has no meaning. Hence the Moon has no meaning either in that case.
o have a role for God in the sustaining of the Universe. An earlier contributor is quite right to bring in quantum mechanics where the issue of non measurement comes to the fore as having an influence on events. — Edmund
Take a look at the Kastrup thread - plenty of confusion and some obscurantism, doesn't help that QM purloined the term "observer".Quantum mechanics is at best irrelevant to the idealism v materialism debate, and at worse just invites obscurantism and confusion.
An observation can occur without any conscious or living being present. — LD Saunders
For one thing, since Einstein came up with relativity, and even before then regarding transforms, we can't even say that we are "observing" the moon any more than we can say that the moon is "observing" us, since space is not absolute. That should give anyone a hint that the discussion was not talking about consciousness being necessary in order for a material world exist. — LD Saunders
A materialist interpretation of quantum mechanics is possible, as is an idealist one. — MetaphysicsNow
Whether you can have Berkelian idealism without also requiring God to be around in the quad is an interesting question. — MetaphysicsNow
dealing with issues concerning nominalism v realism about properties , personal identity over time, adverbialism and representationalsim in the philosophy of mind, to name just a few. — MetaphysicsNow
A materialist interpretation of quantum mechanics is possible, as is an idealist one. — MetaphysicsNow
Any examples?
I have heard of, but not read, Foster. As far as I am aware his basic argument is epistemological in nature, and the problem with that (at least insofar as analytic philosophy is concerned, a tradition to which he belongs) is that the standard position in analytic philosophy is that you cannot obtain a metaphysical conclusion from epistemological premises. In fact, that same principle is what causes the arguments from illusion and hallucination to be given pretty short shrift these days.Anyway, I'm interested in what you say about proving idealism by analysing perception - have you read John Foster? He attempts to argue for idealism entirely indepentently of the usual kind of arguments from illusion and hallucination.
Not a coincidence!By the way, any relation between you and MetaphyicsNow.com, or is that just coincidence ?
We definitely have posters who have argued for subjective idealism without utilizing God, even saying that God was the flaw in Berkley's philosophy.
Wheeler's "many worlds" comes to mind. — MetaphysicsNow
'What answer we get depends on the question we put, the experiment we arrange, the registering device we choose'.
Under materialist interpretations there is always a particle, prior to, during and after measurement.prior to this act of measurement, there is no particle, but only the probability of there being one
Under materialist interpretations there is always a particle, prior to, during and after measurement. — MetaphysicsNow
As I see it, phenomenalistic/subjective idealism faces three challenges:
1) Avoid the collapse to solipsism
2) Account for the apparent permance of particulars
3) Account for the apparent fact that numerically distinct people can perceive one and the same thing in different ways (i.e. from different perspectives). — MetaphysicsNow
The many world's interpretation is, at root, just the idea that the wave function quantifies over all actual and possible states of affairs, where those actual and possible states of affairs are ultimately actual and possible arrangements of electrons and other elementary particles. Hence it is fully committed to the existence of particles before after and during any experimental measurements. It denies any interpretation of QM that involves the idea that the wave function collapses at any point. It has an ontology (at least in many of its forms) that commits it to possibilia as well as actualities, but that might be the price to pay for maintaining materialism.I haven’t heard of any such interpretations. The many worlds interpretation doesn’t say that, but it’s not worth debating, as it can’t be resolved one way or the other.
Hence it is fully committed to the existence of particles before after and during any experimental measurements. — MetaphysicsNow
True, but then for some people that is more palatable than idealism. Incidently, there was at least one recent philosopher (David Lewis, whose ideas are still quite influential in so-called analytic philosophy) who had a range of arguments independent of QM interpretation for the real existence of possible worlds. So even that issue is independent of the whole QM debate.I get that, but at the cost of there being many worlds.
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