What exactly is dishonest in the scenario you posited? In what way is the patient lying to himself? — Moliere
The lie is that X's behaviour is not within his control. — MetaphysicsNow
Well, on empirical grounds he has already established that it is within his control.Why would you disbelieve him when he says it's not in his control?
If OCD is beyond X's control because X's ritualistic behaviour is determined by physiologically abnormal conditions, then by consistency of reasoning all behaviour (not just X's) is determined by physiology.
If all behaviour is determined by physiology, no one has any control over any of their actions. — MetaphysicsNow
If OCD is beyond X's control because X's ritualistic behaviour is determined by physiologically abnormal conditions, then by consistency of reasoning all behaviour (not just X's) is determined by physiology. — MetaphysicsNow
Grasshoppers suffer from OCD because they are really ants, whereas ants suffer from an excess of control -anorexia, for example - because they are really grasshoppers. — unenlightened
But the ant being a grasshopper eludes me. Care to say a little more on that? — Moliere
Your use of a wheel chair is not determined by your lack of legs. Certainly the actions you can choose between for getting from one place to another might be delimited by your lack of legs, but as per my brief reply to Moliere, it is your action of using the wheelchair to get from A to B that is in question. All kinds of things determine what actions I can choose between, including the number of limbs I have at my disposal, but X's point is that the entire element of choice is nullified by physiological abnormality.So if my use of a wheelchair is determined by my lack of legs, no one has any control over any of their actions?
All kinds of things determine what actions I can choose between, including the number of limbs I have at my disposal, but X's point is that the entire element of choice is nullified by physiological abnormality. — MetaphysicsNow
I think Metaphysics now is trying to suggest that even if X is not explicitly saying this, what X is saying does entail this. That to me is the import of the first premise of the sketch argument given. Not sure how the implication holds, but then it's not my argument. My guess is that there's somekind of "being consistent with explanations of actions" principle lying behind it, but maybe not.X is not saying 'that the entire element of choice is nullified by physiological abnormality'.
If OCD is beyond X's control because X's ritualistic behaviour is determined by physiologically abnormal conditions, then by consistency of reasoning all behaviour (not just X's) is determined by physiology. — MetaphysicsNow
So I have to choose what to have to drink in the morning from a menu of tea, coffee, juice, water or nothing. I invariably choose coffee, but do not claim that I want to choose tea but cannot, because if I chose tea my wife would die of shock. I have to choose, and in choosing I have to believe that I am free to choose what I want. And then we do not call my consistent choices 'compulsive'.
But suppose my wife (or my therapist) convinces me that I ought to give up coffee, then I am conflicted; I love to drink coffee in the mornings, but I want not to drink coffee because bla bla. Every evening, I decide to have juice tomorrow, and every morning, I have coffee again. The bla bla reasons not to drink coffee are convincing, but do not make me want to drink no coffee, and to choose is to believe I can make the choice of what I want. — unenlightened
Socrates and Plato had produced arguments claiming that virtue was knowledge. But this was proven to be a deficient position, because one can know what is right yet still proceed to do what is wrong
Socrates argues against this in the Protagoras. — Cavacava
What this demonstrates is that deciding to do something, what we call "choosing" something, is not the same as actually willing oneself to do it. There is a division here, between choice and willing, which allows you to choose something (not to have coffee), but then not proceed with your choice (to end up actually having coffee). This disconnect between rational choice and the motivator for action is why breaking bad habits is so difficult. The rational choice comes from somewhere other than where the motivator for action comes from, and a further capacity must enable the individual to exercise control over the motivator, because it is not the rational choice itself which exercises control. That further capacity is "will power". — Metaphysician Undercover
You know, the "evening person", and the "morning person" are one and the same person don't you? The ant surveys the future, while the grasshopper acts at the present, but they are one and the same person. This is why it is necessary to assume the division between intellect and will, which I referred to. — Metaphysician Undercover
Well it becomes necessary to assume the division of your second sentence when you have assumed the unity of your first sentence. The former is an act of identification which the ant makes and the grasshopper does not. Which kind of illustrates that they are not one and the same, just as their opposed decision/choices does. — unenlightened
I do not make choices or decisions in my sleep, but the sleeping me is one and the same person as the wakened me. — Metaphysician Undercover
That's right - although @Moliere is on the mark insofar as I'm not being clear enough about what it is that I think X is saying:↪unenlightened
X is not saying 'that the entire element of choice is nullified by physiological abnormality'.
I think Metaphysics now is trying to suggest that even if X is not explicitly saying this, what X is saying does entail this.
Where action is defined as something within his control. You're sort of begging the question there, — Moliere
People are conflicted, and though one can rightly say that both sides of the conflict are the same person, one can also, and more usefully say that they are not. If there is no conflict, one is single-minded, and there is no choice. — unenlightened
It is only when there is a conflict, juice has virtues, and coffee has other virtues, that there is a choice. Choice is the resolution of conflict. — unenlightened
4) A did this because electromagnetic impulses in his nervous and muscular system entered into a repetitive loop that was broken only after the 10th closing of the door. — MetaphysicsNow
Now the point about control/will power disappearing completely from all human action comes into play, because if (4) does ultimately provide explanations for all actions, and is what takes away any element of will power or self-control being available for the action described in (3), it presumably also takes away any element of will power or self-control being available for the actions described in (2) and (1). — MetaphysicsNow
There are issues about freedom of will involved here aren't there?
Sure, 4 might need some more filling out, but the filling out is to be neurophysiological in nature. There is perhaps an epistemological point that we don't know enough about neurophysiolgy currently to explain the behaviour this way, but the point is a metaphysical one that - whether we know it or not - there is a sufficient neurophysiological reason (in the sense of fully sufficient neurophysiological cause) for the repetitive behaviour. — jkg20
But choice is not the resolution of the problem in this instance. That's the issue, choice is more like the cause of the problem. The conscious mind, (being represented as the ant), makes a choice which the acting body, (being represented as the grasshopper), for some reason or other cannot uphold. — Metaphysician Undercover
One might say 'the decision acts'. — unenlightened
But isn't having or not having will-power also a matter of character? And what of X, obsessively following the rules of his existence; is it his stubborn will that insists on following his plan even when it is shown to be foolish, or is he impulsively indulging against the plan to change the plan? — unenlightened
This is the idea that I think is wrong, and what I was trying to steer us away from, the idea that there is ever a direct and necessary relationship between the decision and the act. It doesn't matter if you decide the night before, or in the morning just prior to the act, the decision never necessitates the act, as there is always the possibility that you will not do what you've decided to do. — Metaphysician Undercover
That's what I think, having or not having will power is a matter of character, and if it's not an inherited feature it must be cultured at a very young age. Impulsively indulging and stubbornly following one's plan which has been shown to be foolish, are both, opposing examples of lack of will power. — Metaphysician Undercover
And this may be too, but it seems to me that you are defining will power as doing what is right and not accounting for ill-will. And this is problematic for X. We know, by hypothesis, that X's rituals are pointless, but X is conflicted about that. His will is divided, and he does not know whether it is right to be cautious and follow his superstition or right to resist it. — unenlightened
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.