Why would you disbelieve him when he says it's not in his control?

What exactly is dishonest in the scenario you posited? In what way is the patient lying to himself? — Moliere

The lie is that X's behaviour is not within his control. — MetaphysicsNow

As usual, it's a question of identity; who is X? We philosopher-therapists identify X as a being extended through time that has short-term and long-term interests, and point out that his therapeutic self-calming rituals are consuming his life. But this identity theory is in conflict with the immediacy of anxiety, an identity that imposes itself on him. but not on us.

This conflicted identity, known to poets as the Ant and the Grasshopper, afflicts us all, and one can lose one's life as the ant always looking to the future just as well as one can lose it by taking no thought for tomorrow as the grasshopper. But it is not the case that X is really an ant or really a grasshopper; nor is it the case that ants are honest and moral, and grasshoppers are feckless liars.

Control is an interesting concept. It depends on feedback and cannot be complete. Ants control, and grasshoppers are free. But behaviour modifies physiology, and hence there is habit and addiction on both sides. Grasshoppers suffer from OCD because they are really ants, whereas ants suffer from an excess of control -anorexia, for example - because they are really grasshoppers.

Why would you disbelieve him when he says it's not in his control?

Well, on empirical grounds he has already established that it is within his control.

But on more philosophical grounds the framework of the argument would be along the lines:

If OCD is beyond X's control because X's ritualistic behaviour is determined by physiologically abnormal conditions, then by consistency of reasoning all behaviour (not just X's) is determined by physiology.
If all behaviour is determined by physiology, no one has any control over any of their actions.
It is false that no one has any control over any of their actions.
Therefore, not all behaviour is determined by physiology.
Therefore it is not the case that OC is beyond X's control because X's ritualistic behaviour is determined by physiologically abnoral conditions.

The argument is logically valid. It's soundness, I grant you, is up for dispute - which is precisely what this forum is for.

If OCD is beyond X's control because X's ritualistic behaviour is determined by physiologically abnormal conditions, then by consistency of reasoning all behaviour (not just X's) is determined by physiology.
If all behaviour is determined by physiology, no one has any control over any of their actions. — MetaphysicsNow

So if my use of a wheelchair is determined by my lack of legs, no one has any control over any of their actions?

If OCD is beyond X's control because X's ritualistic behaviour is determined by physiologically abnormal conditions, then by consistency of reasoning all behaviour (not just X's) is determined by physiology. — MetaphysicsNow

I have two points here. The first is that I think your conditional is false.

If my heart beats at a certain rate because of physiological conditions then it does not follow that all behavior is determined by physiology. The same goes for abnormal physiology -- so in such and such a case of physiological abnormality I may not have control over this or that behavior, but I may still have control over others.

In fact the normal human is still limited by their physiology in this sense, while also having control over some things too.

There are some things in our control and some things which are not. If we lack control due to some physiological characteristic that wouldn't mean that everything is determined by physiology.


The second point I want to make has to do with the first statement in your conditional: "OCD is beyond X's control because X's ritualistic behavior is determined by physiologically abnormal conditions"

Suppose that it is not the case that OCD is beyond X's control because of physiology. Suppose he is incorrect in his explanation, that there is some other cause or reason for him not being in control. Regardless it would make sense to believe him that he is not in control when he so says, especially in the context of him asking for help as we've presumed he is doing by seeking out treatment of some sort.

He may be wrong about the cause, but he's in a much better position to be able to tell us what he is and is not in control of. And, what's more, it would seem that if we agree with the diagnosis of OCD that we would concur that this particular thing is out of his immediate control.

Grasshoppers suffer from OCD because they are really ants, whereas ants suffer from an excess of control -anorexia, for example - because they are really grasshoppers. — unenlightened

I was following you up to this point. Grasshoppers really being ants makes sense to me in this way: that the grasshopper feels more in control by focusing on the immediate, thinking that the future cannot be controlled. But the ant being a grasshopper eludes me. Care to say a little more on that?

But the ant being a grasshopper eludes me. Care to say a little more on that? — Moliere

Consider anorexia. It's the most dangerous form of obsession to the individual, and it's obsessive self-control. No one is an ant or a grasshopper, everyone resides in the conflict. The urge to indulge (in eating, in this case or in ritual in X's case) is the grasshopper, and the urge to control is the ant. Ritual controls anxiety, anorexia controls appetite. There is always the controller, and the controlled resisting it.

The anorexic feels in control, but their controlling is out of control. The ant is a grasshopper.

But most everyone can see the evils of indulgence, and almost none see the greater evil of indulging in self-control. No one seems to notice that with mastery over the environment, we have lost control of the environment, and that the same thing happens psychologically, because our behaviour in relation to the world is a projection of the inner conflict. "You can control yourself, you must control yourself" is the mantra of the divided mind, oft recited to other divided minds.

Ah! That clicked for me. Thanks.

I will get back with a more detailed reply, but first of all I certainly acknowledge that the first premise of my argument need to be defended: it is not obviously true. Neither is the second premise for that matter. However, the heartbeat example you give is not a counterexample to my first premise, because my heart's beating is not an action of mine. X's claim - at least as I understand it - is that his actions are beyond his control because his actions are caused by physiological abnormalities. Now, what separates actions from other kinds of behaviour (such as my heart's beating)? Well, one thing it is tempting to think is that they are distinguished from other kinds of behaviour of mine by the simple fact that they are within my control. Anyway, that's just a gesture towards a response. Also, I need to fill out my second and third premises which concern the compatibilism/incompatibilism issue.

So if my use of a wheelchair is determined by my lack of legs, no one has any control over any of their actions?

Your use of a wheel chair is not determined by your lack of legs. Certainly the actions you can choose between for getting from one place to another might be delimited by your lack of legs, but as per my brief reply to Moliere, it is your action of using the wheelchair to get from A to B that is in question. All kinds of things determine what actions I can choose between, including the number of limbs I have at my disposal, but X's point is that the entire element of choice is nullified by physiological abnormality.

All kinds of things determine what actions I can choose between, including the number of limbs I have at my disposal, but X's point is that the entire element of choice is nullified by physiological abnormality. — MetaphysicsNow

Ok, then just as I say I cannot choose to walk because I lack legs, X says he cannot choose to refrain from his rituals because he lacks something or has something that prevents it. Now we might want to call it 'reason', or 'honesty', or 'willpower' that he lacks, or we might want to call it 'global anxiety' or 'OCD', or something else, that he has. But he wants to be free of ritual and is not.

So I have to choose what to have to drink in the morning from a menu of tea, coffee, juice, water or nothing. I invariably choose coffee, but do not claim that I want to choose tea but cannot, because if I chose tea my wife would die of shock. I have to choose, and in choosing I have to believe that I am free to choose what I want. And then we do not call my consistent choices 'compulsive'.
But suppose my wife (or my therapist) convinces me that I ought to give up coffee, then I am conflicted; I love to drink coffee in the mornings, but I want not to drink coffee because bla bla. Every evening, I decide to have juice tomorrow, and every morning, I have coffee again. The bla bla reasons not to drink coffee are convincing, but do not make me want to drink no coffee, and to choose is to believe I can make the choice of what I want.
In order to stop drinking coffee, I need either to stop wanting coffee, or take it off the menu. If I come to believe that terrible things will happen if I drink coffee, it will be off the menu, and I cannot choose it. Or if I come to believe that I don't really like coffee, but have just got into a silly habit to look grown up or something, I will choose something else.

X is not saying 'that the entire element of choice is nullified by physiological abnormality'. 'I can go out whenever I want', he says, 'but I have to check the front door three times and not step on the cracks.' Those options are off the menu, because something terrible would happen, and thus it is not a choice but a compulsion.

X is not saying 'that the entire element of choice is nullified by physiological abnormality'.

I think Metaphysics now is trying to suggest that even if X is not explicitly saying this, what X is saying does entail this. That to me is the import of the first premise of the sketch argument given. Not sure how the implication holds, but then it's not my argument. My guess is that there's somekind of "being consistent with explanations of actions" principle lying behind it, but maybe not.

I want to note that you're modifying your premise. You did say behavior originally, and not action.

Look at how your definition of action plugs into the premise --

If OCD is beyond X's control because X's ritualistic behaviour is determined by physiologically abnormal conditions, then by consistency of reasoning all behaviour (not just X's) is determined by physiology. — MetaphysicsNow

to...

"If OCD is beyond X's control because X's ritualistic action is determined by physiologically abnormal conditions, then by consistency of reasoning all action is determined by physiology"

Where action is defined as something within his control. You're sort of begging the question there, to a point where your friend cannot even say that something is out of his control. He might respond "Well, this isn't an action, since action is within our control", and what would you say then?

Regardless, though, the premise remains false. Just because one thing is beyond my control (regardless of the reasoning why we think this is so -- from physical abnormality to evil spirits in the wind to the devil tempting me) that does not then indicate that everything is beyond my control.

I cannot hit a home run. It is something I am physically incapable of. Those who are abnormal -- above par -- can do so. Regardless, I am still quite able to choose -- to use @unenlightened's exampe -- what to drink in the morning.

So I have to choose what to have to drink in the morning from a menu of tea, coffee, juice, water or nothing. I invariably choose coffee, but do not claim that I want to choose tea but cannot, because if I chose tea my wife would die of shock. I have to choose, and in choosing I have to believe that I am free to choose what I want. And then we do not call my consistent choices 'compulsive'.
But suppose my wife (or my therapist) convinces me that I ought to give up coffee, then I am conflicted; I love to drink coffee in the mornings, but I want not to drink coffee because bla bla. Every evening, I decide to have juice tomorrow, and every morning, I have coffee again. The bla bla reasons not to drink coffee are convincing, but do not make me want to drink no coffee, and to choose is to believe I can make the choice of what I want. — unenlightened

What this demonstrates is that deciding to do something, what we call "choosing" something, is not the same as actually willing oneself to do it. There is a division here, between choice and willing, which allows you to choose something (not to have coffee), but then not proceed with your choice (to end up actually having coffee). This disconnect between rational choice and the motivator for action is why breaking bad habits is so difficult. The rational choice comes from somewhere other than where the motivator for action comes from, and a further capacity must enable the individual to exercise control over the motivator, because it is not the rational choice itself which exercises control. That further capacity is "will power".

This is the issue which Augustine grappled with in his expose on free will. Socrates and Plato had produced arguments claiming that virtue was knowledge. But this was proven to be a deficient position, because one can know what is right yet still proceed to do what is wrong. Because of this issue, Augustine proposed a separation between intellect and will. This separation you have very adeptly demonstrated with your example. It is a very important separation and one which is often overlooked in philosophical discussions of "will", as people tend to associate "will" with choice and decision, rather than properly associating it with refraining from action.

But we would be much better served to associate "will" with the power to refrain from acting, rather than as the motivator, or source of action. "Control", as it is used in this thread, represents this capacity to refrain from acting. And this is "will", it is not the capacity to proceed, to act, according to one's choices or decisions, it is the capacity to prevent oneself from acting. In your example then, your inability to refrain from drinking coffee, after you've decided to do such, demonstrates a lack of will power.

I like your differentiation between the Will and Intellect.

As an aside:

Socrates and Plato had produced arguments claiming that virtue was knowledge. But this was proven to be a deficient position, because one can know what is right yet still proceed to do what is wrong

Socrates argues against this in the Protagoras.

“No one,” he declared, “who either knows or believes that there is another possible course of action, better than the one he is following, will ever continue on his present course” (Protagoras 358b-c) The problem of akrasia is still being discussed, but most recent thought seems to side with a version Socrates thought.

Socrates argues against this in the Protagoras. — Cavacava

I agree. In Plato's work, Socrates laid out these arguments, that virtue is knowledge, as what was professed by the sophists like Protagoras and Gorgias. For Socrates it was a matter of contesting and analysing the sophists' claims that virtue could be taught. The difficulties taken up by Augustine, the issue of one knowing what is right yet doing what is wrong, were those exposed by Plato's dialectics. This is the grounds for true freedom of the will. Not only is the will free from physical determinism (determined by physical causes), it is also free from intellectual determinism (determined by decisions of reason).

What this demonstrates is that deciding to do something, what we call "choosing" something, is not the same as actually willing oneself to do it. There is a division here, between choice and willing, which allows you to choose something (not to have coffee), but then not proceed with your choice (to end up actually having coffee). This disconnect between rational choice and the motivator for action is why breaking bad habits is so difficult. The rational choice comes from somewhere other than where the motivator for action comes from, and a further capacity must enable the individual to exercise control over the motivator, because it is not the rational choice itself which exercises control. That further capacity is "will power". — Metaphysician Undercover

I see it differently. I can decide in the evening not to have coffee in the morning because the decision is theoretical and so, cheap - it requires no action and incurs no cost, it is a declaration of intent by the evening person who does not want coffee anyway, because it is nearly bedtime. It is the morning person who has to fulfil the declared intent and incur the cost, or not. The evening ant tries to decide for the morning grasshopper, and the elixir of willpower isn't even on the menu. If the evening ant can sufficiently scare the morning grasshopper about the dire consequences for his heart of coffee, then we call that 'willpower' and 'rationality', and feel smug about it.

You know, the "evening person", and the "morning person" are one and the same person don't you? The ant surveys the future, while the grasshopper acts at the present, but they are one and the same person. This is why it is necessary to assume the division between intellect and will, which I referred to. The ant is making the decisions, prior to the time to act, but when it is time to act, the grasshopper must carry out what the ant has decided. The ant doesn't need to, and ought not, scare the grasshopper at all, because such antics are not conducive to a happy union. The person, who is the unity of the ant and grasshopper, simply requires will power to be successful in maintaining a stable union.

You know, the "evening person", and the "morning person" are one and the same person don't you? The ant surveys the future, while the grasshopper acts at the present, but they are one and the same person. This is why it is necessary to assume the division between intellect and will, which I referred to. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well it becomes necessary to assume the division of your second sentence when you have assumed the unity of your first sentence. The former is an act of identification which the ant makes and the grasshopper does not. Which kind of illustrates that they are not one and the same, just as their opposed decision/choices does.

Well it becomes necessary to assume the division of your second sentence when you have assumed the unity of your first sentence. The former is an act of identification which the ant makes and the grasshopper does not. Which kind of illustrates that they are not one and the same, just as their opposed decision/choices does. — unenlightened

If the grasshopper does not identify, then the grasshopper does not make any choices or decisions either. But this does not mean that the ant and grasshopper are not one and the same person. I do not make choices or decisions in my sleep, but the sleeping me is one and the same person as the wakened me.

I do not make choices or decisions in my sleep, but the sleeping me is one and the same person as the wakened me. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure you are, and sure the ant is the grasshopper, and the morning person is the evening person. And also not the the same. People are conflicted, and though one can rightly say that both sides of the conflict are the same person, one can also, and more usefully say that they are not. If there is no conflict, one is single-minded, and there is no choice. Juice is the best for breakfast - inevitably I have juice. It is only when there is a conflict, juice has virtues, and coffee has other virtues, that there is a choice. Choice is the resolution of conflict.

@jkg20

↪unenlightened

X is not saying 'that the entire element of choice is nullified by physiological abnormality'.

I think Metaphysics now is trying to suggest that even if X is not explicitly saying this, what X is saying does entail this.

That's right - although @Moliere is on the mark insofar as I'm not being clear enough about what it is that I think X is saying:

Where action is defined as something within his control. You're sort of begging the question there, — Moliere

In the first place, then, I need to define action in such a way that it distinguishes what I am talking about from "involuntary" physiological behaviour, like heart beating, whilst at the same time including OCD ritualistic behaviour, along with so-called "normal" behaviour, and avoiding the confounding of will power and control that @Metaphysician Undercover talks about in his reply to @unenlightened - (although I'm not certain that in the end there will be any real distinction there, at least to begin with it will be useful to assume that there is).

Perhaps one neutral way to begin would be to say that actions are behaviours that lend themselves to rationalizations in terms of reasons. X gives reasons to himself and to others for his behaviour, even if the superficial reasons he gives ("a catastrophe will occur if I do not do it, and I want not to be the cause a catastrophe") are unfounded or conceal deeper motivations. The fact that X's heart is beating doesn't lend itself to that kind of rationalization at all. This definition of action doesn't seem to beg any questions about control/will power.

Now that action is defined generally in terms of rationalizations, let's take some imaginary case, where the action is a specific instance of some person, A, closing and opening the door 10 times before leaving his house. Here are some possible rationalizations:
1) A did this because he wanted to win a bet, and the bet was that he would not open and close the door 10 times before leaving (a stupid bet, perhaps, but not all bets are sensible, and if necessary some background context could make it sound more sensible).
2) A did this because he believes he can avert a catastrophe by doing so, and there are independent reasons for thinking that he is right about this (some crazed killer is holding a gun to the head of his child, for instance, and has told him that he will shoot if A does not open and close the door 10 times before leaving).
3) A did this because he believes he can avert a catastrophe by doing so, but there are no independent reasons for thinking that he is right about this - the catastrophe to be avoided is not even well defined.
4) A did this because electromagnetic impulses in his nervous and muscular system entered into a repetitive loop that was broken only after the 10th closing of the door.

Explanations (1) and (2) seem to make sense - A's rationality/powers of control/will power are not called into question, and there is no need to subject the explanations to any further rational scrutiny which would negate the rationalization.
Explanation (3) is analogous to X's initial explanations of X's OCD rituals. These are the kinds of explanations that invite further rational scrutiny and which, after the process of reasoning terminates, would negate the initial reasons proposed. It is simply not rational to believe that unspecified catastrophes can be avoided by opening and closing a door 10 times (well, you could invent a context in which it would, but then you would be describing either an instance of case 1 or 2). Pushing the rational scrutiny further would reveal that were A to invoke his "will power" he ought to have been able to have abstained from opening and closing the door 10 times (even if the effort involved in doing so is non-neglible).
Explanation (4) is the kind of response that A might fall back to when the rational scrutiny applied to (3) reaches the point at which it looks as if A is giving up on the effort required to abstain from opening and closing the door 10 times. Explanation (4) is to me what X's claim about his ritualistic activity being caused by abnormal physiology basically amounts to. In accepting explanation (4), though, we are regarding action (neutrally defined) quite generally as caused by electromagnetic impulses of the muscular/nervous system. Why "quite generally"? Well, as jkg20 points out, it has to do with consistency of reasoning, plus the fact that actions (neutrally defined) can also be described neutrally as bodily motions of such and such a sort. If opening and closing a door 10 times, qua bodily motion, has its ultimate explanation in terms of (4) when the rationalization in (3) is initially given, why not also in cases (1) and (2)? After all, in all three cases precisely the same bodily motions are occuring, and if those bodily motions have their ultimate explanation in terms of neural/muscular occurences for case (3), then the same neural/muscular occurences will also be available for explaining the bodily motions in (2) and (1).
Now the point about control/will power disappearing completely from all human action comes into play, because if (4) does ultimately provide explanations for all actions, and is what takes away any element of will power or self-control being available for the action described in (3), it presumably also takes away any element of will power or self-control being available for the actions described in (2) and (1).

I hope that goes some way to making a little clearer what I'm getting at with the first conditional of my sketched out argument. This is still a work in progress, I hasten to add, and it is not my intention to pull the wool over anybody's eyes by equivocating between the use of terminology, or to move goal posts in order to score points.

People are conflicted, and though one can rightly say that both sides of the conflict are the same person, one can also, and more usefully say that they are not. If there is no conflict, one is single-minded, and there is no choice. — unenlightened

I don't understand why you think it is more useful to think of them as two distinct persons rather than to think of them as two distinct parts of one unified person.

It is only when there is a conflict, juice has virtues, and coffee has other virtues, that there is a choice. Choice is the resolution of conflict. — unenlightened

But choice is not the resolution of the problem in this instance. That's the issue, choice is more like the cause of the problem. The conscious mind, (being represented as the ant), makes a choice which the acting body, (being represented as the grasshopper), for some reason or other cannot uphold. From the perspective of the unified person, the ant is engaged in faulty decision making, making resolutions which cannot be kept. The resolution which cannot be kept is the cause of the conflicted state, it's not a real resolution of conflict..

4) A did this because electromagnetic impulses in his nervous and muscular system entered into a repetitive loop that was broken only after the 10th closing of the door. — MetaphysicsNow

This, 4), doesn't really qualify as an explanation because there is no reason given why the loop would repeat ten times then stop, rather than six, eight, or some other number of times. In the other possible explanations X has a reason for the ten times, but here there is no reason for the ten times, so it is not an explanation.

Now the point about control/will power disappearing completely from all human action comes into play, because if (4) does ultimately provide explanations for all actions, and is what takes away any element of will power or self-control being available for the action described in (3), it presumably also takes away any element of will power or self-control being available for the actions described in (2) and (1). — MetaphysicsNow

Since 4) is not a real explanation, this is not a point to be considered.

Sure, 4 might need some more filling out, but the filling out is to be neurophysiological in nature. There is perhaps an epistemological point that we don't know enough about neurophysiolgy currently to explain the behaviour this way, but the point is a metaphysical one that - whether we know it or not - there is a sufficient neurophysiological reason (in the sense of fully sufficient neurophysiological cause) for the repetitive behaviour.

So @MetaphysicsNow's point is more or less the freedom of will issue that I raised a few days ago :

There are issues about freedom of will involved here aren't there?

Sure, 4 might need some more filling out, but the filling out is to be neurophysiological in nature. There is perhaps an epistemological point that we don't know enough about neurophysiolgy currently to explain the behaviour this way, but the point is a metaphysical one that - whether we know it or not - there is a sufficient neurophysiological reason (in the sense of fully sufficient neurophysiological cause) for the repetitive behaviour. — jkg20

But my point is that the point you are trying to make here is unacceptable and must be rejected. There is no reason to believe that the reason for the repetitive behaviour is neurophysiological at all. Introducing this assumption just forces upon us the so-called hard problem of consciousness, directing us to look for a neurological solution for a psychological problem, when this is most likely not even possible. So unless it can be demonstrated that there is a specific "neurophysiological cause" for the behaviour, to assume that there is, is a mistaken assumption. And such a demonstration will not be produced because the assumed "cause" is really a complex thing which involves a multiplicity of factors. It's not just a simple neurological issue.

But choice is not the resolution of the problem in this instance. That's the issue, choice is more like the cause of the problem. The conscious mind, (being represented as the ant), makes a choice which the acting body, (being represented as the grasshopper), for some reason or other cannot uphold. — Metaphysician Undercover

In this example, I think it makes more sense to talk about evening and morning than mind and body, because the conflict is more clearly delineated. There is a sense that the body makes coffee in the morning before the mind has got it's act together, but I'd rather talk about time.

In a hotel, if I order breakfast in bed, I order it in the evening, and get whatever I ordered last night in the morning. So the choice in the evening is the decision. But at home, the choice in the evening is not the decision, because that happens in the morning when I go get my breakfast, just as it would at the hotel if I came down for breakfast.

The act of ordering, or the act of cooking is the decision and that resolves the problem one way or the other. One might say 'the decision acts'. The choice in the evening at home is not decisive, but is a plan of action that I decide to follow or ignore in the morning. I think this coincides with the attitude of Alcoholics Anonymous - 'one day at a time'. Every day perhaps, every minute, the decision to abstain or relapse now has to be made, and prior commitments to oneself or to another are only a factor that might influence the decision, as might prior habits.

Rather than neurobabble, one might talk in an old-fashioned way about character, as something that is both the condition one is in and that which is developed by the decisions one makes. If I am inclined to be too impulsive, or on the other side too rigid, perhaps I can resist the tendency sometimes, and perhaps I cannot at others.

But isn't having or not having will-power also a matter of character? And what of X, obsessively following the rules of his existence; is it his stubborn will that insists on following his plan even when it is shown to be foolish, or is he impulsively indulging against the plan to change the plan?

One might say 'the decision acts'. — unenlightened

This is the idea that I think is wrong, and what I was trying to steer us away from, the idea that there is ever a direct and necessary relationship between the decision and the act. It doesn't matter if you decide the night before, or in the morning just prior to the act, the decision never necessitates the act, as there is always the possibility that you will not do what you've decided to do.

That's the problem which I referred to, which creates the need for a division between the intellect and the will. If the will is what motivates the act to begin, and the intellect is what decides the act, we need this separation because even after deciding I will do such and such, I might for some reason or another, proceed in a contrary way. It doesn't matter if the decision concerns next week, tomorrow, next hour, or even the next moment, sometimes we make decisions which we are incapable of following through with.

So we cannot say that it is the decision which brings about the act. This is most evident when we decide such and such is wrong, and ought not be done, yet we do it anyway. I might be fully aware that I am carrying out the activity which I have decided I ought not do, and even rationalize reasons for doing what I have decided not to do, as I am doing it, but I may in many cases proceed into this act without ever deciding to do it. So I am doing the act which I decided not to do, having never actually decided to do it this time, but as I am doing it, and realize that I am doing what I decided not to do, I rationalize it such that I carry on with it.

This is why the decision to abstain must be renewed at every moment, as you say with AA. Certain actions will lead one into the forbidden act, without one ever deciding to do it. So we must recognize that we have ventured into this act, which will lead to the forbidden act, without even deciding to do the forbidden act, and instead of rationalizing to proceed into the forbidden act, we renew the vow of abstinence and therefore not continue onward.

But isn't having or not having will-power also a matter of character? And what of X, obsessively following the rules of his existence; is it his stubborn will that insists on following his plan even when it is shown to be foolish, or is he impulsively indulging against the plan to change the plan? — unenlightened

That's what I think, having or not having will power is a matter of character, and if it's not an inherited feature it must be cultured at a very young age. Impulsively indulging and stubbornly following one's plan which has been shown to be foolish, are both, opposing examples of lack of will power. Each is a case of an individual not being capable of doing what one knows oneself ought to do. The complexity involves recognizing and establishing one's own limitations, or even devising a mechanism for changing one's limitations. So as much as we might think that will power only involves making oneself adhere to one's decisions, it also involves constraining one's own mind to only make decisions which one is physically capable of carrying out.

This is the idea that I think is wrong, and what I was trying to steer us away from, the idea that there is ever a direct and necessary relationship between the decision and the act. It doesn't matter if you decide the night before, or in the morning just prior to the act, the decision never necessitates the act, as there is always the possibility that you will not do what you've decided to do. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think this is just a dispute about terminology.

That's what I think, having or not having will power is a matter of character, and if it's not an inherited feature it must be cultured at a very young age. Impulsively indulging and stubbornly following one's plan which has been shown to be foolish, are both, opposing examples of lack of will power. — Metaphysician Undercover

And this may be too, but it seems to me that you are defining will power as doing what is right and not accounting for ill-will. And this is problematic for X. We know, by hypothesis, that X's rituals are pointless, but X is conflicted about that. His will is divided, and he does not know whether it is right to be cautious and follow his superstition or right to resist it.

And this may be too, but it seems to me that you are defining will power as doing what is right and not accounting for ill-will. And this is problematic for X. We know, by hypothesis, that X's rituals are pointless, but X is conflicted about that. His will is divided, and he does not know whether it is right to be cautious and follow his superstition or right to resist it. — unenlightened

It's not necessarily right or wrong, in the sense of being ethical, it is just a matter of what one determines should or should not be done. In the op, X realizes that his behaviour is irrational. So I don't think that there is any conflict in the sense of X not knowing whether his behaviour is right or wrong, he recognizes it as irrational and therefore not called for.

If X did not recognize his behaviour as irrational, that would be another issue. Then perhaps his will would be divided, not knowing whether he should continue with the behaviour or not. But that is not the case X knows the behaviour is irrational, but it is not an important enough issue for X to find the will to take the necessary steps to cure the irrational behaviour.

Is this what you meant when you referred to the ant scaring the grasshopper? When the problem is perceived as important, this import acts to scare up the nerve, the will power to proceed with restraint.