The "magic" involved simply is stipulation — Pierre-Normand

If you mean that a possible world is conjured and it's just stipulated that someone named X is there, yes that's what Kripke proposed. The SEP explains the associated concerns (and no, the problem is not possible world realism.)

...the worries that motivate an appeal to stipulation still remain, in large part, to be accounted for, after we have provisionally set them aside by approving the appeal: the appeal to stipulation is more like a promissory note than the satisfaction of an explanatory obligation. The appeal to stipulation puts off for another occasion any attempt to resolve how we succeed at doing what we take for granted that we manage somehow to do: namely, how we succeed at referring to the right individual, by means of our stipulative effort. There has to be some “reason the stipulated situation, when we use a name, contains the object it does” (Sidelle 1995, p. 99n.4) rather than likely competitors. It is hardly obvious what that reason would be. To see why, consider that in order successfully to stipulate that a name is to follow just you, as a rigid and therefore transworld tracking device, our stipulative effort has to be able, across worlds, to allow us to distinguish what is you from what is not you but is instead your body (say: assume you are not your body). How is this to be done without specifying criteria, if you were with your body when your parents smiled in your direction and baptized you with a rigid designator, saying “We have decided on a name for the birth certificate: …,” thereby stipulating that you are to be called by the name they chose for you? “It is not by magic,” as Jackson (1998, p. 82) reminds us, that your name “picks out what it does pick out” rigidly—namely you—despite the competition against you presented by a different candidate for designation—your copresent body. — SEP (rigid designator)

Kripke side-stepped the issue. So, apparently, have you.

Kripke side-stepped the issue. So, apparently, have you. — Mongrel

The reason why your name picks you up rather than your body is because it has been introduced in the language (when you were baptized, say) as the name of a living human being, and not the name of your body, or the name of the set of molecules that make you up at a time, or whatever else might be copresent with you. Kripke's so called "causal theory of reference" (which he disown) creates that sort of problems for the initial anchoring of a proper name. Co-presence doesn't entail numerical identity, and sortal-concepts (such as the concept of a person) enable us to distinguish merely copresent items that have different individuation and persistance criteria. (See David Wiggins: Sameness and Substance Renewed)

The reason why your name picks you up rather than your body is because it has been introduced in the language (when you were baptized, say) as the name of a living human being, and not the name of your body, — Pierre-Normand

So we covered this before. Kripke was talking about ordinary language use, so we have to attend to the intentions of the speaker.

If what you wrote there is true, there should be no issue with a speaker stipulating an object, France, which must have Paris as its capital. Any other "France" is not the object the speaker is talking about. Call it a baptism of this France-Paris object as "France."

Apparently you object to that scenario. I have no idea why.

If what you wrote there is true, there should be no issue with a speaker stipulating an object, France, which must have Paris as its capital. — Mongrel

Sure, and one might just as well stipulate that "France" is the name of a turnip and therefore is essentially a vegetable. So what? If you make up essential properties and tag them on France arbitrarily, it's not France anymore that you are talking about.

Sure, and one might just as well stipulate that "France" is the mane of a turnip and therefore is essentially a vegetable. So what? If you make up essential properties and tag them on France arbitrarily, it's not France anymore that you are talking about. — Pierre-Normand

I baptize a turnip "France."

Pierre: "That's not France."
Me: "Well, it's not the country whose capital is Paris. That's true. But I'm calling it France."
Pierre: "But it's not France."
Me: "What do you mean by France? What picks it out of any world (including this one?"

Previously you responded with "It's stipulated."

Honestly, I think it would help if you read the SEP article I pointed you toward. The issue you're imagining as resolved is not. One solution (that you seem to lean toward every now and then) is that we link a proper name to an object in a possible world via a proposition.

I baptize a turnip "France."

Pierre: "That's not France."
Me: "Well, it's not the country whose capital is Paris. That's true. But I'm calling it France."
Pierre: "But it's not France."
Me: "What do you mean by France? What picks it out of any world (including this one?"

Previously you responded with "It's stipulated." — Mongrel

This is an example where two different things of two different sorts (and hence that possess two distinct sets of essential properties), might both be named "France". If you are thus talking about counterfactual de re possibilities regarding some object that you are designating with the word "France", the context of your utterance may resolve whether it is France, the European country, or rather your favorite turnip that is at issue. When this ambiguity has been resolved then it is indeed your stipulation and nothing else that makes it the case that the objects that you mean to be talking about, in the counterfactual situation, is your turnip rather than France the country.

We are making use of established (or ah hoc) naming practices, and the associated conceptual apparatus, in order to secure reference both to objects as they are in the actual world and also to those objects (the very same objects) as we fancy them to possibly be (counterfactually). When I judge my turnip to be white, or countenance that it could possibly have ripened pink (counterfactually), it is the very same turnip (numerical identity) that I either perceive (and designate demonstratively, say) or predicate counterfactual determinations of. Talk about "possible worlds" may obscure this very trivial fact if one has inchoate modal realist intuitions, maybe. Then one may feel like one has first to posit a possible world, and then, in a second step, specify what specific counterpart (or Doppelganger) the "actual object" ought to be identified with in the possible world. But this is nonsense. The merely "possible world" wasn't dreamed up appart from the act of positing the "actual object" having, counterfactually, some different determinations.

Honestly, I think it would help if you read the SEP article I pointed you toward. The issue you're imagining as resolved is not. One solution (that you seem to lean toward every now and then) is that we link a proper name to an object in a possible world via a proposition.

It would also help if you would be rather more specific than that. You yourself have raised very many different issues under the same label "the issue". This SEP article on Rigid Designators also raises very many issues that apply specifically to different theories or conceptions about singular reference. Some of the issues only are issues if you are a modal realist, others only are issues if you hold on to a purely descriptive theory of Fregean senses (and hence have trouble countenancing genuine singular reference), or, in the same vein, if you are holding on to some so called causal theory of reference (similar to what Franck Jackson seems to be targeting). If you aren't beholden to any one of those theories, then most of the issues drop. Kripke isn't beholden to any one of them, but he doesn't claim to have a positive theory of his own. His talk about the unbroken "causal" chain that a naming practice must retain to an initial naming event may invite (and has invited) non-conceptual "causal theories".

Gareth Evans and John McDowell have developed an alternative conceptions to such non-conceptual "causal" anchoring theories. (See Evan's chapter 11 (Proper Names) in The Varieties of Reference, or McDowell's paper Putnam on Mind and Meaning for primers.

Talk about "possible worlds" may obscure this very trivial fact if one has inchoate modal realist intuitions, maybe. — Pierre-Normand

No realism necessary.

1. When considering ordinary language use, it is necessary to attend to context of utterance to gain an understanding of the meaning of an utterance.

2. One can baptize any object with any name one chooses. The language community for that sort of thing need not extend beyond two people.

3. I may tell you that: "France might have escaped invasion that year." From the context of the conversation, you know (beyond any shadow of a doubt) that I mean the France that actually existed in 1940. Since that particular France had Paris as its capital, considering a possible world in which France did not have Paris as its capital would be a mistake. The object I am considering must have Paris as its capital.

4. In this case, over the range of possible worlds we're considering (all of which are abstract objects), it is necessary that Paris is the capital of France (although this is not apriori knowledge.) Though this is not a strict expression of Kripke's intentions, it fits well enough.

It might clear things up if you could tell me which of these points you disagree with.

If you still want to talk about the mechanics of reference in regard to rigid designators, we can. I thought originally that talking about that would help with a meeting of the minds between us, but that doesn't seem to be the case.

3. I may tell you that: "France might have escaped invasion that year." From the context of the conversation, you know (beyond any shadow of a doubt) that I mean the France that actually existed in 1940. Since that particular France had Paris as its capital, considering a possible world in which France did not have Paris as its capital would be a mistake. The object I am considering must have Paris as its capital. — Mongrel

Yes, for sure, you are talking about a counterfactual situation where France still has Paris as its capital. This hardly establishes that the country, France, that you are talking about, has Paris as its capital essentially. You seem to be assuming without argument that "the France that actually existed in 1940" is an object that has all its actual properties essentially. But this is a confusion of categories. The object talked about just is France, while also talked about are all the essential and contingent determinations that this object is countenanced to have in the counterfactual situation. If we were to countenance France having a different capital, instead, then we would not be countenancing a different object, but rather a different (counterfactual) determination of this very same object.

This hardly establishes that the country, France, that you are talking about, has Paris as its capital essentially. — Pierre-Normand

Since the the object I'm talking about must have Paris as its capital, perhaps it's a moot point whether we call it essential or not. It's necessary. And it's aposteriori knowledge.

Agree?

If we were to countenance France having a different capital, instead, then we would not be countenancing a different object, but rather a different (counterfactual) determination of this very same object — Pierre-Normand

If I am talking about an object that must have Paris as its capital, you can either acknowledge that necessity or fail understand me, in which case we are not communicating and certainly not in the domain of situations Kripke was interested in.

Since the the object I'm talking about must have Paris as its capital, perhaps it's a moot point whether we call it essential or not. It's necessary. And it's aposteriori knowledge.

Agree? — Mongrel

No it is not essential, neither is it necessary, logically or metaphysically. It just so happens that you are restricting you attention to counterfactual situations where France nevertheless still has Paris as its capital. That hardly makes it necessary that France has Paris as its capital. Likewise, I could restrict my attention to possible worlds where all water is liquid. This would not make it necessary that water is liquid in the same sense that water necessarily is composed of H2O. However, I am not free to posit possible worlds where water is composed of XYZ. This would be to misconstrue what water essentially is (if Kripke and Putnam are right).

Likewise, if Samuel Clemens is (numerically identical to) Mark Twain then they are the same person in all possible worlds where they exist; and that's not just because I've chosen to arbitrarily restrict my attention merely to possible worlds where this identity holds. The identity expressed (by us, in the actual world) by the sentence "Samuel Clemens is Mark Twain" is necessary (i.e. it holds at *all* possible worlds) assuming only that it holds in the actual world and that both "Samuel Clemens" and "Mark Twain" are proper names (and not conventionally abbreviated definite descriptions, say). Here also, the necessity of identity doesn't depend on the speaker's intention in the way that you suggest. Is is not relative to the specific counterfactual situation that the speaker countenances.

The identity expressed (by us, in the actual world) by the sentence "Samuel Clemens is Mark Twain" is necessary (i.e. it holds at *all* possible worlds) — Pierre-Normand

No it isn't. We covered this already. This sentence is necessarily true:

If Samuel Clemens exists, he is Mark Twain.

Likewise,

If the France that I'm thinking of exists, it's capital is Paris.

That is a necessarily true statement if the France I'm thinking of must have Paris as its capital.

I actually tried to explain to the Great Whatever twice that that's what I meant. Its not explicitly laid out by Kripke that the rigid designator can be used in this way to mark out necessary aposteriori knowledge, but I think it follows.

I think what you're doing is imagining some criteria for reference that holds in spite of a speaker's intentions.

I don't think that's going to work. We aren't talking about artificial languages here. It's ordinary language use.

No it isn't. We covered this already. This sentence is necessarily true:

If Samuel Clemens exists, he is Mark Twain. — Mongrel

Of course they are identical in any world where they exist. In possible worlds where Mark Twain never was born, the issue doesn't arise. My point it that they aren't identical just because you are arbitrarily restricting your attention only to some set of possible worlds where they are identical, as you are attempting to do with the case of France having Paris as its capital. In the latter case, you remain free to widen the scope of your consideration to possible worlds where France's capital moved, whereas in the former case there just aren't any possible worlds for you to consider where Samuel Clemens isn't Mark Twain. A posteriori metaphysical necessity isn't a mere matter of stipulation or the arbitrary restriction of the range of possible worlds being considered in some scenario.

Of course they are identical in any world where they exist. — Pierre-Normand

OK, so I think you're refusing to acknowledge something that should be very clear.

"Samuel Clemens is Mark Twain."

This is not a necessarily true statement. You should know why that is and you should know what you have to add to it to make it necessarily true.

Likewise,

If the France that I'm thinking of exists, it's capital is Paris.

That is a necessarily true statement if the France I'm thinking of must have Paris as its capital. — Mongrel

You are making an invalid inference from one de re necessity statement to another unrelated de re necessity statement. Just because you are thinking about France in circumstances where it has Paris as its capital doesn't entail that the object you are thinking about, France, necessarily has Paris as its capital. It could possibly have some other capital. The first de re necessity is about you and your specific thought about France. That you are thinking about France having some specific determinations (either actual or counterfactual) may generate de re necessities about this very thought that you have, but it doesn't generate de re necessities about France. It would still be possible for you (counterfactually) to think intelligibly about France not having Paris as its capital. You would not thereby be thinking about a different country.

Also, the nominal phrase "France as it exists with Paris as its capital" is not the name of a Fregean object. It's just a device used to call attention to a possible determination of an object. Just because you can call attention to a possible determination of an object hardly make that determination metaphysically necessary.

Samuel Clemens is Mark Twain.

This is not a necessarily true statement.

What would you have to add to make it necessarily true?

Maybe the better question would be: why isn't it necessarily true?

Try the sentence out on a possible world where Samuel Clemens is 5 years old.

OK, so I think you're refusing to acknowledge something that should be very clear.

"Samuel Clemens is Mark Twain."

This is not a necessarily true statement. You should know why that is and you should know what you have to add to it to make it necessarily true. — Mongrel

Actually it is a necessary statement since the context is extensional and co-referential terms can be intersubstituted in it salva veritate. The sentence thus expresses the de re necessity, about Mark Twain, that he is identical with himself. It might not be necessary if it were embedded in some intensional context. Someone who ignores that Samuel Clemens is Mark Twain would thus not realize that this sentence expresses a de re necessity, just as someone who would ignore that water essentially is H2O would not grasp that the demonstrative sentence "this water sample is composed of H2O" (in context) expresses a metaphysical necessity.

co-referential terms — Pierre-Normand

When were they co-referential terms?

Consider the truth of the sentence when Clemens was a child. In case you don't know who we're talking about.... no, he was not Mark Twain at that time.

And obviously, the statement is not truth-apt where there is no Samuel Clemens (which is the vast majority of possible worlds...)

Come on, Pierre. Are we really sorting this kind of thing out?????

When were they co-referential terms?

Consider the truth of the sentence when Clemens was a child. In case you don't know who we're talking about.... no, he was not Mark Twain at that time. — Mongrel

People don't come into existence when they are named. "Mark Twain was born in 1835" is a true statement in spite of the fact that he was actually baptized Samuel Langhorne Clemens. He was indeed Mark Twain when he was born, he was just not going by that name. In fact he wasn't going by the name Samuel Clemens either, in all probability. "He was not Mark Twain at that time" isn't the true denial of an identity claim, it's just shorthand for the true claim that he wasn't going by that name at the time.

Pierre.

Samuel Clemens didn't have to pick the pen-name Mark Twain. He could have picked something else.

I think what you're doing is imagining some criteria for reference that holds in spite of a speaker's intentions. — Mongrel

My claim is rather more narrow than that. I am merely denying your claim that when people think of France in some counterfactual scenario, they are thinking of "France" as referring to an object that has its envisioned determinations necessarily. That's just not part of the speaker's intention, and even if it were, it would have no bearing on the issue of a posteriori necessity being discussed in the literature. If you were right about the relationship between necessity and speaker's intentions, then there would be no a posteriori necessity, for there would be no way to inquire empirically about such metaphysical necessities. Whatever one would envision to be necessary for X to exist as we intend to represent it to be determined would be metaphysically necessary by fiat. Each and every speaker would have his own vacuous and tautological conception about how it is necessary that an object be determined in some merely stipulated situation. Hence, what would make it 'necessary' for France to have Paris as its capital is that someone is imagining it in some situation where it has Paris as its capital. That seems to be your account of a posteriori necessity in a nutshell.

So let's go back to this issue of how Samuel Clemens didn't have to pick Mark Twain as his pen name.

Explain to me again how "Samuel Clemens is Mark Twain" is necessarily true.

Pierre.

Samuel Clemens didn't have to pick the pen-name Mark Twain. He could have picked something else. — Mongrel

Yes, and he could also have been baptized some name other than Samuel? So what? You might just as well claim that "water is H2O" doesn't express an metaphysical necessity just because "water" has been used to name "iron" in some alternative history of the English language. When we are assessing the truth of a claim of de dicto necessity, we are interpreting the worlds in which the claim is made according to actual and present linguistic conventions, not the alternate conventions that hold at the different times or counterfactual situations that we are talking about.

When we say that "Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens" expresses a metaphysical necessity, we are not implying that "Mark Twain" always has been uses (if at all) with the reference that we are assigning to it now. What distinguishes a de dicto from a de re necessity is not the fact that linguistic expressions have arbitrary meanings. It is rather a matter of the scope of the modal operator relative to the scope of the existential statement (when the claim of necessity of made explicit in modal logic). The issue of the conventionality of linguistic meaning is entirely separate; it is unrelated to the de dicto/de re distinction.

Explain to me again how "Samuel Clemens is Mark Twain" is necessarily true. — Mongrel

Simply put, because, firstly, although "Samuel Clemens" and "Mark Twain" have different Fregean senses, they have the same references in all possible worlds (being rigid designators), and the truth of statements of identity between two items depend only on the references of the words used to refer to them. And, secondly, because Kripke and Ruth Barcan Marcus have argued convincingly that identity is a necessary relation.

By contrast, the de dicto necessity statement: 'necessarily, the man named "Samuel Clemens" is Mark Twain' is false because 'the man named "Samuel Clemens"' -- the first term of the identity relation -- isn't a rigid designator. It picks different items in different possible worlds, and in some of those, this man isn't Mark Twain (and neither is it Samuel Clemens! -- it's just someone else who was named "Samuel Clemens")

It is still truly said of the man named Samuel Clemens in the actual world (de re) that is Mark Twain (albeit not necessarily named Mark Twain!) in all possible worlds, and vice versa.

It is still truly said of the man named Samuel Clemens in the actual world (de re) that he necessarily is Mark Twain (albeit not necessarily named Mark Twain!) in all possible worlds, and vice versa. — Pierre-Normand

But what about worlds where this man does not exist? Is the extension of the statement true there as well? It doesn't look like it would be truth-apt.

But what about worlds where this man does not exist? — Mongrel

Possible worlds in which Mark Twain never was born aren't relevant to the evaluations of the necessity of the identity between the people that we call "Mark Twain" and "Samuel Clemens" in the actual world. I am unsure why you think there being such possible worlds is relevant. The positive claims of necessary identity between them is equivalent the claim that there isn't any possible world at which the men that we designate with those two different names both exist and aren't numerically identical, or at which one of them only would exist.

Likewise, the claims that water essentially is H2O is equivalent to the claim that there is no possible world at which both water and H2O-stuff would exist and they would not be the same stuff, or at which only one of those two stuffs would exist. It is irrelevant to this claim of metaphysical identity (or claim of metaphysically necessary material constitution, if you prefer) that there are possible worlds at which water doesn't exist at all. Also, that there are possible worlds where France never came about, historically, isn't relevant to nationhood being an essential property of France (if it is one).