Now you're just not even trying. — NKBJ

Correct.

I think there's an easily exploitable flaw in your trifecta, which is that you're relying upon empathy. And many of us don't have the emotional reservoir to be empathic towards every living thing -- not even every living thing that experiences pain. — Moliere

People keep misinterpreting what I mean by the moral trifecta. I am not stating that most people adhere to this moral trifecta, because in reality I would say most people do not. You don't need empathy for other animals to lead to Veganism. All you need is empathy for humans, and logically consistency. And I would also argue, you may not even need empathy, but could replace empathy with a foundation for basic universal human rights. So just focus on these two things.

Do you believe in the most basic universal human rights? And I am not even referring to all 30 articles of human rights. For the sake of argument, let's just say these:

- Right to Life, Liberty, Personal Security
- Freedom from Slavery
- Freedom from Torture and Degrading Treatment

If you believe that every human deserves at least those 3 articles of human rights, that ultimately leads to veganism. You don't even need to bring empathy into the discussion. Because after you acknowledge those 4 articles of human rights, it now comes down to ethical consistency.

Why do you deserve those 3 articles of rights, but an animal does not? Whatever that trait/quality may be, if it were true of a human, would you then be willing to violate the rights of that human? Simple consistency test.

And I would also argue, you may not even need empathy, but could replace empathy with a foundation for basic universal human rights. — chatterbears

But that is now a far worse argument. All humans may be animals, but not all animals are human. So it would be logically inconsistent to grant human rights to non-human animals.

At least in invoking empathy/compassion, you were providing some kind of affective ground for ignoring the difference.

But that is now a far worse argument. All humans may be animals, but not all animals are human. So it would be logically inconsistent to grant human rights to non-human animals. — apokrisis

That is irrelevant. You would still need to explain why you deserve those rights, but an animal does not. Because in many cultures, especially in the west, we grant these 3 rights to dogs. People can actually get locked up for abusing a dog, so people have recognized that dogs deserve these same basic rights. And that anyone who infringes on the dog's rights should be punished.

So why stop at dogs? Why not grant other animals the same rights as well? You'd have to specify the trait in which it is justified for a human to get these basic rights, but not other animals.

You would still need to explain why you deserve those rights, but an animal does not. — chatterbears

But if they are human rights, then they are human rights. Your earlier argument was based on natural justice for sentient beings. Emotionally, that is definitely a more powerful approach. Now you just risk leading people into legalistic confusion.

Because in many cultures, especially in the west, we grant these 3 rights to dogs. People can actually get locked up for abusing a dog, so people have recognized that dogs deserve these same basic rights. And that anyone who infringes on the dog's rights should be punished. — chatterbears

So now you are talking about animal rights. Yes, we have created those too. And they are lesser rights that pragmatically recognise the difference in sentience. So that in itself becomes a problem with this legalistic turn in your approach.

So why stop at dogs? Why not grant other animals the same rights as well? — chatterbears

But animal welfare legislation does normally cover other animals. Do you live somewhere where the legislation only applies to dogs?

But if they are human rights, then they are human rights.....Now you just risk leading people into legalistic confusion. — apokrisis

At one point in time, women and black people did not have the right to vote. Just because a group of beings doesn't have particular rights, or it is not legal as of right now, doesn't mean that is how it should be.

"Human" rights got transferred and applied to dogs, in the US. Currently, 46 of the 50 states have enacted felony penalties for certain forms of animal abuse, while others are charged as a misdemeanor offense. Either way, we recognized that "Human" doesn't necessarily mean it ONLY applies to human. The principle of the rights themselves, should apply to other living beings, such as dogs. Similarly, black people should be allowed to vote, as well as women.

And they are lesser rights that pragmatically recognise the difference in sentience. So that in itself becomes a problem with this legalistic turn in your approach. — apokrisis

And these animal rights should still hold true to the same 3 rights I have referenced.

- Right to Life, Liberty, Personal Security
- Freedom from Slavery
- Freedom from Torture and Degrading Treatment

We already have legal punishment for violating these rights in regards to certain animals (dogs, cats, etc...). But these rights are not also deployed to other animals, such as cows/chickens/pigs.

Chickens do not have the right to life, liberty or personal security. They are not free from slavery and are not free from torture or degrading treatment. These rights are clearly violated by our factory farming industry, yet the same rights are granted to animals like dogs.

But even if NO animals were granted these rights, you (humans) would still need to give a valid justification for why these rights should only be granted to humans and not granted to other animals.

" Do not equate snails to carrots. It is objectively true that less harm would be caused from eating a carrot, than eating meat. That's just a fact."

It is indeed a fact but it is a fact only within an isolated universe where a hungry you is in existence only in the company of a snail and a carrot and you must act or starve like Buridon's ass.

In the reality that we presently occupy you must procure your carrot and in doing so you effect as much harm if not more harm than you would by eating the snail. You maintain that eating the meat contains an ignorance of factory farms. If I am to be conscious of where my meat comes from you must also be conscious of how you have sourced your carrot. You cannot have your carrot-cake and eat it too, if indeed your stated objective is morality as opposed to the gratuitous pleasure one derives from proselyting.

If on the other hand your philosophy insists upon the consumption of moral carrots, from where might one obtain one of these transcendental and magical objects? If you are to arise early in the morning and forage among the weeds for a wild carrot, which you then might bring home and grow to maturity in your garden before you eat it, you might have a claim to a greater morality than the immorality contained in the eating of the snail.

However from whence did you procure your garden and from whence did you procure the free time to forage among the weeds? Someone somewhere will suffer so that you might enjoy these 'luxuries'.

If morality is your stated objective then you must place the consumptive act before your fundamental principle as the true source of the immorality. The horrors you describe factory farms and the abusive of animals are conducted out of a dependence upon or ignorance of the immorality within the consumptive act.

Also, you kept stating my position as a vegetarian, when it is in fact a Vegan. Vegan means the consumption of NO animal products, whatsoever.

All vegans are vegetarian and some are fundamentalist in their thinking. Fundamentalism is the ne plus ultra of philosophical dialogue. This is a philosophy forum and fundamentalism has no interest in dialogue beyond its own prerogative.

There is a major contradiction in your argument which is that you on the one hand claim that there is no significant trait which separates humans from other animals sufficient to justify our variable treatment, but on the other you claim that the lion is not 'wrong' to eat the gazelle because it cannot conceive of 'right' and 'wrong'.

Now, you may argue (indeed you have) that the trait that justifies killing animals cannot be knowledge of right and wrong because it would not be justified to kill a severely mentally disabled person simply because they did not have the capacity to know right from wrong.

So far so good. The problem for your moral consistency comes about when deciding what to do about the severely mentally disabled person and the lion. If we conclude that it's OK for the lion to kill the gazelle because it doesn't know right from wrong, then, in order to be consistent, we must also conclude that it's OK for the mentally disabled person to kill whomever they wish because they don't know right from wrong.

If, alternatively, we intervene to prevent the string of murders which might otherwise be committed by our brain-damaged psychopath, are we not equally obligated to prevent the gazelle's unfair death?

So, to turn the question back to you, what is the trait that makes us morally obligated to prevent the unfair deaths of our psychopath's would be victims, but confers no such obligation to prevent the gazelle's death at the hands (or teeth) of our amoral lion?

"These are not arguments, just angry noises."

The best arguments are often angry noises. The relative quietude that divides the philosopher from the revolutionary might explain the near paralysis of social evolution.

What is being encountered here is fundamentalism. And this is a fantastic opportunity to attempt the impossible act of shifting a fundamental-ism via philosophical dialogue.

Fundamentalism is indeed the antithesis of dialectics. However the relationship between fundamentalism and philosophy lies at the heart of enormous social problems.

It is very helpful and constructive to engage with fundamentalist principles within the context of fundamentalist vegetarianism (veganism), because the debate is unlikely to become racist or lead to violent exchange. If on the other hand we were dealing with another form of the same fundamentalism... if we were speaking of race or religion, this would be a much uglier discussion despite the fact that the real issue at hand is one of fundamentalism.

Fundamentalists are unwilling to proceed to deeper or truths.

Therefore I applaud and am grateful for the anger and the noise when it is confined to the context of carrots and snails.

M

Zero. Why is that relevant? — chatterbears

Exactly.

Both are not a relevant distinction that would condone mistreatment of the living being. Species and skin color, are both a form of discrimination against how one looks. — chatterbears

No, a distinction on the basis of species is a relevant distinction with regard to appropriate treatment, and it's obviously not just a matter of how an animal looks. A chicken which looked exactly like a human would obviously stand out, and it would be extremely odd to treat the chicken as if there were no relevant distinction.

My consistency within my own internal ethical model is what is superior to your perspective. — chatterbears

Nope, your consistency is not superior to mine.

You cannot justify an action in one context, but then reject the same justification in another context. That is called inconsistency, or put more simply, hypocrisy. — chatterbears

You have failed to validly demonstrate any inconsistency in my present stance. You've committed the fallacy of composition by misapplying conclusions drawn from parts of my answer taken in isolation to my answer as a whole. You need to address my answer as a whole, which is not about any single trait or characteristic.

So again, what is the distinction? After how many pages of this thread, you still have not answered that question. Why do you get to justify killing a living being, based on superfluous reasoning? Is it that the chicken has feathers? Is it the beak? Is it the chicken's intelligence level? Is it the height of the chicken?

You'll never answer, and until you do, I don't see a point in responding anymore. You cannot even pinpoint your reasoning for why you get to justify killing another living being. That in and of itself, is inferior to my morality. — chatterbears

My answer hasn't changed. I know that it's not the answer that you want, but it's the answer that you're going to get. I only have to answer the question in a way which answers the question, which is what I've done. I don't have to answer the question in the way that you're pushing for, which is unnecessary and would play into your hand. Again, you're committing the continuum fallacy. You're erroneously rejecting a vague claim simply because it is not as precise as you would like it to be. Vagueness alone does not necessarily imply invalidity.

Your morality is superior because it involves fallacious reasoning? Yeah, I don't think so.

I wasn't saying you have used intelligence as a justification. I was stating that other people have (in this thread), and this is how the argument follows. — chatterbears

Your point is in need of an update. Intelligence is one factor out of multiple factors. Who here, if anyone, is of the position that intelligence or any other single trait is the sole basis of distinguishing between humans and other animals in terms of how we judge how they should be treated? Let's not forget that you have played a part in bringing about this problem by asking subtly loaded questions which contain the controversial assumption that the distinction is due to a single trait, rather than a set of traits. And I've noticed that you're still doing this as of only eight hours ago, despite my pointing out to you previously.

There are more commitments than you're letting on that makes your belief work. — Moliere

Indeed. I've thought that from the start. We've had to try to tease them out. The opening post doesn't say anything about equality, for example, yet some kind of equality seems to be a big part of it, and a part which is much more controversial. Perhaps that's why it was hidden.

Similarly, black people should be allowed to vote, as well as women. — chatterbears

And dogs? Surely dogs too.

Chatterbears is entirely correct in that eating meat is morally wrong and is intellectually repugnant when it can be avoided. IE when one is not hungry for meat. But then what is hunger?

The 'what we should prefer to eat' remains an entirely selfish and self serving argument, because the meat or animals that he does not wish to eat resemble himself in some manner: vis the capacity to have thought, experience pain, be unhappy and so on. Life is to be more valued as it approximates to the animal that he loves the most.

Yet animal is entirely dependent upon plant life. We are all here on this earth as the guests of green plants. The distinction between that which is animal and that which is plant is not as clear cut as we might imagine. Is an animal a multi-cellular organism capable of communicating? If so there are many plants and many forms of multi cellular life that readily fulfil these critera.

Whilst he can safely and soundly expound the notion that killing other beings unnecessarily is wrong. This is simplistic and again is subject to selfish principles because one must decide upon the form of life that can be eaten and that which should not be eaten, and once again we arrive at rigid fundamental principles.

Strict application of aristotle's golden mean resolves the paradox for both the vegetarian and the meat eater. It is not the what we eat but the when and why that are at issue.

Upon the carrot there live micro organisms that are also imbued with life. The Carrot itself is a valid living entity that is no less alive and no less beautiful than an oak or redwood tree. The value that is assigned to either life is assigned on the basis of what matters to him alone. His private fundamental beliefs that cannot be shaken by logic. He is entitled to such beliefs and they are good and based upon a desire to do good but they are equally self serving and come with the advantage of an apparent (but ridiculous) claim to the high moral ground.

If I have a chainsaw in my hand and I ask chatterbears which is more immoral: to chop down the old redwood or eat the burger? If he says that carrots are less beautiful than redwoods that is simply because there are more carrots than redwoods... again a self serving view of what is beautiful and what is to be cherished. Dont eat the carrot, dont eat the cow and dont chop the redwood unless you have a philosophically validated need to do so.

Buddhism contains the concept that all life is suffering however suffering can be best avoided if we remain true to philosophical principles which in this instance reside in the 'why' the 'how' and the 'when' and not in the what.

M

And dogs? Surely dogs too. — apokrisis

Yes, and that's just one of many absurd consequences which arise from the endorsement of an equality of kind which neglects a difference in degree. This is the one fault which pervades much of his thinking.

If we conclude that it's OK for the lion to kill the gazelle because it doesn't know right from wrong, then, in order to be consistent, we must also conclude that it's OK for the mentally disabled person to kill whomever they wish because they don't know right from wrong. — Pseudonym

A couple of things:
The lion and the disabled person are both not morally culpable on the basis of lacking the ability to think about morality. But the lion has the added factor of being excused on the grounds of necessity--he or she must eat the gazelle or die. The disabled person is not in the same position.
Saying that someone is not morally culpable for an action is not the same as saying the outcome of that action is desirable or "okay." An infant is not morally responsible for, say, destroying its parent's property (smashing china, or soiling the carpet, for instance), but we still intervene to prevent the undesirable outcome. Similarly we ought to prevent the mentally disabled person from killing others, as that would be an undesirable, and unnecessary outcome.
You might ask whether that would lead to the conclusion that we ought to intervene on the gazelle's behalf. The problem there is that the ecosystem relies on the balance of all of these animals behaving in just the ways they do, and if we intervene, it could lead to widespread disaster. We would be causing more death and suffering than we averted.
This might lead you to ask about the overpopulation of deer and the necessity for humans to hunt. Note that if this were true, we'd still have to get rid of all factory farms, and only a tiny percentage of the population would be able to eat meat on a very rare occasion. But it's also not true, because there are numerous avenues we can explore for population control that have been widely ignored so far.

Are you implying that a woman's ability to vote is that of a dog? Because dogs lack the abilities required to vote. They do not lack the ability to suffer, that's why hurting them is wrong.

Whilst he can safely and soundly expound the notion that killing other beings unnecessarily is wrong. — Marcus de Brun

But what does it mean to talk of killing other beings unnecessarily? The killing that we're talking about is necessary to meet the demand for meat produce, so it can't be unnecessary in that sense. Does it just mean, "Not necessary for any purpose of which I approve"? If so, then it's really about your personal approval more than it is about necessity, and speaking in terms of the latter masks this. That would mean that what's being said is that to kill other beings for any purpose of which I do not approve is wrong. What makes your approval authoritative?

Indeed. I've thought that from the start. We've had to try to tease them out. The opening post doesn't say anything about equality, for example, yet some kind of equality seems to be a big part of it, and a part which is much more controversial. Perhaps that's why it was hidden. — Sapientia

I don't think @chatterbears is intentionally setting up their argument to be deceptive or anything like that. I think chatterbears is very passionate about animal rights, and sometimes when that's the case it becomes hard to understand why other people don't believe as oneself -- and hard to see that there may be implicit assumptions that make the belief justified to themself.

Are you implying that a woman's ability to vote is that of a dog? — NKBJ

No.

Because dogs lack the abilities required to vote. — NKBJ

Oh really?

They do not lack the ability to suffer, that's why hurting them is wrong. — NKBJ

I know your opinion. Restating it doesn't advance the discussion.

People keep misinterpreting what I mean by the moral trifecta. I am not stating that most people adhere to this moral trifecta, because in reality I would say most people do not. You don't need empathy for other animals to lead to Veganism. All you need is empathy for humans, and logically consistency. And I would also argue, you may not even need empathy, but could replace empathy with a foundation for basic universal human rights. So just focus on these two things. — chatterbears

OK.

Do you believe in the most basic universal human rights?

I do not. I think rights are inadequate for addressing the needs of human beings. That doesn't mean I think that they should be violated, mind. It only means that I think the political theory which requires us to frame demands as rights is deficient.

Regardless, though, for the sake of argument I'm fine with just saying I do believe in the 3 articles below.

And I am not even referring to all 30 articles of human rights. For the sake of argument, let's just say these:

- Right to Life, Liberty, Personal Security
- Freedom from Slavery
- Freedom from Torture and Degrading Treatment

If you believe that every human deserves at least those 3 articles of human rights, that ultimately leads to veganism. You don't even need to bring empathy into the discussion. Because after you acknowledge those 4 articles of human rights, it now comes down to ethical consistency.

Why do you deserve those 3 articles of rights, but an animal does not? Whatever that trait/quality may be, if it were true of a human, would you then be willing to violate the rights of that human? Simple consistency test.

Because humans are more important to me than other animals. It's not a particular trait of humans that makes me feel that way, or a set of traits. I belong to the group 'humans', and I look out for their self-interest.

These are, after all, human rights. Rights which human beings decided we deserve and in turn built into human institutions to make those rights a reality, to the best of our ability. With Locke the reason humans all had natural rights was due to being created by God and equal in the eyes of God.

I'm going to hazard a guess here, since you're talking about Sam Harris in your OP, that you probably don't share that view.

What, then, could secure rights for human beings? It seems to me what is left are institutions. And since institutions are built for our own self-interest, we aren't being inconsistent in giving rights to ourselves and not to all animals.

You don't need empathy for other animals to lead to Veganism. All you need is empathy for humans, and logical consistency. — chatterbears

No, that's not right. You seem to be erroneously assuming that others must accept this hidden principle of an equality of sorts among species which you seem to presuppose. If I reject this principle, then I'm not being inconsistent if I don't judge or act in accordance with it. I can have empathy for humans and logical consistency, yet reject veganism.

You might ask whether that would lead to the conclusion that we ought to intervene on the gazelle's behalf. The problem there is that the ecosystem relies on the balance of all of these animals behaving in just the ways they do, and if we intervene, it could lead to widespread disaster. We would be causing more death and suffering than we averted.
This might lead you to ask about the overpopulation of deer and the necessity for humans to hunt. Note that if this were true, we'd still have to get rid of all factory farms, and only a tiny percentage of the population would be able to eat meat on a very rare occasion. But it's also not true, because there are numerous avenues we can explore for population control that have been widely ignored so far. — NKBJ

You sidled from moral culpability to practicality. Are you saying that if a practical method arose by which we could prevent the lion from eating the gazelle without harming the ecosystem we would be morally obligated to do so? Ie, is your argument that the impractical or undesirable consequences are the only thing preventing us from having a moral obligation to prevent all predators from killing their prey?

If so, then the issue ceases to be a moral one (presuming you are a consequentialist) and becomes an entirely scientific one. What are the consequences of meat-eating on the ecosystem? Not factory farming, not even farming per se. What's being discussed here is the ethics of eating meat. If you're saying that Ethics should be consequentialist, then you need to provide evidence for the negative consequences of eating meat (regardless of how it is obtained).

You (more @chatterbears) seem to make a rights-based argument when it comes to eating meat, but now you're switching to a consequentialist argument when it comes to our obligation to prevent the murder of the gazelle by the lion. Since the entire debate has centred around consistency as a measure of ethical standards, should we not at least stick to one consistent ethical framework?

There's having rights, and then there's the protecting of those rights. "Securing" rights isn't always possible, though. This is why we need those in power to ensure that rights are secured and protected. In this way, it's up to us how we treat those animals lower down on the food chain.

But what does it mean to talk of killing other beings unnecessarily? The killing that we're talking about is necessary to meet the demand for meat produce, so it can't be unnecessary in that sense. Does it just mean, "Not necessary for any purpose of which I approve"? If so, then it's really about your personal approval more than it is about necessity, and speaking in terms of the latter masks this. That would mean that what's being said is that to kill other beings for any purpose of which I do not approve is wrong. What makes your approval authoritative? — Sapientia

Hey, that's actually a pretty decent question! :wink:

I think part of the problem here rests on a bit of an equivocation. There is a difference between causal and moral necessity. Yes, in order for you to eat meat, it is causally necessary to kill animals.
When we talk about moral necessity, though, we have to be comparing two or more moral issues. You eating meat does not inherently entail a moral good. There are situations in which it might: like if your life depended on it, saving your life would be a moral good.
Even if you did argue that the fleeting pleasure of eating flesh was a moral good, it is clearly a very, very minor one and does not even come close to outweighing the bad of the suffering and death of the animal.

You sidled from moral culpability to practicality. Are you saying that if a practical method arose by which we could prevent the lion from eating the gazelle without harming the ecosystem we would be morally obligated to do so? Ie, is your argument that the impractical or undesirable consequences are the only thing preventing us from having a moral obligation to prevent all predators from killing their prey? — Pseudonym

Saving the ecosystem is a greater good than saving the gazelle, though both are good. Since I cannot save both at this moment in time, I have to choose the greater good. When it becomes possible to do both, I should do both.

You (more chatterbears) seem to make a rights-based argument when it comes to eating meat, but now you're switching to a consequentialist argument when it comes to our obligation to prevent the murder of the gazelle by the lion. — Pseudonym

I haven't been arguing with the language of rights. And rights-based morality wouldn't be inconsistent with consequentialism anyway, since they both can be argued to contain elements of the other.

Hey, that's actually a pretty decent question! :wink:

I think part of the problem here rests on a bit of an equivocation. There is a difference between causal and moral necessity. Yes, in order for you to eat meat, it is causally necessary to kill animals.

When we talk about moral necessity, though, we have to be comparing two or more moral issues. You eating meat does not inherently entail a moral good. There are situations in which it might: like if your life depended on it, saving your life would be a moral good.

Even if you did argue that the fleeting pleasure of eating flesh was a moral good, it is clearly a very, very minor one and does not even come close to outweighing the bad of the suffering and death of the animal. — NKBJ

My eating the meat of other animals doesn't inherently entail a moral good or a moral bad which is anything other than relatively minor at best, and does not even come close to the level of bad relating to the suffering and death of humans. I'd sacrifice the lives of at least a hundred sheep for every human life saved, and I wouldn't sacrifice the life of a single human to save the lives of all the sheep in the United Kingdom.

Saving the ecosystem is a greater good than saving the gazelle, though both are good. Since I cannot save both at this moment in time, I have to choose the greater good. When it becomes possible to do both, I should do both. — NKBJ

This sounds insane to me, so I thought I'd better double check. You're actually saying that you see nothing morally wrong with humans completely altering the ecosystems of the entire planet (should they ever be technologically capable of doing so) in order for us to create an artificial utopia where nothing ever died?

I'm not sure what you're trying to get at here. It's up to us, and so we should? Or we have the power, whereas they do not, and so we should grant rights to animals? Or they have rights, and don't have the power to secure them, whereas we do, and so we should secure the rights they already have?

nd does not even come close to the level of bad relating to the suffering and death of humans. — Sapientia

We're not talking about your suffering or death. No human is going to die because we decided not to hurt the animals.