The problem I see here is that you have not actually said why, it is wrong not to help others. — John
If you care about suffering, you will do something about it. — darthbarracuda
For me (and I think for most everyone else who isn't lacking in compassion and empathy - i.e. sociopaths, psychopaths, selfish individuals, most politicians, etc.), it seems wrong to ignore someone who just broke their leg down the block and is screaming in pain... — darthbarracuda
So in general I think there really is no other position to take other than to accept that those who are worse-off than we are should be sought out and helped to the best of our abilities - in other words, if the cost of us helping them is reasonably lower than the relief the victim experiences, we have a moral obligation to do so. — darthbarracuda
This leads to uncomfortable/guilty conclusions that I think modern ethicists have made an entire speculative field out of to try to mitigate: essentially much of modern ethics ends up being apologetics for not doing enough, or being a lazy, selfish individual, i.e. justifying inherent human dispositions as if they are on par with our apparent moral obligations. — darthbarracuda
....and most of all the complete abandonment of one's own personal desires in order to help others. — darthbarracuda
But while I arguably can't help but care about my suffering, why should I "have to" care about yours? So phrased this way, you already presume empathy as a brute fact of your moral economy? — apokrisis
But what then of those who are wired differently and lack such empathy. Is is moral that they should ignore such a situation, or exploit the situation in some non-empathetic fashion? If not, then on what grounds are you now arguing that they should fake some kind of neurotypical feelings of care? — apokrisis
So to justify a morality based on neurotypicality is not as self-justifying as you want to claim. A consequence of such a rigid position is clearly eugenics - let's weed the unempathetic out. — apokrisis
Because empathy is commonplace in neurodevelopment, empathy is morally right. — apokrisis
So it is quite wrong - psychologically - to frame this in terms of people being lazy and selfish (as if these were the biologically natural traits). Instead, what is natural - what we have evolved for - is to live in a close and simple tribal relation. And it is modern society that allows and encourages a strong polarisation of personality types. — apokrisis
And this complete individual self-abnegation is not a naturalistic answer. It is not going to be neurotypically average response - one that feels right given the way most people feel. — apokrisis
What difference does intention make here, aside from legal considerations? — darthbarracuda
[...] and realize that us helping someone in all likelihood probably will not come back to haunt us. — darthbarracuda
[...] thus such a fear would be unwarranted in a purely ideal situation where everyone is actually ethical or at least tries to be. — darthbarracuda
May be true in an ideal world where everyone is sort of like enlightened or semi-enlightened. But unfortunately, we don't have this so I feel that actions, no matter how inconsequential, will perpetuate this 'unenlightened' unexamined sort of worldly thinking. Still, the context of this is the helping-street-children example I described earlier. It's either you go big or go home in helping them. — OglopTo
This is also why I said we had to be politically active, so that we would help these street children and also make them grow up in a society which looked down upon perpetrating suffering. — darthbarracuda
Today, not so much, because we have ways of ending the apparent plague of humanity (nukes, for example). — darthbarracuda
On the contrary I think neurotypicality results in what we see as morality, and those who are atypical are thus not within the realm of morality. In which case, this post can be directed towards those who do indeed experience compassion and empathy and thus can be considered moral agents. — darthbarracuda
I do think that most people, when confront with a case where someone was suffering terribly and they felt competent to do something about it; would do something about it. But that they provided help would not necessarily (and I think in most cases would not) be on account of them following any moral rule, but simply because they felt moved to do something about the person's suffering. — John
From this it would then seem to follow that the typical person is a good moral agent; in which case, what's the problem? — John
If everyone took good care of those closest to them for a start, including themselves, then I think there would be far less suffering in the world. — John
In any case, if you were to go out and dedicate yourself selflessly and diligently to helping others, you would be far more likely to convince people that that is the best way than you are by trying to reason with them about it, or make them feel guilty. — John
Guilt is indeed a motivator for action. — darthbarracuda
And my claim is that if you actually come to terms with your own efficacy, you will realize just how much utility you are keeping for yourself. — darthbarracuda
Recently I have adopted a neat little personal slogan, which I think captures my intuitions about a lot of ethical issues quite well:
If you care about suffering, you will do something about it.
Of course, this is also rather vague in prescription - to what extent should you go to do something about suffering? — darthbarracuda
Now, I am not saying that it is wrong necessary to live in a world where every motivation would be to help others, with as much ability as possible at all times, but it would leave no room for other things, and thus the value of other things that are not ethics-related or compassion-related. This kind of world, for many, would be a world not worth living in. — schopenhauer1
The problem that I see with this is that, especially coming from a pessimist such as yourself, the world is already not worth living in, so these losses of other apparently valuable things are not really that bad, since they are just distractions. This is why I had previously said having a negative outlook but continuing to live affirmatively (i.e. "leeching" off of the affirmative community) is logically contradictory. The philosophical outlook and the subsequent lifestyle are not entirely compatible. — darthbarracuda
I think it is impossible to act at all times out of compassion. You cannot will yourself to be compassionate. You may follow some abstract formula, or act out of some self-imposed duty, but that is not compassion. — schopenhauer1
Indeed we are not all saints, nor is it usually in our capacity to do so. Schop did have some ideas on character that could be used as a model here. He thought thought people had free-will in one sense, but that the free-will would happen in a context of someone's character which he thought was kind of fixed (like its own Idea). He thought some characters were likely to be more compassionate than others. I am not sure, even these people can be perfectly compassionate and thus "fail" at perfect compassion as well. So, it perhaps is just a problem of having an ideal that is never met, like a perfect circle.So yes, I agree that compassion cannot be sustained on the level I was talking about earlier (where every moment of our lives is dedicated to helping others), but that is a personal failure. — darthbarracuda
Like I said before, how far away does someone have to be for them to be insignificant? If we were perfectly compassionate individuals, then we would recognize that distance doesn't have any importance here. If we hold a negative view of existence, then we are being disingenuous by continuing to live - and thus support - the affirmative lifestyle. Without trying to be cliche, we have a choice: to be active or passive, a 1 or a 0.
So, it perhaps is just a problem of having an ideal that is never met, like a perfect circle. — schopenhauer1
One feeling is being driven by some sort of negative (driving away) nagging feeling that, in a way, is a selfish need to not have that feeling anymore, the other comes out of a positive sense (driving towards) of wanting to see suffering alleviated for that other person. — schopenhauer1
However, if you used another basis that is not compassion, you may perhaps have a point. — schopenhauer1
Rather, donating to organizations or being on the board of organizations that can help in a FAR GREATER capacity might be the best way. Or perhaps something even more impersonal and less-compassionate looking. It might even be the case that simply being a consumer in a capitalist economy turns out to be the greatest benefit as the taxes go into research and activities that do indeed help far more people in far more effective ways. — schopenhauer1
Not helping others at every moment of the day, and being egoistic, does not mean that one is enthralled with life. This is similar to the "if you think life is suffering, why don't you just kill yourself?" argument. Just because one does not commit suicide does not show that, indeed one must really think life is great. Rather, just like suicide, it is in most people's nature to be self-interested. Most people care enough to about their own lives to not be burned out emotionally and physically with other people's problems at all times. I accept this fact. — schopenhauer1
This means that I am taking compassion and running with it - I am probing the limits of what compassion leads to, even if this is not actually possible. If we were more compassionate individuals, then we would help more people. Since we are not helping very many people, and instead attending to our own desires, it stands that we are not as compassionate as we think we are, and since morality stems from compassion, this means we are not as moral as we think we are. — darthbarracuda
Perhaps there is a golden mean by which compassion is mitigated by enough self-interested acts so that it can be sustained. — schopenhauer1
Also, more importantly, you may be making a non-issue into an issue. You are countering the claim that people are not as moral as they claim to be or think they are. I would argue that not many people go around saying or thinking they are super compassionate necessarily. I think some people do compassionate acts every once in a while, or what "classically" looks like compassionate acts in our society, but I doubt many people go around claiming how super-compassionate they are. Even Schopenhauer who claimed that morality is based on compassionate sentiment, I doubt would claim that he himself was compassionate. Did you have quotes from him claiming otherwise? If I recall, he seemed to think it was rare for people to live with that much compassion. I'll try to find a quote or something if needed. — schopenhauer1
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