Ignoring suffering for self-indulgence

_db

Recently I have adopted a neat little personal slogan, which I think captures my intuitions about a lot of ethical issues quite well:

If you care about suffering, you will do something about it.

Of course, this is also rather vague in prescription - to what extent should you go to do something about suffering?

I have mulled about this general idea for a long while now, I basically have come to realize that I see no way of justifying self-indulgent actions while others are worse off.

For me (and I think for most everyone else who isn't lacking in compassion and empathy - i.e. sociopaths, psychopaths, selfish individuals, most politicians, etc.), it seems wrong to ignore someone who just broke their leg down the block and is screaming in pain as their femur extends out of their leg at a gross angle. Almost everyone, I think, would feel obligated to aid this person, and also expect others to do the same in such a situation. You could at least call 9-11.

But this also leads to a very slippery slope - at what point do you no longer have a reasonable obligation to help someone? What if this person lived two blocks down, would you still need to help them? What if they lived in a different city, and you saw them through binoculars? What if you theoretically could help them if you drove your car over to the city - is your annoyance with driving a few miles really comparable to the pain this individual is in?

We cannot help those whom we do not know need help. But, in fact, we know a great deal of people, even if it is impersonal, that require aid. And we also know of general facts of society and life in general - the poor get fucked by the rich, the prey gets its neck torn out by the predator, we never seem to be satisfied and in fact often feel pain, etc. And so if we do not know of anyone who needs help, certainly it is possible for us to go out and find those who need help, for we know that someone, somewhere, is in need. We need not sit here and wait for those in need to find us.

This is, of course, largely a consequentialist argument. But I think it is a very strong argument, for at the very least we can appeal to egoism and show how, if we were in extreme pain ourselves, we would like it if someone helped us. I'm sure anyone's reluctance to help someone in need pales in comparison to the pain this person is experiencing.

So in general I think there really is no other position to take other than to accept that those who are worse-off than we are should be sought out and helped to the best of our abilities - in other words, if the cost of us helping them is reasonably lower than the relief the victim experiences, we have a moral obligation to do so.

I've made my own pessimistic views known. But definitely one thing I disagree strongly with when it comes to living as a "pessimist" is the general tendency to advocate isolation, asceticism, and/or the intellectually self-centered, self-indulgent life advocated by these cherished melancholic thinkers. It just doesn't make any sense - if you really believe that there is this much suffering and decay in the world, the worst thing you could do is to propagate this suffering and decay. Having a negative outlook and yet continuing to live an affirmative life is logically contradictory. And, I think, a legitimate understanding of suffering (by compassion and empathy) leads to the dissolution of the doing/allowing distinction, which leads to the conclusion that standing idly by is equivalent, or at least no-more praiseworthy, than intentionally causing harm.

This leads to uncomfortable/guilty conclusions that I think modern ethicists have made an entire speculative field out of to try to mitigate: essentially much of modern ethics ends up being apologetics for not doing enough, or being a lazy, selfish individual, i.e. justifying inherent human dispositions as if they are on par with our apparent moral obligations.

Some of these conclusions would be as follows: the complete abandonment of non-effective-utility intellectual enterprises, including but not limited to much of theoretical physics, evolutionary biology, astronomy, psychology, as well as much or all of the arts and humanities, and especially professional sports and entertainment. For when placed on utility scales, they are largely worthless and exorbitantly wasteful in that they self-indulge while ignoring the plight of others. It also means a radical change in lifestyle, including but not limited to: veganism (or at least vegetarianism), ethically-mandatory political action, and most of all the complete abandonment of one's own personal desires in order to help others.

If you think this is too much to ask for, you need only imagine yourself in the situation of a person in need. And to tell yourself that you are "lucky" for being better off is incredibly selfish.

But I'm under no delusions that this is actually feasible. We are human beings after all, and won't be motivated to abandon all our dreams and desires for moral duty. But I think it's something rather important, and saddening, to point out how incredibly narcissistic we all are, how incredibly immoral we are, at the expense of everyone else. Because once we identify a problem, we can at least try to be better.

Janus

↪darthbarracuda

The problem I see here is that you have not actually said why, it is wrong not to help others. You have said that those who are not pyschopaths etc,, that is those who are compassionate will feel that it is wrong. The question then is how strongly must someone feel it is wrong not to help in some situation to motivate them to help? You ask about distance and so on, but isn't it the case that people just feel what they feel in some situation? And since it is all dependent on feeling, then if the feeling is strong enough they will be motivated to help, and if not, then not?. You seem to be trying to make a leap from a mere feeling to a rational normativity; and I don't see how that can be supported.

_db

The problem I see here is that you have not actually said why, it is wrong not to help others. — John

Well, I see little to no distinction between doing and allowing harm. What matters is that harm is happening, and you are complicit in it if you are not at least trying to help. You are an unused variable, a bystander-without-cause.

Janus

↪darthbarracuda

I don't see that at all. To do harm, deliberately at least, one must be motivated by a feeling or thought that causes us to harm and to want to harm; whereas to fail to help one may merely be unmotivated by any feeling or thought that causes us to help or even want to help. Will you help the fly or spider that is about to be washed down the plughole? (I actually do, usually, but it doesn't cost me much).

_db

↪John

What difference does intention make here, aside from legal considerations? Standing idly by while recognizing the existence of suffering can still be said to be an act of moral negligence - indeed sometimes this is even criminal negligence.

apokrisis

If you care about suffering, you will do something about it. — darthbarracuda

But while I arguably can't help but care about my suffering, why should I "have to" care about yours? So phrased this way, you already presume empathy as a brute fact of your moral economy?

For me (and I think for most everyone else who isn't lacking in compassion and empathy - i.e. sociopaths, psychopaths, selfish individuals, most politicians, etc.), it seems wrong to ignore someone who just broke their leg down the block and is screaming in pain... — darthbarracuda

So yes. There is something bio-typical and evolutionarily advantageous about empathy. We can even point to the neurochemistry and brain architecture that makes it a biologically-unavoidable aspect of neurotypical human existence.

But what then of those who are wired differently and lack such empathy. Is is moral that they should ignore such a situation, or exploit the situation in some non-empathetic fashion? If not, then on what grounds are you now arguing that they should fake some kind of neurotypical feelings of care?

So in general I think there really is no other position to take other than to accept that those who are worse-off than we are should be sought out and helped to the best of our abilities - in other words, if the cost of us helping them is reasonably lower than the relief the victim experiences, we have a moral obligation to do so. — darthbarracuda

But that can't follow if you begin with this notion of "I care". It doesn't deal with the people who don't actually care (through no fault of their own, just bad genetic luck probably exacerbated by bad childhood experience).

So to justify a morality based on neurotypicality is not as self-justifying as you want to claim. A consequence of such a rigid position is clearly eugenics - let's weed the unempathetic out.

Of course we instead generally take a more biologically sound approach - recognise that variation even on empathy is part of a natural spectrum. Degrees in the ability to care are neurotypically normal. Where intervention is most justified is in childhood experience - get in there with social services. And also consider the way that "normal society" in fact might encourage un-empathetic behaviours. Then for the dangerously damaged, you lock them away.

So to make care central, you have to deal with its natural variety in principled fashion - as well as the fact that this is essentially a naturalistic argument. Is is ought. Because empathy is commonplace in neurodevelopment, empathy is morally right.

This leads to uncomfortable/guilty conclusions that I think modern ethicists have made an entire speculative field out of to try to mitigate: essentially much of modern ethics ends up being apologetics for not doing enough, or being a lazy, selfish individual, i.e. justifying inherent human dispositions as if they are on par with our apparent moral obligations. — darthbarracuda

From a psychological point of view, getting out and involved in ordinary community stuff is the healthy antidote to the deep pessimism that an isolationist and introverted lifestyle will likely perpetuate.

So it is quite wrong - psychologically - to frame this in terms of people being lazy and selfish (as if these were the biologically natural traits). Instead, what is natural - what we have evolved for - is to live in a close and simple tribal relation. And it is modern society that allows and encourages a strong polarisation of personality types.

The good thing about modern society is that it allows a stronger expression of both introversion and extraversion - the most basic psychodynamic personality dimension. And then that is also a bad thing in that people can retreat too far into those separate styles of existence.

....and most of all the complete abandonment of one's own personal desires in order to help others. — darthbarracuda

So from one extreme to the other, hey?

I think you have to start with the naturalistic basis of your OP - that we neurotypically find that we care about the suffering (and happiness) of others. And then follow that through to its logical conclusions. And this complete individual self-abnegation is not a naturalistic answer. It is not going to be neurotypically average response - one that feels right given the way most people feel.

_db

But while I arguably can't help but care about my suffering, why should I "have to" care about yours? So phrased this way, you already presume empathy as a brute fact of your moral economy? — apokrisis

Absolutely. Empathy and compassion are the primary sources of morality. Any attempt to ground morality primarily by different means, I think, gets the whole thing backwards. Ethics is supposed to be about welfare.

But what then of those who are wired differently and lack such empathy. Is is moral that they should ignore such a situation, or exploit the situation in some non-empathetic fashion? If not, then on what grounds are you now arguing that they should fake some kind of neurotypical feelings of care? — apokrisis

I think those who are unable to feel compassion/empathy are incapable of grasping the important aspects of morality.

So to justify a morality based on neurotypicality is not as self-justifying as you want to claim. A consequence of such a rigid position is clearly eugenics - let's weed the unempathetic out. — apokrisis

On the contrary I think neurotypicality results in what we see as morality, and those who are atypical are thus not within the realm of morality. In which case, this post can be directed towards those who do indeed experience compassion and empathy and thus can be considered moral agents.

Because empathy is commonplace in neurodevelopment, empathy is morally right. — apokrisis

Just to make my point clear - I don't think there is an objective morality. But for those who are involved in ethical discussion, as well as the average population, what they see as morality is sourced from compassion and empathy. If they are to act moral within this framework, then my post is directed towards them. If you are considering acting upon a compassion-based ethics, then my post is important.

So it is quite wrong - psychologically - to frame this in terms of people being lazy and selfish (as if these were the biologically natural traits). Instead, what is natural - what we have evolved for - is to live in a close and simple tribal relation. And it is modern society that allows and encourages a strong polarisation of personality types. — apokrisis

What is also seemingly nature is our ability to ignore the background static of everyone else outside of our tribe who is suffering.

And this complete individual self-abnegation is not a naturalistic answer. It is not going to be neurotypically average response - one that feels right given the way most people feel. — apokrisis

This is an important point: I don't think we are able to live moral lives. We are disqualified. Given that our morality here is sourced from compassion and empathy, we have to fundamentally ignore the extreme possible extent of our compassion and empathy in order to live "averagely" or "naturally". But there's nothing ethical about that, because this ignores compassion and empathy.

OglopTo

What difference does intention make here, aside from legal considerations? — darthbarracuda

Feeling compassion is one thing and usually a prerequisite. Acting on one's feeling is another issue altogether and depends on a case-to-case basis depending partly on the severity of the matter and the consequences of 'helping'.

For example, in general, I feel torn in giving money or food to street children not because I don't want to help. I feel empathy or compassion about their condition, but helping them 'a bit' is another matter. I feel like this gives them an impression that when they grow up, it's OK to have children despite their financial means because they can get by with the help of others. Alleviating 'a bit' the suffering of one today can multiply to the suffering of many more in the future. Its like its either you go big or go home in helping in this case.

Sometimes, one can't avoid the feeling of helplessness and tragedy that one's actions are insignificant in the larger scale of things and can sometimes even do more harm than good. If one really one's to help and make a change, one can do so in good faith, hoping that everything will turn out for the better in the end -- but this is especially difficult if one has a predisposition to (psychological) pessimism.

_db

↪OglopTo

This is an important point: we don't know how our actions are going to affect others, like a butterfly effect. But whereas there is merely a hypothetical possibility that someone is harmed because of what you did to try to help someone, there is an actuality that someone is harmed because you did nothing.

All this means is that we must be reasonable in our assessment of a situation, and realize that us helping someone in all likelihood probably will not come back to haunt us. Any bad things other people will do they likely will have done regardless of whether or not we help them. People need help and our fear of what they might do afterwards only insults them.

Ideally this principle should apply to not just yourself but to other people as well, thus such a fear would be unwarranted in a purely ideal situation where everyone is actually ethical or at least tries to be.

OglopTo

[...] and realize that us helping someone in all likelihood probably will not come back to haunt us. — darthbarracuda

It may not haunt us but it may haunt others (more) in the end, increasing the overall suffering.

One can only act in good faith if one decides that it is the best course of action. For example, deciding on not helping 'a bit' the street children is acting in good faith that they will eventually overcome their condition, reflect on their suffering, and make better decisions later in life. It's not like you're rubbing salt into the wound because the motivation is borne out of compassion for them and acting in good faith given one's personal worldview.

[...] thus such a fear would be unwarranted in a purely ideal situation where everyone is actually ethical or at least tries to be. — darthbarracuda

May be true in an ideal world where everyone is sort of like enlightened or semi-enlightened. But unfortunately, we don't have this so I feel that actions, no matter how inconsequential, will perpetuate this 'unenlightened' unexamined sort of worldly thinking. Sometimes, perpetuating this idea through 'helping a bit' leads to more suffering than doing nothing.

Still, the context of this is the helping-street-children example I described earlier. It's either you go big or go home in helping them.

_db

May be true in an ideal world where everyone is sort of like enlightened or semi-enlightened. But unfortunately, we don't have this so I feel that actions, no matter how inconsequential, will perpetuate this 'unenlightened' unexamined sort of worldly thinking. Still, the context of this is the helping-street-children example I described earlier. It's either you go big or go home in helping them. — OglopTo

Not helping them would betray a form of misanthropy. Back in the days of the classical pessimists, then, misanthropy could be compatible with asceticism. Today, not so much, because we have ways of ending the apparent plague of humanity (nukes, for example).

This is also why I said we had to be politically active, so that we would help these street children and also make them grow up in a society which looked down upon perpetrating suffering.

OglopTo

This is also why I said we had to be politically active, so that we would help these street children and also make them grow up in a society which looked down upon perpetrating suffering. — darthbarracuda

Yep, go big or go home. Giving a bit of food or alms would send the wrong signals.

Today, not so much, because we have ways of ending the apparent plague of humanity (nukes, for example). — darthbarracuda

I agree, but again, the decision is on a case to case basis and one can't just generalize.

I for example, do believe that there is good in having nukes. In an ideal enlightened world, there is no need for armaments. But unfortunately, there is politics in this world; politics escalate to war; and only a show of force can end war. I do not agree to total nuclear disarmament, I would actually want at least one country to have the monopoly of this -- hoping that the wielders of these nukes would be, again, you guessed it, acting in good faith.

_db

Giving a bit of food or alms would send the wrong signals. — OglopTo

Or you do both.

hoping that the wielders of these nukes would be, again, you guessed it, acting in good faith. — OglopTo

I was more referring to the advocation of a nuclear winter to destroy the ecosystems.

_db

I would like to hear from other people as well. I'm not trying to be a jerk when I say this, but how do you live with yourself while knowing there are people who are suffering and will continue to suffer if you do not help them? Or while knowing that there are many ways you could educate people to stop them from inflicting harm upon other sentients, whether that be environmentalism, veganism, anti-space exploration-ism, procreative ethic discussions, etc?

Do you think you are a moral person just because you are "decent" or "adequate"?

Janus

↪darthbarracuda

Well. I was speaking about motivation, not really about intention. The difference is simply between being motivated to do harm, and not being motivated to provide help. I don't think the two can be reasonably thought as being morally equivalent. In one case there is malicious intent and in the other there is simply.disinterest, there is no positive intent at all. One might not even intentionally ignore the sufferer. I do think that many, if not most, people, when confronted with a situation where someone was suffering terribly and they felt comfortable with, and competent to, do something about it; would do something about it. But that they provide help in such situations would not necessarily (and I think in most cases would not) be on account of them following any moral rule, but simply because they felt moved to do something about the person's suffering.

Janus

On the contrary I think neurotypicality results in what we see as morality, and those who are atypical are thus not within the realm of morality. In which case, this post can be directed towards those who do indeed experience compassion and empathy and thus can be considered moral agents. — darthbarracuda

From this it would then seem to follow that the typical person is a good moral agent; in which case, what's the problem?

_db

I do think that most people, when confront with a case where someone was suffering terribly and they felt competent to do something about it; would do something about it. But that they provided help would not necessarily (and I think in most cases would not) be on account of them following any moral rule, but simply because they felt moved to do something about the person's suffering. — John

Then why is this not applied to the homeless African child, or the slave labor of China, or the constant mutilation of animals in the wild? Do you have to have someone breathing down your neck for it to make you want to help them?

From this it would then seem to follow that the typical person is a good moral agent; in which case, what's the problem? — John

What I meant here was that we are not taking ethics far enough. We limit our concept of obligation for our own comfort and security.

Janus

↪darthbarracuda

But you have acknowledged that moral acts are motivated by compassion and not by reason; and now you seem to be trying to stipulate by reason how, and in what kinds of circumstances, one should feel compassion and act on it. But everyone is different and their compassion is triggered by different situations and kinds of situations. Perhaps you are trying to use the emotion of guilt to motivate others and yourself to feel more widely compassionate and moved to act? Have you ever considered that for many people, when they consider the degree and scope of human suffering in the abstract, there is simply too much of it to know where to start responding? If everyone took good care of those closest to them for a start, including themselves, then I think there would be far less suffering in the world.

In any case, if you were to go out and dedicate yourself selflessly and diligently to helping others, you would be far more likely to convince people that that is the best way than you are by trying to reason with them about it, or make them feel guilty.

_db

↪John

Guilt is indeed a motivator for action.

If everyone took good care of those closest to them for a start, including themselves, then I think there would be far less suffering in the world. — John

True. So the governments of countries with impoverished citizens are of most suspect - but the countries around it that allow this to continue are also suspect.

So even if someone else really ought to be doing something about it, you are still able to do something. And my claim is that if you actually come to terms with your own efficacy, you will realize just how much utility you are keeping for yourself.

In any case, if you were to go out and dedicate yourself selflessly and diligently to helping others, you would be far more likely to convince people that that is the best way than you are by trying to reason with them about it, or make them feel guilty. — John

I have and am trying.

Janus

Guilt is indeed a motivator for action. — darthbarracuda

Unfortunately, or fortunately, guilt s not an effective motivator for me.

And my claim is that if you actually come to terms with your own efficacy, you will realize just how much utility you are keeping for yourself. — darthbarracuda

I have little enough time and utility for myself as it is; what with wasting all the time I do posting on here!

schopenhauer1

Recently I have adopted a neat little personal slogan, which I think captures my intuitions about a lot of ethical issues quite well:

If you care about suffering, you will do something about it.

Of course, this is also rather vague in prescription - to what extent should you go to do something about suffering? — darthbarracuda

I think this is almost a bit of a repugnant conclusion of compassion. If everyone was busy always fixing everyone else's problem, the instrumentality of life would rear its ugly head as it would be very apparent that life is nothing more than repairing and maintaining rather than pursuing anything else. Now, I am not saying that it is wrong necessary to live in a world where every motivation would be to help others, with as much ability as possible at all times, but it would leave no room for other things, and thus the value of other things that are not ethics-related or compassion-related. This kind of world, for many, would be a world not worth living in. Therefore, much of the personal ethical compassion can be alleviated by organizations and social bodies (like government) that would work at these things, thus leaving others to pursue more than just helping others.

Of course, the irony is, that almost anything we do is instrumental- that is it is striving to strive, constantly distracting ourselves from the the fact that there is really nothing behind the repeated actions, or the repeated attempt for novel actions. So, to conclude, this scenario of compassion-only actions would simply hasten the idea that we are just maintaining ourselves to maintain. People need the distractions of entertainment and pleasure oriented goals, otherwise the futility of just living to live would be too apparent.

_db

Now, I am not saying that it is wrong necessary to live in a world where every motivation would be to help others, with as much ability as possible at all times, but it would leave no room for other things, and thus the value of other things that are not ethics-related or compassion-related. This kind of world, for many, would be a world not worth living in. — schopenhauer1

The problem that I see with this is that, especially coming from a pessimist such as yourself, the world is already not worth living in, so these losses of other apparently valuable things are not really that bad, since they are just distractions. This is why I had previously said having a negative outlook but continuing to live affirmatively (i.e. "leeching" off of the affirmative community) is logically contradictory. The philosophical outlook and the subsequent lifestyle are not entirely compatible.

To say it another way, if the government adopted the philosophy of someone like, say, Schopenhauer, as domestic and foreign policy, as well as what I see to be the logical extension of it (as described above), we would not live in the same kind of society. It would be radically changed unlike anything we would have seen before. The aesthetics that Schopenhauer advocated for calming the Will would not longer be supported anywhere, as they would be seen as wasteful spending habits.

So I think it's sort of contradictory to hold such a bleak view of existence and yet be opposed to the deconstruction of society to benefit those in need. For what reason would you be against this that wouldn't undermine your own existentialism?

schopenhauer1

The problem that I see with this is that, especially coming from a pessimist such as yourself, the world is already not worth living in, so these losses of other apparently valuable things are not really that bad, since they are just distractions. This is why I had previously said having a negative outlook but continuing to live affirmatively (i.e. "leeching" off of the affirmative community) is logically contradictory. The philosophical outlook and the subsequent lifestyle are not entirely compatible. — darthbarracuda

I am not Schopenhauer, though I bare his name on here :). So, I don't identify with all his conclusions though I can sympathize where he was going with many of his thoughts. For example, I don't think we can achieve some sort of state of non-willing as he thought could happen with much ascetic practice.

I think my point earlier was that the compassion thing, when taken to its extreme conclusion (assuming anyone knows the appropriate compassionate acts to choose, who to apply it to, how to prioritize them, how to manifest them so they are actually helping and not just appearing to help, or whether helping in short-term vs. long-term and many many other considerations which makes the implementation of this trickier than one might think...) is that it leads to the same conclusion that one would get anyways, just in more stark fashion- that is to say that life is simply instrumental. So, you will never really fix the problem that is at the core of things, only the surface of them. So, anyways, if I was to use Schop, I believe he admitted most people are not driven purely by compassion. I agree with this. For various psychological and social reasons, it would be much harder to move people to act at all times out of compassion. I think it is impossible to act at all times out of compassion. You cannot will yourself to be compassionate. You may follow some abstract formula, or act out of some self-imposed duty, but that is not compassion.

_db

I think it is impossible to act at all times out of compassion. You cannot will yourself to be compassionate. You may follow some abstract formula, or act out of some self-imposed duty, but that is not compassion. — schopenhauer1

This is also why I think it was in Schopenhauer's (and others') (literal) best-interest to identify as a misanthrope, because this allows him and others to squeeze around their responsibilities in pursuit of a self-centered ascetic life. This would allow him to be selective in his compassion - and fuck everyone else, they don't deserve to be helped. Thus Schopenhauer's antinatalism was not only compassion based but also aesthetically-based: don't create any more monsters. Humans suck.

So if you are a person who actually does hate humanity and other sentient organisms, then compassion becomes something of a black sheep. If that is you (or anyone else reading this), there's nothing more I can really say, other than that I think you have your values misplaced.

So yes, I agree that compassion cannot be sustained on the level I was talking about earlier (where every moment of our lives is dedicated to helping others), but that is a personal failure. Like I said before, how far away does someone have to be for them to be insignificant? If we were perfectly compassionate individuals, then we would recognize that distance doesn't have any importance here. If we hold a negative view of existence, then we are being disingenuous by continuing to live - and thus support - the affirmative lifestyle. Without trying to be cliche, we have a choice: to be active or passive, a 1 or a 0.

schopenhauer1

So yes, I agree that compassion cannot be sustained on the level I was talking about earlier (where every moment of our lives is dedicated to helping others), but that is a personal failure. — darthbarracuda

Indeed we are not all saints, nor is it usually in our capacity to do so. Schop did have some ideas on character that could be used as a model here. He thought thought people had free-will in one sense, but that the free-will would happen in a context of someone's character which he thought was kind of fixed (like its own Idea). He thought some characters were likely to be more compassionate than others. I am not sure, even these people can be perfectly compassionate and thus "fail" at perfect compassion as well. So, it perhaps is just a problem of having an ideal that is never met, like a perfect circle.

Like I said before, how far away does someone have to be for them to be insignificant? If we were perfectly compassionate individuals, then we would recognize that distance doesn't have any importance here. If we hold a negative view of existence, then we are being disingenuous by continuing to live - and thus support - the affirmative lifestyle. Without trying to be cliche, we have a choice: to be active or passive, a 1 or a 0.

I don't think we have a choice if we were to fully use your wording here of "compassion". Compassion is an internal feeling that moves you. It may move you to tear up seeing or hearing about people in pain, it may make you write some thoughts to sway people, it may move you to donate, or it may move you to go out and try to actively participate in alleviating a particular suffering.

Let's say that the list I gave is some hierarchy of least to most one can do when one is moved. It seems some people "feel" moved towards different reactions to a particular X instance of suffering. Most people do not "feel" moved enough to actively participate in the alleviation of suffering. Perhaps they lack the compassion that others have. If it is laziness, then that is still effectively saying that they lacked sufficient capacity for compassion as they were not moved enough.

Can compassion be taught? Schopenhauer did not think so as he thought characters were fixed. I am not as sure one way or the other. I think you may be able to give someone a guilty complex, but I am not sure how much a guilt complex is compassion or a particular type of neuroses one cultivates to act as if one were actually compassionate. Compassion and guilt are not necessarily connected. One feeling is being driven by some sort of negative (driving away) nagging feeling that, in a way, is a selfish need to not have that feeling anymore, the other comes out of a positive sense (driving towards) of wanting to see suffering alleviated for that other person.

So, at the end of the day, no we are not saints, nor do we have the capacity to necessarily be ones. However, if you used another basis that is not compassion, you may perhaps have a point. So, it is perhaps a self-imposed duty or utilitarian formula which you are truly trying to posit: If one wants to prevent future suffering, to be consistent, one ought to prevent present suffering. So here, you are appealing to people's sense of consistency- making them put their money where their mouth is. However, this is simply a command to be followed out of a sense of consistency if it is deontological. If the basis of ethics is something of a sentiment, then of course, this is not ethical- merely rule-following.

The same for utilitarianism. If utilitarianism is correct simply because it cares most about results, then you perhaps may have a point that, motivation be damned, suffering can be alleviated if more people try to alleviate it. However, if one were truly utilitarian, and did a calculus of cost/benefit, it might actually be that helping one individual is NOT the best way to alleviate suffering. Rather, donating to organizations or being on the board of organizations that can help in a FAR GREATER capacity might be the best way. Or perhaps something even more impersonal and less-compassionate looking. It might even be the case that simply being a consumer in a capitalist economy turns out to be the greatest benefit as the taxes go into research and activities that do indeed help far more people in far more effective ways.

Not helping others at every moment of the day, and being egoistic, does not mean that one is enthralled with life. This is similar to the "if you think life is suffering, why don't you just kill yourself?" argument. Just because one does not commit suicide does not show that, indeed one must really think life is great. Rather, just like suicide, it is in most people's nature to be self-interested. Most people care enough to about their own lives to not be burned out emotionally and physically with other people's problems at all times. I accept this fact.

_db

So, it perhaps is just a problem of having an ideal that is never met, like a perfect circle. — schopenhauer1

Exactly. Our abilities (or lack thereof) do not dictate morality.

One feeling is being driven by some sort of negative (driving away) nagging feeling that, in a way, is a selfish need to not have that feeling anymore, the other comes out of a positive sense (driving towards) of wanting to see suffering alleviated for that other person. — schopenhauer1

However, if you used another basis that is not compassion, you may perhaps have a point. — schopenhauer1

The guilt comes from the fact that someone is ignoring a compelling experience. To not feel guilt when recognizing the plight of others requires one to place greater emphasis on oneself than other people, or to believe that one is more important than others.

This means that I am taking compassion and running with it - I am probing the limits of what compassion leads to, even if this is not actually possible. If we were more compassionate individuals, then we would help more people. Since we are not helping very many people, and instead attending to our own desires, it stands that we are not as compassionate as we think we are, and since morality stems from compassion, this means we are not as moral as we think we are.

So for me at least, it doesn't matter whether or not feeling guilty for not helping others is genuinely compassion-based in the positive or negative sense, for what matters here is that we can recognize the link between compassion and morality and see how we are deficient in both (which presumably leads to guilt, misanthropy, or perhaps self-improvement).

Rather, donating to organizations or being on the board of organizations that can help in a FAR GREATER capacity might be the best way. Or perhaps something even more impersonal and less-compassionate looking. It might even be the case that simply being a consumer in a capitalist economy turns out to be the greatest benefit as the taxes go into research and activities that do indeed help far more people in far more effective ways. — schopenhauer1

Indeed, I advocate donating all your savings post-mortem, and while alive, physically interacting with those in need as well as getting involved in politics and society in general. Maximizing your utility.

Not helping others at every moment of the day, and being egoistic, does not mean that one is enthralled with life. This is similar to the "if you think life is suffering, why don't you just kill yourself?" argument. Just because one does not commit suicide does not show that, indeed one must really think life is great. Rather, just like suicide, it is in most people's nature to be self-interested. Most people care enough to about their own lives to not be burned out emotionally and physically with other people's problems at all times. I accept this fact. — schopenhauer1

Right, but again, if we take compassion-based ethics to its logical end, then the conscientious support of an affirmative system cannot be acceptable, regardless of how we actually are psychologically and in general.

The overall point being made here is that you cannot be "comfortable" and also concerned with the well-being of others.

schopenhauer1

This means that I am taking compassion and running with it - I am probing the limits of what compassion leads to, even if this is not actually possible. If we were more compassionate individuals, then we would help more people. Since we are not helping very many people, and instead attending to our own desires, it stands that we are not as compassionate as we think we are, and since morality stems from compassion, this means we are not as moral as we think we are. — darthbarracuda

It sounds like you are making compassion this monstrous dictator. It would be compassionate for the do-gooder to realize that a life straining at every moment to do-good would be wearisome and make their life miserable and thus would need have their own suffering alleviated by only having a moderate amount of compassionate acts. Perhaps there is a golden mean by which compassion is mitigated by enough self-interested acts so that it can be sustained. If there is not, then compassion would be causing there to be more suffering for the compassionate which would defeat the cause of compassion which is alleviating suffering. Thus, it is the application of compassion which may be off here. The only reason to be burn out and be miserable in the process would be out of some principle which is probably no longer compassion as I stated earlier. If someone has a guilt complex that large, then that might not even be compassion anymore.

Also, more importantly, you may be making a non-issue into an issue. You are countering the claim that people are not as moral as they claim to be or think they are. I would argue that not many people go around saying or thinking they are super compassionate necessarily. I think some people do compassionate acts every once in a while, or what "classically" looks like compassionate acts in our society, but I doubt many people go around claiming how super-compassionate they are. Even Schopenhauer who claimed that morality is based on compassionate sentiment, I doubt would claim that he himself was compassionate. Did you have quotes from him claiming otherwise? If I recall, he seemed to think it was rare for people to live with that much compassion. I'll try to find a quote or something if needed.

Edit: I also wanted to address the idea of inefficiency. I guess this approach is utilitarian, but call it what you will.. One of my objections with Stoicism vs. Pessimism was that Stoicism had a long process of suffering-reduction through practice, discipline, etc. This whole need to overcome in the first place could simply be solved for the following generation by not having them. I described it as more elegant. You are not trapping the next guy or gal to deal with any issue that needs to be over come period. Now, for those of us who are here already, we are already trapped and thus must manage. What is the best way to manage? I always advocated recognition that we are suffering. One can call it rebellious pessimism. Let people know that this is not an inevitability and make sure that they know why it is that life needs to be played out with all its obligations for anyone. My focus is the instrumentality and people's understanding of this idea to the point where everything else, including other suffering, is put in context of this idea. The minute we focus on the details that are tangential we are doing things that Zapffe explained- distraction, isolation, anchoring, etc..

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Perhaps there is a golden mean by which compassion is mitigated by enough self-interested acts so that it can be sustained. — schopenhauer1

Correct, which is why I was primarily interested in those who are worse-off. We have to balance the input with the output. If tending to them does not hurt you as much as they are hurting, then it seems as though we really have no excuse not to help them. The point is to maximize your utility, and every one of us can do better even if we won't. Certainly other alternatives, such as becoming a monk, nun, or other kind of ascetic only makes sure that you are doing alright, but nobody else is helped.

Also, more importantly, you may be making a non-issue into an issue. You are countering the claim that people are not as moral as they claim to be or think they are. I would argue that not many people go around saying or thinking they are super compassionate necessarily. I think some people do compassionate acts every once in a while, or what "classically" looks like compassionate acts in our society, but I doubt many people go around claiming how super-compassionate they are. Even Schopenhauer who claimed that morality is based on compassionate sentiment, I doubt would claim that he himself was compassionate. Did you have quotes from him claiming otherwise? If I recall, he seemed to think it was rare for people to live with that much compassion. I'll try to find a quote or something if needed. — schopenhauer1

People probably do believe that they could be better, but overall they believe that they are a good person. How they are living their lives, the choices they make (that inevitably reflect self-interest) is not put into question. Many people would not see the harm in not donating your savings post-mortem, or of eating meat, or of any number of things.

Levinas wrote about the "persecution of ethics", and I think this is exactly what I'm talking about in this case. People in general do indeed feel compelled to do something when they think about the suffering of others, but not out of positive compassion but because they know it would be better if they did something. They come to recognize this and learn to push it out of their immediate conscious.

Just how many people could be saved if you didn't buy that new flatscreen television? Just how many animals could have been helped if you didn't spend all your time playing Call of Duty (irony intended)?

So when I say that morality stems from compassion, I mean that the recognition of suffering as an important thing is due to compassion. But the subsequent acts to remove or prevent this suffering need not be motivated solely by compassion. It can be a logical counterfactual proposition - if we view suffering as bad, then removing suffering is good. What is good is what we ought to do. Therefore, we ought to remove suffering, even if we don't want to remove suffering (which is what Schopenhauer had in mind and what you refer to as positive compassion).

And the rub here is that most of us, including myself, recognize that suffering is bad, and yet don't want to get off our asses and do something about it for our entire life. So you get a tugging feeling in your gut, which you inevitably repress by distracting yourself with things you like to do. The moral person need not enjoy being moral - but the virtuous person does.

In regards to your edit, I agree that people should be more educated as to what life entails exactly. Which is why I advocate political and social involvement while alive - it also gives you a purpose to live.

Ignoring suffering for self-indulgence

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