I agree, more or less. I'm not so certain about Hume, but whatever. Presentation matters. Aesthetics are a part of theoretical concerns, explanations, and explorations. And there are times when aesthetics can override the purported theoretical concerns -- the aim at truth.

As far as I'm concerned that means that people who are interested in theory should pay attention to aesthetics. It matters. Sometimes more than mere true statements.

To be honest (and hopefully not come across dismissive...), I think this is much ado about nothing... mostly. Like this:

Literary flamboyance can be used to mask theoretical gaps.
(...)

They may repeat banal observations at key points in time, so as to create the illusion of complexity. They may quote a long-dead poet to add intrigue, mystique or garner an impression of being a "worldly" person who has interests in a variety of tastes, when in reality, a poem by itself does not prove anything "scientifically" - it's fluff. — darthbarracuda

Is less likely to happen among people in the same discipline, this sounds like a critique of science advocates (e.g. Neil Degrass Tyson). Flamboyance can be attempted by academics to their fellows, but assuming it's in a relatively formal setting it's not likely to function as a way of passing off nonsense.

Sometimes, a theory is taken to be true in the absence of any other contenders. — darthbarracuda

I think you're confusing accepting a theory because it's most rational theory with the unilateral assertion of its truth. Much of the time when pressed, it's the former that's being communicated. The latter is generally reserved for very well evidenced theories.

Yet once again, its usefulness does not prove it is true. It merely means it is useful, which may be completely accidental. — darthbarracuda

Whereas the possibility you're representing is both unevidenced and extremely unlikely. Reality could be all sorts of ways, but what you're basically saying is this. "Oh yeah, those beliefs are useful and allow you to,.by believing them, correctly predict and plan for reality to be such and such a way. However, in fact it just seems like it." You might as well have said "No" for all you gave us to chew on for that view. If Newtonian dynamics tells me some object will move in some way in certain conditions, and it does under continued testing, it's just useful. It's (the theory) is either true or near enough that anything else is probably irrelevant to most tasks.

I mean, I could run your argument against mathematics or logic, but most wouldn't accept that argument. (Even despite us knowing mathematics is not, as often said, some beacon of indubitable knowledge. It is, however, indispensable).

By and large the assumption seems to be that the world is a rational place and thus can be ascertained and understood rationally, when in fact there is no possible evidence that could prove or disprove this assumption. — darthbarracuda

It's not merely an assumption. The idea is that if reality can be understood, we ought to be able to predict how it will be in some scenario or how it was in some scenario. Repeatedly, such that the assumption becomes ever more likely, asymptoting nearer a probability of 1 that reality is, in fact effable, understandable. The idea that no one has ever responded to Hume's argument is odd. If you, as Kant did in responding to Hume, accept the existence of the synthetic a priori then you seem to have gotten around the argument. You can probably find many more responses on the SEP, like Bayesian probability being applied.

Thank you for responding.

Flamboyance can be attempted by academics to their fellows, but assuming it's in a relatively formal setting it's not likely to function as a way of passing off nonsense. — MindForged

By "flamboyance", I was not meaning anything outrageous. I meant very simply common wording, as well as general organization of ideas. A theory with little evidence that is organized and worded in a pleasing manner may very well get more attention than a theory with better evidence but poor organization. A theory that sparks the imagination, makes people really wonder, can be completely false yet nevertheless garner significant support. There are many aspects of the presentation that subtly influence how you view the theory: is it a man, or a woman who is speaking? What ethnicity are they? That metaphor used three paragraphs back was quite astute: but what about the theory as a whole? Sometimes it seems like these things are peppered around, like icing on the cake, to make the theory look more appetizing than it would without.

Consider: the two sentences mean the same thing:

"In 1492 Columbus sailed across the Atlantic Ocean."

"In the year 1492, Columbus braved the vast, blue expanse: the Atlantic Ocean."

Both mean the same thing, but the second one is more vibrant, alive, poetic.

Similarly, we can say the following:

"Bed bugs reproduce via traumatic insemination."

or

"Male bed bugs pin a female bed bug down and forcibly jab a sharp syringe into the female's abdomen in order to reproduce."

Once again, they mean the same thing, but the presentation is different. The first one is seen as preferable because the second one harbors uncomfortable notions of rape. Supposedly, the natural world is amoral and so the further away we keep scientific inquiry from morality, the better (or so it goes).

I think you're confusing accepting a theory because it's most rational theory with the unilateral assertion of its truth. Much of the time when pressed, it's the former that's being communicated. The latter is generally reserved for very well evidenced theories. — MindForged

Right. But "most rational" theory may still be give too much credence to the theory. This can happen, I think, in historical fields (but also any field, conceivably). The evidence for things can be sparse. As a kid growing up I loved history (and still do). As I started to read more academic literature, I started to realize just how tentative historical theories can be. Often theories are taken as true because they cohere well to other theories, and ultimately cohere with a naturalistic picture of the world. But the evidence going for it is still not very strong. One almost thinks that sometimes researchers are motivated to create a theory in order to fill the gap of its absence. It doesn't matter how poorly supported it actually is - as long as it's the "most rational" theory (i.e. the best-of-the-worst).

Theorists are doing the best they can, though. We've come a long way even in the past 200 years or so, the standards are much higher and rigorous than before. Which is good.

Whereas the possibility you're representing is both unevidenced and extremely unlikely. Reality could be all sorts of ways, but what you're basically saying is this. "Oh yeah, those beliefs are useful and allow you to,.by believing them, correctly predict and plan for reality to be such and such a way. However, in fact it just seems like it." You might as well have said "No" for all you gave us to chew on for that view. If Newtonian dynamics tells me some object will move in some way in certain conditions, and it does under continued testing, it's just useful. It's (the theory) is either true or near enough that anything else is probably irrelevant to most tasks. — MindForged

In Outlines of Skepticism, Sextus Empiricus describes the skeptical attitude as one of an ongoing inquiry. It is, in contemporary terms, agnosticism about anything but impressions. Neither dogmatic statement for or against a proposition is taken to be true, because there exists always the possibility that a proposition in the future will contradict the accepted belief. For Sextus, then, belief is akin to a disease of sorts - the less beliefs you have, the better off you are. The more you can navigate the world based on impressions alone, the better.

This skepticism (and other forms of global skepticism) are not popular because they get in the way of "progress" and the achievement of projects. To my eyes, pragmatism never was and never will be an ideal solution to this epistemic dilemma. If we could get around skepticism Descartes-style, we would, but we can't. And we're too impatient and affirmative to be skeptical. This is not an argument against skepticism though. It just goes to show how little the real world actually matters, I think.

To this day I do not think ideas like solipsism, relativism, or even "nihilism" have ever been "refuted". Most theorists have moved on - literally. They have "better things to do", since they assume to be true that which skepticism puts into doubt. Similar to how gung-ho moralists are so often vehemently against "relativism" to the point of using it as a derogatory term. Why are they like this? Because relativism threatens the moral project. Under relativism, they can't argue for absolute moral truths. Why do religious fundamentalists hate atheists? Because atheism threatens the central pillar of Judeo-Christian-Islamic religious belief. As such theory in general is threatened by skepticism. Yet skepticism is ignored, treated as "childish". Why?

A theory with little evidence that is organized and worded in a pleasing manner may very well get more attention than a theory with better evidence but poor organization. A theory that sparks the imagination, makes people really wonder, can be completely false yet nevertheless garner significant support. — darthbarracuda

Bare possibilities aren't fun to discuss, it would be prudent, I think, to articulate real examples of this. Otherwise it doesn't seem like an interesting thesis, especially when it's tantalizingly described as flamboyant.

Supposedly, the natural world is amoral and so the further away we keep scientific inquiry from morality, the better (or so it goes). — darthbarracuda

I suppose my confusion is, then, how these examples really elucidate your point. By your own admission, they mean the same as their more direct counterparts and seemingly everyone knows why they're articulated that way. Without an example of how this actually, supposedly, causes mistakes it seems like much ado.

But "most rational" theory may still be give too much credence to the theory. Often theories are taken as true because they cohere well to other theories, and ultimately cohere with a naturalistic picture of the world. But the evidence going for it is still not very strong. — darthbarracuda

Coherence with other theories is only one criterion of theory choice. A theory which is dominant purely on that ground (as opposed to strong evidence) is a poor theory overall. It's adoption would transparently be because there was nothing else on offer with the desired traits. People insist on having a theory of some sort, whether it's correct or not, so bad theories will go mainstream from time to time, most often early in a discipline's development.

Why are they like this? Because relativism threatens the moral project. Under relativism, they can't argue for absolute moral truths. Why do religious fundamentalists hate atheists? Because atheism threatens the central pillar of Judeo-Christian-Islamic religious belief. As such theory in general is threatened by skepticism. Yet skepticism is ignored, treated as "childish". Why? — darthbarracuda

I don't dismiss relativism out of hand, but it's hardly the case (as I read you as saying) that relativism (of whatever sort) has established itself and that people just moved on instead of really refuting it. Really, it's no different than anything else in philosophy. Positions (and even while branches) come and go from being vogue. Sometimes for good reasons, other times because it's not with the spirit of the times. Logicism in classical mathematics died especially due to Gödel and Tarski; good reasons. Metaphysics came back because of the resurgence of formal discussions and developments of modality; also good. Logical positivism, despite definitely not being a view of endorse, wasn't really refuted. Sometimes it's bad, or represents a tendency that people can't let go of. Maybe moral realism is like this, maybe not. But it's not obvious either way to me.

Anyway, Hume's induction problem is interesting but I don't think it throws into doubt the notion of evidence supporting a theory (if I understood your OP correctly).

In order for something to be a "fact", it must hold widespread agreement amongst contemporary theorists. — darthbarracuda

In order to be ACCEPTED as a fact, etc. Whether it is a fact or not depends on how reality is. The real facts could be buried somewhere else with everyone passing them over, or not even thought of yet.

The scientist can not only be a good observer of the world - they must also be good at presenting what they see, keeping the audience interested long enough to get the point across. — darthbarracuda

I don't know if this is a counter-example or a variant on your view. The analytic philosophy of language is replete with papers that sound mathematical and/or logical. They feed successfully off each other, creating a matrix of terminology and argument you have to try to understand before you can even criticise what they're saying. Often it's good to throw in a few symbols and things that look like equations.

I suspect a lot of them are guff. But it's hard to penetrate their world sufficiently to be sure; I mean, I've gone back to school to try to figure it out and I can't.

Interesting piece, i thought you might be interested in a book I've just come across extolling the virtues of a good story, when it comes to their presentation.

http://www.jonathangottschall.com/storytelling-animal

This is part of the theme I have heard being called 'Truth vs Rhetoric'.
Rhetoric is not a bad thing as such, and can be a really good thing when it serves to complement truth. Rhetoric is bad only in the absence of truth, called 'mere rhetoric'.

We can prove truth is more important than rhetoric by imagining them in competition: If we can only choose between a person that is good a finding truth but bad at rhetoric, and a person that is bad at finding truth but good at rhetoric, I thing we would all choose the former over the latter. Therefore truth is more important than rhetoric.

If we can only choose between a person that is good a finding truth but bad at rhetoric, and a person that is bad at finding truth but good at rhetoric, I thing we would all choose the former over the latter. Therefore truth is more important than rhetoric. — Samuel Lacrampe

Nonsense, people choose the latter over and over again in their billions.

People would choose the rhetorician because they also believe he is speaking the truth; but I don't believe people would choose mere rhetoric if they knew the person was not speaking the truth.

Then you have a much more grandiose view of human nature than I do. Placebos work even when people are told they're placebos.

That may depend on the context. If I have a non-physiologically harmful condition like a headache which symptoms can be alleviated with a placebo, then I would take it. But if I know the cause is physiologically harmful, like a tumour, then I would not take a mere placebo. I believe such would be the case for most people.

I understood the OP to be about theories, so which drug definitively worked would not enter into it. The point, in the real world, is that we never have such alternatives. We have theories which seem closer to 'truth' (by whatever measure), and theories which seem further away. People, it seems, will regularly choose to maintain theories which they themselves consider rationally to be further away from 'truth' because of the rhetorical appeal of the story they come with. Just look at any of the research on cognitive dissonace, confirmation bias, etc.

I do very much doubt someone would reject a drug which has been proven beyond all doubt to cure whatever ailment they have, but people regularly do reject drugs with high levels of proof (closer to 'truth') in favour of drugs with little or no level of proof, even for very serious conditions, simply because they prefer the story.

I admit that aside from my own experience, I don't know what people tend to choose in general. Therefore, as a descriptive view on truth vs rhetoric, it may be that people tend to favour the latter over the former. However, as a prescriptive view on truth vs rhetoric, I hope you and I agree we ought to pick the former over the latter. What good is it to persuade people if the object of persuasion is not true?

I think the answer to that question depends on what you understand by 'true'. I'm happy to believe that there is an existent reality outside of our own interpretation, I'm absolutely certain that there is a "way things are", and either of these things could be called 'The Truth', but I'm not clear in most cases how we determine whether our theories are any closer to it than any other. Inter-subjectivity and predictive power certainly seem useful and in some understandings of "the way things are", they could be said to show how close a theory is to 'the truth', but this is far from certain.

So the trouble is, do people like certain rhetoric because it sounds true? Have we got any justifiable epistemology which could counter that?

I think a good deal of the population hold theories which they themselves do not believe to true, simply because they like the way they've been presented. I honestly think these people would be happier without the cognitive dissonance this causes, but that's not my main concern.

My concern over rhetoric is it masking a theory which, to me, seems evidently not true. If to me, it seems not true, then I don't want a load of people believing in it because I'm concerned about the consequences if they do, so I will do my best to prevent that. My best will inevitably involve choosing the rhetoric I think will have most effect, and if people believe me purely because of my rhetoric, then as far as I'm concerned, that's good enough.

As long as the intention is to aim for truth, then that is good enough. After which, even if truth is not found, the resulting errors can be called honest errors. The problem lies in those who trade the aim for truth for other aims, like comfort in the lie, or different still, don't even consider truth one way or the other, like bullsh*tting.

Well, I think we can agree on that (who wouldn't), but I think if you and I came up with a list of people who were 'aiming for truth' and a list of people who were 'bullshitting', I doubt our lists would contain the same people, now why would that be, and more importantly, if we cannot resolve our conflicting lists then what use is our conclusion that the people on the 'truth-seekers' list are the ones everyone should follow/listen to?

While it can be hard to call out a liar, I don't believe it is hard to tell apart bullshitters from truth-seekers. Truth-seekers are rational, that is, they can back up their claims with objective reasons. The beauty of rationality is that it is a universal language, where two strangers can converse and come to agreements provided they use the same definitions and agree on some principles (which they will if they dig deep enough).

On the other hand, bullshitters, by definition, don't even try to be rational. Thus a bullshitter can be called out by asking simple questions such as "Why?", "How do you figure that?", and "Can you back that up?".

The beauty of rationality is that it is a universal language, where two strangers can converse and come to agreements provided they use the same definitions and agree on some principles (which they will if they dig deep enough). — Samuel Lacrampe

And you see that happening do you...ever? Have you read much philosophy? As a little experiment, have a look through the last ten threads on this forum and just make a note of the times when all those involved have rationally come to some agreement. Rational analysis does not simply reveal the truth, there are too many confounding factors. It's like saying that an analysis of the position of all the molecules in the atmosphere at any one time will be able to determine the weather. It might well be true, but impossible. In stead we must make informed speculations based on macro measurements and this means that two perfectly rational well-informed meteorologists might still disagree with each other.

It's what Van Inwagen call the problem of epistemic peers, which I have mentioned elsewhere. If someone who is ostensibly as well-informed and intelligent as you are about a subject disagrees with you, then it follows that it must be possible for someone as well-informed and intelligent as you to be nonetheless wrong (since one of you has to be wrong). If it is possible for someone as well-informed and intelligent as you to be wrong, then how do you know it isn't you?

Personally, I've never encountered anyone in serious debate who has been unable to answer "Why?" or "Can you back that up?". They may well give me an answer that I'm unsatisfied with, but then we get into the problem of epistemic peers (how do I know that my dissatisfaction with their answer means it is wrong and not that I am wrong?).

Rationality is deceptive. One thinks one has reached the only inevitable conclusion based on all the facts, but "all the facts" are only ever going to a minuscule subset of all there is to know about a subject, like trying to draw conclusions about an elephant by looking only at it's toenail. and then you have to draw 'rational' conclusions from this tiny subset of evidence. How are you checking that your conclusions are indeed rational? You can't check against yourself, a system cannot test itself for errors, how would it ever know if the testing process had errors. You could check with other people, but if, when other people disagree with you, you're going to call them out as bullshitters then the conclusion of that test seems something of a fait de complit doesn't it?

So how do these two strangers who have dug deep enough and agreed on some principles have any means of checking that their 'rational' analysis actually means anything?

[...] If it is possible for someone as well-informed and intelligent as you to be wrong, then how do you know it isn't you? — Pseudonym

The rational person does not claim to never be wrong. Rationality, like math, is in theory infallible in its applicable topics; although the person applying it is not, because we all make mistakes once in a while. If two mathematicians disagree on the result of a given problem, they can judge who is wrong by checking each other's steps.

So how do these two strangers who have dug deep enough and agreed on some principles have any means of checking that their 'rational' analysis actually means anything? — Pseudonym

Dialectic: Each person defends their position with objective reasons, called an argument, and attempts to refute the other's arguments.

Although it does not need to be formulated that way, an argument can always be reshaped into a syllogism; and a syllogism is refuted in only three ways: (1) Ambiguous term, (2) False premise, and (3) Logical fallacy. (1) The ambiguous term is in my opinion the most critical part to get right. Socrates spent most of his dialogues on definitions. (2) The false premise can come from a disagreement on principles or on facts. If on principles, keep digging until you find a common one, and this becomes the starting point of the discussion. If on facts, then we can at least agree on hypothetical reasoning: If A then B, but if C then D. (3) The unintended logical fallacy can be caught by someone else.

If I cannot refute your argument, then it does not necessarily mean you speak the truth, but it does mean you are closer to the truth than I am; because even if it turns out my position was the right one, it would be by coincidence, and not by knowledge.