Literary flamboyance can be used to mask theoretical gaps.
(...)
They may repeat banal observations at key points in time, so as to create the illusion of complexity. They may quote a long-dead poet to add intrigue, mystique or garner an impression of being a "worldly" person who has interests in a variety of tastes, when in reality, a poem by itself does not prove anything "scientifically" - it's fluff. — darthbarracuda
Sometimes, a theory is taken to be true in the absence of any other contenders. — darthbarracuda
Yet once again, its usefulness does not prove it is true. It merely means it is useful, which may be completely accidental. — darthbarracuda
By and large the assumption seems to be that the world is a rational place and thus can be ascertained and understood rationally, when in fact there is no possible evidence that could prove or disprove this assumption. — darthbarracuda
Flamboyance can be attempted by academics to their fellows, but assuming it's in a relatively formal setting it's not likely to function as a way of passing off nonsense. — MindForged
I think you're confusing accepting a theory because it's most rational theory with the unilateral assertion of its truth. Much of the time when pressed, it's the former that's being communicated. The latter is generally reserved for very well evidenced theories. — MindForged
Whereas the possibility you're representing is both unevidenced and extremely unlikely. Reality could be all sorts of ways, but what you're basically saying is this. "Oh yeah, those beliefs are useful and allow you to,.by believing them, correctly predict and plan for reality to be such and such a way. However, in fact it just seems like it." You might as well have said "No" for all you gave us to chew on for that view. If Newtonian dynamics tells me some object will move in some way in certain conditions, and it does under continued testing, it's just useful. It's (the theory) is either true or near enough that anything else is probably irrelevant to most tasks. — MindForged
A theory with little evidence that is organized and worded in a pleasing manner may very well get more attention than a theory with better evidence but poor organization. A theory that sparks the imagination, makes people really wonder, can be completely false yet nevertheless garner significant support. — darthbarracuda
Supposedly, the natural world is amoral and so the further away we keep scientific inquiry from morality, the better (or so it goes). — darthbarracuda
But "most rational" theory may still be give too much credence to the theory. Often theories are taken as true because they cohere well to other theories, and ultimately cohere with a naturalistic picture of the world. But the evidence going for it is still not very strong. — darthbarracuda
Why are they like this? Because relativism threatens the moral project. Under relativism, they can't argue for absolute moral truths. Why do religious fundamentalists hate atheists? Because atheism threatens the central pillar of Judeo-Christian-Islamic religious belief. As such theory in general is threatened by skepticism. Yet skepticism is ignored, treated as "childish". Why? — darthbarracuda
In order for something to be a "fact", it must hold widespread agreement amongst contemporary theorists. — darthbarracuda
The scientist can not only be a good observer of the world - they must also be good at presenting what they see, keeping the audience interested long enough to get the point across. — darthbarracuda
If we can only choose between a person that is good a finding truth but bad at rhetoric, and a person that is bad at finding truth but good at rhetoric, I thing we would all choose the former over the latter. Therefore truth is more important than rhetoric. — Samuel Lacrampe
The beauty of rationality is that it is a universal language, where two strangers can converse and come to agreements provided they use the same definitions and agree on some principles (which they will if they dig deep enough). — Samuel Lacrampe
The rational person does not claim to never be wrong. Rationality, like math, is in theory infallible in its applicable topics; although the person applying it is not, because we all make mistakes once in a while. If two mathematicians disagree on the result of a given problem, they can judge who is wrong by checking each other's steps.[...] If it is possible for someone as well-informed and intelligent as you to be wrong, then how do you know it isn't you? — Pseudonym
Dialectic: Each person defends their position with objective reasons, called an argument, and attempts to refute the other's arguments.So how do these two strangers who have dug deep enough and agreed on some principles have any means of checking that their 'rational' analysis actually means anything? — Pseudonym
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