no; used as in what we do with it.
— Banno
Exactly. What you do with words is use them to refer to (communicate) the non-verbal contents of your mind. — Harry Hindu

So we use words to "refer to (communicate)" the non-words in our minds? :chin: — Pattern-chaser

Indeed. There is something quite amiss in Harry's account.

Let's look at one of his claims directly: Harry says that when I talk of "Harry Hindu", what I am refering to is the Harry Hindu in my mind.

But that's not right. The notion of Harry Hindu in my mind does not write posts in the philosophy forum. It's some sort of mental object, and so does not have hands with which to write.

Now, Harry Hindu, being a person, can write posts on PF. It follows that what I refer to when I use the name "Harry Hindu" is Harry Hindu, and not My-mental-image-of-Harry-Hindu.

Harry will claim that this is some how an unfair account; he is in the thrall of a false picture of how language works, as something that exists in his head instead of something that is constructed by all of us together as we use it.

We can go a step further. I keep seeing "Hairy" instead of "Harry", and as a result my image of Harry Hindu is sometimes like this:


Somehow I think it not quite accurate.

But if the meaning of "Harry Hindu" is my mental image, and not the actual Harry, then I can't be wrong.

But if the meaning of "Harry Hindu" is my mental image, and not the actual Harry, then I can't be wrong. — Banno

Really? That is Harry?

Before using words, you have to think of what it is you want to say, and it doesn't always come in the form of other words, rather it comes in non-verbal sensory impressions that we translate to words in order to communicate those ideas to another person. — Harry Hindu

We can go a step further. I keep seeing "Hairy" instead of "Harry", and as a result my image of Harry Hindu is sometimes like this: — Banno

Between the picture theory of language and linguistic behaviourism there is a middle ground position.

Mental imagery or non-verbal content is the brain doing its thing of anticipating its perceptual future. To act in the world according to a model of the world is to act on the basis of a running forward prediction. So mental imagery is the development of constrained states of expectation. And that constraint can range from vague inklings all the way up to vividly exact sensori-motor states. Language then becomes a way to achieve those kinds of anticipatory mental states in the minds of others, and even - though self talk - yourself.

So when we think "tree", we set up a state of constrained expectation in ourself that could be quite vague and permissive - a generalised sense of tree-ness. Or if we make the attentive effort to flesh out some particular predictive image, which takes about half a second to generate, we may have some strongly developed and vivid picture of a particular oak in a forest clearing in mind.

And likewise, when we say "tree", we can rely on fellow language users to respond with more or less accuracy in line with our own learnt habits of thought. Their mental imagery or states of expectancy will be well enough constrained to achieve the same intents.

The point is that no word needs to have completely defined meaning - if meaning is understood as some kind of exhaustive veridical content. That is merely importing naive realism into the story.

Words only have to constrain states of expectation to the degree that it is useful. And sometimes being vague is more useful, given the future is often not all that exactly predictable. So arguing over whether words have some exact correspondence with reality is rather missing the point. The goal is the modelling one of words having some useful kind of correspondence with the certainties and uncertainties of the near future.

So a constraints-based approach says meanings are open-ended. Any expression is unlimited in its potential interpretations by any reasonably competent speaker. There will always be a way to misunderstand ... a way to avoid agreement.

But well co-ordinated speech will put one speaker in mind of the same thoughts, the same states of mental expectancy, as another, to the degree it is useful. And that will reflect both the certainties and uncertainties that are inherent in the pragmatics of predicting the future in meaningful fashion.

To then try to map propositional notions of truth on to the psychology of forward modelling or perceptual anticipation is of course then the importing of naive realism. Propositional truth likes to ignore the issue of vagueness for a start. It wants to deal in crisp yes or no only.

Is that an image of Harry I see before me? Answer one way or the other. Let's pretend that ambiguity or uncertainty are not inherent in the business of making psychological predictions about the future of our experiences.

Is it that despite the Socratic method being around for more than 2000years, no-one (except you) has thought to apply it to the meanings of words, or is it that they have but the process simply takes more than 2000 years to resolve (in which case I don't have much hope for the technique helping much on this forum), or is it, just possibly, that it doesn't work? — Pseudonym

I would not exclude the fourth possibility that you all just suck at it :joke: .

But instead of trying to persuade that it doesn't work by the mere fact that no one could find the essence of 'belief', can you locate an inherent flaw in the method in general?

How is the fact that it evidently doesn't work, despite 2000 years of trial, not an inherent flaw. If someone gave me a new phone and it didn't function, I wouldn't expect to have to find the exact diode that had failed before being entitled to conclude that the phone didn't work.

If you want an account of those flaws, you could read Wittgenstein, Nietzsche, even Heidegger(if you must), or any of the many ordinary language philosophers, existentialists, quietists, pragmatists, all of whom in various ways have found flaws in the process. But that's not the point. The point is that you personally would not find their arguments compelling. What they see as flaws, you would not, and how do you resolve that problem? You can't keep discussing it until one of you agrees with the other, that's the very method that's being examined so to continue already begs the question. You can't simply presume they're mistaken, they're at least as intelligent as you are and possessed of the same empirical and a priori knowledge. So you can only conclude that the truth of the matter is unobtainable, or you're some kind of unique genius. It's up to you which.

You seem to be missing out an entire, crucially important stage and that's what I'm trying to ask you about (and I think that's what Banno's trying to get at too).

Your process seems to go like this;

1. You have a sensation/thought in your mind which you convert to a sign (word) which somehow represents that sensation/thought.
2. You say that word or write it and I hear it or read it.
3. I then try to convert that word into a sensation or thought hopefully close to the one you had.

This seems to me to encapsulate entirely what you're saying about communication, and I don't think anyone's disagreeing with you. But none of that is what the philosophical discussion of meaning is about. Philosophical discussions of meaning are about how you know what words are good ones to use to represent your sensation/thought. You don't just pick some random word, so how do you know which one to pick? That is the meaning of the word, its the reason you chose it to represent the sensation/thought you wanted to communicate. Why choose 'tree'? Because it somehow is already the sound that is most likely to get the same image into my mind that you have in yours (that of a tree). So if meaning is whatever you intend, then what is that thing which is clearly a property of the word 'tree' which led you to choose it to do that job? — Pseudonym

Why make a distinction between meaning an philosophical meaning? What I'm doing is defining meaning in a way that makes sense in all manners that we use the word, "meaning". There shouldn't be any inconsistencies - just integration.

Your important stage was covered in step 1. We choose certain words because those are the strings of symbols that we learned to refer to anything. Were you taught the word, "tree" without any reference to actual trees, or even pictures of trees?

But we could have learned ANY string of symbols to refer to a tree. If you were born and raised in China, you'd use a different symbol and different sound to refer to trees. So the symbols we assign are arbitrary. This is why language is flexible. This is why new uses arise and are either accepted or rejected by the society you find yourself in. You could use any symbol you want, but in order to communicate with people of the same language, you need to learn the symbols of that language.

The meaning of any spoken or written word is what the author intended. I have asked both you and Banno how it is that we don't impose our own meanings on the words that others post. Instead, we always try to get at the intent of the user of those words. You both ignore this point yet I think it shows that meaning isn't projected. It is predicted. This also accounts for how we can misinterpret meanings.If we could project our meanings, then how do we get anything wrong? You, Banno, and Pattern-Chaser are ignoring these key points that are a detriment to your positions.

So we use words to "refer to (communicate)" the non-words in our minds? :chin: — Pattern-chaser

I don't see what is so difficult about that. Did you learn what "tree" refers to when you were very young when your parents pointed to a tree and said, "tree"? Do you not associate the non-verbal imagery of trees, their smell, the feel of their bark and leaves, the sound of the wind blowing through the leaves, etc? - all of which are composed of sensory impressions that are not words?

Perhaps. But I think you're not. I commented because you claimed the words were the effect. Now you agree that they aren't (?), so I'm not sure what your argument or point is. Let's see if we can drill to the core of this sub-topic.

You appear to assert that meaning is the relationship between cause and effect.

Have I understood your position correctly?
Is this offered as a definition of meaning, or an illustrative example of what meaning is? — Pattern-chaser

It is the definition of meaning.

I never rejected that words are an effect. How can you deny that they are. How did your words get on this screen, if not by cause and effect? How is it that I can read your words if you didn't have an idea that you wanted to convey to me? Are you saying that your words are not a reflection of your ideas? If so, then what are you talking about?

Let's look at one of his claims directly: Harry says that when I talk of "Harry Hindu", what I am refering to is the Harry Hindu in my mind.

But that's not right. The notion of Harry Hindu in my mind does not write posts in the philosophy forum. It's some sort of mental object, and so does not have hands with which to write.

Now, Harry Hindu, being a person, can write posts on PF. It follows that what I refer to when I use the name "Harry Hindu" is Harry Hindu, and not My-mental-image-of-Harry-Hindu.

Harry will claim that this is some how an unfair account; he is in the thrall of a false picture of how language works, as something that exists in his head instead of something that is constructed by all of us together as we use it. — Banno

Banno, and what is your mental image of me if not a representation of the real me? Would you be talking about me if you never met me? The only way you know me is through your mental representations of me, which I have to say, are very limited especially via an internet forum.

If your mental representation of me doesn't include hands and arms, then how do you explain the existence of my posts? While I don't have a mental picture of you as I don't know what you look like, I do believe you have hands and are capable of typing. My only mental image of you is an internet avatar, and the same for you in representing me.

Being that we live in a shared world, using shared symbols to refer to those things in the world, and equipped with an understanding that our minds are just representations themselves (effects of prior causes (which is the outside world)), then it is understood within the context of language use that we are referring to the world, not our representations of it, unless we make it clear that we are taking about the contents of our minds instead of the world. We do this when a doctor asks you to describe your visual experiences, or the pain you are having because that helps the doctor get at what is happening in the world with your eyes or body.

We can go a step further. I keep seeing "Hairy" instead of "Harry", and as a result my image of Harry Hindu is sometimes like this:
portrait-of-an-indian-saddhu-at-a-temple-in-udaipur-rajasthan-c2ae0c.jpg

Somehow I think it not quite accurate.

But if the meaning of "Harry Hindu" is my mental image, and not the actual Harry, then I can't be wrong. — Banno

Exactly, which is what you are implying, not me. Your mental image can be wrong, BECAUSE it is a predicted representation. You are wrong, and your language use represents that (your inaccurate mental representation of me). In other words, you are using words to refer to your representation of me, which can be wrong or right. So, your word use isn't wrong, just your representation of me is, which is an effect itself - an effect of your limited interactions with me and your own biases, and therefore has an effect on the words you use to describe me.

We choose certain words because those are the strings of symbols that we learned to refer to anything. — Harry Hindu

Right, so the word already had a meaning before the author writes it. It has to, otherwise the author would have no reason to select it. If the word had a meaning before the author writes it, then it's meaning cannot just be whatever the author intends. There is some property of the word 'tree' which already exists prior the the author's selecting it, which make it good choice for him to convey the idea of the tall plant in the woods.

The question of meaning is not about how a word comes to mean what it does within the language community, its about what it means already within that community, and we've just established, it must mean something already before the author uses it, in order for him to make a non-arbitrary selection. So your contention that the meaning of a word is whatever the speaker has in mind when they employ it, is simply wrong.

Instead, we always try to get at the intent of the user of those words. — Harry Hindu

No, we don't. If an author uses the word 'tree', I assume he means either the tall plant, or maybe some multi-branching diagram. I make absolutely no investigation of what the author intended beyond selecting from the established uses of the word in context. I don't ask them to elaborate unless I'm confused, I don't look to some published glossary of their personal meanings. I expect it to mean one of the things it already means within the language game I'm playing. So again, the meaning of the word already exists and the author must necessarily adhere to the rules of the language game or else he will not be understood.

If we could project our meanings, then how do we get anything wrong? — Harry Hindu

I've never suggested that we get to project our meanings any more than the author gets to project theirs. The meaning of a word is its use in the language game. It's determined by the interaction of both players and the millions of language speakers who have gone before them, and the nature of the language game being played.

If the word had a meaning before the author writes it, then it's meaning cannot just be whatever the author intends. There is some property of the word 'tree' which already exists prior the the author's selecting it, which make it good choice for him to convey the idea of the tall plant in the woods. — Pseudonym

It can't be difficult to agree that this is a two-way street. Linguistic communities create the general game. And individual players make creative use of the resulting space of free actions. Eventually new linguistic habits can emerge from those creative uses because they seem generally useful at the communal level (rather than just tentatively useful at the personal creative level on some occasion or other).

So any argument that tries to establish that only one side of the deal is in control - the community or the author - is a waste of breath. The interesting question is about characterising the dynamic in play. (Which is where a systems style constraints approach makes the most sense.)

The question of meaning is not about how a word comes to mean what it does within the language community, its about what it means already within that community, and we've just established, it must mean something already before the author uses it, in order for him to make a non-arbitrary selection. — Pseudonym

Yep. So you are forcing the synchronic, history-flattening, view on the issue when the diachronic, or developmental, view is the one that is going to see the whole deal.

Actual human experience of society and culture tells us that games evolve their rules all the time. They are always fiddling with the rules of rugby, Wall St, or the highway code.

No, we don't. If an author uses the word 'tree', I assume he means either the tall plant, or maybe some multi-branching diagram. — Pseudonym

This goes to something else. It backs up @Harry Hindu on the strangely contested idea that words do refer to essences in some fashion. We can see the common "treeness" connecting these two examples of acceptable language use. A general hierarchical branching structure.

So whatever the author means in either case, it is essentially that. Trees - the plant kind - are indeed a particular expression of a more general, and strikingly simple, rule for growth-based symmetry breaking.

And in being a mathematically general fact of that kind, it undermines the view that it is all "just a language game". Talk of trees, and their treeness, isn't arbitrary. It is talk about some deep fact of the world - a fact about how the world plays its "games" of structuring form. The universe has actual "rules" - or rather, its universal forms, its simplest possible and so most widely observed constraints on random variety.

The meaning of a word is its use in the language game. It's determined by the interaction of both players and the millions of language speakers who have gone before them, and the nature of the language game being played. — Pseudonym

It is more complicated than that as the language game is also being played with "the world". It interacts in pragmatic fashion with that.

The language game is in addition being played from the foundation of the perception game. That too is a semiotic interaction in which developmental neurology is a genetically constrained game of making pragmatic sense of "the world". We can see its "colours", we can smell its "odours". We can experience the full variety of "its" sensory qualities.

So calling language a game does get something right about language. The puzzle is how this small point then gets turned into a general stance of saying "it is only a game".

Sure, humans are different in living linguistically structured lives and so having a very socially- constructed relationship with the world. But there is a world out there. And even perceptual level semiotics is seeking to understand it in terms of its essences, generalities or global habits.

It can't be difficult to agree that this is a two-way street. Linguistic communities create the general game. And individual players make creative use of the resulting space of free actions. Eventually new linguistic habits can emerge from those creative uses because they seem generally useful at the communal level (rather than just tentatively useful at the personal creative level on some occasion or other).

So any argument that tries to establish that only one side of the deal is in control - the community or the author - is a waste of breath. The interesting question is about characterising the dynamic in play. (Which is where a systems style constraints approach makes the most sense.) — apokrisis

Exactly. This is what I was trying to convey. The author selects from meanings which already exist (or are implied by existing uses) that will communicate the message. We keep using the word 'tree', but it's actually a terrible example considering the point of the OP which is to imply that some progress could be made in philosophical discourse if words were defined first. I opposed that by claiming that at no point in time would we become any clearer as to what vague philosophical terms actually mean by describing them in other terms. In this sense, the fact that meaning is use is the most pertinent aspect of the whole field of language. It makes the point that people will make use of the terms in an argument vaguely, even rhetorically, as place-holders for concepts that don't exist, as place-holders for concepts that might exist but with know idea how...etc. All sorts of uses, none of which are connected to some referential definition. I don't deny that the language user has a part to play in evolving definitions, but it's their part in the game that matters to me here.

Yep. So you are forcing the synchronic, history-flattening, view on the issue when the diachronic, or developmental, view is the one that is going to see the whole deal.

Actual human experience of society and culture tells us that games evolve their rules all the time. They are always fiddling with the rules of rugby, Wall St, or the highway code. — apokrisis

So, as above, the intention behind my ignoring the historical aspect was not to deny it a place in understanding meaning, but to suggest that it was unimportant in this particular argument. I'm trying to say that the mechanics of how a word comes to mean what it does in a particular language game does not help us understand why further definitions are of no use in philosophical discourse to clarify vague terms. I'm not suggesting it's of no use at all. The entire history of the use and evolution of the word 'rational' within the language game played by philosophers, for example, has been part of the rhetoric of philosophy. We couldn't go back over it's evolution to help us understand how it's being used in an argument that, say, belief in God is not rational. It's use in that proposition is entirely rhetorical, it's meaning here is determined by the game being played now, it's not been guided by some external essence, like the word 'tree', it's been guided entirely by it's function within the same sort of language game within which it evolved.

Talk of trees, and their treeness, isn't arbitrary. It is talk about some deep fact of the world - a fact about how the world plays its "games" of structuring form. The universe has actual "rules" - or rather, its universal forms, its simplest possible and so most widely observed constraints on random variety. — apokrisis

I think I've covered this above, in that what I'm saying applies more to words used within philosophical discussion that words sunsu lato. Even here though, it would be worth tempering your appeal to universal essences. The word 'tree' actually seems to derives from the root 'deru' which means strong and steadfast. So It was originally trying to get at the tree's firm and unyielding nature, not it's multi-branching form. The word has also been used (particularly in Middle English) to describe a number of things simply made of wood, regardless of their form. The use of the word tree to describe many things of a multi-branching form is very recent. So, I buy into the idea that authors use their creativity to come up with new uses of a word which are accepted on their merits, I also buy into the idea that the recognition of patterns guides people in that creative endeavour, but I don't see how the imposition by the world of these constraints tells us anything useful because we cannot see them in advance. All we can say is that all future uses of the word 'tree' will be somehow constrained by our preference for pattern over randomness. It is unlikely that a new use will arise which is not in some way connected to past uses, but we cannot possibly say in what way, so I'm not sure what use such an approach is.

You appear to assert that meaning is the relationship between cause and effect.
Have I understood your position correctly?
Is this offered as a definition of meaning, or an illustrative example of what meaning is? — Pattern-chaser

It is the definition of meaning. — Harry Hindu

OK ... for a start, the relationship between a cause and its consequent effect is known as, and defined as, a cause-effect relationship. Of course, cause-effect relationships appear everywhere, so if I point to a different way of defining meaning, you will easily be able to point in the same direction, and find a cause-effect relationship. But I don't think this supports your thesis. It's more coincidental, and relies on the almost universal presence of causes and effects.

This thread is about defining terms, and meaning is one of the more difficult ones. Not least because we will often end up referring to the meaning of meaning, and such like, and the phraseology can easily become confused. More generally, words are ambiguous. A brief look at a dictionary will confirm that most words have multiple meanings, in English and (I think) in most other languages too. Lawyers have laboured for centuries to find unambiguous language in which to phrase contracts, without significant success.

Some users of language celebrate its ambiguity. The choice that English often provides, of near-synonyms derived from Viking, Anglo-Saxon, Norman French, Latin or Greek, mean that we can choose the one with the required shades of meaning. Poetry is the most obvious, and most advanced, form of this kind of language usage. Meanings are stretched and distorted, quite deliberately, to transmit impressions that simple, literal, language cannot convey.

In these terms, it is difficult to appreciate a definition of meaning that is so analytical, and so unexpected, compared with the way that the term meaning is more commonly used. Most dictionaries offer a number of definitions for meaning, none of which mention cause and effect. This means little, as dictionaries are only a starting-point when it comes to defining words, and the way they are used. But your definition is so different, it is hard to know where to begin examining it.

Your definition makes it clear you see meaning as being intrinsic to the thing being discussed or described. And so I feel obliged to trot out the standard refutation for this: if meaning exists out there in the real world, please point to it. And please describe the measuring equipment used to confirm its existence. Where is your meaning-meter? :wink:

I am guessing that you are generally of the Objectivist persuasion (?), so am I correct to assume that you intend a simple and literal definition of meaning? Something comparable with 'the meaning of a word can be found in a dictionary'? In fact, I wonder if you see "meaning" as meaning little more than "definition"?

Despite all this, I cannot forget that many uses of the term meaning revolve around significance or import (to human beings). To use the term in a way that precludes this existing and long-standing usage can only lead to confusion, can it not? You do seem to be using the term in a unique way.

We keep using the word 'tree', but it's actually a terrible example considering the point of the OP which is to imply that some progress could be made in philosophical discourse if words were defined first. — Pseudonym

Oh I agree heartily that starting with definitions is the last thing we would do. You are absolutely correct that meaning can't be analysed by interrogating the terms we use themselves.

The word 'tree' actually seems to derives from the root 'deru' which means strong and steadfast. So It was originally trying to get at the tree's firm and unyielding nature, not it's multi-branching form. — Pseudonym

I'd be surprised if there weren't terms even back then to distinguish trees - as tall plants branching off from a single trunk - from shrubs. Maybe every tree was an "oak" or whatever. Certainly we would expect the concrete noun to precede its metaphoric use. So deru would not have started out as steadfast and then trees be called that by analogy.

But whatever. My point was that nature does indeed have ontic structure. So words can speak rather directly to universal essences in that sense. The meanings of language can be constrained by reality in that fashion. The social construction of reality has its actual limits, as well as its actual creative freedoms.

This matters for philosophical language where the ability to pick out the universal in language use is a contentious issue. But that is a step beyond the original argument you were making, I see that.

All we can say is that all future uses of the word 'tree' will be somehow constrained by our preference for pattern over randomness. — Pseudonym

Again, it comes back to my greater interest in language as a form of semiosis. So I want to go the step beyond the pragmatics of "meaning is use" to the story of the actual general mechanism by which that is true. Thus a speech act becomes a state of interpretive constraint which is "understood" in terms of a suitable sign, a suitable act of measurement.

The meaning of "the cat is on the mat" is some kind of agreement to that being a perceived fact. And the agreement hinges on being able to ignore a whole bunch of potential differences as to that being understood as the case. The cat could be a squirrel - a remote possibility, but we could be mistaken. Or the mat could be really a rug, in someone else's eyes.

So this strengthens the psychological aspect of semantics. We can only agree a meaning to the extent we agree to ignore the endless possible differences of nature, of the real world. Word use corresponds not to things in themselves but to where we agree to stop debating the open-ended differences that will always remain.

So word definitions are doubly useless. Word use is by design open-ended. A word only constrains a space of interpretive possibilities. We could use "tree" to mean a whole bunch of things in creative fashion. Then even worse, where "tree" ceases to apply is also a product of pragmatic agreement. We simply decide that despite the endless possible ongoing differences, we will draw our boundary here, for the moment. For the duration of this speech act.

But then, in having this generalised character, words are pretty good at capturing the abstract. Words are intrinsically philosophical in that they generalise so easily. They don't sweat the detail. They are quite happy having a loose or universal fit.

That is how constraints work. And so - the even bigger picture - language is like nature in that regard. It is a structure that can be tightened as much as necessary to achieve a result. But that openness is closed by reaching some shared point of unconcern, or equilibrium, or diminished returns. Eventually differences no longer make a difference so far as the meaning goes.

Or the other way to put it is that nature is like language - semiotic. Which is another metaphysical story of course.

I'd be surprised if there weren't terms even back then to distinguish trees - as tall plants branching off from a single trunk - from shrubs. — apokrisis

Absolutely. My main point here is to question the use this constraints-based approach is being put to (not is usefulness, which I don't doubt, just its use here). So what I'm getting at is that whilst we can be fairly sure, it seems to me, that the creative re-use of words is definatly constrained by needing to conform to some pattern dictated by the world, I'm not so sure that we can 'see' what those boundaries might be. Essentially, those boundaries themselves are limited only by the creativity of the language user and new uses of words may surprise us not only by a connection to the world which we can 'see' but had not made use of ourselves, but also by a connection to the world that we had not even 'seen' until the language user presents it to us.

Its like, to stick with our example, we might be unsurprised by anyone describing a new 'branchy' thing as a 'tree', we're prepared for any branch-like thing to be referred to as a 'tree' even though we might not currently be using the word that way. But then there's calling a steadfast and sturdy-like thing a 'tree'. Not only would that be a way we hadn't personally used 'tree', but it would also be a connection we weren't even expecting.

We can only agree a meaning to the extent we agree to ignore the endless possible differences of nature, of the real world. Word use corresponds not to things in themselves but to where we agree to stop debating the open-ended differences that will always remain. — apokrisis

This is a really interesting way of putting it. It's not too far from Wittgenstein's family resemblance, but I prefer this exposition. What's interesting about this for the OP, is that there is some act of definition which could be discussed prior to a debate, but that that act itself would most likely render the entire debate pointless. An honest agreement about what we had excluded by our use of a term would, I think, dissolve the majority of metaphysical debates.

and

Right, so the word already had a meaning before the author writes it. It has to, otherwise the author would have no reason to select it. If the word had a meaning before the author writes it, then it's meaning cannot just be whatever the author intends. There is some property of the word 'tree' which already exists prior the the author's selecting it, which make it good choice for him to convey the idea of the tall plant in the woods.

The question of meaning is not about how a word comes to mean what it does within the language community, its about what it means already within that community, and we've just established, it must mean something already before the author uses it, in order for him to make a non-arbitrary selection. So your contention that the meaning of a word is whatever the speaker has in mind when they employ it, is simply wrong. — Pseudonym

If words had meaning prior to any author using them, then where did words come from if they existed prior to humans? Who, or what assigned each word it's meaning in every language that ever existed or will exist? The fact that there are different languages itself is proof that language use is arbitrary. The symbols (sounds and scribbles) we use are arbitrary but the things that they refer to aren't. Your native language is just the system you've adopted as your means of communicating your non-verbal ideas. Using that system with a user of a different system causes problems. Both users have non-verbal ideas but can't share them externally without using a shared system - a protocol as the term is used in computer science.

And if words have meaning prior to their use, then how do you account for artistic and metaphorical uses of words and how they come to be commonly used within any language system? "You can't see the forest from the trees." is a metaphor that doesn't refer to any real forest or trees, but to a mental state - a lack of objectivity. How did that metaphor arise and become popular to use when referring to someone's lack of objectivity?

Words have no meaning in themselves until they are used to refer to something. There are just various systems of symbol use that vary in flexibility - where certain trends in re-using existing symbols (or inventing new symbols) to refer to other (or new) ideas within different contexts, exists. Sometimes another language's words are adopted into another language as a trend, and this is how a mixed language can develop - like Spanglish. Pig-Latin is a humorous play on the English language. Is there a Pig-Latin for Mandarin or Russian? Why not? Why would one use Pig-Latin instead of proper English? Doesn't that refer to their intent? Your native language is the effect of your development within a certain culture.

No, we don't. If an author uses the word 'tree', I assume he means either the tall plant, or maybe some multi-branching diagram. I make absolutely no investigation of what the author intended beyond selecting from the established uses of the word in context. I don't ask them to elaborate unless I'm confused, I don't look to some published glossary of their personal meanings. I expect it to mean one of the things it already means within the language game I'm playing. So again, the meaning of the word already exists and the author must necessarily adhere to the rules of the language game or else he will not be understood. — Pseudonym

This is forgetting that "established uses" of words are very different across the human species and change frequently within a language system (new words arise and existing words are re-vamped).

I've never suggested that we get to project our meanings any more than the author gets to project theirs. The meaning of a word is its use in the language game. It's determined by the interaction of both players and the millions of language speakers who have gone before them, and the nature of the language game being played. — Pseudonym

What I've been saying is your explanation leaves no room for artistic and metaphorical variety and inventiveness that exists and needs to be addressed in any good explanation of language and meaning.

Let me give another example:

Say that you are at home and are sitting downstairs reading a book in your favorite chair when you hear a loud "Boom!" from upstairs. Instinctively, you mentally try to get at the cause of the noise. You instinctively try to get at the meaning of the sound. You will attempt to predict the cause, or the meaning of noise. Is it a burglar? Did something fall? Is it a ghost? Eventually, you make your way upstairs and find that your brother fell out of bed while he was sleeping. That was the meaning/cause of the noise.

After breakfast, your brother goes back upstairs while you continue to read downstairs. After about 20 minutes, you hear your brother shout, "Boom!" Again, you attempt to get at the meaning of his word use. Why did he say, "Boom!" What did he mean? What what his intent? Is he teasing you and trying to be funny? You go upstairs again to investigate. You find your brother sitting at his computer desk playing a video game and he yelled, "Boom!" as the result of his excitement in blowing up an online opponent.

In each case, it was the cause of the sound that entailed the meaning of the sound (the effect), not some anthropomorphic rule for interpreting a certain system of symbols.

Your mental image can be wrong, BECAUSE it is a predicted representation. — Harry Hindu

One more time.

Your theory of meaning is that the name "Harry Hindu" refers to my mental image of you.

But you agree, from what you said above, that my mental image of you is not you.

That is, you distinguish between my mental image of Harry Hindu and Harry Hindu.

And it follows, quite directly, that my mental image of Harry Hindu, and Harry Hindu, are not the very same thing.

And hence, The referent of Harry Hindu is not my mental image of Harry Hindu.

And again: In order to formulate the expression "Your mental image of Harry Hindu can be wrong, BECAUSE it is a predicted representation of Harry Hindu", you must differentiate between my mental image of Harry and Harry himself.

And in so doing, you show that "Harry" refers to Harry, and not to a mental image.

Your theory of meaning is that the name "Harry Hindu" refers to my mental image of you. — Banno

You missed some vital punctuation. It should be: The name "Harry Hindu" refers to my mental image of “you”.

And really, even your “my” should be in quotes. Or is there some you that is separate from the sum of “your” willing actions? How do you hope to escape representationalism concerning pictures in the head while still talking about the kind of conscious self that could have that type of detached observing, rather than embodied and enactive, relation with anything?

One more time.

Your theory of meaning is that the name "Harry Hindu" refers to my mental image of you.

But you agree, from what you said above, that my mental image of you is not you.

That is, you distinguish between my mental image of Harry Hindu and Harry Hindu.

And it follows, quite directly, that my mental image of Harry Hindu, and Harry Hindu, are not the very same thing.

And hence, The referent of Harry Hindu is not my mental image of Harry Hindu.

And again: In order to formulate the expression "Your mental image of Harry Hindu can be wrong, BECAUSE it is a predicted representation of Harry Hindu", you must differentiate between my mental image of Harry and Harry himself.

And in so doing, you show that "Harry" refers to Harry, and not to a mental image. — Banno

All you have to do is go back an re-read my post to see that your reply is pointless. As I stated before, your words do refer to your mental image because your words are an inaccurate description of the actual "Harry Hindu" (I put Harry Hindu in quotes because Harry Hindu is a fictitious entity - an avatar on an internet forum and not the actual me - so it adds an extra layer of causation/meaning that you have to get through to get to the real me). If your words were more accurate, then I could still say that you words refer to your mental image of me. It's just that your mental image of me is more accurate and your words would reflect that.

While your mental image of me and the actual me are not the same thing, they are related through causation - similar to how the image in the mirror is not you, but a reflection of you in a causal relationship.

Edit.

All you have to do is go back an re-read my post to see that your reply is pointless. As I stated before, your words do refer to your mental image because your words are an inaccurate description of the actual "Harry Hindu" — Harry Hindu

What shall "actual Harry Hindu" mean? The actual mental image?
If someone shows a picture and says "This is <insert some name here>" it is clear that he means the "actual" person.
If someone says "Harry is floating in front of his computer while writing his posts" it is again clear that he is joking - just because of that.

Sorry for late response. Real life got in the way for a moment.

How is the fact that it evidently doesn't work, despite 2000 years of trial, not an inherent flaw. If someone gave me a new phone and it didn't function, I wouldn't expect to have to find the exact diode that had failed before being entitled to conclude that the phone didn't work. — Pseudonym

You mean to say "the fact that no one could find the essence of 'belief' in this forum". That it doesn't work is precisely what we are disputing here. At worst, even if the perfect definitions are not always found, the method allows to get very close to it; thereby making it worthwhile to use.

If you want an account of those flaws, you could read Wittgenstein, Nietzsche, even Heidegger(if you must), or any of the many ordinary language philosophers, existentialists, quietists, pragmatists, all of whom in various ways have found flaws in the process. — Pseudonym

Claiming that others have an argument is not a substitute to come up with an argument of your own. Maybe they do have compelling arguments, but you would not know it if you cannot say what it is. If you and I are going to have a long term discussion, I expect you to philosophize, and not merely point to other philosophers.

The point is that you personally would not find their arguments compelling. [...] — Pseudonym

Why not? In our previous discussion here, my position was the exact opposite, that, unlikely you, I believe we can come to an agreement.

Harry can't see it. Odd. Let's be clear: Harry Hindu is not my mental image of Harry Hindu. Yet if Harry's theory of meaning were right, he would be.

your mental image of me and the actual me are not the same thing, — Harry Hindu

Indeed. Which of them is Harry Hindu?

Propper names do not have a sense.

Propper names do not have a sense. — Banno

So it could just as easily be you who is "Harry Hindu" here.

Sounds legit.

So it could just as easily be you who is "Harry Hindu" here. — apokrisis

Propper names don't refer? Or is distinguishing sense and reference not something you do?

Apart from solipsism I'm not aware of any philosophy where a statement about the world would not refer to something outside the mind.

It's kind of off-putting when you keep talking about propper names.

But as a Peircean, I do indeed find Fregeanism the over-simplified version.

Eg: https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/viewFile/13383/9918

Peirce, again. Not my cup of tea. I think there were a few interesting things happened in logic over the last hundred and fifty years.

It's odd that one is obliged to say such things.

I suppose Harry might have some variation of Kripke's causal chains of reference in mind; but it would be a long and odd stretch to say that causal chains of reference referred to mental images.