Ah thank you for clarifying. Now, let us assume you're right, that which argument we adopt is based on our preferences. Why would that not be rational?

In my last post to you I gave you two examples (Monads and shitting in the street) of how an absurd preference could lead to an absurd thesis. In a philosophical debate, it is generally incumbent on you to either point out a flaw in my examples, or explain how the outcomes are equally good as your thesis argues.

You instead countered:

"But there is no one fact that we can all hang our philosophical coats on".

So what? Does you theory that every thesis is equal since it is based on preferences hang its hat on one fact? How does that counter my examples?

so long as you continue to mistakenly presume we choose (adopt) our beliefs, you will mistakenly presume the next question is the basis upon which we make such a choice (adoption). We go the way we are drawn. Absent a counter-veiling draw, no choice is presented, no preference is selected.

we go the way we are drawn

this is actually quite beautiful. Is this from somewhere or did you make this up? Either way, I like it.

We go the way we are drawn. Absent a counter-veiling draw, no choice is presented, no preference is selected. — Arne

I don't understand the distinction you're trying to make here.

Say I have a preference for vanilla ice-cream. I don't choose this preference (at least not in the moment), it is simply there as a brute fact. So when I'm faced with two choices of ice-cream, I will either choose the one I prefer, because I prefer it. Or deliberately choose one I do not prefer (maybe to expand my tastes, or simply out of self-flagellation). But if I'm given two meals, one of which is prepared with vanilla, and one of which is not. I may be 'drawn' to the one that has vanilla in it, even if I can't determine why. It's still because I prefer vanilla, it hasn't become some mystic force compelling me toward one particular meal. All that's happened is, absent of any other reason, I choose the one which reflects my preferences. I might be well aware I'm doing that, or I might be doing it subconsciously. I'm not sure what significance the distinction between those two routes has to the OP. Perhaps you could lay it out a bit?

I don't understand the distinction you're trying to make here. — Pseudonym

And you never will so long as you continue to equate trivial decisions such as flavors of ice cream with decisions regarding one's philosophical journey.

In addition and consistent with my previous comments, we do not make the number of decision during the course of a day as we think we do, let alone significant decisions. We spend most of our day on "auto pilot" when it comes to executing the decisions we have already made.

we go the way we are drawn
this is actually quite beautiful. Is this from somewhere or did you make this up? Either way, I like it.Reveal — mrnormal5150

It is mine. It is rooted in my interpretation of Heidegger's Being and Time.

And you never will so long as you continue to equate trivial decisions such as flavors of ice cream with decisions regarding one's philosophical journey. — Arne

How does this work? What is it about my equating trivial decisions with decisions about a philosophical journey which prevents me from understanding your distinction?

In addition and consistent with my previous comments, we do not make the number of decision during the course of a day as we think we do, let alone significant decisions. We spend most of our day on "auto pilot" when it comes to executing the decisions we have already made. — Arne

I don't understand the relevance of this. How does the number of decisions we make impact on the definition on the distinction you're trying to make?

I thought I'd asked rather a simple question, I just want to know what distinguishes being drawn to something from having a preference for something. All I'm getting so far is possibly either that you're defining one as being subconscious and the other conscious, or else you're defining one as being more powerful (or less trivial) than the other. The trouble is, it's not clear which, and in either case, I'm not sure how it would be demonstrably the case in philosophy.

How does this work? What is it about my equating trivial decisions with decisions about a philosophical journey which prevents me from understanding your distinction? — Pseudonym

What is it about my distinction that you are having difficulty understanding?

What if you were an internalist about justification, and maintained that non-belief states, themselves not justified, can act as justifiers?

Ah thank you for clarifying. Now, let us assume you're right, that which argument we adopt is based on our preferences. Why would that not be rational? — mrnormal5150

Preferences would be irrational as they aren't reasoned positions.

Preferences would be irrational as they aren't reasoned positions. — TheMadFool

you seem to be expressing a preference for the reasoned position?

and why would preferences not be a reasoned position?

don't most people have reasons for their preference?

in fact, couldn't one consider a preference to be the result of a previous reasoned decision rendered default?

if you are going to suggest that a preference is not a reasoned position, then what type of position is it?

is it just built in?

and if you want to suggest philosophy is ultimately about preference, then why would that be limited to just philosophy?

philosophically oriented people strike me as more contemplative than the average bear?

if they are going to make their decisions based upon preference, why are they spending all of that time thinking, reading, and writing?

and couldn't one argue that a reasoned position is simply a preference supported by argument?

the entire post rests upon a distinction between preference and reason and I suspect that if there is any such distinction, it is chimerical at best. Most people consider their preferences rooted in reason, i.e,. they have reasons for what they prefer. And your thesis supports that our apparently reasoned positions are simply overlays of argument upon philosophical positions adopted out of preference. So we have reasons for our preferences and preferences for our reasons and you have presented no argument as to why the reducibility of each to the other provides either with a deeper ground?

in fact, if we push your premise, your preference for preference as the ground of philosophy that all reasoned positions are the product of preferences and there is, therefore, no room for reason as an alternative primordial ground. As a result, even your distinction between preference and a reasoned position is a distinction without a difference.

Each of us is an understanding of being. We are driven towards and drawn to (1) that which is consistent with our understanding of being, (2) that which facilitates our interpretation of our understanding of being, and (3) that which facilitates our articulation of our interpretation of our understanding of being.

I fail to see how arguing for or against the notion that we prefer what we are driven to or drawn towards contributes any substance.

The story of the elephant and the blind men comes to mind.

One guy touches the trunk and says the elephant is rough and the other guy touches the tusks and says its smooth. Note smooth and rough are contraries. The whole picture is missing but there's proof on both sides (the rough trunk and the smooth tusk) leading to contradictory conclusions.

I think philosophical issues can be described as blind men feeling different parts of the problem and coming to irreconcilable conclusions.

So, until we see the issue in its entirity we don't really have any choice to persuade us to take side on the basis of logical arguments. We, therefore, adopt or believe in what we like. Preference!

Preferences would be irrational as they aren't reasoned positions.

I don't see how that follows. I'm asking why you think preferences are irrational if they aren't "reasoned." Are all non-reasoned things irrational? Is my tv set irrational? My taste for Indian food? These are non-rational...not irrational. Also, rationality and reasons can split apart, as my examples illustrated. Furthermore, rationality is a complex; it is an achievement of sorts. There are no default rational items. In order to arrive at "rational" beliefs, we will need justifiers. Justifiers themselves need not be justified. Insofar as our preferences can act as justifiers (I can think of several accessibility internalists who think this) they would be part of the process of rational belief formation. Because they themselves are non-rational elements of one's justifying base does not make them irrational.

I don't know about that. Aren't there premises that we all agree on? ...that we're each in a life in a "physical" world...and that there are abstract facts (at least in the sense that we can mention them)?

No, I suggest that our metaphysical differences originate in our ability to use terms that we conveniently forget to define, and then determinedly refuse to define. ...and our willingness to repeat assertions without answering arguments against them.

Of course it usually can't be proved that one metaphysics is true and that others are false, because pretty much all metaphysicses predict the same physical world that we observe...and usually do so by unparsimonious, unfalsifiable unverifiable contrivance.

But it can be shown that a metaphysics is unmparismonious, unverifiable and unfalsifiable, dependent on assumptions or a brute-fact.

....or that one isn't.

Much of the argument and difference here consists of repetition of claims that aren't supported when questioned.

As someone asked in an OP earlier, of what value is metaphysics without consistent, well-specified and consistent definitions? Some people here get angry when asked to define a term by which they feel they support their position.

...a term like "substantial", "real", "existent", "actual", etc.

Michael Ossipoff