"Human openness can relate to what-is only if it is held out into the nothing."

We look out at All from a transcendent position, specifically, openness held out in the nothing. This is his conclusion.

The nothing is, phenomenologically, a component of the realization of being.

Agree?

transcendence is from self to world, not from self to nothing.

I didn't say it was from self to nothing.

It would seem to me in that case that he's trying to say something about dread/anxiety/fear rather than "the nothing." Our dread/anxiety/fear can of course be irrational or have no reasonable basis, but I would think then resolution would be a psychological or medical issue.

First and foremost, Heidegger would agree that medical attention is appropriate for some. But he is not talking about such people. Second and by way of clarification, Heidegger’s argument cannot be understood without grasping his distinction between fear on the one hand and dread(anxiety) on the other. And the reason he is making the distinction is to remove fear from the equation.

Fear is always related to an entity within the world whereas dread(anxiety) is never related to an entity within the world. And he only discusses fear to distinguish it from dread(anxiety). Dread(anxiety) is the issue of interest for him, not fear. Beyond that, it is an open question as to whether his concept of dread(anxiety) can be grasped without understanding his concept of world.

More like Carnap than Dewey, I would think. But I'll acknowledge "the nothing" and the fascination "it" has for some baffles and intrigues me. For example, I would pose the question as "Why is there something?" There is no "instead of" alternative. This nonentity is seemingly profound and fearsome, and I wonder how and why it can be that. — Ciceronianus the White

I guess I mean the 'swabian peasant' thing seems like the kick, the positivist tinkering just potemkin-philosophy in the service of Being Wry.

If what you're worried about is the spookiness of the language, I wouldn't disagree. It *is* a bit trumped up, and over-solemn, like Kubrick. But solemnity is a tonal preference, like wryness. Some like it, some don't. You can read Heidegger, and appreciate his thought without loving his vibe. Sloterdijk, for example, isthe polar opposite of Heidegger tonally (joyfully cynical, legitimately funny)while basing the lion's share of his thought on H's work.

Anyway, if there was no alternative, like you say, the question wouldn't make sense, even as you rephrased it. But it does make sense.

Anyway, if there was no alternative, like you say, the question wouldn't make sense, even as you rephrased it. But it does make sense. — csalisbury

But pity those nonsensical non-beings forever not asking, 'why is there nothing, rather than something?'

Not asking, of course, because being is unimaginable to non-beings.

I'm reading a message into your sketch, one that might not be there. But, if it is there: 'what conditions are necessary for asking the question?' is a different question than 'why is there something (rather than nothing?)'

:up: :up: (for the previous post)

I think "nothing" is sometimes (most times) shorthand for those who tire of dealing with the apparent temporal nature of being and/or those who are incapable of saying "I do not know."

If what you're worried about is the spookiness of the language — csalisbury

In some sense, "nothing" draws people in.

I sometimes think nothing and unintelligible are significantly synonymous for Heidegger. Not to mention that unintelligible is an apt description for the end result of most conversations in which people attempt to discuss "nothing."

I like that. I think.:smile:

sometimes think nothing and unintelligible are significantly synonymous for Heidegger. — Arne

Maybe, but not in this essay. Pay attention to his references to Hegel. This essay is not complete gibberish. It seems like you're suggesting that it is.

Well there's the necessary conditions for asking, the necessary conditions for sense, and the necessary conditions for imagining. All different. 'What would it be like if there was nothing?' is something one can ask - given that there is something - das ein. But to give an answer would be folly; 'Shut up!' is an appropriate response. 'There's nothing like nothing.'

I think I'm going back to my psychological analysis. The shock of the womb expelling, crushing, like Monty Python's foot forever stamping you out of existence, and into the unimaginable world. It's not a question, it's a trauma.

The unimaginable (to dasfoetus) world brings into being the unimaginable possibility of non-existence. what is born, is already not what was - is already mourning the death of the womb-.world.

Maybe, but not in this essay. Pay attention to his references to Hegel. This essay is not complete gibberish. It seems like you're suggesting that it is. — frank

Could you reproduce what you consider to be the relevant/important passages? It feels like having a bit of text to work from might help give some direction to a conversation that's now sort of spinning in a void.

Also :up: :lol:

I did previously in the thread. I'm pretty sure he's simply tweaking Hegel in this essay, but I guess it's possible that his obscure language turns his presentation into a kind of mirror.

What do you see in it?

I agree that there's no answer. That's the crux of it. 'Shut up!' can be an appropriate response, depending on the situation. If one of my co-workers bounced the question off me, iI'd be more than a little off-put. Neither the place nor the time.

But there are other responses just as appropriate, depending on the place and time. I recently went to see a Kirtan performance and the the chanter gestured toward the question in some of his between-chants banter. In this setting, the kirtan itself is an appropriate response to the question. The chant is enriched and made deeper by the question. The chant isn't an answer, but the lack of an possible answer is built into the chant's power.

Birth-trauma isn't many degrees of separation from 'thrownness.' I like that take. It's mine too, usually. But I feel like birth trauma is more an explanation of why *I* am - why any *I* is - drawn to the question. Why is something like birth trauma possible? I think the question - why does anything exist - reaches beyond the personal, even though the personal is our way in.

Maybe, but not in this essay. Pay attention to his references to Hegel. This essay is not complete gibberish. It seems like you're suggesting that it is. — frank

I am not suggesting it is gibberish.

I am not using unintelligible as a synonym for gibberish.

For Heidegger, the only entities that can be rendered intelligible are entities that have reference within the world that we are in.

And dread (unlike fear) has no reference within the world that we are in.

As a result, we are simply incapable of rendering intelligible the nothing to which Heidegger argues that dread refers.

I feel like you can solve the paradox like this: We can intelligibly indicate the limit beyond which intelligibility fails.

You misunderstood me. This essay becomes gibberish if we substitute "unintelligible" for "nothing."

This dread of unknown etiology is just the case where the nothing is revealed to consciousness. A confrontation with the nothing us "dormant" in our everyday dealings with what-is. Why do you think he would say that?

then I defer. What is Metaphysics is on my list. I will bump it up a notch.

Cool. I look forward to your take.

This dread of unknown etiology is just the case where the nothing is revealed to consciousness. — frank

I think Heidegger would agree with Wittgenstein's notion that the world is everything. And since dread (for Heidegger) refers to no entity within the world (which is everything) then dread necessarily refers to "nothing." And it reveals to consciousness that to which it refers.

Why is something like birth trauma possible? I think the question - why does anything exist - reaches beyond the personal, even though the personal is our way in. — csalisbury

Being reaches beyond the personal, not-being does not. The dreadful is the closing in. That is why the question is a reawakening of the trauma and not of the reaching beyond of birth.

that's an interesting interpretation. Since H consciously walks on past the sign that says "End of Logic, Only Phenomenology Ahead" he leaves us in the situation of everyone speaking from what rings true to them personally.

Since he seemed to lack interest in clarity, I say every person's interpretation is equal. I listen to you to hear what nuggets you drew out of it.

Being reaches beyond the personal, not-being does not. The dreadful is the closing in. That is why the question is a reawakening of the trauma and not of the reaching beyond of birth. — unenlightened

Whenever an existential choice or commitment is made the not-being of infinite other-possibility slips away from the personal, so I would say that it is precisely not-being that reaches beyond the personal. The dreadful is the opening out into the impersonal. Perhaps dread can be coherently framed as a "reawakening of the trauma" (of birth), but I think that, for Heidegger, it is much more to do with the anxiety that inevitably comes with death, and with possibility itself. Possibility brings, ironically, a dread of nothingness, of the disappearance of all possibility. death is both the ultimate possibility and the end of all possibility.

Since he seemed to lack interest in clarity, I say every person's interpretation is equal. — frank

don't you find that to be a bit convenient? Certainly there are aspects of Heidegger to which all serious Heidegger scholars would concur? And certainly you would agree that some people are simply better at articulating their interpretation than others? Or perhaps you have a different understanding of interpretation than I? Is there anything regarding the interpretation I have offered that you think any serious Heidegger scholar would dispute in any significant way? I doubt if I am on the fringes. On the other hand, I do not interact with many people who have more than a passing understanding of Being and Time.

Since he seemed to lack interest in clarity, I say every person's interpretation is equal. — frank — Arne

and when it comes to clarity, which ontological treatises prior to Heidegger would you consider having adequate clarity? And if they have more clarity, is that even the test? After 500 years of Descartes, the Cartesian's believe they can explain the interaction of subject and object by calling it transcendence and then pretending that they are not using the word as if it were a synonym for magic.

Since H consciously walks on past the sign that says "End of Logic, Only Phenomenology Ahead" — frank

Have you read Heidegger's Metaphysical Foundations of Logic?

I actually had a hard time tracking down a copy of that one. Barnes and Noble had it listed as the Metaphysical Foundations of Love.

Certainly there are aspects of Heidegger to which all serious Heidegger scholars would concur? — Arne

There is a spectrum of interpretations. Put Haugeland in the mix and it's a wide spectrum.

After 500 years of Descartes, the Cartesian's believe they can explain the interaction of subject and object by calling it transcendence and then pretending that they are not using the word as if it were a synonym for magic. — Arne

Name a contemporary Cartesian. Most of us lean toward ontological anti-realism. An example of clarity: See here (PDF)

Have you read Heidegger's Metaphysical Foundations of Logic? — Arne

No. Is it good? The "walk on past logic" thing wasnt an insult btw. He explicitly stated that he was leaving logic behind in WIM.