Well, you got to start somewhere...

:up:

Intention is a primary source.

Moreover, the purpose here is not a commentary on Wittgenstein, but an analysis of belief. The two best accounts of meaning come from Wittgenstein and from Davidson. But they do not meet smoothly. The fun for me is to play with various modes of analysis to see what the result is; can it be made consistent?

Anscombe sits at a pivotal point where Philosophy of Language tipped over to Philosophy of Mind. Another bit part was played by Searle, of course, with his work on Intentionality that derives from Austin. A comparison, or perhaps even a contrast, with Davidson might well be worth considering.

Ant that seems to be the direction the line of enquiry I've taken here is heading.

Fair enough. You've done a good job of keeping the thread going.

My best gloss is: to believe something is to take it to be true.

The attempts at reduction, in terms of behavior, equation of belief with belief report, belief as distinguishing between truth and falsity, &c. can't be right.

Clearly we can be disingenuous and behave other than we believe. Clearly we can believe something and for this reason act on it – not all beliefs are backward rationalizations of behavior. Clearly a belief report is a linguistic act and a belief isn't. Clearly we can say someone believed something correctly. None of these notions seem to help.

All correlation is belief.
— creativesoul

because...? — Banno

Well. We're looking for what counts as belief; a criterion of necessary and sufficient conditions which when met by a candidate warrants our calling that candidate "belief". Belief must be meaningful, and it must presuppose truth. Those are necessary because if we remove either, what's left cannot count as belief.

So... all correlation is belief because all correlation attributes meaning(by virtue of drawing correlations) as well as presupposes the existence of it's own content(regardless of subsequent further qualification). Statements presuppose truth. Belief prior to language presupposes truth in the aforementioned manner(all correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content).

That's how "is true" becomes redundant. Another aside... sort of.

Rather, belief is not a mental state. "Is true" can't be redundant, because there are untrue beliefs.

Rather, belief is not a mental state. — Banno

Are intentions mental states?

It's just my musings. I'm lucky enough to have a few good critics.

Redundancy is about meaning Banno, not truth. "Is true" is redundant as a result of being superfluous. It adds no further meaning to belief statements. You know this.

I agree that belief is not a mental state, so the "rather" is misplaced.

It adds no further meaning to belief statements. — creativesoul

That's wrong. Some beliefs can be true, some false; therefore something is added to a belief in its being true.

I don't see that there is anything here that has not been already covered.

That's wrong. Some beliefs can be true, some false; therefore something is added to a belief in its being true. — Banno

It's not wrong. You've misunderstood what I'm getting at.

Belief statements can be both true and false. We agree there. True belief has something added to it that false belief doesn't. I agree there with the sentiment, although the wording('something added') is suspect. So, the reply is sort of agreeable, but misses the point and is irrelevant.

Adding "is true" does not make a belief statement true.

Adding "is true" onto a belief statement does not change the meaning of the belief statement. That's the point. "Is true" is redundant. All belief presupposes it's own truth. That's why "is true" is redundant.

Redundancy is about meaning not truth.

I don't see that there is anything here that has not been already covered. — Banno

Try this...

Well. We're looking for what counts as belief; a criterion of necessary and sufficient conditions which when met by a candidate warrants our calling that candidate "belief". Belief must be meaningful, and it must presuppose truth. Those are necessary because if we remove either, what's left cannot count as belief.

So... all correlation is belief because all correlation attributes meaning(by virtue of drawing correlations) as well as presupposes the existence of it's own content(regardless of subsequent further qualification). Statements presuppose truth. Belief prior to language presupposes truth in the aforementioned manner(all correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content). — creativesoul

Let's get back on track. If the keys are in the kitchen, we say "the keys are in the kitchen" or, perhaps even "it is true that the keys are in the kitchen" in order to really push the point.

We sometimes use talk of belief to distinguish what is true from what is false - I searched the kitchen because I believed the keys were there, but as it turns out I was wrong.

Compare:
Pat searched the kitchen because he believed that his keys were there.

with
Pat searched the kitchen because there was a good chance his keys were there.

The notion of belief is used to bring out the difference between the keys being in the kitchen and one's thinking that the keys are in the kitchen - between being true and being acknowledged or accepted as true.

Now I take that to be the very common sense explanation you seem to think I deny. — Banno

Yes, let's. To get back on track, I think we'll have to retrace the track a little.

The notion I am playing with is that we get the order of the explanation wrong.

It's not:
Pat believes the keys are in the Kitchen
So, all things being equal, Pat will search in the kitchen

but

Pat searched in the kitchen
Therefore Pat says he believes the keys are in the kitchen — Banno

Probability?

I don't think so. I think we are using belief here simply to mark the fact that the keys might not be in the kitchen. — Banno

You denied the common sense order of explanation, you denied that it has to do with probability, and you put forward an inferior alternative. That's a mistake. The right answer is that Pat believed that there was a good chance that his keys were in the kitchen, so he searched the kitchen. Your alternative leaves open the question of why Pat searched the kitchen - which is why I asked you that question, but for some reason you chose not to answer. If what Pat says is true, then you're back to the common sense order of explanation, but with a redundant addition of what Pat says. What Pat says doesn't matter. What Pat believed matters.

Contrary to what you said, we're not using belief here simply to mark the fact that the keys might not be in the kitchen. That's your less plausible alternative. It's wrong. We're using belief to explain Pat's behaviour. That makes a lot more sense. It's obvious, isn't it? Why skip past the obvious answer?

In defense of Banno's notion of "belief" being used as a placemarker for falsehood. He's right. However, that's only one sense of the word "belief". Pat believed the keys were in the kitchen, but it turns out he was wrong. They were in the ignition of the car. Pat could then rightfully claim "I believed they were in the kitchen" as a means for marking falsehood.

There's an underlying current here that it seems not many pay attention to. While Witt talked about looking towards use as a means of seeking meaning and that has most certainly allowed us to establish alternative methods for attributin meaning(Speech Act Theorists and what not), there already were some others that are still valid methods of attributing meaning. There are several different ways. Each unique in it's own way and quite useful. None are capable of explaining all of the others...

Well. No conventional ones anyway. They do all have something in common aside from what they're doing. They share a foundation of elemental constituents. They all consist of the same things.

Why say that he searched the kitchen because he believed the keys were there, rather than he searched the kitchen because the keys were there?

I'm suggesting that it's because the keys might not be in the kitchen. On this I suspect we agree.

I am also sugesting we consider some more recent moves in our understanding of consciousness, such that it might be that our

common sense order of explanation — Sapientia

might be wrong.

It's not rational counter to this, to simply repeat that our common sense order is right.

In any case, what's wrong with "I don't believe that the keys are in the kitchen, but I can't find them anywhere else, so I will search there anyway"?

Pat doesn't know where the keys are. He searches for them in the kitchen because that is one of the places they could be.

In any case, what's wrong with "I don't believe that the keys are in the kitchen, but I can't find them anywhere else, so I will search there anyway"? — Banno

Performative contradiction. Incoherence. Self-contradiction. Poor language use.

We think that the keys are here or there. We look here or there. No keys. We consider other possible locations, but not just any possible location. Rather all the places we look are places we believe our keys will be. Otherwise, we wouldn't look. The neighbors top dresser drawer will not be searched, even though it's a logically possible location(if all sorts of other things are just so).

In any case, what's wrong with "I don't believe that the keys are in the kitchen, but I can't find them anywhere else, so I will search there anyway"? — Banno

It depends on how you read it. Belief can be neutral – we can be undecided as to p, and so neither believe that p, nor that not p. When undecided, one might of course search the condition on the off-chance.

What does read as a pragmatic contradiction under normal circumstances is "I believe that the keys aren't in the kitchen, and I will search there anyway" – unless of course there is some reason one has to doubt one's own rationality or beliefs, or one is doing so to appease some external obligation or epistemic authority.

The problem is that negations of belief statements can often be read as "negation raising" – that is, we often read (by some process) "I don't believe that p" as "I believe that not p." On such a reading, what you posted is indeed a bit odd.

But either way, I think all this discussion doesn't matter. Yes, you can use belief reports to distinguish truth from merely purported truth (which in fact isn't so). But this is just an epiphenomenon of the fact that belief is taking something to be true, and there's no reason to think that taking something to be true makes it true. We can also use belief to affirm truth, rather than falsity. This simply isn't important.

Yes.

It's worth paying some attention to the logic of denying a propositional attitude. There are four possibilities.

a. Pat believes the keys are in the kitchen.
b. Pat does not believe the keys are in the kitchen.
c. Pat believes the keys are not in the kitchen.
d. Pat does not believe the keys are not in the kitchen.

(a) contradicts (b). (c) contradicts (d). (a) contradicts (c). But (b) dies not contradict (d); Pat may have no beliefs relating to the keys.

Belief has a connection to faith. While faith is the belief in thing not seen. Belief is what we accept to be true, but which s not rigorously derived, personally, by the observer. Our system of beliefs is often accepted on faith, based on the prestige of others, or on our own intuitions, but not directly seen with our own eyes.

For example, I have never seen an atom up close and personal. I have seen pictures and representations of atoms. I believe atoms are real based on the prestige of science, knowledge of science tools, and the credibly of those who have been able to see it, directly. Belief has a degree of disconnect from hard direct sensory evidence that you personally have. It is sort of a social short cut to a result that skips many steps. The result of belief can be right or wrong, but the disconnect is still there, so the unconscious mind will have some doubt ,that can result in fanaticism.

The unconscious is natural and dependent on direct sensory evidence to confirm. The conscious mind has imagination which does not have to jive with sensory reality. Belief is somewhere in the middle between sensory reality and imagination; empathy. The unconscious is not in the middle with the ego, but stands on one side of the bridge. The result can be unconscious dynamics which lends an emotional state to belief.

If you learn everything by reading, your belief system will be molded. But there is still a disconnect with reality; in the imagination, until you generate your own applied data. Then belief changes to confirmation, where the unconscious mind agrees with you. This adds a calmer emotional baseline to the belief.

Why say that he searched the kitchen because he believed the keys were there, rather than he searched the kitchen because the keys were there? — Banno

What an odd question. If he searched the kitchen because he believed the keys were there, then why wouldn't I say so? Why would I miss out the part about his belief, which is the very reason he searched the kitchen for his keys? That the keys were in fact there is irrelevant to why he was looking for them in that place.

I'm suggesting that it's because the keys might not be in the kitchen. On this I suspect we agree. — Banno

No, we don't. We sometimes use phrases like "I believe" or "I think" to convey or emphasise uncertainty, and uncertainty relates to possibility, which is what might or might not be. Maybe that's what you're getting at. But that has nothing to do with why I would say the former rather than the latter. I would say the former rather than the latter because it clearly states the truth, whereas the latter is either a less explicit way of saying something like the former, or, if taken strictly as worded, it's false. The former makes sense, whereas the latter is missing something which must be assumed in order to make sense of it, lest it be rendered a falsehood.

I see what we've been talking about as being about motive or cause, whereas you seem to see what we've been talking about as being about uncertainty or possibility.

I am also sugesting we consider some more recent moves in our understanding of consciousness, such that it might be that our
common sense order of explanation
— Sapientia
might be wrong.

It's not rational counter to this, to simply repeat that our common sense order is right. — Banno

I'm not simply repeating that our common sense order is right. I'm trying to convey to you the necessity of explaining why you think that your alternative is better, and I'm awaiting said-explanation from you. I see that you've raised an alternative, but why should I go with it? You'd need to actually displace the current understanding. The impression I'm getting from you is like a guy who comes up with the bright idea of painting a wall by using a paint brush back to front. "Like, hey guys, what if the handle part of the brush is better at applying paint than the part with the bristles?".

"Like, hey guys, what if the handle part of the brush is better at applying paint than the part with the bristles?". — Sapientia

Which would be fine if there were no bristles...

I don't see that there is anything here that has not been already covered. — Banno

By whom Banno?

Have you directly addressed what I've said? The answer(s) to your questions? A recap...

You claimed belief was empty, or words to that affect, after the failure of one particular notion thereof. I pointed out that that didn't follow, but rather that that particular notion failed. I suggested drawing a distinction between belief statements and belief as a manner of correcting a fatal flaw of that notion that led us to absurdity.

You did not cover any of it, nor have you in the past.

I am also sugesting we consider some more recent moves in our understanding of consciousness... — Banno

This piqued my curiosity...

What moves in our understanding of consciousness?

Bayesian stuff? Ad hoc stuff as a means for following norms? What moves?

Which would be fine if there were no bristles... — Banno

But there are, so it's not fine, it's a bad idea. And since you don't seem to want to defend your bad idea, I'm going to move on.

But there are, — Sapientia

Are there? Again, that's the issue.

Do you believe what you write Banno?

Denying belief?

:joke:

Word games are inadequate here. I know you're musing, but do you want to get serious about the subject?