Whether they say something interesting about the metaphysics of nature is akin to whether you find a particular poet interesting. — Janus
So, Peirce allowed that there might be other kinds of 'truths'; aesthetic truths, spiritual truths, that the community of enquirers would never come to agree upon? — Janus
However if you water down the conception of the divine enough - like Peirce had to do to make it consistent with his excellent understanding of evolutionary theory and developmental cosmology - then it is not as if there is some biblical difference from what I see as pure athetistic naturalism. — apokrisis
Uexküll claims that the apperception process, although lawful, cannot be mathematically described. Thus, for principal reasons, biology cannot be reduced to physics. For example, the laws of color complementarity are laws of the subject that govern the appearance of things in space but cannot be reduced to spatial relations. Therefore they go beyond physics which is limited to spatio-temporal relations.
“We have shown that, in Kant’s sense, there is no such thing as absolute space (there is no Newtonian space) on which our subject is without influence. For both the specific material of space, namely local signs and direction-signs, and the form this material assumes are subjective creations. Without the spatial qualities and the bridging of them together into their common form that apperception makes possible (Kant’s ‘apperception process’) there would be no space at all, but merely a number of sense-qualities, such as colors, sounds, smells, and so forth, these would of course, have their specific forms and laws, but there would be no common arena in which they could all play their part” (1926, 49).
Uexküll introduced a biology of subjects which he seems to be tempted to expand to a cosmology and physics of subjects and their Umwelts (1973, 324, 339). The combination of signs into complex unities is understood as the activity of a Kantian transcendental subject that is beyond experience:
“[…] the impulses that build up our bodies elude our knowledge. And so it is self-evident that the whole impulse-system, which is at once the architect and the director of our body, is forever hidden from our view. As Kant would say, we have to do with a transcendental subject i.e. a subject lying beyond what we can experience, far wider in its embrace than the spirit, which embraces only the life of our ego”
So is Lord of the Rings, Game of Thrones, or Toy Story. That is a requirement of poetic worlds too. That is what makes them realities which our imaginations can inhabit. — apokrisis
Huh? To the degree there is a constructed "self", there is a matching unwelt. So animals and newborns are clearly experiential due to their relevant degree of biologically constructed selfhood. But not in terms of a linguistically structured one to the degree that remains absent. — apokrisis
Feel free to fuck off anytime you like. — apokrisis
I am considering the notion that the so-called ‘firstness’ actually corresponds with, and manifests as, the first person perspective. — Wayfarer
And I think the reason Peirce didn't devote that much effort to that side of his work was because he was a working scientist and of a mainly pragmatic bent. — Wayfarer
But you didn't address the other things in the post.. specifically baby and animal experiences, — schopenhauer1
Peirce not accepted as THE theory but is overlayed on top of other ones post-facto, and the big glaring one, how is the "interpretant" magically turned into experience without the interpretant being experiential. — schopenhauer1
No it bloody isn't. Not if naturalism is the position that there is something more at stake here than merely "interest". — apokrisis
It seems that what else it is besides that is a matter of taste. — Janus
Another problem I see for your position is the question as to whether nature really is exhaustively measurable, or even really measurable at all. — Janus
Beyond that point it is just differences that don't make a difference.] — apokrisis
Pfft. I can't even be bothered with an arrogant retort. — apokrisis
but they may matter to different individuals in other ways. — Janus
Just as it then defines science in terms of the opinions on which a community of reasoning inquirers would arrive at in settled fashion by the end. — apokrisis
Look I know this applies to science; I already agreed with that. I just don't accept that it applies to philosophy — Janus
Pfft. — apokrisis
I want to know what the being of these things are, though. I want to know what it means for a thing, state, or process to be rather than not, as it exists in and of itself. — darthbarracuda
Thus the conversation starts to have a meaningful direction. It is getting somewhere. It is becoming clear that to exist is to persist, to be formed, if not in fact in-formed. — apokrisis
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