I don't see that. The stick looks bent; but the fact is that it is straight.

Beliefs... again, I'm forced to wonder if there is a fact to the matter of what one believes. — Banno

The researchers you referenced don't join you in that doubt. But philosophy is the Land of Doubt.

In regards to your assertion that you are experiencing doubt: is there any fact of the matter? Is the proposition you have asserted truth apt?

The researchers you referenced don't join you in that doubt — frank

They show that introspection is not an infallible method of determining one's mental state. Beliefs are a metal state.

Meh. I could reply that you confuse belief and certainty. Such rhetoric gets us nowhere.

I'm pointing out that beliefs are not simple single things like "being convinced that I can open my front door with my front door key", but rather multifarious. — Banno

Certainty and belief are inextricably related. You can't be certain of something yet not believe it. You can find words such as "certainty" included in dictionary definitions of belief.

One thing is clear: beliefs are things like being convinced that I can open my front door with my front door key. That's an actual belief that I have, and I wouldn't have it if I was not convinced of it.

Whether beliefs such as this are simple or multifarious is open for discussion. Why don't you sum up what more you think there is to it? You mentioned actions and abilities, but I think that it's mistaken to say that this is what belief consists in. The only actions would be whatever is going on in my brain, and the only abilities would be whatever enables me to believe. In that sense, they're more like prerequisites for belief than what belief consists in. I can't think of a better way of saying what belief consists in than that it consists in being convinced. That's the simple answer, anyway. I suppose one could then analyse what it is to be convinced, if one wanted to delve deeper.

Yet something here keeps drawing responses from you. — Banno

These comments that strike me as quite clearly wrong is precisely what is drawing responses from me. It flies in the face of what I know, or at least what I think I know. I'm curious how you guys think up this stuff, and what makes you think that it's right, and, by implication, that I'm wrong.

They show that introspection is not an infallible method of determining one's mental state. Beliefs are a metal state. — Banno

No, they showed that people aren't good at explaining their mental states, for instance explaining why they're angry, via introspection. The researchers affirm that people have access to mental content by introspection.

From another thread, but relevant here...

At conception, no creature is capable of drawing a correlation, connection, and/or association between that which becomes symbol and that which becomes symbolized. Hence, at conception there is no thought or belief, because all thought and belief is meaningful, and there can be no attribution of meaning this early on. Thus, like knowledge, thought and belief are accrued.

It's the content of the correlations that becomes the target of this investigation. What can be rightfully said about meaningful non-linguistic thought and belief? Based upon the groundwork laid heretofore I ask the following...

What sorts of things could become symbol and symbolized(become meaningful) to a non linguistic creature?

There can be no linguistic construct operating in non linguistic thought and belief. They must be able to draw connections, correlations and/or associations. That which becomes symbol cannot already be one to the creature. The same is true regarding that which becomes symbolized. So, prior to the creature drawing correlations between things, and these things becoming symbol and symbolized, they must already be things in and of themselves. They must be things that exist in their entirety prior to becoming symbol and/or symbolized, and they must be directly perceptible.

So, we have my drake responding to a sound while clearly showing expectation of getting fed. He doesn't think in words. His belief can only be rendered in terms of the connections he has drawn between things and/or himself. While words are a way to make such connections, drake doesn't have words. We can clearly see that the drake perceives stuff like food, me. sounds, etc. He has clearly made connections between 'objects' of his own physiological sensory perception and himself. These connections presuppose the existence of their own content.

Drake doesn't believe "the sound exists" or "I'm about to be fed". To quite the contrary his belief consists of the connections. The existence of the content of his connections(the sound and getting fed) cannot be doubted by him. Drake cannot hold such strong expectation that he is about to be fed after hearing the sound without believing he heard the sound.

We can say that drake believes he is about to be fed, but the content of his belief is not linguistic. Rather, as I've been at pains to show... it is drawing meaningful correlations. Language consists of the same.

The researchers affirm that people have access to mental content by introspection. — frank

Sure; yet the research clearly shows that this access is not privileged.

One's beliefs change in order to justify oneself.

You mentioned actions and abilities, but I think that it's mistaken to say that this is what belief consists in. — Sapientia

Saying things like "This key unlocks the door" is of course one of the actions affiliated to the belief that the key unlocks the door. As is saying it to yourself. Or thinking it.

Now I'm not sure what you are suggesting, but it appears you think that beliefs are in some sense to be understood as a purely mental phenomena; that the state of the world is not relevant to what one believes.

This is usually framed in terms of beliefs being either internal or external. I'm now leaning towards an external approach, after having started this thread with an internalist approach, as given in the OP. But I have one eye towards some sort of dissolution of this apparent schism.

It would be interesting to hear your view.

They distinguished between mental contents (such as feelings) and mental processes, arguing that while introspection gives us access to contents, processes remain hidden. — Wiki article

I don't think feelings are most productively thought of as "contents" at all. I don't "look inside my mind" to see how I feel. I know I feel angry, sad, elated or whatever directly, my body knows it. And further, beliefs are not like feelings, I would say; beliefs are part of the reflexively explanatory narrative that I tell myself about who I am. "I believe, this, I believe that: this is who I am".

I don't introspect (look inside) the mind to see its contents: beliefs, thoughts, feelings and so on; like I might look inside a physical container to examine its contents. I think this is a phenomenologically false and misleading analogy.

Say I'm asked why I believe the earth is a sphere. I dont want to seem irrational. I want to have a good reason. I'll try to seem smart and explain something about how humans worked out the shape of the earth. All the while I think I'm giving an honest account when its actually a constructed narrative.

When we get to emotions it's a whole other ball of wax. Emotion is like music. It can be simple and profound or broad and symphonic. I think there are memory harmonics just like in music so that stuff from childhood blends with displaced guilt and some movie I really liked. Sometimes emotion is contagious so just looking at an angry face has me feeling angry, but I wasn't even conscious of staring at that angry man. I started wondering what I was angry about.

With emotion, a constructed narrative might be all the explanation that's possible. I still know that I'm angry because of introspection, not from staring at my own mug in the mirror.

I still know that I'm angry because of introspection, — frank

Do you know by introspecting? Or are you just angry, with or without introspection?

It's possible to be out of touch with one's feelings or beliefs. That's not unusual.

I still know that I'm angry because of introspection, not from staring at my own mug in the mirror. — frank

As I already said above I think you know you are angry directly, immediately; your body knows it, you feel it.

Ok.

Yeah, that's when you're trying too hard to introspect, or convince yourself of some reflexive explanatory narrative about yourself that fits your preferred self-image, or maybe your self-hatred, or how you want others to see you or whatever; it's complex.

.

OK?, That's it??

Combat? That's terse! Combat what, who, how, why?

I think what is shown by the experiments in question is more than that.

You know that when I wrote "you" in what you responded to with 'Combat', I was not referring specifically to you, right?

Maybe so. I'll look at it again.

Man, just leave me alone ok?

Sure thing: I had no idea you are so sensitive. Maybe I'm insensitive to the psychological states of others on these forums. I always assume they are here just to test their own and others' ideas. So forgive me if you thought I was being rude. :smile:

I don't think introspection is like a math puzzle which you solve and then its done. Introspection is continuous both when awake and asleep. So, when its not consciously done, then its relegated to the unconscious/subconscious/super-conscious processes.

I don't "look inside my mind" to see how I feel. I know I feel angry, sad, elated or whatever directly, my body knows it. — Janus

I think this only applies to emotions readily recognized in your conscious (directly-focused) mentation. There are subtle forms of emotions which we are not always aware of. For example: disatisfaction, complaints, blame, etc., are all precipitated from anger but we usually notice the aggressive representations. Subtle emotions such as jealousy and envy also usually go unnoticed in the earlier stages of their manifestation. Emotions are like waves in the ocean, most people only recognize the crests, and only those externally perceivable at that, and miss out on the rest of the motion.

I'm pointing out that beliefs are not simple single things like "being convinced that I can open my front door with my front door key", but rather multifarious. — Banno

Indeed, but this is still a bit too narrow.

I would only add that not all beliefs are simple things. However, it seems rather clear to me that all beliefs have the same basic constitution.

There is no such thing as introspection... aside from asking others about ourselves.
— creativesoul

That's so obviously wrong it's funny. What's up with you guys? Y'all sayin' some crazy shit. — Sapientia

At first blush, that may seem crazy. However, think on it a bit. There can be no introspection without language. Language is social. Introspection requires others.

The belief as attitude notion is not entirely wrong. Some belief is an attitude towards a particular assertion/statement/proposition. Think Gettier's Case II.

Belief that a disjunction is true requires multiple facets of understanding. In order for Smith to believe that a disjunction is true, s/he must first undertand what makes that disjunction true. Smith must ubderstand the truth conditions of that disjunction. That is a belief in it's entirety. Smith must also believe that those conditions have been met. Thus, Smith's belief is not (p v q). That is far too inadequate a description. Rather Smith's belief is (p v q) is true because p is true.

Some belief is an attitude towards a particular assertion/statement/proposition. Others are not. Think Jack.

Jack doesn't understand propositions. Thus, there can be no way for him to have an attitude towards a proposition, unless one wishes to also hold and argue that propositions somehow exist prior to language creation, and do so in a way that is perfectly understandable to Jack. That's the only way Jack could have an attitude towards a particular proposition. Propositions are language products. Thus, Jack's belief is inexplicable when using such terms. Propositions are utterly meaningless to Jack. Jack's belief must be meaningful to Jack. Propositions are not adequate descriptions of Jack's belief despite our being required to use them as a means for talking about it. Jack can think in neither words nor attitudes towards words.

Both these consist of the same basic elemental constituents.

I agree that emotions can be unconscious, but I think if we are attentive we can feel their bodily effects. Particular jealousies or envies may be inferred from paying attention to the thoughts that arise, but it's not a precise science I would say.

One's beliefs change in order to justify oneself. — Banno

One must be careful if they are the only judge of themselves

Some folk have very questionable methods...

Philosophically, beliefs do not have the solidity needed to ground explanations for our actions. — Banno

I haven't seen this argued for.