People do not always accurately represent their own thought and belief. It does not follow from that that belief is inadequate ground for an explanation of behaviour.

Philosophically, beliefs do not have the solidity needed to ground explanations for our actions. — Banno

All explanation is belief-based. All explanation is grounded upon belief. The above makes little sense in light of that...

Some explanation is sincere, and others are not. What is the difference when it comes to situations where the speaker is explaining their own belief to another? Has nothing to do with the truth of the belief statement in general. Rather, it has everything to do with whether or not the speaker believes what they are saying.

Surely all these explanations are belief-based. One lies because they believe that they ought not let others know what they believe.

Does anyone experience the birth of a belief? If one were to examine a particular belief wouldn't one find it bound to a sea of inter-related beliefs?

I think if we are attentive we can feel their bodily effects. — Janus

That would come under the heading of introspection. Did you not read the SEP article Banno posted?

In any case the take-home from psychology is that introspection is not provelidged.

@Hanover's opinion might be interesting here.

I guess it depends on how you define the term and what associations you think it has. I think the idea of introspection arrives the connotations of 'looking within' and 'examining contents'; they are visual associations, and I think those associations are misleading, as I think I have already explained.

It would be standard to consider attention to body sensations as an example of introspection.

Well, I don't know what "standard" is, but given such a broad definition of introspection then I would have to agree. It's often said that we cannot be mistaken about what we feel, or about how things, in the most direct of senses, seem to us, and I mostly agree with that. But I question the notion that we have infallible access to the "contents of our minds", because 'contents' and 'states' always become mixed up with lingually based conceptual narratives that are acquired from the public realm.

I would tend to say that I know what kind of person I am, not from "looking within" but from thinking about how I have interacted with others, and what I tend to think about others. The other point is that, for me at least, paying attention to what I am thinking is not a form of inspection or looking, much less introspection or looking within, but a matter of listening to a voice. When I know just what I am thinking, I can hear my own voice, just as I can silently intone the words of a song or of a text I am reading. The other ways I can know what I am thinking is by seeing the words appear as I write them, or hear them spoken out loud when I am talking.
Maybe it's not the same for everyone, though; I acknowledge that possibility.

Well, I don't know what "standard" is, but given such a broad definition of introspection then I would have to agree. It's often said that we cannot be mistaken about what we feel, or about how things, in the most direct of senses, seem to us, and I mostly agree with that. But I question the notion that we have infallible access to the "contents of our minds", because 'contents' and 'states' always become mixed up with lingually based conceptual narratives that are acquired from the public realm. — Janus

I think language and possibly cultural symbols are like a musical instrument that's inherited. I think that what I am is basically like a theme album with certain recurring refrains played on that instrument. I have some ability to decide what's being played, but there are underlying currents to it that have to play out no matter what I might want.

I would tend to say that I know what kind of person I am, not from "looking within" but from thinking about how I have interacted with others, and what I tend to think about others. The other point is that, for me at least, paying attention to what I am thinking is not a form of inspection or looking, much less introspection or looking within, but a matter of listening to a voice. — Janus

If I try to directly feel my own being, I don't feel anything. Like music, what's happening now takes on meaning in the context of what's been before, so my view is parallel to yours.

If one were to examine a particular belief wouldn't one find it bound to a sea of inter-related beliefs? — frank

Indeed. I'll give you one guess what the operative mechanism of that inter-relation is...

All thought, belief, and statements are the product of meaningful correlation. There are no examples to the contrary.

Indeed. I'll give you one guess what the operative mechanism of that inter-relation is... — creativesoul

I think the inter-relatedness of beliefs is a manifestation of logic. Or that's not quite right. I want to say that it actually is logic.

What is logic? One way to show what it is would be to point to the necessary inter-relatedness of beliefs.

What's your take?

Saying things like "This key unlocks the door" is of course one of the actions affiliated to the belief that the key unlocks the door. As is saying it to yourself. Or thinking it. — Banno

Yes, they're related. I haven't denied that. A bacon sandwich consists of bacon and bread, but it doesn't consist in saying or thinking something such as, "I like bacon", although that would be related in a way.

Now I'm not sure what you are suggesting, but it appears you think that beliefs are in some sense to be understood as a purely mental phenomena; that the state of the world is not relevant to what one believes. — Banno

No, not quite. I'm not sure what I've said that could've given you that idea. That's a tad too vague and imprecise for me. What would or would not count as a purely mental phenomena? On what basis? And no, clearly there are many beliefs where the state of the world is of relevance to what one believes, although there might also be exceptions.

I would say that, in a sense, beliefs are mental phenomena. For one to believe this or that requires mental activity. They're internal, like thoughts, not external, like ordinary objects. But there's also a necessary physical aspect involved. So, purely mental? Seems not. Mental activity entails brain activity.

But there's also another sense where they're not really mental or phenomena at all, but more like a status or a fact about me in relation to other things. My beliefs are a set of the things of which I am convinced, and they do not cease to exist or cease to be my beliefs when, e.g. I go to sleep. Although they do cease to be my beliefs if I am no longer convinced of them.

This is usually framed in terms of beliefs being either internal or external. I'm now leaning towards an external approach, after having started this thread with an internalist approach, as given in the OP. But I have one eye towards some sort of dissolution of this apparent schism.

It would be interesting to hear your view. — Banno

Well, after giving it some thought, and as is consistent with what I've said above, I would say that it isn't either one or the other, but both, in a sense. That is, they're internal, in a sense, and external, in a different sense. A complete picture of belief requires both.

At first blush, that may seem crazy. However, think on it a bit. There can be no introspection without language. Language is social. Introspection requires others. — creativesoul

At first blush and after consideration, it seems crazily mistaken. And I think that it is crazily mistaken or you mean something other than what I think you mean, based on what you've said. You aren't exactly helping with these really broad and ambiguous statements like, "Language is social", and, "Introspection requires others". Statements like that ought to be qualified, clarified, explained... not just spurted out and left there in confusion. It's not very difficult to think of a sense where both of those statements are obviously wrong. Being a bookworm is commonly associated with being antisocial. And surely you won't deny that you and I can both introspect on our own, without others around. That's not mere speculation, it's demonstrably true. And I don't agree with your first premise, either. This reasoning of yours seems like it's based on some kind of post hoc fallacy and/or hasty generalisation.

I think language and possibly cultural symbols are like a musical instrument that's inherited. I think that what I am is basically like a theme album with certain recurring refrains played on that instrument. I have some ability to decide what's being played, but there are underlying currents to it that have to play out no matter what I might want. — frank

IF I understand this right, I think I agree with it. The underlying themes would be what is subconsciously determinative of my being and doing?

If I try to directly feel my own being, I don't feel anything. Like music, what's happening now takes on meaning in the context of what's been before, so my view is parallel to yours. — frank

What I directly feel is something like a diffuse field of the most dimly apprehended different intensities; nothing to precisely articulate without getting all cerebral. So, I think it's right that what's happening in the most immediate present is articulated (takes on meaning) in terms of the past (as continuity) and also as what is itself now past. I'm not sure what you mean by "parallel", though?

The underlying themes would be what is subconsciously determinative of my being and doing? — Janus

I was thinking of patterns that pervade experience: like spring, summer, autumn, winter.

So, I think it's right that what's happening in the most immediate present is articulated (takes on meaning) in terms of the past (as continuity) and also as what is itself now past — Janus

What's the relationship between belief and identity? Are beliefs the the final solidification of identity? If being is ever changing like music, what are beliefs in relation to that flux?

Indeed. I'll give you one guess what the operative mechanism of that inter-relation is...
— creativesoul

I think the inter-relatedness of beliefs is a manifestation of logic. Or that's not quite right. I want to say that it actually is logic.

What is logic? One way to show what it is would be to point to the necessary inter-relatedness of beliefs.

What's your take? — frank

I would not agree to saying that the way all beliefs are related is logic. Doing so would render logic in such a way that allows it to be illogical, because some beliefs are related in an illogical manner.

At first blush and after consideration, it seems crazily mistaken. And I think that it is crazily mistaken or you mean something other than what I think you mean, based on what you've said. You aren't exactly helping with these really broad and ambiguous statements like, "Language is social", and, "Introspection requires others". Statements like that ought to be qualified, clarified, explained... not just spurted out and left there in confusion. It's not very difficult to think of a sense where both of those statements are obviously wrong. Being a bookworm is commonly associated with being antisocial. And surely you won't deny that you and I can both introspect on our own, without others around. That's not mere speculation, it's demonstrably true. And I don't agree with your first premise, either. This reasoning of yours seems like it's based on some kind of post hoc fallacy and/or hasty generalisation. — Sapientia

p1 Introspection requires language.
p2 Language is social.
C1 Introspection requires that which is social.(from p1 and p2)
p3 Being social requires others(by definition)
C2 Introspection requires others(from C1 and p3)

What part are you objecting to, and would you offer a valid form of objection?

By the way, aside from your characterizations about the argument here, nothing you've said conflicts with the argument.

Well, after giving it some thought, and as is consistent with what I've said above, I would say that it isn't either one or the other, but both, in a sense. That is, they're internal, in a sense, and external, in a different sense. A complete picture of belief requires both. — Sapientia

A complete picture of "belief" requires eliminating the talk about different senses by virtue of effectively combining and subsequently exhausting all.

All belief is existentially dependent upon both the internal and the external. There is no belief without both and a creature capable of connecting the two.

Yes. @Sapientia, how can you be pleased with both? Surely you must accept one side or the other, or reject the dilemma.

Holding a belief is acting in some ways and not in others. Other folk are as likely to fathom your beliefs as you are to introspect them. Hence it is erroneous to give some sort of primacy to beliefs that one commits to as a result of introspection. One can be wrong bout what one believes.

Consider mind as the interaction of brains and world. Your belief that the your key fits the door is part of a web of ways in which your mind interacts with keys and doors... and where the boundary between belief and knowledge and certainty and doubt and intent lies is in a state of flux.

Consider mind as the interaction of brains and world. Your belief that the your key fits the door is part of a web of ways in which your mind interacts with keys and doors... and where the boundary between belief and knowledge and certainty and doubt and intent lies is in a state of flux. — Banno

This is not too far from

p1 Introspection requires language.
p2 Language is social.
C1 Introspection requires that which is social.(from p1 and p2)
p3 Being social requires others(by definition)
C2 Introspection requires others(from C1 and p3) — creativesoul

But there's also another sense where they're not really mental or phenomena at all, but more like a status or a fact about me in relation to other things. My beliefs are a set of the things of which I am convinced, and they do not cease to exist or cease to be my beliefs when, e.g. I go to sleep. Although they do cease to be my beliefs if I am no longer convinced of them. — Sapientia

Nor from this.

If one were to examine a particular belief wouldn't one find it bound to a sea of inter-related beliefs? — frank

Yes.

In any case the take-home from psychology is that introspection is not provelidged. — Banno

Well there's this:

O wad some Power the giftie gie us
To see oursels as ithers see us!
It wad frae mony a blunder free us,
An' foolish notion:

I think Daniel Kahneman says somewhere in his book that cognitive biases are just the sorts of things we don't notice about ourselves but others do, so Burns was dead on.

Of course, that's primarily a matter of habit. We can learn to be more self-aware, more careful. We can learn to think better.

Must introspection be either infallible or non-existent? No middle ground?

Must introspection be either infallible or non-existent? No middle ground? — Srap Tasmaner

We can get things right about thinking and believing creatures, and thus about ourselves, but not all by oneself.

Be careful who you trust. Some folk have questionable methodology.

Holding a belief is acting in some ways and not in others. — Banno

So holding the belief that aliens do or do not exist is acting in some way and not another? Seems to me to just be something I think and has nothing to do with what I do or don't do.

What part are you objecting to, and would you offer a valid form of objection? — creativesoul

Are you joking? A valid form of objection? The burden is on you to support your own premises, which are far from self-evident, besides the third premise. I don't care about the third premise, and I don't care about any conclusions at this stage. I would like you to explain your thinking behind the first two premises, not repeat them in the form of a logical argument, which is not a helpful response to my last reply. The problem remains unresolved, and I'm still waiting on you to explain yourself.

By the way, aside from your characterizations about the argument here, nothing you've said conflicts with the argument. — creativesoul

Look, your argument is worth jackshit thus far without the substance to back it up. It's not worth arguing over whether or not what I said conflicts with your argument, because you've presented no substantive argument, just an empty shell of an argument. Anyone can piece together a few premises and draw a conclusion. P1) Socrates is from Mars... But is Socrates actually from Mars? No. Why would anyone think that?

A complete picture of "belief" requires eliminating the talk about different senses by virtue of effectively combining and subsequently exhausting all. — creativesoul

Come again?

All belief is existentially dependent upon both the internal and the external. There is no belief without both and a creature capable of connecting the two. — creativesoul

Yes, I agree.

Sapientia, how can you be pleased with both? Surely you must accept one side or the other, or reject the dilemma. — Banno

Why wouldn't I be okay with both? And yes, I did reject the dilemma. I think that it's a false dilemma.

Holding a belief is acting in some ways and not in others. — Banno

What do you mean? Holding a belief is simply holding a belief: being convinced of something. Of course, we'd expect people to act in a certain way as a result of their beliefs. But that's not what holding a belief is. Did you mean the former or the latter? I have no problem with the former, although that differs from what you actually said, which seems plain wrong, as Michael's reaction attests.

Other folk are as likely to fathom your beliefs as you are to introspect them. — Banno

No, that's not true. The likelihood varies.

Hence it is erroneous to give some sort of primacy to beliefs that one commits to as a result of introspection. — Banno

No, it's not erroneous. It's not uncommon to have superior knowledge of your own beliefs in comparison to others knowledge of your beliefs.

One can be wrong about what one believes. — Banno

Yes, of course, that goes without saying.

Consider mind as the interaction of brains and world. Your belief that the your key fits the door is part of a web of ways in which your mind interacts with keys and doors... and where the boundary between belief and knowledge and certainty and doubt and intent lies is in a state of flux. — Banno

¯\_(°-°)_/ ¯

No. I'm not kidding. Valid refutation is required.

In short...

Introspection is metacognitive
Metacognition requires language
Introspection requires language

Just for you Sapentia...

Introspection is thinking about one's own mental ongoings(one's own thought and belief). In order to even be able to think about one's own thought and belief, thought and belief must be prior to thinking about it, and there must be a means of identifying, isolating, and further assessing it. That means is language. We use the terms "mental ongoings", "thought", "belief", etc.

With me yet?

All belief is meaningful. All meaning is attributed. All attribution of meaning requires something to become symbol, something to become symbolized, and a creature capable of connecting the two. All belief requires something to become symbol, something to become symbolized, and a creature capable of connecting the two. The connecting of the symbol to what's symbolized is the attribution of meaning and constitutes being meaningful thought and/or belief formation itself. At conception there is no mental faculty capable of attributing meaning.

At conception there is neither thought nor belief.