You still have to convince your opponent that in cases (1) or (2) that there is any occurent instance of redness that a person is aware of when a person has a mental image of a red snooker ball or dreams about a red snooker ball. In both cases the person imagining/dreaming might be thought of as representing the existence of a red snooker ball, but representation of a red snooker ball can be accomplished without the vehicle of representation actually being red. After all, I can represent a red snooker ball with the words "red snooker ball" but those words are not red. In case (3), of course, there very definitely is an occurent instance of redness of which the person is aware and it is the redness of the very snooker ball that the person sees.
From this kind of perspective you are just inventing pseudo problems.

But does case (3) involve a representation of a red snooker ball as well? If so, what's the vehicle for the representation in that case, is it the same kind of vehicle as for (1) and (2)?

↪Pattern-chaser

Pattern-chaser said: "Redness is being used to describe the human experience of seeing something that is red."


In this statement lies the crux of the issue: At one and the same time you imply that "something is red" (i.e. the something I might see in the world around me) and on the other that the experience (of seeing something that is red) is red. Presumably you are using "red" in two distinct senses here... — jkg20

No! I'm pretty sure the words you're replying to say this quite clearly. I remarked that the term "redness" is being used to label/represent the human experience of seeing something red. So I did not say that "the experience (of seeing something that is red) is red", I explicitly said that "Redness is being used to describe the human experience of seeing something that is red".

1) Having a mental image of a red snooker ball.
2) Having a dream of a red snooker ball.
3) Seeing a red snooker ball.
I am in no way shape or form denying that such phenomena as these exist: people engage in mental imagery, people dream and people see. The specific assumption (and an assumption is all that it is at the moment) I am bringing into the spotlight and challenging is that those three phenomena share a common factor over and above the bare fact that they are about a red snooker ball. You and Pattern-chaser appear to believe that there is such a common factor, but have provided no arguments for agreeing with you. — jkg20

The common factor the three share is the one you mention: they all concern a red snooker ball. But they also share the involvement of a human mind, that is (for one of three different reasons) thinking about something coloured red. In this case, only option 3 involves the human experience of seeing something that is red. The other two rely on human memory (1) or imagination (2).

↪Pattern-chaser

Pattern-chaser said: "I've been trying to understand this sub-thread by adopting the (scientific) perspective of an objectivist philosopher."

That is the source of your confusion I think - the scientific perspective you are trying to adopt is incoherent. It requires on the one hand that red actually be a visible surface property of objects in the world that provide the basis for all empirical evidence (how would a world of colourless objects provide us with any visual evidence for any scientific hypothesis?) and on the other that red is only a feature of electromagnetic radiation (and thus something that is not a visible feature of surfaces of objects). — jkg20

Ah. <light-bulb emoji> You are trying to make the point that colour is a property of an object out there in the world, and not a consequence of looking at that object with human eyes. With that I must disagree. Red does not exist in the Physical Universe. That which gives rise to red being seen by a human definitely does exist in the real world. I believe that beauty (or red, in this case :wink:) is in the eye of the beholder; you believe it is part of the thing you are looking at. It would've been easier if you'd just said that. :up: :grin:

The points you make about human beings having a metaphorical use for the word "red" may well be true, but when I make a purely visual observation that a snooker ball is red, I'm not being metaphorical, and I am not talking about the frequency of electromagnetic radiation either. — jkg20

I know that you aren't being metaphorical. I wasn't either. I was commenting on the ambiguity of the word "red". This is not metaphor. Metaphor is something quite different.

But when you observe that something is red, you are talking about the frequency of electromagnetic radiation. That is the one and only thing that registers to human eyes as being red. Nothing else can give rise to that visual observation. [Ignoring iridescence and the like.]

Ah. <light-bulb emoji> You are trying to make the point that colour is a property of an object out there in the world, and not a consequence of looking at that object with human eyes. With that I must disagree.

I think @jkg20's point is that whilst you might disagree with it, neither you nor Steve Klinko have given an argument that he/she is wrong about this. We might be able to get an argument on the basis of @jkg20's reply to my last question about whether he thinks there is representation going on in the case of veridical vision, but we'll have to wait and see. Just saying that it is wrong and that physics proves it won't cut the mustard because as far as I understand it, @jkg20's position is that modern physics is contaminated by conceptual confusion about what colour is and so proves nothing.

But when you observe that something is red, you are talking about the frequency of electromagnetic radiation.

This seems wrong for all sorts of reasons. First, just from the ordinary language perspective there are plenty of people who talk about things being red who have not the faintest idea of what electromagnetic radiation is, so in the ordinary sense of "talking about something" they are certainly not talking about electromagnetic radiation. Also, prior to the century or so of science that culminated in Maxwell's equations, nobody had the faintest idea that electromagnetic radiation even existed, so it cannot be sensibly supposed that everyone was talking about electromagnetic radiation when they made observations about red things in the 16th century (for instance) You might want to say that what makes an observational statement like "the snooker ball is red" true involves and always did involve some story about electromagnetic radiation, but that is an entirely different claim from claiming that the person making the statement is talking about electromagnetic radiation. The difference to be sensitive to here is that between the meaning of a statement and the facts that make the statement true. Consider from the Steve Klinko perspective (with which you seem to be in sympathy) the following two statements:
1) I saw a red snooker ball
2) I dreamt about a red snooker ball
For Klinko and yourself "red" has more or less the same meaning in both statements. So, if you are claiming that in (1) the meaning of the term "red" unpacks in to some kind of talk about electromagnetic radiation, then it must also do so in (2). But in (1) that unpacking is (presumably) justified on the basis that electromagnetic radiation plays a causal role in making the statement true. So, either you have to deny that in (2) what is being talked about is electromagnetic radiation, and in which case you undermine your position that "red" in 1 and 2 have the same meaning, or you have to stick to your guns and say that electromagnetic radiation plays a causal role in making (2) true, but that is just empirically false. You cannot eat your cake and have it too.

Regarding whether or not seeing a red snooker ball involves representation, my inclination is to say no. The red snooker ball is just there before me, no need for any representation. Dreaming or imagining or having a mental image of a red snooker ball do involve representation. So, for me, there is a significant difference between dreaming/imagining/remembering on the one hand and seeing on the other.
@Pattern-chaser You tallk about the "world out there" - how do you think you arrived at that concept other than seeing things "out there", and how would you see things out there if they did not have colour? A colourless world cannot be compared to a blank screen.

Ah. <light-bulb emoji> You are trying to make the point that colour is a property of an object out there in the world, and not a consequence of looking at that object with human eyes. With that I must disagree. Red does not exist in the Physical Universe. That which gives rise to red being seen by a human definitely does exist in the real world. I believe that beauty (or red, in this case :wink:) is in the eye of the beholder; you believe it is part of the thing you are looking at. It would've been easier if you'd just said that. :up: :grin: — Pattern-chaser

↪Pattern-chaser

I think jkg20's point is that whilst you might disagree with it, neither you nor Steve Klinko have given an argument that he/she is wrong about this. We might be able to get an argument on the basis of @jkg20's reply to my last question about whether he thinks there is representation going on in the case of veridical vision, but we'll have to wait and see. Just saying that it is wrong and that physics proves it won't cut the mustard because as far as I understand it, @jkg20's position is that modern physics is contaminated by conceptual confusion about what colour is and so proves nothing. — MetaphysicsNow

OK, that seems fair enough. ... But ... I'm still not quite sure what the (sub-)topic of conversation is. :chin: So,

What is the (sub-)topic you wish to discuss? Is it whether colour exists out there in the Physical Universe, or is it the distinction between red and redness (i.e. the human experience of perceiving something red), or something else? :chin:

@Pattern-chaser You talk about the "world out there" - how do you think you arrived at that concept other than seeing things "out there", and how would you see things out there if they did not have colour? A colourless world cannot be compared to a blank screen. — jkg20

Let's begin by saying that my answer is given as a human. I.e. I am not considering how another sentient but non-human being might 'see' the world.

Of course I have seen things, and heard from other humans of things they have seen, and so on. And in this way, I learned of the world and its contents. I see those things as having colour, because "colour" is the label we use to refer to that range of electromagnetic radiation we also label as "visible light". And most of the things I see either reflect or emit visible light, which my eyes can detect. Which is why I can 'see' them, of course. But is 'colour' an attribute of the things I see, or is it an artefact of human sight/perception? (Just to be clear, I do not refer to the presence of the human label "colour" in the Physical Universe. I refer to that which the label "colour" refers to, which I think is your intention.)

Am I on the track you wish to consider, or have I deviated without knowing it?

(And yes, you are right to observe I have not yet offered any justification for my belief that colour is a human creation, and has no (human-independent) existence in the world. I will attempt that if/when you confirm that this is the (sub-)topic you wish to discuss.)

Pattern-chaser

"Who cares, wins"

Hello - yes, that's right: my position is that red is first and foremost a feature we discover, by sight, as part of the world. When I genuinely see a red snooker ball, there is an instantiation of the property red right out there in the world - consitutive of the visible surface of the snooer ball - and I see that instantiation of red. Electromagnetic radiation may play a role in explaining how I get to see that instantiation of red, but I do NOT see electromagnetic radiation and electromagnetic radiation is only derivately coloured. Furthermore, as a sighted person, my concept of "the world out there" is grounded precisely on the basis of seeing such instantiations of colour.

The first and most obvious response that occurs to me is: if all humans are completely removed from the Physical Universe, does 'red' remain? I.e. is 'red' human-independent? It doesn't seem so to me. And, if I am a non-human intelligence, whose senses respond to different things than yours, maybe I 'see' all of what you call "light" as having just one 'colour'. In which case, to me there is no colour in the world; it's just something you (humans) invented. :chin: Or maybe I don't sense what you call light at all. Maybe I can only 'see' (what you call) X-rays and gamma rays. Where is 'red' for me? [It looks like it's inside your head....] So, in your words:

Furthermore, as a non-human person, my concept of "the world out there" is grounded precisely on the basis of seeing only (what you call) X-rays and gamma rays. Where in the world is 'red', human? :chin:

When I genuinely see a red snooker ball, there is an instantiation of the property red right out there in the world - consitutive of the visible surface of the snooker ball - and I see that instantiation of red. — jkg20

An instantiation is created dynamically, which would seem to support the notion of 'red' being a human thing, existing only in human minds. If it is out there in the world, 'red' would not be instantiated, because it would already be there, as a property/attribute of the thing that you see as being red.

electromagnetic radiation is only derivately coloured — jkg20

Yes, because red derives from humans and the way we see and perceive things.

The first and most obvious response that occurs to me is: if all humans are completely removed from the Physical Universe, does 'red' remain? I.e. is 'red' human-independent? It doesn't seem so to me.

And if I say, "Yes, red would remain in the absence of human beings" what is your argument to prove me wrong?

Also let us get something clear, insofar as so-called visible light is electromagnetic radiation, nobody sees light. The so-called visible range of the electromagnetic spectrum is based on the idea that when we see colour on the surface of an object, it is because that surface is reflecting electromagnetic radiation with a wavelength falling within a certain band. Even if we became sensitive in some way to electromagnetic radiation that falls outside of this range (e.g. to x-rays) we would never see x-rays. What we see are things located in space. Electromagnetic radiation - if it exists as anything other than a theoretical device - exists only in the spaces between us and the things we see.

An instantiation is created dynamically, which would seem to support the notion of 'red' being a human thing, existing only in human minds

What I mean by "instantiation of red" is just "instance of red" i.e. a datable locatable occurence of a property. In that sense, mass is instantiated wherever there is a physical object, and since I presume that for you mass is not a human-dependent property, then you would still owe me an argument to show that red nevertheless is a human-dependent property.

Yes, because red derives from humans and the way we see and perceive things.

We use "red" to describe em radiation within a certain range of wavelengths because in standard cases where objects are taken to be reflecting radiation in that range we usually see that they have red surfaces. But it is, nevertheless, the object's redness - existing independent of us - that we see in those cases. At least, once again I underline this point, nothing that anybody has so far argued requires me to think of things in any other way than that.

insofar as so-called visible light is electromagnetic radiation, nobody sees light. The so-called visible range of the electromagnetic spectrum is based on the idea that when we see colour on the surface of an object, it is because that surface is reflecting electromagnetic radiation with a wavelength falling within a certain band. [...] Electromagnetic radiation - if it exists as anything other than a theoretical device - exists only in the spaces between us and the things we see. — jkg20

So you do not accept that photons impinging on a human retina give rise to seeing things? :chin:

you would still owe me an argument to show that red nevertheless is a human-dependent property. — jkg20

Yes, well the problem with that is that you have been much cleverer than I first thought. You have crafted an alternative definition for "red" that defines it as an intrinsic property of objects out there in the real world. With this definition in place, you are correct to assert that red is a property of the world, not exclusively that of humans. And there is no way that I know of to demonstrate that what you have done is incorrect. Words are invented and changed by people, and you are people. You have changed the word to suit your needs. Unless I change it back to suit mine, we have reached an impasse.

So you do not accept that photons impinging on a human retina give rise to seeing things? :chin:

It depends what you mean by that question. Are you asking me whether I am a metaphysical realist about photons? If that is the question then the answer is "no". However, even if I were a metaphysical realist about photons and I accepted that they played a causal role in seeing things in the world, it would not be relevant to the issue since the things that one ends up seeing under that causal account could still be instances of redness out there on the surface of objects - nothing other than those surfaces need be red.

you have been much cleverer than I first thought. You have crafted an alternative definition for "red" that defines it as an intrinsic property of objects out there in the real world.

Not really - right from the beginning my use of the word "red" corresponds precisely to the way it is used by the position known as direct realism in the philosophy of perception, and direct realism is supposed to be the default position of common sense - nothing particularly sophisticated or clever about that.

you have been much cleverer than I first thought. You have crafted an alternative definition for "red" that defines it as an intrinsic property of objects out there in the real world. — Pattern-chaser

Not really - right from the beginning my use of the word "red" corresponds precisely to the way it is used by the position known as direct realism — jkg20

OK, so direct realists did this, not you. My point stands. The definition you use for "red" is unusual, and does not include many or most of the shades of meaning used by humans when they say "red". As I said,

You have changed the word to suit your needs. Unless I change it back to suit mine, we have reached an impasse. — Pattern-chaser

Edited to add: this page gives an idea of some of the different meanings conventionally used for "red". It is a dictionary, so it's not authoritative (nothing is!), but it gives the basic idea. In China, "red" also stands for prosperity. There's a lot your different-and-constrained redefinition misses out.

" Red does not exist in the Physical Universe. That which gives rise to red being seen by a human definitely does exist in the real world. "

Humans are part of the physical universe, so this suggests redness (that thing we perceive and contemplate) is part of the physical world.

There are two general elements that give rise to red being seen by humans:
1) the physical characteristics of the surfaces that result in certain wavelengths of light being reflected
2) the human physical capacity to see, and remember, this aspect of physical objects

I assume you're claiming there to be something about #2 that is non-physical. Is that correct? If so, then what makes you think this can't be physical? I realize that the quale "redness" is not something that can be fully described with propositions, but that just suggests it is a sort of non-propositional knowledge. It is not epiphenomenal, because it contributes to the way we interact with the world. Conscious awareness of redness is just a memory of the past perception, and memory seems reducible to the physical.

But the direct realist usage conforms precisely to the main dictionary definition under which (in the example given on the link you gave) lips are red - i.e. physical objects in the world - and specifically their surfaces - are red. I'm struggling to understand what you think is particularly sophisticated or unusual about the direct realist idea that redness is a visible feature of the surfaces of physical objects.

You still have to convince your opponent that in cases (1) or (2) that there is any occurent instance of redness that a person is aware of when a person has a mental image of a red snooker ball or dreams about a red snooker ball. In both cases the person imagining/dreaming might be thought of as representing the existence of a red snooker ball, but representation of a red snooker ball can be accomplished without the vehicle of representation actually being red. After all, I can represent a red snooker ball with the words "red snooker ball" but those words are not red. In case (3), of course, there very definitely is an occurent instance of redness of which the person is aware and it is the redness of the very snooker ball that the person sees.
From this kind of perspective you are just inventing pseudo problems. — jkg20

My experience of a Red snooker ball, or any Red object, in a Dream is that it is just as Red as my experience of Red in awake Consciousness. You might be someone that does not Dream in color in which case the Redness of things in your Dreams might seem less than in awake Consciousness. If I try to remember what the Red looked like after Dreaming I can not produce in my Mind a photographic reconstruction of the Dream experience. But it is also true that if I try to remember any Red experiences that I might have had while awake I can not produce a photographic reconstruction of the awake experience.The vividness of the Redness is just as intense whether Dreaming or Awake, for me. So it seems clear that the process that produces the Red in the two different cases must be the same.

But the direct realist usage conforms precisely to the main dictionary definition under which (in the example given on the link you gave) lips are red... — jkg20

This isn't a surprise; it isn't incompatible with my beliefs either. But that wasn't the point. I'm sure I said that.

The definition you use for "red" is unusual, and does not include many or most of the shades of meaning used by humans when they say "red". — Pattern-chaser

Oh yes, I did. :up: :wink: [Underline added.]

Assuming we have reached the core of this sub-thread, and the topic you wish to discuss is direct realism, I think we are down to definitions, and to the meaning and the context, intended by both of us. My view is broader, and tries to embrace all of the meanings that humans conventionally use "red" for. Yours is more focussed, and considers only the direct realism perspective. I'm afraid I still don't see any room here for manoeuvre, or for further discussion. I think you see little use or point in a more inclusive definition of "red". :meh:

Humans are part of the physical universe, so this suggests redness (that thing we perceive and contemplate) is part of the physical world. — Relativist

This is like saying that Harry Potter and Sherlock Holmes exist in the real world, because the books and films that represent their adventures exist in the real world. I don't think this argument holds water. :chin:

(2) the human physical capacity to see, and remember, this aspect of physical objects

I assume you're claiming there to be something about #2 that is non-physical. Is that correct? — Relativist

Not really, no. [Not that I deny the above; it's just not exactly what I'm saying. :wink:] I'm getting at something along these lines:

The definition you use for "red" is unusual, and does not include many or most of the shades of meaning used by humans when they say "red". — Pattern-chaser

My view is broader, and tries to embrace all of the meanings that humans conventionally use "red" for. — Pattern-chaser

We Do Not See Objects We Detect Objects

The Big Bang happens and a new Universe is created. This Universe consists of Matter, Energy, and Space. After billions of years of complicated interactions and processes the Matter, Energy, and Space produce a planet with Conscious Life Forms (CLFs). In the course of their evolution the CLFs will need to See each other in order to live and interact with each other. But what does it really mean to See? A CLF is first of all a Physical Thing. There is no magic power that just lets a CLF See another CLF. A CLF can only Detect another CLF through some sensing mechanism which must be made out of Physical material and which uses Physical processes. There never is any kind of Seeing in the sense that we think we understand it. There is always only Detection.

So a CLF might understand that it does not ever really See another CLF, but it will still insist that it Sees the reflected Light. The CLF would be mistaken if it thinks it Sees even the reflected Light. All it can do is Detect the reflected Light. Its sensing mechanism can only produce Physical reactions, like Neural Activity, that are correlated with the reflected Light. If the reflected Light is Red the sensing mechanism will fire Neurons that only fire for Red inputs. The CLF might be able to sense that the Red Neurons are firing. So every time these Neurons fire it can report that it is seeing Red. This CLF is only sensing particular Neurons firing and is not experiencing Red like we do.

A CLF like us Sees Red as a Conscious experience and is not aware of any Neural Activity. This Conscious Red Experience is how we Detect Red Light from the external Physical World. The Red that we see is a Surrogate for the 680nm Wavelength Light that is impinging on our Retinas. The two things we know are:

1) Neural Activity for Red happens
2) A Conscious experience of Red happens

The question we should all be considering is, how does 1 happening result in 2 happening? This is the Hard Problem of Consciousness and the answer to the question would explain the Explanatory Gap of Consciousness.

The people that are still talking about Wavelengths of Light don't understand the basic Hard Problem of Consciousness or the Explanatory Gap.

There never is any kind of Seeing in the sense that we think we understand it. There is always only Detection.

But this is precisely the claim that needs arguing for, not assuming. You are telling a story about vision that may or may not lead to a hard problem, but you have provided no argument that your account of vision that leads to that problem is correct - including, by the way, the pretty brute realism that underlies it.

So it seems clear that the process that produces the Red in the two different cases must be the same.

Again, just assumptions. What if I insist that in the one case what is produced is the seeing of something red and in the other the mere representation of something red? In that case the processes are different.

"Red" is perhaps giving too much leeway to veer off the metaphysical point that Klinko is trying to hammer home. Let's go with "cadmium orange" instead.

↪SteveKlinko

There never is any kind of Seeing in the sense that we think we understand it. There is always only Detection.
But this is precisely the claim that needs arguing for, not assuming. You are telling a story about vision that may or may not lead to a hard problem, but you have provided no argument that your account of vision that leads to that problem is correct - including, by the way, the pretty brute realism that underlies it.


So it seems clear that the process that produces the Red in the two different cases must be the same.
Again, just assumptions. What if I insist that in the one case what is produced is the seeing of something red and in the other the mere representation of something red? In that case the processes are different. — jkg20

Here is an argument for the general perception of Light of any Wavelength. This argument is based on an engineering analysis approach where we trace the path of the perception of Light. The first thing that happens is that Physical Light enters the Eye and is focused onto the Retina. The instant the Physical Light hits the Retina it activates the Rods and Cones. Various wavelengths of Physical Light will preferentially activate various different Rods and Cones. The Physical Light is absorbed by the Rods and Cones and the Physical Light is no longer Physical Light. What is left is an avalanche of chemical reactions that eventually fires a Neuron that sends a signal away from the Retina and to the Visual Areas (VAs) of the Cerebral Cortex, and this happens for millions of Neurons at the same time and these signals are all bundled into the Optic Nerve. It’s a long journey from the Retina through the Lateral Geniculate Nucleus (LGN) of the Thalamus and to the Visual Areas which are located in the back of the head. One of the known functions of the LGN is to block Visual information from the Eye during sleep. During this whole trip from Eye to the VAs we are not dealing with Physical Light anymore but rather this is of course Neural Activity. The Neural Activity eventually progresses to the first Visual Area (V1) to get processed and is then sent to the second Visual Area (V2) and on to other Visual Areas V3, V4, V5, and more. All the areas also send signals back to previous Areas to create a giant mish mash of parallel processing that is difficult to completely quantify. All the processing and feedback is also Neural Activity since it is correlated with the Physical Light. But the Physical Light is long gone, all you have is Neural Activity. So all we can really say is that we experience Neural Activity not Physical Light. But the Neural Activity as described is not Conscious Light (the Conscious experience od Light) yet. It’s just Neural Activity. Where is the experience of Conscious Light? We know when this Neural Activity happens that Conscious Light happens. But the Conscious Light cannot be found in the Brain. Ok, it’s not found YET, and maybe someday it will be found in the Brain. One thing for sure is that we don't experience the actual Physical Light but rather we experience the Neural Activity that was correlated with the Physical Light.

The Conscious experience of the Light that we are so familiar with is the result of Neural Activity. In fact anything that can stimulate Neural Activity will produce the Conscious Light effect. You can rub your eyes and See Lights. This is because rubbing your eyes stimulates Neural Activity. There is much Neural Activity while Dreaming at night and you can See Light while Dreaming. This is Conscious Light and is certainly not any kind of Physical Light. Dream Light is a perfect example showing that Conscious Light is something different than Physical Light. We have never Seen Physical Light but only our own internal Conscious Light. One final example is After Images. These are images of the scene you were looking at after you close your eyes. The Retina and Cortex Activity takes a while to shutdown after your eyes are closed. The Retina and Cortex activity quickly extinguishes but you still See Light for a number of seconds after you close your eyes where there is no longer Light hitting the Retina. This is again the Conscious Light. So it is the Neural Activity that we See as Light. The question is how does this Neural Activity get converted into the Conscious Light that we experience?

↪Pattern-chaser "Red" is perhaps giving too much leeway to veer off the metaphysical point that Klinko is trying to hammer home. Let's go with "cadmium orange" instead. — jkg20

Choose any Color that you want to study. People with colorblindness can think about the shade of White. Pick a Sound to study. Take the Standard A Tone.

What is the Redness of the Red?
What is the Orange-ness of the Orange?
What is the A-ness of the Standard A?

These are all Conscious experiences.

It seems to me you're the one who does most of the 'veering'. First it's red and redness, then it's that red is an external thing, and now ... what? And what about my observation that "red" is as ambiguous as most English words, and your approach ignores all but one of its possible meanings? :chin:

And what about my observation that "red" is as ambiguous as most English words, and your approach ignores all but one of its possible meanings?

My interest is in the fundamental metaphysics of the theory of vision that Klinko is outlining and whether it reveals any such thing as the "hard problem" that he is talking about, and indeed whether it is even a coherent theory. All the other uses of "red" that you are talking about are metaphorical/otherwise derived from the use of "red" to describe a visible property of the surface of objects (which is far from being an unusual use of the word) so I ignore those other uses on the grounds that for my concerns, they are irrelevant.

so I ignore those other uses — jkg20

Then your constrained researches will return constrained results. :up:

Why? For me, the research is constrained to the fundamental case - the results from the fundamental case will have consequences for all cases based on that foundation.

But your constrained results have already ignored all other meanings and uses to which humans put the term "red". The results from your limited and constrained case cannot extend to cover the things you have intentionally excluded. You can have your cake, or you can eat it. Choose one.