I think we can rule out the option that everything that exists was designed or intended to be this way, as that implies there is something in addition to "everything that exists" that did that design, so it's not really everything that exists. Unless we consider that maybe everything that exists designed itself, and deal with how that got started since you need everything that exists in place to design the everything that exists.

About the other part, it might be interesting to google "finely tuned universe". There, you will read about a cosmologist named Martin Rees who identifies six physical constants within the universe that science has no theories why they are set the way they are, or of any relationship between them, suggesting they are set randomly (let's set aside the discussion about whether there is such a thing as randomness to keep this simple). If so, then the odds that they would be set in a way that provides for a stable universe that allows human life to form is astronomically small. This has been fueling multiverse theories. These theories basically visualize that there are an infinite or astronomically large number of big banged out universes out there, kind of like a sea of bubbles, and a very super tiny fraction of them would have universes that are stable and suitable for life. Of course any humans out sitting on some planet pondering these things are going to be in one of those rare universes that is set just right to allow for them to exist, so as long as there are enough of these universes out there that it is likely that at least one of them has this, then it is irrelevant how improbable it is for a specific bubble.

To bring this back down to Earth, what do you mean by "particle"? Does the property of concrete atomistic particleness not develop in time due to the cooling and expansion of a Big Bang cosmos?

So you are presuming the timeless existence of little itty bits of matter floating free in an empty spatial void. And there is zero physical evidence of that being the true story of our Universe. It is how we might usefully conceive of the Universe right now. But it was not true at its start. Nor will it be at its Heat Death.

The bit of your multiverse or ergodic return speculation that can still work is the idea that the universe in its current cold and expanded state - the one where particles in a void is a reasonable classical physics summary - is infinite in its spatial extent. And so there is room enough, if we kept crossing the universe, that we would "have" to encounter an unlimited number of replica Earths, with replica you's and me's living the exact same lives.

There would be an infinite number of near replicas - all the ways those Earths, those us, could be fractionally or, more often, substantially different. And then an infinite number of absolutely exact replicas.

But a logical argument that always returns the answer "yes" on any question ought to be suspect.

"Would multiplying by infinity result in an infinite number of exactly 'me's' on top of an infinity of 'nearly-me's'?" "Yes. Anything times infinity equals infinity."

At what point would one start to wonder if this kind of simple extrapolation - one that turns any possibility into an actuality - is a little metaphysically sus?

Time is a perception of our minds, the way we experience existence is from one moment to the next, from our perspective there is a linear progression through time, but the truth is that time is not real, its simply something that our species perceives — xxxdutchiexxx

Do you really believe that there is not a substantial difference between past and future? If there is such a difference, how can time be "not real"?

The passage of time is literally created from the way your brain perceives the world around you, ask yourself, would time exist if there was not a single conscious being in existence? no, it would not because there would be no one around to even acknowledge its existence. What if you stop experiencing the passage of time as you do now? what if you begin to experience all past, present and future events all at the same time? You would no longer experience the passage of time, everything would simply be one with everything else.....In order for you to grasp what I am saying, you must take yourself out of the picture, remove your self from this reality and allow your perspective to change, you must allow yourself to see the big picture without judgement, once you remove your ego you will be able to fully see things for what they really are.

"Time is a perception of our minds,"
Physics has time dependent equations, such as the Schoroedinger equation, which describe how a physical system evolves over time. Further, this is contrary to intuition. So you have a burden to show why it is more likely merely an illusion.

If time is an illusion, how can you claim the universe can collapse? Are you assuming block time (b-theory)?

Are there infinitely many possible universes, or only a finite number of possibilities? Is the past infinite? There are reasons to think it is not.

The passage of time is literally created from the way your brain perceives the world around you, ask yourself, would time exist if there was not a single conscious being in existence? — xxxdutchiexxx

Doesn't the geological evidence show that time was passing before there was life on earth?

Anyway, what I was asking you was don't you live your life as if there is a substantial difference between past and future?

What if you stop experiencing the passage of time as you do now? what if you begin to experience all past, present and future events all at the same time? You would no longer experience the passage of time, everything would simply be one with everything else.... — xxxdutchiexxx

Sure, you can make up a fictional scenario in which there is no time. But it's fictional so of what use is that?

In order for you to grasp what I am saying, you must take yourself out of the picture, remove your self from this reality and allow your perspective to change, you must allow yourself to see the big picture without judgement, once you remove your ego you will be able to fully see things for what they really are. — xxxdutchiexxx

OK, I'm ready to play this game. I remove myself from reality, and there is nothing, no universe, absolutely nothing. Where and when do we start? Any assumption we add here, to produce a perspective, will be just an assumption. So "to fully see things for what they really are" requires that we assume a perspective. Do you agree? Without a perspective there is nothing.

A few observations.

First, time neither exists as such outside of the mind, nor is it a mental fiction. Aristotle was dead-on when he defined time as the measure of motion (aka change) according to before and after. So, it is based on the reality of change, yet, it is not change itself, but the result of a humans processing (measuring) change.

Second, atomist prejudices aside, there is no reason to think that the cosmos is made of particles. Quantum theory uses wave equations to describe the nature of things, with so-called "wave-particle duality" resulting from an unwillingness to give up the old dogmas.

Third, our best cosmological theories do not see the universe as ending in collapse, but in an ignominious heat death. Thus, the idea of cycling is passe.

Fourth, while many cosmologists speculate about a multiverse,
a. A multiverse is not entailed in any accepted theory. (We have no accepted theory of quantum gravity.)
b. The multiverse hypothesis not falsifiable (since other universes are, by definition, dynamically isolated from ours), and therefore not scientific, but mythological.
c. Even if there were other universes, there is no reason to believe that their physics (including their fine tuned constants) would be any different from ours.
i. The most parsimonious assumption is that they do not differ in any fundamental way from ours.
ii. We have no theory explaining why our physical constants have the values they do. Absent such a theory, we can say how they could have different values, and cannot rationally predict that they will have different values in other universes.
iii. If we could deduce the existence of other universes (we cannot presently), our deduction would be based on the physics learned in this universe. But, if another universe had different physics (to avoid fine tuning in that universe), the physics learned in this universe would be in applicable, and the deduction would break down.
d. The reason given for the existence of other universes is explicitly atheological -- not scientific.

Fifth, we know that there are laws of nature that physics studies and tries to describe. if these laws had no ontological reality, physics would be a species of fiction, not a science.
a. These laws are immaterial -- it is a category error to ask what they are made of.
b. They are also intentional. Franz Brentano determined that the defining characteristic of intentionality is "aboutness." Ideas are about their potential instances. Acts of will are about the states they seek to instantiate. In the same way, the laws of nature (as opposed to their approximate descriptions, the laws of physics) are about the states they bring to pass.

Thus, physics reveals that our universe is fundamentally intentional, both in its laws and in the values of its constants.

I am puzzled by your discussion. At the 20,000ft level, I read it like so:

1. There are things we don't know about the universe. [me: I agree]
2. Therefore, it must be like this. [me: uh.... wait;.. what?]
3. Therefore, because it is like this, we can conclude the universe is fundamentally intentional. [me: let's go back to 2 again?]

There is speculation that evidence of multiverses may be found in CMB radiation so it's not ruled out yet if any of them are testable scientific theories.

Science has no theories as to why these constants are set the way they are, or any relationship between them, so we do not know that if there are other universes, how their settings would compare to ours. Without additional information, you could be right that they are likely the same, or they could vary across the different universes. We cannot make any assumptions without additional information. I don't share the assumption that it is reasonable to assume they are fixed as it seems that (barring additional info) having the values flow through the ranges seems simple and frees us from having to explain why they are fixed to certain values-- a good challenger for the most parsimonious assumption.

I'm not arguing that we can conclude the universe was not intentional, just that the option of it being random is still a perfectly viable option given what we know.

However, if we do come up with a good reason to conclude the universe was intentional, then that implies the universe is only part of a larger realm of which includes the entity that caused the universe as it intended. But then we just moved the original question (is universe intentional or random) to this larger realm.

There's lots of problems with your claims.

.

Second, atomist prejudices aside, there is no reason to think that the cosmos is made of particles. Quantum theory uses wave equations to describe the nature of things, with so-called "wave-particle duality" resulting from an unwillingness to give up the old dogmas.
Wrong that this was due to "unwillingness." It was due to the observation that photons exhibit the properties of particles in some cases and the properties of waves, in other cases. The duality has been "solved" with quantum field theory, which considers fields as fundamental and particles as quantized ripples in fields.

Third, our best cosmological theories do not see the universe as ending in collapse, but in an ignominious heat death. Thus, the idea of cycling is passe.
Wrong. Sean Carroll, for example, has proposed that the heat death results in conditions from which a quantum fluctuation can occur which results in inflation ( ie a big bang).

A multiverse is not entailed in any accepted theory. (We have no accepted theory of quantum gravity.)
Not quite true. It is entailed by the many worlds interpretation of Quantum Theory, so in that respect it is entailed by accepted theory. However, no specific interpretation of Quantum theory has been shown to be true.

The multiverse hypothesis not falsifiable (since other universes are, by definition, dynamically isolated from ours), and therefore not scientific, but mythological.
Two errors here:
1) at minimum, a multiverse hypothesis is metaphysical, not mythological
2) multiverse hypotheses are tied to broader hypotheses (incomplete scientific theories) that are falsifiable.

Even if there were other universes, there is no reason to believe that their physics (including their fine tuned constants) would be any different from ours.
It is a presumption to claim the constants are "fine tuned." The real issue is: should we believe the physics that we know is truly fundamental? No- and that's because it is clearly incomplete and incoherent. The true fundamental physics would almost certainly have different expressions.

These laws are immaterial -- it is a category error to ask what they are made of.
That is a metaphysical assumption, not established fact. The "laws" of physics are abstract descriptions of the physical relations among the things that exist in the universe. The relations are due to the properties of the existents. Properties and relations of physical things do not exist independently of the things that have them.

1. There are things we don't know about the universe. [me: I agree]
2. Therefore, it must be like this. [me: uh.... wait;.. what?] — jajsfaye

I don't recall basing any claim on things we don't know about the universe. Could you be specific?

There is speculation that evidence of multiverses may be found — jajsfaye

It seems that you're the one relying on what we do not know. To be falsifiable, a theory must make a prediction that can be tested. Speculation about an unobserved possibility is not a prediction. If a theory predicted that we will find a specific feature of CMB radiation that is otherwise unexplained, then if we didn't find that feature, we'd know the theory was false. Any theory that does not provide such a definitive test is mythic, not scientific.

We cannot make any assumptions without additional information. — jajsfaye

Exactly. So, multiverse speculation is not a rational answer to the fine tuning argument. Let me be clear. I don't think the fine tuning argument proves anything. Still, it makes a very strong case in the legal sense. Evidence-free speculation about a multiverse with varied constants is not a rational rebuttal to that case. It is only an excuse for continuing to be an atheist in the face of overwhelming evidence of intelligence.

Let's be fair, since the fine-tuning argument is not a deductive proof, it can be ignored in good faith, but the reasons for doing so aren't scientific. They are usually an extra-scientific commitment to metaphysical naturalism. Letting ones faith-commitments influence one's science is no more rational for atheists than for creationists.

However, if we do come up with a good reason to conclude the universe was intentional, then that implies the universe is only part of a larger realm of which includes the entity that caused the universe as it intended. But then we just moved the original question (is universe intentional or random) to this larger realm. — jajsfaye

Yes, and no. It would be larger in a conceptual sense than that assumed by metaphysical naturalists. It need be no larger in a physical sense if the intelligence acted immanently, as suggested by Aquinas, inter alia.

The duality has been "solved" with quantum field theory, which considers fields as fundamental and particles as quantized ripples in fields. — Relativist

While I agree that quantum field theory, with its second quantization, provides us with consistent theory adequate to its purposes, it does not provide us with "particles" in the classical sense of point masses. Physics has no need of the particle construct or of the concept of wave-particle duality. Quantized fields are waves, not the point masses of atomists.

Sean Carroll, for example, has proposed that the heat death results in conditions from which a quantum fluctuation can occur which results in inflation — Relativist

And is a quantum fluctuation resulting in inflation "cycling" in the old sense of collapse? My choice not to say everything in a finite post does not mean what I do say is wrong.

It is entailed by the many worlds interpretation of Quantum Theory, so in that respect it is entailed by accepted theory. — Relativist

No, actually, it is not so entailed. If you actually read Everett's paper, as I have, he does not propose many worlds in any ontological sense, but only in an epistemic sense. What he argues is that as the measured quantum system is represented as a superposition of states, so we should model the brain of the observer as a corresponding superposition of states (a sort of Schrodinger cat). Each sub-state of the brain then represents one possible outcome of the quantum observation. So, we do not have many worlds, but many representations of one world.

Even if true, Everett's interpretation is entirely useless in rebutting the fine tuning argument, as each supposed representation has exactly the same physics, with exactly the same (fine-tuned) constants, as every other representation.

I have strong reasons, based on accepted physics, for rejecting both Schrodinger's cat and Everett's interpretation. As they are not germane to this thread, I will not offer them here.

a multiverse hypothesis is metaphysical, not mythological — Relativist

A metaphysical conclusion is one based on our experience of being (existence). A mythological claim lacks an adequate experiential basis -- as does the multiverse hypothesis.

multiverse hypotheses are tied to broader hypotheses (incomplete scientific theories) that are falsifiable. — Relativist

"Tied to" does not mean "derived from." When there is no logical implication, a hypothesis must be judged on its independent merits.

The true fundamental physics would almost certainly have different expressions. — Relativist

I agree. Nonetheless, the physics we have now is more than adequate to many purposes -- just as Newtonian physics continues to be more than adequate in its verified realm of application. So, while we can and should expect further, fundamental, revisions in our present physics, there is no reason to expect that the conclusions of a revised physics would overturn the conclusions of our present physics in its verified realm of application.

As the arguments for the fine-tuning of the various constants are sound applications of present physics in its verified realm of application, there is no rational reason to think that advances in physics would lead to their rejection.

The "laws" of physics are abstract descriptions of the physical relations among the things that exist in the universe. The relations are due to the properties of the existents. Properties and relations of physical things do not exist independently of the things that have them. — Relativist

First, as I explained, when I say "laws of nature" I mean the aspects of reality physics seeks to describe with its laws ("the laws of physics"), and not the descriptions themselves. Now either physics is describing (in a limited and approximate way), some aspect of reality ("the laws of nature"), or physics is a species of fiction. So, we may conclude that there are actual laws of nature -- which is to say that they are an aspect of reality.

Of course, the laws are co-extensive with the particles and fields they control, but not because they have parts outside of parts (are extended). They are not. Rather they are co-extensive because that is their domain of operation.

Nor can they be physically separated. Still, they can be separated in thought, so they are a different aspect of the universe than its matter and fields -- an aspect which is immaterial in the sense of lacking parts outside of parts and material constituents.

It is confusing to call laws "properties." "Property" usually means an aspect of a thing that may or may not be found in other things and that can vary between various tokens of the same type. Clearly, universal laws are not "properties" in this (usual) sense. If you are merely saying that we can have no operative laws without matter or fields for them to operate on, I am happy to stipulate that.

You don't seem to understand me. It's possible that I was not clear, given that is a common tendency with me. :)

But, I was not claiming that there are multiple universes. I was simply stating it as a possibility, given the limits of what we know. The original question was about whether or not the universe was designed or random, and it is a possible explanation that allows for the "random" option (I will use random broadly here for the sake of simplicity, to mean anything that varies over a range of options). I am not declaring that things are this way; it is just a hypothetical possibility and nothing more, given the constraints of what we currently know.

I don't know how atheism fits into this. I actually consider myself quite spiritual, but those spiritual feelings are irrelevant here.

As far as I know, science does not know yet why these constants are set the way they are, or of any relationship between them. The multiverses is one option being presented to explain why the universe is so finely tuned to allow us to be here, given that astronomically low probability that it would be set that way if the properties were set randomly.

Until a scientific experiment is performed that adjusts our confidence level past a threshold that a scientific theory can be accepted that multiverses exist or not, it is in the realm of the unknown. This does not mean that we can assume they exist. But is also does not mean that we can assume they do not exist.

You seem to be assuming they do not exist until we know otherwise; therefore, we can conclude that a designer created this universe. Your concluding sentence was:

Thus, physics reveals that our universe is fundamentally intentional, both in its laws and in the values of its constants.

. What I am saying is that no, we cannot make such conclusions yet because there are other hypothetical options of which we do not yet know enough to rule them out with high confidence.

Part of your logic was to rule out the random option on the assumption that it is not as parsimonious as the conclusion that the universe is designed. That is, given these two possibilities:

A: There are multiverses and these have a range of parameters such that there is reasonable probability that at least one of them is finely tuned to support us being here.

B: There is either one universe or they are all set to the same parameters, but there is also a designer with the intelligence and capability to set the universe to be finely tuned to support us being here.

You seem to assume that B is more parsimonious and, thus, must be assumed to be true. It is hard for me to agree with that.

Relativist: It is entailed by the many worlds interpretation of Quantum Theory, so in that respect it is entailed by accepted theory.

Dfpolis: No, actually, it is not so entailed. If you actually read Everett's paper, as I have, he does not propose many worlds in any ontological sense, but only in an epistemic sense. What he argues is that as the measured quantum system is represented as a superposition of states, so we should model the brain of the observer as a corresponding superposition of states (a sort of Schrodinger cat). Each sub-state of the brain then represents one possible outcome of the quantum observation. So, we do not have many worlds, but many representations of one world.

Everett wrote: " from the standpoint of our theory, it is not so much the system which is affected by an observation as the observer, who becomes correlated to the system. " and "In our case, we wish to make statements about "trajectories" of observers. However, for us a trajectory is constantly branching (transforming from state to superposition) with each successive measurement."

Irrespective of whether Everett himself was a realist or an instrumentalist, a realist perspective on his interpretation is absolutely ontological .

Even if true, Everett's interpretation is entirely useless in rebutting the fine tuning argument, as each supposed representation has exactly the same physics, with exactly the same (fine-tuned) constants, as every other representation.
Of course it doesn't rebut the FTA on its own, but in conjunction with the potential for more fundamental physics it constitutes a mechanism for actualizing alternative realizations of localized physics.

"What[Everett] argues is that as the measured quantum system is represented as a superposition of states, so we should model the brain of the observer as a corresponding superposition of states"
Everett does not use this characterization in his dissertation, and it would be problematic when you consider potential consequences of different branches (one branched brain states gets one girl pregnant, while another branched state gets a different girl pregnant. This results in different offspring in the two branches).

So, we do not have many worlds, but many representations of one world.
Only with a specific interpretation of Everett's paper. The MWI interpretation has a variety of post-Everett flavors.

Relativist: "a multiverse hypothesis is metaphysical, not mythological"

Dfpolis: "A metaphysical conclusion is one based on our experience of being (existence). A mythological claim lacks an adequate experiential basis -- as does the multiverse hypothesis."

A multiverse metaphysics has as much standing as an Aristotelian metaphysics (consider Aristotle's hypothesis that "essence" exists). Metaphysical theories are not the product of physical experiments. They are explanatory hypotheses that attempt to explain that which exists, and is posited to exist. If your simply making the epistemological stance that we have no right to believe something that is not subject to experimental confirmation, I don't really take issue with it - I just object to applying different epistemological standards in order to argue for something one would like to believe.

Dfpolis: "The multiverse hypothesis not falsifiable (since other universes are, by definition, dynamically isolated from ours), and therefore not scientific, but mythological."
Relativist: "multiverse hypotheses are tied to broader hypotheses (incomplete scientific theories) that are falsifiable."
Dfpolis: "Tied to" does not mean "derived from." When there is no logical implication, a hypothesis must be judged on its independent merits.

Each specific multiverse is actually derivable from an (incomplete) scientific theory, so your objection has no merit. Here's an excerpt from a survey of Multiverse Theories written by P. C. W. Davies:

The problem arises because string theory is formulated most naturally in 10 or 11
spacetime dimensions, whereas the spacetime of our perceptions is four dimensional. The
extra space dimensions are rendered unobservable by a process called compactification:
they are rolled up to a very small size. ... This basic notion may be extended to any
number of extra dimensions, but then the process of compactification is no longer unique.
In general, there are very many ways of compactifying several extra dimensions. When
additional degrees of freedom in string theory are taken into account, compactification
may involve several hundred variables, all of which may vary from one region of the
universe to another. These variables serve to fix the low-energy physics, by determining
what sorts of particles exist, what their masses might be and the nature and strengths of
the forces that act between them. The theory also permits compactification to spaces with
other than three dimensions. Thus string theory predicts myriad possible low-energy
worlds. Some might be quite like ours, but with slightly heavier electrons or a somewhat
stronger weak force. Others might differ radically, and possess, say, five large (i.e.
uncompactified) space dimensions and two species of photons.

This flavor of string theory entails multiple possible "low energy physics" (the physics we observe), and this string theory is falsifiable.

Dfpolis: the physics we have now is more than adequate to many purposes -- just as Newtonian physics continues to be more than adequate in its verified realm of application. So, while we can and should expect further, fundamental, revisions in our present physics, there is no reason to expect that the conclusions of a revised physics would overturn the conclusions of our present physics in its verified realm of application.
Sure, but its "verified realm of application" is limited to this universe. It's premature to declare that the quest for more fundamental physics, and the possible implications of it, are doomed.

As the arguments for the fine-tuning of the various constants are sound applications of present physics in its verified realm of application, there is no rational reason to think that advances in physics would lead to their rejection.
There is no good argument for the "fine-tuning" of the constants! - they all depend on the presumption of design. But there is very good reason to think further exploration into more fundamental physics would change our views on what is physically possible: the Copernican principle (or principle of mediocrity): why should we think our portion of the universe is representative of the whole?

" they can be separated in thought, so they are a different aspect of the universe than its matter and fields -- an aspect which is immaterial in the sense of lacking parts outside of parts and material constituents
The fact that we can think abstractly about some properties of physical states of affairs doesn't imply there is anything immaterial about those physical states of affairs. It seems a tangent to discuss the nature of mental objects, like abstractions.

"It is confusing to call laws "properties."
Get used to it, I didn't make it up. Physicalist philosophers like D.M. Armstrong and Michael Tooley have been using this terminology for years.

In brief: everything that exists is a "state of affairs". A state of affairs has 3 sorts of constituents: a (thin) particular, its relational properties, and its non-relational properties. ("Thick particular" = the particular with its properties).

There are "state of affairs types" - i.e. sets of particular states of affairs that have one or more properties in common. Example: a specific electron is a state of affairs, whereas "electron" (in general) is a state of affairs type.

A law of nature is a relation between states of affairs types. Ergo, under this account, laws of nature are relational properties that exist between states of affairs types. "electrons have an attractive relation to protons" is a law of nature. The law is instantiated in specific pairs of electrons and protons.

I was not claiming that there are multiple universes. I was simply stating it as a possibility, given the limits of what we know. — jajsfaye

I agree, it is a possibility. That is why the fine-tuning argument is not a proof, but merely a convincing argument on the model of a court case.

I will use random broadly here for the sake of simplicity, to mean anything that varies over a range of options — jajsfaye

That's fine, but this definition of random does not exclude the idea of intentionality.

You seem to be assuming they do not exist until we know otherwise — jajsfaye

No, I am not assuming that the multiverse hypothesis is wrong. I am merely pointing out that while it is logically possible, it does not rise to the level of a scientific hypothesis, because the only support there is for it is the argument that if there is no God, there must be a multiverse.

Your concluding sentence was:

"Thus, physics reveals that our universe is fundamentally intentional, both in its laws and in the values of its constants." — jajsfaye

Let me be clear. I have already said that the fine tuning argument is not a proof. It merely presents us with evidence of Intelligence. (By "evidence," I mean rational grounds inclining us to a conclusion, as legal evidence does.) On the one side, we have physics telling us, in a way unlikely to change with further advances, that the cosmos is fine-tuned for life. On the other hand, we have an unfalsifiable logical possibility, unsupported by a shred of evidence and in violation of the principle of parsimony, that there may be a myriad of other universes -- and that those other universes might just have different physical constants -- then again, they might not. I think any rational evaluation would see the fine-tuning argument (revealed by physics) as the stronger case.

That said, I don't rely on the fine tuning argument because there are unrefuted deductive arguments (aka actual proofs) for the existence of God as the ongoing sustainer of the cosmos.

You have not commented on my analysis showing that the laws of nature are intentional. That is my main argument for intelligence, with fine-tuning playing only a supporting role. If the laws of nature are intentional in character, then we must call their source a mind -- not a mind like ours, but still, a mind.

given these two possibilities:

A: There are multiverses and these have a range of parameters such that there is reasonable probability that at least one of them is finely tuned to support us being here.

B: There is either one universe or they are all set to the same parameters, but there is also a designer with the intelligence and capability to set the universe to be finely tuned to support us being here.

You seem to assume that B is more parsimonious and, thus, must be assumed to be true. It is hard for me to agree with that. — jajsfaye

This mis-states the case. Most of B is known fact, not assumption. We know that this universe exists and is fine tuned. So, the only hypothesis in B is that there is a single intelligence at work.

On the other hand, A posits (1) a myriad of other, complex, universes and (2) that each of these has (for reasons unknown) independent values of its physical constants.

Clearly, the hypothesis of a single intelligent Being is simpler than the dual hypotheses of a myriad of other universes and that physical constants vary between universes.

Finally, I do not think that God "designed" the universe. If God exists, He is necessarily changeless. So there can be no sequence of design and implementation in God. There can only be intentional implementation.

Is the case for fine-tuned for life that good?

The constants found in physics (and similar sciences) are but part of such an assessment. We'd have to take entirely different ontologies/structures into account as well, or we'd still just be looking at ours. (For that matter, we don't change π, and expect to find circles, I don't anyway.) Not a simple assessment to make; how would we come up with such alternate universes...?

Following evidence + current models thereof, life, as we know it, has a window somewhere between formation of solar systems and the beginning of the degenerate era, ever marching towards heat death (cf expansion of the universe). Heat death involves an unfathomable amount of time (even compared to 14 billion years), ruled by the lonely photon in deep cold.

In the meantime, life seems rare, at least from what we currently know. Our present universe is largely indifferent/hostile to life (by far). It's vast, open spaces and lots of radiation, with rocks here and there, gases and suns, and the occasional black hole and supernova blast. Life on Earth requires free energy from the Sun to stay around; energy that temporarily partakes in food chains before dispersing ever on (entropy + expansion).

Isn't it somewhat self-elevating to think of life as a pre-determined purpose of the universe...? Or more specifically, like some seem to think, us? :o Self-importance (even narcissism)? Douglas Adams' puddle comes to mind.

Texas sharpshooter fallacy (Wikipedia)

Irrespective of whether Everett himself was a realist or an instrumentalist, a realist perspective on his interpretation is absolutely ontological . — Relativist

When I say that Everett's interpretation is more epistemological than ontological, I am speaking about the "manyness" of the worlds envisioned. I agree that he is speaking of real brainstates in real observers; nonetheless, these brainstates image different mathematical projections of one and the same world.

To understand this, you need to understand what a superposition of states is. It is not many worlds on top of each other, but a mathematical means of representing a single state in as a sum of mathematical forms called "eigenfunctions." Any state represented by one set of eigenfunctions can be mathematically transformed into representation in terms of any other complete set of functions. So, the mathematical structure (representation) of a particular superposition is not a natural property, but a reflection of how someone has chosen to represent nature. Thus, however we choose to represent a natural state by alternate sets of functions, it remains one and the same state. It is never many states, and certainly never many states with different physical constants as would be required to rebut the fine-tuning argument.

When I read Everett's paper I was truly impressed by the clarity and consistency of his thinking. Still, it is based on bad physics. It is not necessary to criticize his thinking here because, as I said, Everett's "many worlds" are all one and the same world with one and the same set of physical constants.

Of course it doesn't rebut the FTA on its own, but in conjunction with the potential for more fundamental physics it constitutes a mechanism for actualizing alternative realizations of localized physics. — Relativist

If it does not rebut the FTA on its own, it does not rebut the FTA. As I explained in another post, just as the advances of 20th century physics left Newtonian physics in tact with respect to phenomena in its verified realm of application, so any further advances, however fundamental, will leave 20th century physics in tact in its verified realm of application. Nothing will make a description of one world with one set of constants suddenly become a description of many worlds with many different constants.

The MWI interpretation has a variety of post-Everett flavors. — Relativist

Indeed it does. That is why we need to examine notthe "interpretations," but the logic Everett used to justify his proposal.

There is no good argument for the "fine-tuning" of the constants! - they all depend on the presumption of design. — Relativist

So, the physics showing that minute variations in the constants leads to conditions unsuited to life depends on the assumption of design? Would you care to provide an example showing how this assumption changed the calculations? Or even how it could change the calculations? The vast literature generated by naturalists to support the possibility of a multiverse as an explicit alternative to fine-tuning shows that some very prominent physicists and cosmologists take the calculations quite seriously.

A multiverse metaphysics has as much standing as an Aristotelian metaphysics (consider Aristotle's hypothesis that "essence" exists). — Relativist

No, it does not. Aristotle was an empiricist. He did not "hypothesize that 'essence' exists." He said that our definitions of universal terms reflect common elements in their instances, and that we may name those common elements the object's "essence." In other words, essences are the foundation in reality for essential definitions. I do not see how any empiricist could deny that there are real differences, found in individuals, that allow us to say this is human and this a canary. Biologists do that every time they determine what species an organism is.

So, while Aristotle's account of essences is entirely empirical, no account of multiverses is. Thus, multiverses are not "metaphysical" -- they derive from no adequate empirical foundation and are rightly classed as mythic.

Each specific multiverse is actually derivable from an (incomplete) scientific theory, so your objection has no merit. — Relativist

Really? "Incomplete" theories now have evidentiary standing? This merits no further discussion.

The problem arises because string theory is formulated most naturally in 10 or 11
spacetime dimensions ...

String theory is indeed "incomplete." So incomplete that it has made no falsifiable prediction and its supporters mix results from logically inconsistent versions. I will not repeat the harsher and less charitable criticisms. I merely note that dressing ignorance in mathematical lace doesn't make it a thing of beauty.

Sure, but its "verified realm of application" is limited to this universe. It's premature to declare that the quest for more fundamental physics, and the possible implications of it, are doomed. — Relativist

I have no problem with physics that only works for empirical reality. I am not sure why anyone would -- accept to rationalize a faith position.

I have never said or implied "that the quest for more fundamental physics, and the possible implications of it, are doomed." It is not something I believe, and so it seems a bit underhanded to suggest that I do. I will say until we actually have empirically verified advances in fundamental physics, it is irrational to pretend to know its implications.

why should we think our portion of the universe is representative of the whole? — Relativist

Because it exhausts our knowledge base. Either we base science on actual data, or we admit baseless speculation. Natural science, with its hypothetico-deductive method, will never achieve metaphysical certitude. Logically, there will always be other possibilities -- but we can't base science on possibility alone. Science needs to explain our actual experience of nature -- not possible mythic realms.

The fact that we can think abstractly about some properties of physical states of affairs doesn't imply there is anything immaterial about those physical states of affairs. — Relativist

You're arguing skew to the point here. It is not a question of whether we think abstractly or not. The question is: what are the properties of the object of thought. We think abstractly of quanta and fields, yet we know they are material because they have mass-energy and parts outside of parts (extension). We think abstractly of works of art, but we know they are composed of atoms. When we think of the laws of nature, our concept does not involve parts outside of parts -- they are not spatially divisible -- or the possession of mass-energy. Thus, laws of nature lack the defining characteristics of matter -- not because our thoughts are abstract, but because what we are thinking about falls into a different category.

"It is confusing to call laws "properties."
Get used to it, I didn't make it up. Physicalist philosophers like D.M. Armstrong and Michael Tooley have been using this terminology for years. — Relativist

It is no defense that Armstrong and Tooley are equally confused. Properties are logical "accidents" -- aspects of individuals. Some apples have the property being red or sweet. Others do not. The laws of nature operate universally. Of course you can take a word and extend its meaning. But, when you fail to see that it means different things in different sentences, you open yourself to the fallacy of equivocation. Precise thinking requires sensitivity to variations in meaning. Lumping equivocal meanings together is a sign of confusion.

under this account, laws of nature are relational properties that exist between states of affairs types. — Relativist

Indeed. The conceptual space you are projecting reality into does not span the available data. When you employ a projection that is not one-to-one, you leave data on the table. Other projections, into different conceptual spaces, are better suited to the data you have abstracted away. Your projection ignores intentionality. Intentions, while real, need not be reflected in physical states of affairs.

The question of whether existence came from chance or was determined, comes down to whether you believe in an intelligent God or a blockhead God. Neither predetermined existence or random existence can be proven, so both are based on faith. This faith translates to two different types of religions and godheads.

If the universe came by chance, this implies a God who is an idiot savant. He has no clue what he is doing. He is unable to plan, but periodically he will come up with something by chance. He will throw all the parts of a car in the air hoping a car appears. If something else happens, fine. He is not very smart but depends on luck for anything to happen.

A God of determinism is more mediative and is able to plan things out. He is the genius old brother of the idiot savant. I like this religion better.

The ancients always assumed determinism instead of random, in terms of the larger things, because creation was connected to the Gods and random creation meant their God or Gods were mentally defective, unable to do what human could do; think and plan.

Random was never satisfying, except by those who were trying to overthrow the Gods and put man in his or their place. An idiot savant God can be made subservient, since he can't counter the planning of man, in a timely fashion. A God of determinism is always steps ahead of man.

When I say that Everett's interpretation is more epistemological than ontological, I am speaking about the "manyness" of the worlds envisioned...It is not many worlds on top of each other, but a mathematical means of representing a single state in as a sum of mathematical forms called "eigenfunctions."

Sure: there is one all encompassing state in a quantum system, but the issue is: how does the classical world that we experience emerge from the quantum system that comprises reality. A realist view of MWI is based on the ontological commitment that physical reality is a quantum system, and that the classical world of experience is an eigenstate of that QM system. So the "world branching" is (technically) just a classical perspective: each eigenstate is a classical "world."
You also mention there being exactly one set of physical constraints, and I agree - but that doesn't mean we have a complete understanding of what the true constraints are, since we can only see how they manifest in our classical world.

So, the physics showing that minute variations in the constants leads to conditions unsuited to life depends on the assumption of design? Would you care to provide an example showing how this assumption changed the calculations? Or even how it could change the calculations? The vast literature generated by naturalists to support the possibility of a multiverse as an explicit alternative to fine-tuning shows that some very prominent physicists and cosmologists take the calculations quite seriously.

It's moot what you see in the literature because you're seeing response based on a flawed premise. The alleged "fine tuning" is a product of post hoc analysis. The FTA has the unstated assumption that life was a design objective. Consider any metaphysically possible world W, which contains complex objects of type T. One could argue that W was fine tuned for T. What is special about life? It's special to us, but that doesn't make it intrinsically special. I feel special to myself, and am the product of a series of improbable accidents of pairs of individuals who happened to reproduce: was I the product of a priori design? If you disagree with my analysis, try reformulating the FTA without assuming life is intrisically special, or assuming the world was "fine tuned" (a question begging concept).

Aristotle was an empiricist. He did not "hypothesize that 'essence' exists." He said that our definitions of universal terms reflect common elements in their instances and that we may name those common elements the object's "essence." In other words, essences are the foundation in reality for essential definitions. I do not see how any empiricist could deny that there are real differences, found in individuals, that allow us to say this is human and this a canary. Biologists do that every time they determine what species an organism is.

Aristotle's reasoning was a product of his time, but with advances in science and analytic philosophy, we can see that the notion of essence has no empirical basis. And yet there continue to be philosophers who embrace the metaphysics (e.g. Edward Feser).

Essence entails the existence of necessary and sufficient properties for individuation and for delineating "kinds." What are your necessary and sufficient properties vs your accidental properties? Would you be YOU had there been a single gene that was different? How about a single day of your life having different experiences?

What are the necessary and sufficient properties for being a horse? Consider the evolution of horse throughout the evolutionary history of its ancestry: it is arbitrary where you draw the line between horse and non-horse. Species is a sortal, based on vague boundaries, not some underlying metaphysical distinction.

Really? "Incomplete" theories now have evidentiary standing? This merits no further discussion.

We weren't discussing evidence. You had alleged the multiverse hypothesis was "mythological" and that it was not falsifiable. I showed that you were mistaken on both counts. I admit there is no evidence for a multiverse, but there are good reasons to think this might be the case - as I discussed. Multiverse is consistent with what we know, and it is entailed by some reasonable extrapolations about what we know (these extrapolations are what I referred to as "incomplete theories"). Science advances in this way; accepted theory does not arrive in its final form.

" So incomplete that it has made no falsifiable prediction and its supporters mix results from logically inconsistent versions. I will not repeat the harsher and less charitable criticisms.

Errors in the analysis are self-correcting - that's what peer review is for.

I merely note that dressing ignorance in mathematical lace doesn't make it a thing of beauty.

Agreed, but this doesn't make metaphysical speculations that are devoid of math any prettier. I bring these things up not because they are necessarily true, but rather to show why we shouldn't be seduced by metaphysical explanations that implicitly rely on arguments from ignorance. We should be agnostic to the existence of multiverse, not hastily dismissing it for insufficient empirical basis while declaring victory for a deism that also lacks an empirical basis.

I have no problem with physics that only works for empirical reality. I am not sure why anyone would -- accept to rationalize a faith position.

That's fine as long as you refrain from arguments from ignorance as I just discussed.

You're arguing skew to the point here. It is not a question of whether we think abstractly or not. The question is: what are the properties of the object of thought. We think abstractly of quanta and fields, yet we know they are material because they have mass-energy and parts outside of parts (extension). We think abstractly of works of art, but we know they are composed of atoms. When we think of the laws of nature, our concept does not involve parts outside of parts -- they are not spatially divisible -- or the possession of mass-energy. Thus, laws of nature lack the defining characteristics of matter -- not because our thoughts are abstract, but because what we are thinking about falls into a different category.

You seem to have some physical/metaphysical framework in mind, and are judging the Armstrong-Tooley framework from that perspective. That is the category error. Armstrong developed a fairly complete metaphysics, and it can account for everything you've discussed - but it of course does so very differently. So, for example, from the perspective of Armstrong's metaphysics, it's meaningless to assert "laws of nature lack the defining characteristics of matter". We don't really need to debate which metaphysics is true, as long as you don't implicitly insist that your metaphysical assumptions form the proper basis for exploring metaphysical truths.

A realist view of MWI is based on the ontological commitment that physical reality is a quantum system, and that the classical world of experience is an eigenstate of that QM system. So the "world branching" is (technically) just a classical perspective: each eigenstate is a classical "world." — Relativist

No, in quantum theory, the actual world is always a superposition of states. Eigenstates with respect to one dynamical variable are superpositions of many states with respect to another. So the only "special" thing about being an eigenstate is that the corresponding eigenvalue is one of the possible answers if we try to measure the associated variable.

But, as I keep repeating, the MWI is not evidence against the FTA because every "world" has the same physical constants. Also, it is based on defective physics.

You also mention there being exactly one set of physical constraints, and I agree - but that doesn't mean we have a complete understanding of what the true constraints are, since we can only see how they manifest in our classical world. — Relativist

As they are determined by how they "manifest" in the classical world, that is all we need to know -- whatever you may think contrasts with "manifesting in the classical world."

The FTA has the unstated assumption that life was a design objective. — Relativist

No, the FTA infers that life was intentional from the fact that the variables have the exact values required to produce life. Suppose you ran a store with only one thing costing $1.59 and a young person plunks $1.59 on the counter, looking at you expectantly. It would be a rational inference to conclude that the child wants the one thing costing $1.59.

Consider any metaphysically possible world W, which contains complex objects of type T. One could argue that W was fine tuned for T. — Relativist

This is simply false. For the argument to be persuasive, you need the additional datum at the core of the FTA, viz., that minute variations of W's constants would preclude the existence of Ts.

with advances in science and analytic philosophy, we can see that the notion of essence has no empirical basis — Relativist

This is nonsense, as shown by my example of biologists making taxonomic decisions. There is a foundation in reality for essential definitions, and that is what Aristotle defines as a thing's "essence:"
"The essence of each thing is what it is said to be propter se" Metaphysics Z, 4 -- and saying what something is, is defining it.

Essence entails the existence of necessary and sufficient properties for individuation and for delineating "kinds." What are your necessary and sufficient properties vs your accidental properties? Would you be YOU had there been a single gene that was different? How about a single day of your life having different experiences? — Relativist

You are confusing my individual characteristics with what allows me to be called a "human." Aristotle's essences are not individual, but specific. So, "Essence entails the existence of necessary and sufficient properties for individuation" is simply false. "Essence entails the existence of necessary and sufficient properties for delineating 'kinds'" is true.

Consider the evolution of horse throughout the evolutionary history of its ancestry — Relativist

Biologists have -- defining different species in the ancestral line of the modern horse.

More fundamentally, you seem to be thinking of essences as something imposed from the outside. What actually happens is that we humans develop conceptual spaces in response to our experiences. Then, when we want to be more precise, we formally define what we mean by various terms, and necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of a term are, collectively, the essence of what we have defined.

Since essences are only found in concrete things, they don't pre-exist their instances. As species evolve, so do the properties we use to define them, i.e. their essences.

Remember: Aristotle started by teaching logic. His primary concern is precision in language, not Plato's Ideal World. His discussion of essence and existence is about how what we say reflects our experience of reality.

What are your necessary and sufficient properties vs your accidental properties? — Relativist

Let's take the concept <human>. Every creature that evokes that concept has a human essence because its essence is just a set of properties sufficient to evoke the concept <human>. Said in a different way, the human essence ontological basis for abstracting the concept <human>. Other properties it has -- properties that vary from from one human to another -- are, by definition, "accidental." ("Accidental" in this sense is not to be confused with "accidental" in the sense of random.)

We weren't discussing evidence. You had alleged the multiverse hypothesis was "mythological" and that it was not falsifiable. — Relativist

A theory is mythic if it has no evidentiary basis. It is unfalsifiable if no evidence can falsify it. You did not show I was wrong on either count. ("I admit there is no evidence for a multiverse.")

Multiverse is consistent with what we know, and it is entailed by some reasonable extrapolations — Relativist

Being consistent means it's logically possible. I agree a multiverse is logically possible -- that requires no supporting evidence. One can extrapolate in any way one wishes. Experience shows that "reasonable extrapolations" have no epistic value. "The earth looks pretty flat to me," though true, does not support "The earth is flat." "The stars appear to rotate around the earth," while true, does not entail "The stars are embedded in a crystalline sphere." I require actual evidence and adherence to methodological canons to call a theory "scientific."

Science advances in this way; accepted theory does not arrive in its final form. — Relativist

I quite agree. But, for every accepted theory there are thousands that turn out to be utter rubbish. I'm not saying no one should research multiverses or work out the consequences of alternate hypotheses. If I were refereeing a paper working out a reasonable hypothesis, I wouldn't reject it because it involved a multiverse. This is not a discussion about freedom of thought or the right to discuss various hypotheses, but about what it's rational to think true given what we actually know.

Errors in the analysis are self-correcting - that's what peer review is for. — Relativist

This is a contradiction. Errors don't self-reflect and think themselves wrong. People correct them -- and I'm one of those doing so.

We should be agnostic to the existence of multiverse, not hastily dismissing it for insufficient empirical basis while declaring victory for a deism that also lacks an empirical basis. — Relativist

You seem confused as to my position. I'm open to the possibility of a multiverse. I even think it's a sensible line of inquiry. What I'm discussing is the current epistic value of the multiverse hypothesis as opposed to the FTA. It should be obvious that any hypothesis lacking supporting evidence (as you agree wrt a multiverse) has no epistic value. On the other hand, the FTA is based on evidence and peer-reviewed calculations. I agree that the FTA is not a "proof," but it does have epistic value. So it makes a far stronger case in the legal sense.

That's fine as long as you refrain from arguments from ignorance — Relativist

You've bandied about "arguments from ignorance" for a while I don't recall advancing any -- nor you pointing out any. On the other hand, you're using our ignorance wrt a multiverse as a counter to the FTA. Please be specific as to any arguments from ignorance you think I'm making.

You seem to have some physical/metaphysical framework in mind, — Relativist

My metaphysical framework is dynamic realism -- that "existence" is convertible with "the power to act in some way," and a being's "essence" is a specification of its possible acts. (This isn't Aristotle's definition of "essence,") My epistemological framework is my projection paradigm -- that all we know is a dynamic projection (dimensionally diminished map) of reality, i.e. the result of reality acting on us in some limited way.

Feel free to criticize of my framework.

You ... are judging the Armstrong-Tooley framework from that perspective. That is the category error. — Relativist

Do you know what a category error is? If so how am I making one?

from the perspective of Armstrong's metaphysics, it's meaningless to assert "laws of nature lack the defining characteristics of matter". — Relativist

I am willing to grant this is the case. Since my sentence is perfectly meaningful in normal English language discourse, I conclude that Armstrong's metaphysics is inadequate to normal English discourse. You are perfectly free to limit yourself to their framework. I prefer to be open to many complementary projections of reality.

you guys are way too smart.
my head hurts reading all that.

let's say we were not intentionally designed, but rather began from an explosion that led to the division of a "single celled organism" right?? that led to...well everything we are now??

our bodies have very few parts to them that we can live without.
they all depend on each other.
we need a brain to make all of our organs function, but we need the organs to allow our brain to function.

for instance,
our brains tell our lungs to breathe
our lungs draw oxygen from the air and send it into our blood stream.
our hearts (also told to beat by our brain)
pump the oxygen rich blood through a network of arteries to the brain so it can continue to tell the body to keep doing what it does.

SO --
when this single cell was splitting....
when it was one, it became two, and so on, right?
how many cells is a brain made of?
or a heart?
or even our veins?

at what point did a single cell decide it was going to start splitting and growing into a heart?
and if it DID, why?
was it already a brain that knew it needed a heart?
was a Primordial Goo Brain smarter than we are now?
that it (accidentally randomly) knew it needed a complex operating system??
but even if it WAS that smart -- how the heck did it manage to keep the body alive while it was
3D printing itself over a million years? one. piece. at. a. time. when all the pieces function as a WHOLE?

i am so confused right now

Regarding the relationship between MWI and the multiverse, I refer you to this paper: The Multiverse Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics.

You've bandied about "arguments from ignorance" for a while I don't recall advancing any -- nor you pointing out any. On the other hand, you're using our ignorance wrt a multiverse as a counter to the FTA. Please be specific as to any arguments from ignorance you think I'm making.

You've reference the Fine Tuning Argument, and I inferred that you were referring to the FTA for God's existence. If I'm mistaken that your agenda is to "prove" God's existence based on the alleged "fine tuning" of these constants, then there's nothing really to discuss. But if that is what you have in mind, then I see an argument from ignorance behind the reasoning: we don't know why the constants are in this narrow life permitting range, therefore it must be due to design.

I'll assume you actually do believe "fine tuning" entails God, so I'll continue.

But, as I keep repeating, the MWI is not evidence against the FTA because every "world" has the same physical constants

And as I keep repeating, we don't know what the true fundamental laws of nature actually are. All we can know is what we have access to, and that's the way the laws of nature manifest in this universe. To avoid continuing to go in circles, I'll interject that our fundamental disagreement is really metaphysics, not the physics. We can agree that known physics does not entail a multiverse, much less variations in the so-called fundamental constants. This takes our epistemic quest out of the realm of (narrowly defined) physical possibility. What is the implication? It just implies the answer is beyond the realm of current physics. If you were to claim, "therefore it must be God" you would be committing an argument from ignorance. Why should we think a supernatural being is more likely than an unknown natural cause? The converse seems more likely because we don't know that there exists anything other than the natural world.

I apologize in advance if I am mistaken in assuming your objective is :"prove" God's existence from the alleged fine tuning, but if I have correctly anticipated this - then my arguments are relevant.

No, the FTA infers that life was intentional from the fact that the variables have the exact values required to produce life.

So what? This universe happened to produce a set of things that we characterize as "living." Why regard this as special?

Suppose you ran a store with only one thing costing $1.59 and a young person plunks $1.59 on the counter, looking at you expectantly. It would be a rational inference to conclude that the child wants the one thing costing $1.59.

You are relating a coincidence (two things unexpectedly coinciding). What is life coinciding with?

Relativist: "Consider any metaphysically possible world W, which contains complex objects of type T. One could argue that W was fine tuned for T.."

This is simply false. For the argument to be persuasive, you need the additional datum at the core of the FTA, viz., that minute variations of W's constants would preclude the existence of Ts.

I considered this implied, but OK, let's formally add it: Consider a metaphysically possible world, W, which contains complex objects of type T which would not exist had the fundamental constants differed from what is actual in that world.

There are many sorts things that exist in THIS world that would not exist had the constants been different.

You are confusing my individual characteristics with what allows me to be called a "human." Aristotle's essences are not individual, but specific. So, "Essence entails the existence of necessary and sufficient properties for individuation" is simply false. "Essence entails the existence of necessary and sufficient properties for delineating 'kinds'" is true.

I believe you're right about Aristotle. I had confused his metaphysics with that of Thomas Aquinas. Thomist metaphyics has the view of essence that I was referring to: it is an integral part of his metaphysics, and yet it is pure assumption that there is such a thing.

My metaphysical framework is dynamic realism -- that "existence" is convertible with "the power to act in some way," and a being's "essence" is a specification of its possible acts. (This isn't Aristotle's definition of "essence,")

Sounds similar to Thomist metaphysics, and it again sounds like an assumption - not something that we know exists due to evidence, but rather something that is postulated. My issue is that if you're going to accept unprovable postulates in your preferred metaphysics, you must accept them in alternative metaphysics to avoid a double standard. Every metaphysical theory depends on postulates (sometimes called "first principles").

Relativist: We weren't discussing evidence. You had alleged the multiverse hypothesis was "mythological" and that it was not falsifiable.

A theory is mythic if it has no evidentiary basis. It is unfalsifiable if no evidence can falsify it. You did not show I was wrong on either count. ("I admit there is no evidence for a multiverse.")

All physics is rooted in empirical data, even when at the stage of hypothesis. Any physics hypothesis may assume physical structures that are not observable- consider quantum field theory. Nevertheless theories are falsifiable, and so are the rigorous multiverse theories, such as Loop Quantum Cosmology which is derived from Loop Quantum Gravity (an incomplete quantum theory of Gravity.

This seems another case of you trying to constrain naturalistic metaphysical theories to known physics, while (I anticipate) availing yourself of unconstrained supernatural assumptions. If you applied your stricture consistently, you'd have to treat "God" as mythic. It certainly fits your definition (no evidence).

You seem confused as to my position. I'm open to the possibility of a multiverse. I even think it's a sensible line of inquiry. What I'm discussing is the current epistic value of the multiverse hypothesis as opposed to the FTA. It should be obvious that any hypothesis lacking supporting evidence (as you agree wrt a multiverse) has no epistic value. On the other hand, the FTA is based on evidence and peer-reviewed calculations. I agree that the FTA is not a "proof," but it does have epistic value. So it makes a far stronger case in the legal sense.

The dependency of life on the universe having these constants within a narrow range is accepted science, but it is still nothing more than a post-hoc analysis. It's somewhat interesting that we wouldn't have existed had these constants differed. The error in reasoning occurs only when attempting "prove" God's existence by this fact. And it most certainly IS consistent with the scientific endeavor to explore whether or not there's a reason for the constants being what they are - and the only valid way to explore this is to consider if and how they could have been DIFFERENT. This has nothing to do with figuring out why there is life, because life just happens to be something that exists in this universe. Some naturalists fall for the bait and try to answer it, but they're as misguided as those who tackle the equally presumptive question: why is there something rather than nothing?

I am willing to grant this is the case. Since my sentence is perfectly meaningful in normal English language discourse, I conclude that Armstrong's metaphysics is inadequate to normal English discourse. You are perfectly free to limit yourself to their framework. I prefer to be open to many complementary projections of reality.

You are mistaken about Armstrong's metaphysics - it's pretty complete, and it's coherent. We don't necessarily need to explore it in detail. And no, I'm not actually committed to Armstrong's metaphysics. I bring it up when other metaphysical assumptions are made to show that any conclusions that are made are contingent upon those metaphysical assumptions being true.

You had made this claim: "These laws are immaterial -- it is a category error to ask what they are made of." Immaterial laws exist in the mind. If you were to claim they exist independent of the things that exhibit the described behavior (e.g. as platonic entities) and they somehow direct or govern that behavior, then you would be making a debatable metaphysical assumption. Of course, I may be mistaken that you had this in mind, in which case this is all moot.

at what point did a single cell decide it was going to start splitting and growing into a heart?
and if it DID, why?
was it already a brain that knew it needed a heart?
was a Primordial Goo Brain smarter than we are now?
that it (accidentally randomly) knew it needed a complex operating system??
but even if it WAS that smart -- how the heck did it manage to keep the body alive while it was
3D printing itself over a million years? one. piece. at. a. time. when all the pieces function as a WHOLE? — Uniquorn

The evolution of complex structures is not due to decision making. I suggest you read up on natural selection.

The op is very cyclic and denies some significant components of our lives which refute the idea of 'chance'; such as the law of CAUSE & EFFECT or INTELLIGENCE. Cause implies reason which negates 'chance'. Also, the very idea of progression/evolution (a fundamental activity of the intelligence aspect of life) implies a moving forward, not forwards and then backwards. While life does have cyclic events, they do not alter its progression. Metempsychosis (Reincarnation) is a better super-normal explanation of that 'deja vu' or it's just the mind doing what it does best: drawing connections. It may be like how we understand other people's family drama even though the circumstances and the people are different. Deja vu is more analogical than factual.

As with many arguments it is often unclear what the conclusion is. Most often the fine tuning argument is portrayed as a set of incredibly coincidental factors that needed to be almost precisely as they are to support life, with the conclusion stating therefor it was designed as such, and therefor there is a designer.

But I think that is a misrepresentation of the real conclusion. The real conclusion is a probability question. It is, what is more likely, that this is by some design, and there is a designer, or are other explanations that are more likely. The 2 most given ones are, yes it is all just an accident. Or there are multi universes, maybe an infinite number of alternative universes and it is therefor more likely one would be like this one.

As a theist, I like this argument - not so much for its support of theism, but to show the length some will go to find any answer other than it is more likely there is a designer. In general to the atheist, or hard agnostic there is almost nothing that is less likely than God is.

This is long - but does a very good job of presenting the argument from a theist POV if anyone wants to take the time.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w6qWzxKVBko

If I'm mistaken that your agenda is to "prove" God's existence based on the alleged "fine tuning" of these constants, then there's nothing really to discuss. — Relativist

If you've read my posts, you would have seen me state 2 or 3 times that I do not think the FTA proves God's existence. It only makes a strong case in the legal sense.

The FTA is an argumentum singum quia (an argument based on signs). Such arguments are only deductively sound when the signs can only point to one thing. That is not the case with the FTA or design arguments such as Paley's. Nonetheless, the FTA is persuasive, as a number of atheists have admitted -- giving it as a reason for positing a multiverse.

I've also said that a Multiverse is logically possible -- and more, a possibility worth researching. Also, I would be happy to see a theory that would actually allow us to calculate the fundamental physical constants -- even if it showed they could have different values under different circumstances.

The strength of the FTA lies in the fact that when many improbable means coordinate to effect the same end, it is usually the case that they are intelligently directed to that end. This is the kind of reasoning used in court cases. So it's quite rational, even though not airtight.

we don't know what the true fundamental laws of nature actually are. — Relativist

Yes, but we do know that whatever the fundamental laws are, they closely approximate the physics we have in its verified realm of application.

There are many sorts things that exist in THIS world that would not exist had the constants been different. — Relativist

For example? As I read it, some of the constants control times that are important mainly, if not exclusively, to biogenesis.

Thomist metaphyics has the view of essence that I was referring to: — Relativist

No, Aquinas follows Aristotle in his discussion of essences. Aquinas' treatment of existence goes beyond that of Aristotle.

it is an integral part of his metaphysics, and yet it is pure assumption that there is such a thing. — Relativist

Aquinas is quite clear that neither essence nor existence are "things." They are just "principles" -- the foundation in reality (objective basis) for saying that a thing is (existence), and what kind of a thing it is (essence). So, if you think that there's an objective basis for saying something exists, you agree with Aquinas that it has "existence," and if you think there's an objective basis for saying you're human and Fido is a dog, then you agree that you and Fido have essences. There is nothing more to essence and existence than that.

Sounds similar to Thomist metaphysics, and it again sounds like an assumption - not something that we know exists due to evidence, but rather something that is postulated. — Relativist

No, its not an assumption. Its a couple of definitions based on experience. Things have to exist to act. What does't exist, can't do anything, and what can't do anything is indistinguishable from nothing (non-being). Nothing we encounter in nature can do everything, but if we know what it can do (e.g. walk like a duck, quack like a duck, etc), then we can tell what it is. So, the specification of a things possible acts tells us what it is (its essence).

My issue is that if you're going to accept unprovable postulates in your preferred metaphysics — Relativist

We know our fundamental facts directly from experience, not indirectly, via proofs. So, if you know your premises from experience, I'm all for them.

theories are falsifiable, and so are the rigorous multiverse theories — Relativist

What is the specific falsifiable prediction?

Immaterial laws exist in the mind. — Relativist

The approximate descriptions of the laws of nature exist in our minds. You have already admitted that there are fundamental laws and that we do not fully understand them. Without laws of nature operative in the universe, we have no way of explaining the origin of the cosmos or the evolution of life. Our scientific explanations only work because we grant that the laws we observe now were operative in the past.

If you were to claim they exist independent of the things that exhibit the described behavior (e.g. as platonic entities) and they somehow direct or govern that behavior, then you would be making a debatable metaphysical assumption. — Relativist

I am not saying that they can operate independently of the things they operate on. That would be nonsense. I am saying that we can grasp the existence of laws of nature that are logically distinct from, but physically inseparable form, material states.

In 100 billion million gazillion years, evolution could never "natural selection" a wedding cake with a little plastic bride and groom statue on top.
I'm just a stupid girl and I can do that;
but not even the smartest man on the planet can make a human body or even fully understand it.
There's no way we are "random."
Someone designed us;
and that someone is a genius.

the FTA is persuasive, as a number of atheists have admitted -- giving it as a reason for positing a multiverse.

That is all anyone could hope for, but my position is that the alleged persuasive power is a consequence of people failing to see the inherent problems that I've brought up.

The strength of the FTA lies in the fact that when many improbable means coordinate to effect the same end, it is usually the case that they are intelligently directed to that end. This is the kind of reasoning used in court cases. So it's quite rational, even though not airtight.

I agree with the approach, but disagree with your claim that there is intelligent direction "to that end." This characterization continues the same flawed reasoning by implicitly assuming there is an end (or goal or objective). That is one of my most important points.

we do know that whatever the fundamental laws are, they closely approximate the physics we have in its verified realm of application.

Which sidesteps the important issue. The "realm of application" is the universe after Planck time. That's problematic for drawing conclusions about a broader scope - and a multiverse, and the possibility of differing "constants" is a broader scope.

Relativist: There are many sorts things that exist in THIS world that would not exist had the constants been different

For example?

Sandstone and snowflakes, to name two. But keep in mind that if we're including God among the possibilities to consider, we have to consider all metaphysically possible worlds - and a multiverse with differing constants is every bit as metaphysically possible as is a God. You can't dismiss multiverse for lack of evidence and then propose a God which also has no evidence.

Aquinas is quite clear that neither essence nor existence are "things." They are just "principles" -- the foundation in reality (objective basis) for saying that a thing is (existence), and what kind of a thing it is (essence). So, if you think that there's an objective basis for saying something exists, you agree with Aquinas that it has "existence," and if you think there's an objective basis for saying you're human and Fido is a dog, then you agree that you and Fido have essences. There is nothing more to essence and existence than that.

Aquinas distinguishes between essence (necessary and sufficient properties) and accidents (contingent properties). Consider humans: there are no necessary and sufficient properties for being human - every portion of human DNA is accident. You can define a sortal - i.e. a set of properties that divides up all beings into two sets: human and non-human, and if you only did that with the set of people alive today, you'd have no difficulty. However, try to divide up all living things that have ever lived on earth into human and non-human, and you will unavoidably have to draw an arbitrary boundary. Among the ways one identifies a species is that members of that species can breed and produce another of that species. Consider an ordered set of all your ancestors through the evolutionary past: each generation was the same "species" as the prior generation - able to interbreed. And yet, you are not the same species as your Australopithecus ancestors (as well as a great many other ancestors in the evolutionary chain.

If you treat essence as nothing but a sortal of accidental properties, then Aquinas definition of God goes awry (according to Aquinas, God is a being in whom essence and existence are identical).

I brought up essence just as an example of a metaphysical postulate. Aquinas paradigm also postulates: act, potency, form, substance, and accident. It's coherent, but it is not the only coherent metaphysical paradigm, so one can't claim to have an objective case for something that is based on any particular metaphysical paradigm.

Relativist: My issue is that if you're going to accept unprovable postulates in your preferred metaphysics you must accept them in alternative metaphysics to avoid a double standard.

We know our fundamental facts directly from experience, not indirectly, via proofs.

The nature of the things that exist (such as whether they consist of form and substance, or whether they are states of affairs) is not a "fundamental fact" that comes from experience - rather, it is a postulated paradigm - an assumption.

What is the specific falsifiable prediction [in a rigorous mulitiverse hypothesis]?

The Loop Quantum Gravity cosmological model is dependent on Loop Quantum Gravity theory being true, which is testable in principle (see this). The Cosmology also predicts observable remnants in the CMB, but will require more precise measurement.

I am not saying that they can operate independently of the things they operate on. That would be nonsense.

That's not what I asked. I asked if you believe the laws of nature EXIST (not operate) independently of the entities that exhibit them.

my position is that the alleged persuasive power is a consequence of people failing to see the inherent problems that I've brought up. — Relativist

Then you can only hope that people will listen. You have not convinced me of the cogency of your objections.

I agree with the approach, but disagree with your claim that there is intelligent direction "to that end." This characterization continues the same flawed reasoning by implicitly assuming there is an end (or goal or objective). — Relativist

As I said, I am a determinist in physics. So, there are definite ends (aka "final states" -- which need not be "final") to which physical processes tend. The question is, is the existence of a determinate end evidence of intentionality? If we accept Brentano's analysis of intentionality, it is. The essential characteristic of intentionality is "aboutness." Just as my intention to go to the store is about achieving a state in which I am at the store, so the laws of nature are about the determinate states they give rise to. That means that the laws of nature are "intentional" by Brentano's definition.

If we then say that any source of intentionality is, by definition, a mind, then a mind is responsible for the laws of nature. That does not mean that it's a mind just like ours. Clearly, it is not. Still, it is rationally classed as a mind.

The "realm of application" is the universe after Planck time. That's problematic for drawing conclusions about a broader scope - and a multiverse, and the possibility of differing "constants" is a broader scope. — Relativist

I agree, that is why there is no scientific support for a multiverse. On the other hand, the verified realm of application does include the calculations showing that small variations in the physical constants would preclude life.

Sandstone and snowflakes, to name two. — Relativist

Really? I think this requires a bit more argument. The existence of the required elements (H, O, Si) does not require nuclear fusion in stars and so is far less constrained than the existence of life.

if we're including God among the possibilities to consider, we have to consider all metaphysically possible worlds — Relativist

No, we don't. We only have to consider actual evidence. No consideration of "possible worlds" can add anything to what we actually know. Possible worlds talk is just a way of injecting baseless speculation into philosophical discourse.
1. As Claude Shannon pointed out, information is not possibility, but the reduction of possibility.
2. We have know way of knowing if any world is metaphysically possible other than the one world we know to be actual -- for nothing impossible can be actual.
3. Imagining that a "world" is possible is not adequate grounds for concluding that it is possible. Russel and Whitehead imagined that the self-consistency of arithmetic was provable. Goedel showed it was not.
4. Possible worlds don't provide a rational basis for representing propositional probabilities because the density of possible states cannot be objectively defined.

a multiverse with differing constants is every bit as metaphysically possible as is a God. — Relativist

No, again. God is a metaphysical necessity. The only possibility that can be attributed to God is epistemological -- due to ignorance. The evidence for God's existence is all being. If anything is, we can conclude, with metaphysical certainty, that God is.

Aquinas distinguishes between essence (necessary and sufficient properties) and accidents (contingent properties). — Relativist

Yes, he is seconding Aristotle on that. Some properties that humans have make no difference in there classification as human. You can be tall or short, fair or dark, have red hair or be bald, and still be human. If you agree with this, then you agree that some properties are "accidental" wrt being human.

Consider humans: there are no necessary and sufficient properties for being human - every portion of human DNA is accident. — Relativist

While I don't deny the biological importance of DNA, your genetic coding doesn't enter into my judgement that you're human and Fido is a dog. All that's necessary is that, as a result of my experiencing you, the concept <human> is properly evoked in me. That happens every day with people who have no real understanding of DNA.

However, try to divide up all living things that have ever lived on earth into human and non-human, and you will unavoidably have to draw an arbitrary boundary. — Relativist

No doubt. What does that have to do with anything? I am not saying that our conceptual spaces are predetermined. I am not a Platonist or a Neoplatonist. I don't think you are a person because you participate in an Ideal or because you reflect an exemplar idea in the mind of God. I'm saying that, as a result of experiencing the world around us, we abstract concepts that allow us to make rational judgements. As abstractions, these concepts leave out many notes of intelligibility (lots of data).

Why do we use abstractions? Because our brains can only represent 5-9 "chunks" of information at a time. So, we can't deal with reality in all its complexity. Thus, abstractions (universal ideas) are a "stupid human" trick for reducing the complexity of reality to our limited representations capacity.

God knows all reality exhaustively, so He has no need of the stupid human trick of abstraction, of universal or exemplar ideas. We humans on the other hand, can have different conceptual spaces. For example, Metaphysician Undercover and I have different, but related, concepts we call "truth." 19th century slave owners typically had a concept they called "human" that did not include blacks, while mine does -- and we all know how Nazis thought and think.

If you treat essence as nothing but a sortal of accidental properties — Relativist

Of course, I don't. I sort by what is essential to my concept of humans -- a concept that is largely transcultural.

... then Aquinas definition of God goes awry (according to Aquinas, God is a being in whom essence and existence are identical). — Relativist

I don't see that you've shown that there is no basis in reality for saying that a thing is (existence) or what it is (essence). So, I can't follow your thinking.

Also, while Aquinas does show that essence and existence are identical in God, I don't recall him using this as a definition.

I brought up essence just as an example of a metaphysical postulate. — Relativist

And I showed that it is not a postulate, but names something found in reality -- i.e., the objective basis of essential definitions -- what it is about concrete individuals that allows us to apply our species concepts to them.

Aquinas paradigm also postulates: act, potency, form, substance, and accident. — Relativist

All of which we find in our experience of reality and its conceptualization.

It's coherent, but it is not the only coherent metaphysical paradigm, so one can't claim to have an objective case for something that is based on any particular metaphysical paradigm. — Relativist

I'm sorry. First, It is more than "coherent" or self-consistent. It is based on reality, so it can be used to analyze reality.

Second, the fact that we have one reality based conceptual space that can be used to analyze reality does not, by any means preclude the possibility of other, equally reality-based, conceptual spaces that can be used to analyze reality. Given that reality is far too complex to be exhausted by the stupid human trick of abstraction, the more ways we think of reality, the more projections we use, the better.

If we have many diverse projections of the same reality, we can recover some of the dimensionality lost in each. Combining them gives us a more complete model than any one alone can give.

The nature of the things that exist (such as whether they consist of form and substance, or whether they are states of affairs) is not a "fundamental fact" that comes from experience - rather, it is a postulated paradigm - an assumption. — Relativist

This is a false dichotomy. We can take the same experience of reality and project it into an Aristotelian conceptual space or one preferred by analytic philosophers. There is nothing about thinking of objects in terms of matter and form, substance and accidents that precludes us thinking of the same experience in terms of sequences of events or states of affairs. This kind of territorial exclusivity is totally irrational -- but typical of modern philosophy.

What is fundamental is our experience of reality in all of its complexity. How we choose to think of it is in no way fundamental. Thinking of it in one way or another makes philosopical problem solving easier or harder in the same way that the choice of coordinate systems makes the mathematics of a physics problem easier or harder.

I asked if you believe the laws of nature EXIST (not operate) independently of the entities that exhibit them. — Relativist

The laws of nature only exist insofar as they operate to produce order in nature -- as producing order is their essence. So, they are physically inseparable from the matter and fields on which they act. They are, however, logically distinct, and so mentally separable.

Why do we use abstractions? Because our brains can only represent 5-9 "chunks" of information at a time. So, we can't deal with reality in all its complexity. Thus, abstractions (universal ideas) are a "stupid human" trick for reducing the complexity of reality to our limited representations capacity. — Dfpolis

That is a very interesting interpretation, although I would like to consider a counter argument.

If you consider the reality of numbers, these are abstractions that can't necessarily be described according to this argument. I'm not going to try and define what number is, as it is still a highly vexed issue. But Platonism in mathematics is the view that abstract objects such as numbers are real independently of any act of thought on our part, but can only be grasped by the mind; ergo, real but immaterial (which is why Platonism poses a conceptual challenge to materialism). That is why Platonism is sometimes categorised as a form of objective idealism (i.e. to differentiate it from the subjective idealism of Berkeley.)

I would argue that one consequence of this, is the ability to arrive at what Kant called the synthetic a priori - 'a proposition the predicate of which is not logically or analytically contained in the subject—i.e., synthetic—and the truth of which is verifiable independently of experience—i.e., a priori'. So in such cases we're relying on abstractions to make genuinely new discoveries; and the modern history of science has very many examples of just this kind of reasoning (as per Wigner's famous essay). That is because through reason the mind is able to grasp facts that it could never obtain through experience alone; which is why I am dubious about the belief that the grasp of abstractions is something that comes from experience.

In my case, I'm pretty hopeless at mathematics; and no amount of experience will make me an excellent mathematician. Whereas excellent mathematicians are able to see things that I simply cannot; and I don't think this is a matter of experience but of innate intellectual ability. And this ability is, as platonists argue, an insight into a real domain, namely, the domain of mathematical truths, which is not objective, but transcendental in nature.

You have not convinced me of the cogency of your objections.

For the FTA to have any utility, it needs to have some persuasive power. No belief is held in isolation, and this makes it difficult to judge an argument the same way a non-theist would (even an open-minded agnostic who is open to both God's existence and non-existence). The fact that you bring up intentionality demonstrates that you aren't judging the FTA apart from your related beliefs.

BTW, I haven't mentioned my own position. I call myself an "agnostic deist." This means that I consider it possible that there exists some sort of entity that created the world, but it is also possible that the world is simple a brute fact. My reason for thinking a "deity" is a distinct possibility is the existence of consciousness - which is difficult to account for under materialism. It actually would have bearing on my position if the FTA were at all convincing. I try to look at it as objectively as I can, although I'd never claim I'm better than anyone else at this.

there are definite ends (aka "final states" -- which need not be "final") to which physical processes tend... If we then say that any source of intentionality is, by definition, a mind, then a mind is responsible for the laws of nature

Interesting perspective, but I have two questions about it:
1) How is it not arbitrary to label any state as a "definite end" or "final state", if every state will evolve to another through a potentially infinite future?
2) How would one distinguish a non-intentional state from an intentional one? I ask because your claims seem based on the assumption of intentionality ("knowing" that God did it) rather than demonstrating it.

I agree, that is why there is no scientific support for a multiverse...

There's also no scientific support for intentionality or God. You seem to be doing exactly what I anticipated: only considering metaphysical possibility to admit God into consideration, and refusing to admit it for anything else. This is inconsistent.

Relativist: "if we're including God among the possibilities to consider, we have to consider all metaphysically possible worlds"

No, we don't. We only have to consider actual evidence

Then this removes God from consideration.

Possible worlds talk is just a way of injecting baseless speculation into philosophical discourse.

Possible worlds is just a semantics for discussing modal claims. You are inconsistent in your use of modality. What exactly is the modality you propose to use to "baselessly" (without evidence) propose God as the solution? For God to be the answer, God must be "possible" and possibility entails a modality. You could use epistemic possibility (as far as we know, there might be a God), or conceptual possibility (God is conceivable, and therefore possible), or broadly logical possibility (God's existence entails no broadly logical contradictions). But whatever modality you use, consistency demands using the same modality to consider multiverse. Clearly, God is not physically possible, so you can't use this.

(re: sandstone and snowflakes) The existence of the required elements (H, O, Si) does not require nuclear fusion in stars and so is far less constrained than the existence of life.

Snowflakes depends on a variety of elements, planet formation, atmosphere, liquid water on the planet surface, evaporation, a narrow range of atmospheric and surface temperatures, dust in the atmosphere.
Sandstone also requires a planet with certain minerals present, water flowing - and thus the presence of sufficient water so that it will pool and flow, a narrow range of temperature on the surface, and in the atmosphere. Silicon only exists because very large stars previously existed that could fused it and later when supernova. Water itself is dependent on the production of oxygen by stars as well.

Snowflakes and sandstone are probably more prevalent than life in the universe, but their existence is still dependent on prior conditions - conditions whose probability is indeterminable.

No, again. God is a metaphysical necessity. The only possibility that can be attributed to God is epistemological -- due to ignorance. The evidence for God's existence is all being. If anything is, we can conclude, with metaphysical certainty, that God is.

More correctly: it is epistemically possible that a metaphysically necessary God exists. The only modality in which the possibilities for both God's existence and non-existence can be evaluated is epistemic modality. But a multiverse is also epistemically possible - you admitted this.

While I don't deny the biological importance of DNA, your genetic coding doesn't enter into my judgement that you're human and Fido is a dog.... What does that have to do with anything?

The issue is that "essence" is a concept based on a primitive analysis of human-ness and dog-ness (etc). If everything that makes us human or dog is an accident (as genetics and evolution suggest) then there is no reason to think there IS such a thing.

I don't see that you've shown that there is no basis in reality for saying that a thing is (existence) or what it is (essence).

You're forgetting that my original issue is that the existence of "essence" is an assumption. I didn't claim it was incoherent. Again: every metaphysical theory depends on assumptions. This seems so trivially true, I can't understand why you'd deny it.

I showed that it is not a postulate, but names something found in reality -- i.e., the objective basis of essential definitions -- what it is about concrete individuals that allows us to apply our species concepts to them.

No you didn't! You denied the concept is related to DNA, even though you earlier claimed species entailed essential kinds. That is contradictory. Now you've claimed it's not just a sortal of accidental properties, and made the vague assertion "what is essential to my concept of humans -- a concept that is largely transcultural". What exactly does essence refer to? Identify something about dogs that set them apart as an essential kind from wolves, that is not simply the accident of DNA variation.

Relativist: " Aquinas paradigm also postulates: act, potency, form, substance, and accident."
All of which we find in our experience of reality and its conceptualization.

Seriously, do you not understand that this is a postulated pardigm? It is a way to account for the things that exist. Earlier I referenced Armstrong's ontology. He accounts for existents differently, and it's every bit as complete and coherent. I'm not going to argue that Armstrong's account is true and Aquinas is false, because they both account for everything - they are simply different, unproveable paradigms.

the fact that we have one reality based conceptual space that can be used to analyze reality does not, by any means preclude the possibility of other, equally reality-based, conceptual spaces that can be used to analyze reality. Given that reality is far too complex to be exhausted by the stupid human trick of abstraction, the more ways we think of reality, the more projections we use, the better.

What you call a "conceptual space" is what I'm calling a "paradigm" - but other than this, I agree completely. But there's an important corollary: one can't "prove" any particular "conceptual space" is true. Thomistic metaphysics is popular with theists because it entails a God, but if someone claims this constitutes an objective proof of God's existence, they are ignoring the epistemically contingent nature of the Thomist paradigm.