Time is a perception of our minds, the way we experience existence is from one moment to the next, from our perspective there is a linear progression through time, but the truth is that time is not real, its simply something that our species perceives — xxxdutchiexxx
The passage of time is literally created from the way your brain perceives the world around you, ask yourself, would time exist if there was not a single conscious being in existence? — xxxdutchiexxx
What if you stop experiencing the passage of time as you do now? what if you begin to experience all past, present and future events all at the same time? You would no longer experience the passage of time, everything would simply be one with everything else.... — xxxdutchiexxx
In order for you to grasp what I am saying, you must take yourself out of the picture, remove your self from this reality and allow your perspective to change, you must allow yourself to see the big picture without judgement, once you remove your ego you will be able to fully see things for what they really are. — xxxdutchiexxx
1. There are things we don't know about the universe. [me: I agree]
2. Therefore, it must be like this. [me: uh.... wait;.. what?] — jajsfaye
There is speculation that evidence of multiverses may be found — jajsfaye
We cannot make any assumptions without additional information. — jajsfaye
However, if we do come up with a good reason to conclude the universe was intentional, then that implies the universe is only part of a larger realm of which includes the entity that caused the universe as it intended. But then we just moved the original question (is universe intentional or random) to this larger realm. — jajsfaye
The duality has been "solved" with quantum field theory, which considers fields as fundamental and particles as quantized ripples in fields. — Relativist
Sean Carroll, for example, has proposed that the heat death results in conditions from which a quantum fluctuation can occur which results in inflation — Relativist
It is entailed by the many worlds interpretation of Quantum Theory, so in that respect it is entailed by accepted theory. — Relativist
a multiverse hypothesis is metaphysical, not mythological — Relativist
multiverse hypotheses are tied to broader hypotheses (incomplete scientific theories) that are falsifiable. — Relativist
The true fundamental physics would almost certainly have different expressions. — Relativist
The "laws" of physics are abstract descriptions of the physical relations among the things that exist in the universe. The relations are due to the properties of the existents. Properties and relations of physical things do not exist independently of the things that have them. — Relativist
. What I am saying is that no, we cannot make such conclusions yet because there are other hypothetical options of which we do not yet know enough to rule them out with high confidence.Thus, physics reveals that our universe is fundamentally intentional, both in its laws and in the values of its constants.
This flavor of string theory entails multiple possible "low energy physics" (the physics we observe), and this string theory is falsifiable.The problem arises because string theory is formulated most naturally in 10 or 11
spacetime dimensions, whereas the spacetime of our perceptions is four dimensional. The
extra space dimensions are rendered unobservable by a process called compactification:
they are rolled up to a very small size. ... This basic notion may be extended to any
number of extra dimensions, but then the process of compactification is no longer unique.
In general, there are very many ways of compactifying several extra dimensions. When
additional degrees of freedom in string theory are taken into account, compactification
may involve several hundred variables, all of which may vary from one region of the
universe to another. These variables serve to fix the low-energy physics, by determining
what sorts of particles exist, what their masses might be and the nature and strengths of
the forces that act between them. The theory also permits compactification to spaces with
other than three dimensions. Thus string theory predicts myriad possible low-energy
worlds. Some might be quite like ours, but with slightly heavier electrons or a somewhat
stronger weak force. Others might differ radically, and possess, say, five large (i.e.
uncompactified) space dimensions and two species of photons.
I was not claiming that there are multiple universes. I was simply stating it as a possibility, given the limits of what we know. — jajsfaye
I will use random broadly here for the sake of simplicity, to mean anything that varies over a range of options — jajsfaye
You seem to be assuming they do not exist until we know otherwise — jajsfaye
Your concluding sentence was:
"Thus, physics reveals that our universe is fundamentally intentional, both in its laws and in the values of its constants." — jajsfaye
given these two possibilities:
A: There are multiverses and these have a range of parameters such that there is reasonable probability that at least one of them is finely tuned to support us being here.
B: There is either one universe or they are all set to the same parameters, but there is also a designer with the intelligence and capability to set the universe to be finely tuned to support us being here.
You seem to assume that B is more parsimonious and, thus, must be assumed to be true. It is hard for me to agree with that. — jajsfaye
Irrespective of whether Everett himself was a realist or an instrumentalist, a realist perspective on his interpretation is absolutely ontological . — Relativist
Of course it doesn't rebut the FTA on its own, but in conjunction with the potential for more fundamental physics it constitutes a mechanism for actualizing alternative realizations of localized physics. — Relativist
The MWI interpretation has a variety of post-Everett flavors. — Relativist
There is no good argument for the "fine-tuning" of the constants! - they all depend on the presumption of design. — Relativist
A multiverse metaphysics has as much standing as an Aristotelian metaphysics (consider Aristotle's hypothesis that "essence" exists). — Relativist
Each specific multiverse is actually derivable from an (incomplete) scientific theory, so your objection has no merit. — Relativist
The problem arises because string theory is formulated most naturally in 10 or 11
spacetime dimensions ...
Sure, but its "verified realm of application" is limited to this universe. It's premature to declare that the quest for more fundamental physics, and the possible implications of it, are doomed. — Relativist
why should we think our portion of the universe is representative of the whole? — Relativist
The fact that we can think abstractly about some properties of physical states of affairs doesn't imply there is anything immaterial about those physical states of affairs. — Relativist
"It is confusing to call laws "properties."
Get used to it, I didn't make it up. Physicalist philosophers like D.M. Armstrong and Michael Tooley have been using this terminology for years. — Relativist
under this account, laws of nature are relational properties that exist between states of affairs types. — Relativist
Sure: there is one all encompassing state in a quantum system, but the issue is: how does the classical world that we experience emerge from the quantum system that comprises reality. A realist view of MWI is based on the ontological commitment that physical reality is a quantum system, and that the classical world of experience is an eigenstate of that QM system. So the "world branching" is (technically) just a classical perspective: each eigenstate is a classical "world."When I say that Everett's interpretation is more epistemological than ontological, I am speaking about the "manyness" of the worlds envisioned...It is not many worlds on top of each other, but a mathematical means of representing a single state in as a sum of mathematical forms called "eigenfunctions."
It's moot what you see in the literature because you're seeing response based on a flawed premise. The alleged "fine tuning" is a product of post hoc analysis. The FTA has the unstated assumption that life was a design objective. Consider any metaphysically possible world W, which contains complex objects of type T. One could argue that W was fine tuned for T. What is special about life? It's special to us, but that doesn't make it intrinsically special. I feel special to myself, and am the product of a series of improbable accidents of pairs of individuals who happened to reproduce: was I the product of a priori design? If you disagree with my analysis, try reformulating the FTA without assuming life is intrisically special, or assuming the world was "fine tuned" (a question begging concept).So, the physics showing that minute variations in the constants leads to conditions unsuited to life depends on the assumption of design? Would you care to provide an example showing how this assumption changed the calculations? Or even how it could change the calculations? The vast literature generated by naturalists to support the possibility of a multiverse as an explicit alternative to fine-tuning shows that some very prominent physicists and cosmologists take the calculations quite seriously.
Aristotle's reasoning was a product of his time, but with advances in science and analytic philosophy, we can see that the notion of essence has no empirical basis. And yet there continue to be philosophers who embrace the metaphysics (e.g. Edward Feser).Aristotle was an empiricist. He did not "hypothesize that 'essence' exists." He said that our definitions of universal terms reflect common elements in their instances and that we may name those common elements the object's "essence." In other words, essences are the foundation in reality for essential definitions. I do not see how any empiricist could deny that there are real differences, found in individuals, that allow us to say this is human and this a canary. Biologists do that every time they determine what species an organism is.
We weren't discussing evidence. You had alleged the multiverse hypothesis was "mythological" and that it was not falsifiable. I showed that you were mistaken on both counts. I admit there is no evidence for a multiverse, but there are good reasons to think this might be the case - as I discussed. Multiverse is consistent with what we know, and it is entailed by some reasonable extrapolations about what we know (these extrapolations are what I referred to as "incomplete theories"). Science advances in this way; accepted theory does not arrive in its final form.Really? "Incomplete" theories now have evidentiary standing? This merits no further discussion.
Errors in the analysis are self-correcting - that's what peer review is for." So incomplete that it has made no falsifiable prediction and its supporters mix results from logically inconsistent versions. I will not repeat the harsher and less charitable criticisms.
Agreed, but this doesn't make metaphysical speculations that are devoid of math any prettier. I bring these things up not because they are necessarily true, but rather to show why we shouldn't be seduced by metaphysical explanations that implicitly rely on arguments from ignorance. We should be agnostic to the existence of multiverse, not hastily dismissing it for insufficient empirical basis while declaring victory for a deism that also lacks an empirical basis.I merely note that dressing ignorance in mathematical lace doesn't make it a thing of beauty.
That's fine as long as you refrain from arguments from ignorance as I just discussed.I have no problem with physics that only works for empirical reality. I am not sure why anyone would -- accept to rationalize a faith position.
You seem to have some physical/metaphysical framework in mind, and are judging the Armstrong-Tooley framework from that perspective. That is the category error. Armstrong developed a fairly complete metaphysics, and it can account for everything you've discussed - but it of course does so very differently. So, for example, from the perspective of Armstrong's metaphysics, it's meaningless to assert "laws of nature lack the defining characteristics of matter". We don't really need to debate which metaphysics is true, as long as you don't implicitly insist that your metaphysical assumptions form the proper basis for exploring metaphysical truths.You're arguing skew to the point here. It is not a question of whether we think abstractly or not. The question is: what are the properties of the object of thought. We think abstractly of quanta and fields, yet we know they are material because they have mass-energy and parts outside of parts (extension). We think abstractly of works of art, but we know they are composed of atoms. When we think of the laws of nature, our concept does not involve parts outside of parts -- they are not spatially divisible -- or the possession of mass-energy. Thus, laws of nature lack the defining characteristics of matter -- not because our thoughts are abstract, but because what we are thinking about falls into a different category.
A realist view of MWI is based on the ontological commitment that physical reality is a quantum system, and that the classical world of experience is an eigenstate of that QM system. So the "world branching" is (technically) just a classical perspective: each eigenstate is a classical "world." — Relativist
You also mention there being exactly one set of physical constraints, and I agree - but that doesn't mean we have a complete understanding of what the true constraints are, since we can only see how they manifest in our classical world. — Relativist
The FTA has the unstated assumption that life was a design objective. — Relativist
Consider any metaphysically possible world W, which contains complex objects of type T. One could argue that W was fine tuned for T. — Relativist
with advances in science and analytic philosophy, we can see that the notion of essence has no empirical basis — Relativist
Essence entails the existence of necessary and sufficient properties for individuation and for delineating "kinds." What are your necessary and sufficient properties vs your accidental properties? Would you be YOU had there been a single gene that was different? How about a single day of your life having different experiences? — Relativist
Consider the evolution of horse throughout the evolutionary history of its ancestry — Relativist
What are your necessary and sufficient properties vs your accidental properties? — Relativist
We weren't discussing evidence. You had alleged the multiverse hypothesis was "mythological" and that it was not falsifiable. — Relativist
Multiverse is consistent with what we know, and it is entailed by some reasonable extrapolations — Relativist
Science advances in this way; accepted theory does not arrive in its final form. — Relativist
Errors in the analysis are self-correcting - that's what peer review is for. — Relativist
We should be agnostic to the existence of multiverse, not hastily dismissing it for insufficient empirical basis while declaring victory for a deism that also lacks an empirical basis. — Relativist
That's fine as long as you refrain from arguments from ignorance — Relativist
You seem to have some physical/metaphysical framework in mind, — Relativist
You ... are judging the Armstrong-Tooley framework from that perspective. That is the category error. — Relativist
from the perspective of Armstrong's metaphysics, it's meaningless to assert "laws of nature lack the defining characteristics of matter". — Relativist
You've reference the Fine Tuning Argument, and I inferred that you were referring to the FTA for God's existence. If I'm mistaken that your agenda is to "prove" God's existence based on the alleged "fine tuning" of these constants, then there's nothing really to discuss. But if that is what you have in mind, then I see an argument from ignorance behind the reasoning: we don't know why the constants are in this narrow life permitting range, therefore it must be due to design.You've bandied about "arguments from ignorance" for a while I don't recall advancing any -- nor you pointing out any. On the other hand, you're using our ignorance wrt a multiverse as a counter to the FTA. Please be specific as to any arguments from ignorance you think I'm making.
And as I keep repeating, we don't know what the true fundamental laws of nature actually are. All we can know is what we have access to, and that's the way the laws of nature manifest in this universe. To avoid continuing to go in circles, I'll interject that our fundamental disagreement is really metaphysics, not the physics. We can agree that known physics does not entail a multiverse, much less variations in the so-called fundamental constants. This takes our epistemic quest out of the realm of (narrowly defined) physical possibility. What is the implication? It just implies the answer is beyond the realm of current physics. If you were to claim, "therefore it must be God" you would be committing an argument from ignorance. Why should we think a supernatural being is more likely than an unknown natural cause? The converse seems more likely because we don't know that there exists anything other than the natural world.But, as I keep repeating, the MWI is not evidence against the FTA because every "world" has the same physical constants
So what? This universe happened to produce a set of things that we characterize as "living." Why regard this as special?No, the FTA infers that life was intentional from the fact that the variables have the exact values required to produce life.
You are relating a coincidence (two things unexpectedly coinciding). What is life coinciding with?Suppose you ran a store with only one thing costing $1.59 and a young person plunks $1.59 on the counter, looking at you expectantly. It would be a rational inference to conclude that the child wants the one thing costing $1.59.
I considered this implied, but OK, let's formally add it: Consider a metaphysically possible world, W, which contains complex objects of type T which would not exist had the fundamental constants differed from what is actual in that world.Relativist: "Consider any metaphysically possible world W, which contains complex objects of type T. One could argue that W was fine tuned for T.."
This is simply false. For the argument to be persuasive, you need the additional datum at the core of the FTA, viz., that minute variations of W's constants would preclude the existence of Ts.
I believe you're right about Aristotle. I had confused his metaphysics with that of Thomas Aquinas. Thomist metaphyics has the view of essence that I was referring to: it is an integral part of his metaphysics, and yet it is pure assumption that there is such a thing.You are confusing my individual characteristics with what allows me to be called a "human." Aristotle's essences are not individual, but specific. So, "Essence entails the existence of necessary and sufficient properties for individuation" is simply false. "Essence entails the existence of necessary and sufficient properties for delineating 'kinds'" is true.
Sounds similar to Thomist metaphysics, and it again sounds like an assumption - not something that we know exists due to evidence, but rather something that is postulated. My issue is that if you're going to accept unprovable postulates in your preferred metaphysics, you must accept them in alternative metaphysics to avoid a double standard. Every metaphysical theory depends on postulates (sometimes called "first principles").My metaphysical framework is dynamic realism -- that "existence" is convertible with "the power to act in some way," and a being's "essence" is a specification of its possible acts. (This isn't Aristotle's definition of "essence,")
All physics is rooted in empirical data, even when at the stage of hypothesis. Any physics hypothesis may assume physical structures that are not observable- consider quantum field theory. Nevertheless theories are falsifiable, and so are the rigorous multiverse theories, such as Loop Quantum Cosmology which is derived from Loop Quantum Gravity (an incomplete quantum theory of Gravity.Relativist: We weren't discussing evidence. You had alleged the multiverse hypothesis was "mythological" and that it was not falsifiable.
A theory is mythic if it has no evidentiary basis. It is unfalsifiable if no evidence can falsify it. You did not show I was wrong on either count. ("I admit there is no evidence for a multiverse.")
The dependency of life on the universe having these constants within a narrow range is accepted science, but it is still nothing more than a post-hoc analysis. It's somewhat interesting that we wouldn't have existed had these constants differed. The error in reasoning occurs only when attempting "prove" God's existence by this fact. And it most certainly IS consistent with the scientific endeavor to explore whether or not there's a reason for the constants being what they are - and the only valid way to explore this is to consider if and how they could have been DIFFERENT. This has nothing to do with figuring out why there is life, because life just happens to be something that exists in this universe. Some naturalists fall for the bait and try to answer it, but they're as misguided as those who tackle the equally presumptive question: why is there something rather than nothing?You seem confused as to my position. I'm open to the possibility of a multiverse. I even think it's a sensible line of inquiry. What I'm discussing is the current epistic value of the multiverse hypothesis as opposed to the FTA. It should be obvious that any hypothesis lacking supporting evidence (as you agree wrt a multiverse) has no epistic value. On the other hand, the FTA is based on evidence and peer-reviewed calculations. I agree that the FTA is not a "proof," but it does have epistic value. So it makes a far stronger case in the legal sense.
You are mistaken about Armstrong's metaphysics - it's pretty complete, and it's coherent. We don't necessarily need to explore it in detail. And no, I'm not actually committed to Armstrong's metaphysics. I bring it up when other metaphysical assumptions are made to show that any conclusions that are made are contingent upon those metaphysical assumptions being true.I am willing to grant this is the case. Since my sentence is perfectly meaningful in normal English language discourse, I conclude that Armstrong's metaphysics is inadequate to normal English discourse. You are perfectly free to limit yourself to their framework. I prefer to be open to many complementary projections of reality.
The evolution of complex structures is not due to decision making. I suggest you read up on natural selection.at what point did a single cell decide it was going to start splitting and growing into a heart?
and if it DID, why?
was it already a brain that knew it needed a heart?
was a Primordial Goo Brain smarter than we are now?
that it (accidentally randomly) knew it needed a complex operating system??
but even if it WAS that smart -- how the heck did it manage to keep the body alive while it was
3D printing itself over a million years? one. piece. at. a. time. when all the pieces function as a WHOLE? — Uniquorn
If I'm mistaken that your agenda is to "prove" God's existence based on the alleged "fine tuning" of these constants, then there's nothing really to discuss. — Relativist
we don't know what the true fundamental laws of nature actually are. — Relativist
There are many sorts things that exist in THIS world that would not exist had the constants been different. — Relativist
Thomist metaphyics has the view of essence that I was referring to: — Relativist
it is an integral part of his metaphysics, and yet it is pure assumption that there is such a thing. — Relativist
Sounds similar to Thomist metaphysics, and it again sounds like an assumption - not something that we know exists due to evidence, but rather something that is postulated. — Relativist
My issue is that if you're going to accept unprovable postulates in your preferred metaphysics — Relativist
theories are falsifiable, and so are the rigorous multiverse theories — Relativist
Immaterial laws exist in the mind. — Relativist
If you were to claim they exist independent of the things that exhibit the described behavior (e.g. as platonic entities) and they somehow direct or govern that behavior, then you would be making a debatable metaphysical assumption. — Relativist
That is all anyone could hope for, but my position is that the alleged persuasive power is a consequence of people failing to see the inherent problems that I've brought up.the FTA is persuasive, as a number of atheists have admitted -- giving it as a reason for positing a multiverse.
I agree with the approach, but disagree with your claim that there is intelligent direction "to that end." This characterization continues the same flawed reasoning by implicitly assuming there is an end (or goal or objective). That is one of my most important points.The strength of the FTA lies in the fact that when many improbable means coordinate to effect the same end, it is usually the case that they are intelligently directed to that end. This is the kind of reasoning used in court cases. So it's quite rational, even though not airtight.
Which sidesteps the important issue. The "realm of application" is the universe after Planck time. That's problematic for drawing conclusions about a broader scope - and a multiverse, and the possibility of differing "constants" is a broader scope.we do know that whatever the fundamental laws are, they closely approximate the physics we have in its verified realm of application.
Sandstone and snowflakes, to name two. But keep in mind that if we're including God among the possibilities to consider, we have to consider all metaphysically possible worlds - and a multiverse with differing constants is every bit as metaphysically possible as is a God. You can't dismiss multiverse for lack of evidence and then propose a God which also has no evidence.Relativist: There are many sorts things that exist in THIS world that would not exist had the constants been different
For example?
Aquinas distinguishes between essence (necessary and sufficient properties) and accidents (contingent properties). Consider humans: there are no necessary and sufficient properties for being human - every portion of human DNA is accident. You can define a sortal - i.e. a set of properties that divides up all beings into two sets: human and non-human, and if you only did that with the set of people alive today, you'd have no difficulty. However, try to divide up all living things that have ever lived on earth into human and non-human, and you will unavoidably have to draw an arbitrary boundary. Among the ways one identifies a species is that members of that species can breed and produce another of that species. Consider an ordered set of all your ancestors through the evolutionary past: each generation was the same "species" as the prior generation - able to interbreed. And yet, you are not the same species as your Australopithecus ancestors (as well as a great many other ancestors in the evolutionary chain.Aquinas is quite clear that neither essence nor existence are "things." They are just "principles" -- the foundation in reality (objective basis) for saying that a thing is (existence), and what kind of a thing it is (essence). So, if you think that there's an objective basis for saying something exists, you agree with Aquinas that it has "existence," and if you think there's an objective basis for saying you're human and Fido is a dog, then you agree that you and Fido have essences. There is nothing more to essence and existence than that.
The nature of the things that exist (such as whether they consist of form and substance, or whether they are states of affairs) is not a "fundamental fact" that comes from experience - rather, it is a postulated paradigm - an assumption.Relativist: My issue is that if you're going to accept unprovable postulates in your preferred metaphysics you must accept them in alternative metaphysics to avoid a double standard.
We know our fundamental facts directly from experience, not indirectly, via proofs.
The Loop Quantum Gravity cosmological model is dependent on Loop Quantum Gravity theory being true, which is testable in principle (see this). The Cosmology also predicts observable remnants in the CMB, but will require more precise measurement.What is the specific falsifiable prediction [in a rigorous mulitiverse hypothesis]?
That's not what I asked. I asked if you believe the laws of nature EXIST (not operate) independently of the entities that exhibit them.I am not saying that they can operate independently of the things they operate on. That would be nonsense.
my position is that the alleged persuasive power is a consequence of people failing to see the inherent problems that I've brought up. — Relativist
I agree with the approach, but disagree with your claim that there is intelligent direction "to that end." This characterization continues the same flawed reasoning by implicitly assuming there is an end (or goal or objective). — Relativist
The "realm of application" is the universe after Planck time. That's problematic for drawing conclusions about a broader scope - and a multiverse, and the possibility of differing "constants" is a broader scope. — Relativist
Sandstone and snowflakes, to name two. — Relativist
if we're including God among the possibilities to consider, we have to consider all metaphysically possible worlds — Relativist
a multiverse with differing constants is every bit as metaphysically possible as is a God. — Relativist
Aquinas distinguishes between essence (necessary and sufficient properties) and accidents (contingent properties). — Relativist
Consider humans: there are no necessary and sufficient properties for being human - every portion of human DNA is accident. — Relativist
However, try to divide up all living things that have ever lived on earth into human and non-human, and you will unavoidably have to draw an arbitrary boundary. — Relativist
If you treat essence as nothing but a sortal of accidental properties — Relativist
... then Aquinas definition of God goes awry (according to Aquinas, God is a being in whom essence and existence are identical). — Relativist
I brought up essence just as an example of a metaphysical postulate. — Relativist
Aquinas paradigm also postulates: act, potency, form, substance, and accident. — Relativist
It's coherent, but it is not the only coherent metaphysical paradigm, so one can't claim to have an objective case for something that is based on any particular metaphysical paradigm. — Relativist
The nature of the things that exist (such as whether they consist of form and substance, or whether they are states of affairs) is not a "fundamental fact" that comes from experience - rather, it is a postulated paradigm - an assumption. — Relativist
I asked if you believe the laws of nature EXIST (not operate) independently of the entities that exhibit them. — Relativist
Why do we use abstractions? Because our brains can only represent 5-9 "chunks" of information at a time. So, we can't deal with reality in all its complexity. Thus, abstractions (universal ideas) are a "stupid human" trick for reducing the complexity of reality to our limited representations capacity. — Dfpolis
For the FTA to have any utility, it needs to have some persuasive power. No belief is held in isolation, and this makes it difficult to judge an argument the same way a non-theist would (even an open-minded agnostic who is open to both God's existence and non-existence). The fact that you bring up intentionality demonstrates that you aren't judging the FTA apart from your related beliefs.You have not convinced me of the cogency of your objections.
Interesting perspective, but I have two questions about it:there are definite ends (aka "final states" -- which need not be "final") to which physical processes tend... If we then say that any source of intentionality is, by definition, a mind, then a mind is responsible for the laws of nature
There's also no scientific support for intentionality or God. You seem to be doing exactly what I anticipated: only considering metaphysical possibility to admit God into consideration, and refusing to admit it for anything else. This is inconsistent.I agree, that is why there is no scientific support for a multiverse...
Then this removes God from consideration.Relativist: "if we're including God among the possibilities to consider, we have to consider all metaphysically possible worlds"
No, we don't. We only have to consider actual evidence
Possible worlds is just a semantics for discussing modal claims. You are inconsistent in your use of modality. What exactly is the modality you propose to use to "baselessly" (without evidence) propose God as the solution? For God to be the answer, God must be "possible" and possibility entails a modality. You could use epistemic possibility (as far as we know, there might be a God), or conceptual possibility (God is conceivable, and therefore possible), or broadly logical possibility (God's existence entails no broadly logical contradictions). But whatever modality you use, consistency demands using the same modality to consider multiverse. Clearly, God is not physically possible, so you can't use this.Possible worlds talk is just a way of injecting baseless speculation into philosophical discourse.
Snowflakes depends on a variety of elements, planet formation, atmosphere, liquid water on the planet surface, evaporation, a narrow range of atmospheric and surface temperatures, dust in the atmosphere.(re: sandstone and snowflakes) The existence of the required elements (H, O, Si) does not require nuclear fusion in stars and so is far less constrained than the existence of life.
More correctly: it is epistemically possible that a metaphysically necessary God exists. The only modality in which the possibilities for both God's existence and non-existence can be evaluated is epistemic modality. But a multiverse is also epistemically possible - you admitted this.No, again. God is a metaphysical necessity. The only possibility that can be attributed to God is epistemological -- due to ignorance. The evidence for God's existence is all being. If anything is, we can conclude, with metaphysical certainty, that God is.
The issue is that "essence" is a concept based on a primitive analysis of human-ness and dog-ness (etc). If everything that makes us human or dog is an accident (as genetics and evolution suggest) then there is no reason to think there IS such a thing.While I don't deny the biological importance of DNA, your genetic coding doesn't enter into my judgement that you're human and Fido is a dog.... What does that have to do with anything?
You're forgetting that my original issue is that the existence of "essence" is an assumption. I didn't claim it was incoherent. Again: every metaphysical theory depends on assumptions. This seems so trivially true, I can't understand why you'd deny it.I don't see that you've shown that there is no basis in reality for saying that a thing is (existence) or what it is (essence).
No you didn't! You denied the concept is related to DNA, even though you earlier claimed species entailed essential kinds. That is contradictory. Now you've claimed it's not just a sortal of accidental properties, and made the vague assertion "what is essential to my concept of humans -- a concept that is largely transcultural". What exactly does essence refer to? Identify something about dogs that set them apart as an essential kind from wolves, that is not simply the accident of DNA variation.I showed that it is not a postulate, but names something found in reality -- i.e., the objective basis of essential definitions -- what it is about concrete individuals that allows us to apply our species concepts to them.
Seriously, do you not understand that this is a postulated pardigm? It is a way to account for the things that exist. Earlier I referenced Armstrong's ontology. He accounts for existents differently, and it's every bit as complete and coherent. I'm not going to argue that Armstrong's account is true and Aquinas is false, because they both account for everything - they are simply different, unproveable paradigms.Relativist: " Aquinas paradigm also postulates: act, potency, form, substance, and accident."
All of which we find in our experience of reality and its conceptualization.
What you call a "conceptual space" is what I'm calling a "paradigm" - but other than this, I agree completely. But there's an important corollary: one can't "prove" any particular "conceptual space" is true. Thomistic metaphysics is popular with theists because it entails a God, but if someone claims this constitutes an objective proof of God's existence, they are ignoring the epistemically contingent nature of the Thomist paradigm.the fact that we have one reality based conceptual space that can be used to analyze reality does not, by any means preclude the possibility of other, equally reality-based, conceptual spaces that can be used to analyze reality. Given that reality is far too complex to be exhausted by the stupid human trick of abstraction, the more ways we think of reality, the more projections we use, the better.
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