I assert that a Peircean pragmatic/semiotic approach to metaphysics is the best. Best in terms of both its rational coherence and empirical correspondence to a theory of everything. Best as its theory of epistemology is also its theory of ontology. Best because it unifies mind and world in a modelling relation. — apokrisis
Rational coherence is simply a matter of avoiding inconsistencies or contradictions in your system. How would we go about testing "empirical correspondence to a theory of everything"? — Janus
You can say there are good reasons to believe it, but those reasons will always be the ones you prefer to use as criteria, rather than some alternative set of reasons. The absolute superiority of any set of reasons cannot be demonstrated. — Janus
So, I would agree that assertions about the existence of God, or Eternity, or the Good, and so on are not rationally decidable; but they do have an affective, a metaphorical, an aesthetic and a poetic sense, and in terms of those senses such assertions are not meaningless nonsense. — Janus
And the fact is, which I doubt you will dare to deny, that people's faith in such figures may make enormous differences to both individual lives and societies, so they may also have pragmatic value or dis-value, depending on how the effects they produce are judged. — Janus
And I would say it gives you more of a problem admitting the principle of least action does reduce to a holistic position which takes finality seriously as part of the fundamental workings of the Cosmos. — apokrisis
Again, I thought you were arguing against four causes modelling. And now you are championing it under the permissive banner of pluralism. — apokrisis
if you have to dig up that antique, — SophistiCat
We are more used to thinking in terms of unfolding forward in time, but there is no time asymmetry in such systems. — SophistiCat
And it has least to do with Aristotelian final cause, which is bound up with anthropomorphic, psychological categories of goals and intentions. — SophistiCat
There are deeper and more interesting ways to make sense of such alternate explanatory frameworks. — SophistiCat
No. The immaterial is real enough. "Justice," "seven," "relations" are all names for real things. But I think you confuse two words: real and reality. What is in reality is real. What is real is not necessarily in reality. Unless you define it that way.Can't we just say that reality consists of two parts, the material and the immaterial? — Metaphysician Undercover
So we would define that reality in dualist terms. — Metaphysician Undercover
It is due to reason's inability to count it, inability due to definitions both of counting and that to be counted. That is,it is uncountable. This isn't deficiency, it's how it is. It's not a deficiency on your part that you cannot run 120 miles per hour; it's just the way you are, the way it is. Your understanding of "infinite" is what is deficient.I don't see how this is a problem. If something is "uncountable", this is due to the human being's deficient capacity to count it. — Metaphysician Undercover
No problem here. Perhaps this question: for you, is there any distinction - difference - between real and reality. I'd start with one's an adjective and an accident, the other a noun and a substance. Perhaps you can show how they're identical under reality.The proper answer is that it is necessary to include the immaterial as real, in order to account for all aspects of reality. — Metaphysician Undercover
It's not a question of "how do you account for it?", because no one can account for all aspects of reality. That is not a fair question. The proper answer is that it is necessary to include the immaterial as real, in order to account for all aspects of reality. — Metaphysician Undercover
It's clear that you do not trouble to distinguish between "real" and "reality." It's a useful distinction to make, and troublesome not to make it. The question above: real = reality? No difference? The same thing? Just two words that mean exactly the same thing?However, allowing that the immaterial is real is a step forward, toward a complete understanding of reality. — Metaphysician Undercover
So you are defending the "material world" ... as the everyday perception you have of living in a world of medium size dry goods. — apokrisis
If you don't care about theories that make predictions, then you simply are left with an odd notion of a theory. — apokrisis
They are not metaphysics either, to the degree that metaphysics is an inquiry into the fundamental nature of reality. — apokrisis
Rather than deny it, I've offered that as evidence. It is the pragmatic social utility of theistic or romantic constructs that accounts for their evolution and persistence in human linguistic culture.
Anthropological science explains why people come to think that way. — apokrisis
The principle of least action is a good example of how "mystical" the most material-appearing mathematical descriptions of nature already are. Our most fundamental law of physical existence - the second law of thermodynamics - is openly teleological. Quantum interpretations show that non-locality is real and yet still intellectually unacceptable to most folk. — apokrisis
Yes. though I'm not sure it needs any defense so much as acknowledgement of what it is, for what it is, as what it is. — tim wood
I have now watched Leonard Susskind discuss and describe the holographic theory on Youtube. — tim wood
More of a problem is wackdoodles of greater or lesser wackdoodleness who grab this idea and run with it into science fiction and science fantasy. I do not think you are such, but in your choosing to adhere to theory over reality it's hard to tell. — tim wood
...and I ask you what you do when it rains, that's a serious question. At the least it puts the question to you, "Is it raining?" — tim wood
As a matter of faith I assume that eventually some new thing will be found and understood that will render the strangeness and weirdness of QM merely amazing and beautiful, but understood. — tim wood
I expect you to disagree and continue with your assertions, but it is probably a waste of time; — Janus
What is in reality is real. What is real is not necessarily in reality. Unless you define it that way. — tim wood
If you disagree then it is on you to show how measurement is possible in metaphysics; or how metaphysical ideas could be assessed in terms of their practical outcomes. How does metaphysics differ from natural science, taken as a more or less unified whole, in your view? — Janus
You are defending a very traditional response to the socio-cultural threat posed by the Enlightenment. This old cultural war still wants to play out. — apokrisis
You actually don't have any good argument for why people should not be interested in ideas that cannot be definitively cashed out; the very idea of "cashing out" reveals your instrumentalist bias. — Janus
Look, what's the point of confining metaphysics to science? — Janus
Instead of arguing against what I say you want to reduce it to some 'old cultural war playing out'. — Janus
You actually don't have any good argument for why people should not be interested in ideas that cannot be definitively cashed out; the very idea of "cashing out" reveals your instrumentalist bias. — Janus
Metaphysician Undercover — Metaphysician Undercover
I myself am obliged to accept the reality of Platonic forms, essences and substantial being — Wayfarer
Positing a Platonic idea or exemplar implies, for example, that some individuals are more human (better reflect the exemplar) than others. This can only foster prejudice and injustice. — Dfpolis
I confine it to pragmatic inquiry - that combination of theory and measurement that we would use to organise our experience in intelligible fashion. — apokrisis
You are the one saying it is art against science, not me. — apokrisis
That is why you need me to be saying that metaphysics is confined to science and excludes art. It would fit into your world as you understand it. It frustrates you that I say something wider than that. — apokrisis
That said, this is a mischaracterization of science. Science is, in part, descriptive of what is and has been, and so concerned with states of reality, not merely prediction. Biology, astronomy and oceanography provide numerous examples of objective description rather than prediction. Cosmology is at least as concerned with the origins of the cosmos as with its fate. — Dfpolis
Second, unless we know that certain things are true, reliable prediction is impossible. We need a set of initial conditions (e.g., the present sate of reality), an adequate knowledge of the relevant dynamics, and, usually, a knowledge that they mathematics we are employing is adequate to the reality we wish to predict. Thus, whatever practical end our prediction msy seek to advance, our foundation needs be a firm grasp of truth. — Dfpolis
Yes, science is "in part, descriptive", but the trend in modern science, due to the way that scientific projects are funded, is toward usefulness, and that is mostly found in predictive capacity. — Metaphysician Undercover
The end goal is not to fit all observations to some descriptive system or other. It is to find the pattern, the formal organisation, that gives the clue as to the causal machinery. Once you can model that underlying causal machinery, you are in business. You can generate predictions. — apokrisis
the trend in modern science, due to the way that scientific projects are funded, is toward usefulness, and that is mostly found in predictive capacity. — Metaphysician Undercover
Thales predicted a solar eclipse based on models which had the sun and moon orbiting the earth. — Metaphysician Undercover
appearance is not necessarily truth. — Metaphysician Undercover
How we frame things for funding purposes is not evidence for our personal motivations. — Dfpolis
Thales could not have predicted a solar eclipse without assuming truth of the body of astronomical knowledge he received. He need to know the observed cycles (the scientific laws of his day) and where in those cycles he was when he made the prediction (aka the initial conditions). — Dfpolis
Whether we think of the sun orbiting the earth, the earth orbiting the sun, or both orbiting the galactic center depends on which frame of reference we chose to employ. None is a uniquely true frame of reference, only more or less suited to our present need. — Dfpolis
Right, but when appearances are false they're useless to physical science. Only veridical appearances (observed phenomena) are of use in the study of nature. — Dfpolis
The "underlying causal machinery" if that's what you want to call it, is irrelevant to the predictive capacity, which is what is valued. — Metaphysician Undercover
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.