One can most certainly change the way that they look at the world by virtue of changing the way they talk about it and/or themselves. One can do this deliberately. One can deliberately change they way that they behave as a means to change the way they feel. This can, in turn, change one's belief.
How is that deception? — creativesoul
Because it's intentional belief altering via coercive/irrational means. Is deception the intent to conceal or manipulate or is it the successful concealment/manipulation of objective truth? I'll satisfy both:
Lets say I'm at a singles bar looking for a date, and I know that statistically my chances of being successful are low... Consuming alcohol can make me go from believing it is true that I will likely fail to either forgetting or believing the opposite, even while it remains true that I will likely fail despite the statistical benefits alcohol may confer. — VagabondSpectre
That seems along the right lines to me. The "splitting of selves" approach (I think it goes by the term "psychological partitioning" in the literature) only makes sense if one tries to force self-deception into the model of one person being deceitful to another. In those cases the key point is that the deceitful person both believes/knows something to be the case and intends that the other should believe the opposite is the case. — jkg20
Self-deception does not seem like that to me, it is more like having a suspicion that something you wish to be true may not be true, but rather than pursuing the chain of reasoning that will decide the issue for you, you give yourself (perhaps bad) reasons for not pursuing that chain of reasoning.
One is not a plurality. — creativesoul
I think our disagreement, then, is that for me self-deception exists as I described, but does not involve lying to oneself if we consider lying to oneself only on the model of one person lying to another. I agree that lying to oneself conceived on that model is just not coherent, it involves a contradiction. However, that needn't make self-deception impossible — jkg20
One is not a plurality.
— creativesoul
A heap is not a plurality of grains? A mind is not a plurality of thoughts? A brain is not a plurality of neurones? A body is not a plurality of cells? — unenlightened
One mind is not a plurality of minds. — creativesoul
One mind is not a plurality of minds.
— creativesoul
But it might be a plurality of awarenesses, a plurality of intentions, or one element of several of a person. You seem to be ruling out a division on the ground of calling it 'one'. As if someone called 'Honesty' cannot be dishonest. — unenlightened
As I understand it, a self-deceiver is confronted with a choice to pursue a difficult line of reasoning which he/she suspects (but does not know) might lead to reassessing a cherished belief, but instead of following that line of reasoning finds comforting, probably superficial, reasons for ignoring that line of reasoning and just continuing to maintain the cherished belief. The truth or falsity of the cherished belief might not necessarily matter, incidently, maybe the belief that the self-deceiver cherishes is in fact true (constructing an example might be interesting - I'll have a think about it) but the self-deceiver is (arguably) at fault from the rational perspective for not having engaged in the ignored reasoning process. The thing about self-deception that is important is that at some level it is rationally blame worthy, there is something the self-deceiver should do but does not do, and this conception I am offering at least allows for the self-deceiver to be blamed in that way. — jkg20
Laing Wrote a book about the divided self; you may not agree with his psychology, but you really cannot rule it out a priori. — unenlightened
As I understand it, a self-deceiver is confronted with a choice to pursue a difficult line of reasoning which he/she suspects (but does not know) might lead to reassessing a cherished belief, but instead of following that line of reasoning finds comforting, probably superficial, reasons for ignoring that line of reasoning and just continuing to maintain the cherished belief. The truth or falsity of the cherished belief might not necessarily matter, incidently, maybe the belief that the self-deceiver cherishes is in fact true (constructing an example might be interesting - I'll have a think about it) but the self-deceiver is (arguably) at fault from the rational perspective for not having engaged in the ignored reasoning process. — jkg20
As I understand it, a self-deceiver is confronted with a choice to pursue a difficult line of reasoning which he/she suspects (but does not know) might lead to reassessing a cherished belief, but instead of following that line of reasoning finds comforting, probably superficial, reasons for ignoring that line of reasoning and just continuing to maintain the cherished belief. The truth or falsity of the cherished belief might not necessarily matter, incidently, maybe the belief that the self-deceiver cherishes is in fact true (constructing an example might be interesting - I'll have a think about it) but the self-deceiver is (arguably) at fault from the rational perspective for not having engaged in the ignored reasoning process. The thing about self-deception that is important is that at some level it is rationally blame worthy, there is something the self-deceiver should do but does not do, and this conception I am offering at least allows for the self-deceiver to be blamed in that way. — jkg20
I mean surely self-deception is something in and of itself, right? In that case there should be something or some things that make it qualify. Ahem... a criterion.
Anyone here have one? — creativesoul
There is something wrong in being self-deceptive, one is doing something one should not be doing. Note that there is a difference between one person being deceitful to another and one person simply deceiving another (magicians deceive people, but when they do so, they are not being deceitful). What in general that is added to deceptive behaviour in order to make it deceitful is that some social norms of acceptable behaviour are being violated. Self-deception retains from deceitfulness that aspect of its being wrong, and since that is based on social norms it would follow that when one is deceiving oneself it involves going against what others believe one ought to be doing/have done. Solitary self-deception probably makes as little sense as solitary rule following.So self deception is when one doesn't do what another thinks they ought?
If I am mistaken about the fact that I am a good philosopher, and someone points out that my thinking is sloppy and my ideas confused, then on seeing the evidence I will correct the mistake. "I thought I was quite good at this, but I see I was wrong. No worries."
If OTOH, I am deceiving myself that i am a good philosopher, and the same thing happens, I will resist, my feelings will be hurt, I will get angry and dismissive, I will attack the evidence, make excuses, and so on. Folks will commonly die to maintain a false image of themselves.
I gave this criterion a long way back- "commitment". — unenlightened
There is something wrong in being self-deceptive, one is doing something one should not be doing. Note that there is a difference between one person being deceitful to another and one person simply deceiving another (magicians deceive people, but when they do so, they are not being deceitful). — jkg20
What in general that is added to deceptive behaviour in order to make it deceitful is that some social norms of acceptable behaviour are being violated. Self-deception retains from deceitfulness that aspect of its being wrong, and since that is based on social norms it would follow that when one is deceiving oneself it involves going against what others believe one ought to be doing/have done. Solitary self-deception probably makes as little sense as solitary rule following. — jkg20
As for a criterion, let me have a stab at one (there may be others): refusal to engage in a rational process that one is aware exists, that one can engage fully in and where that refusal is motivated by the fact that it may undermine a cherished belief (might need to add that an alternative rational process is engaged in which provides - perhaps superficial - support for the cherished belief). — jkg20
It is humanly impossible to knowingly believe a falsehood. — creativesoul
Yes, I think I agree with your parsing.
It is humanly impossible to knowingly believe a falsehood.
— creativesoul
Right, I think I get what you are saying here. If one says out loud, "I believe X and X is false." there is an obvious contradiction. But folks can get very close: consider the cliche "I'm not a racist but ..." where what follows the 'but' is some obviously racist belief. One can believe things that are contradictory, just as long as one does not notice the contradiction.
But thereafter, I stop agreeing. I might believe I can lift up that rock, and all it takes to change my belief is trying and failing. I don't need anyone else.
I think your 'knowingly believe' is doing too much work. — unenlightened
That is to say, I do not know everything I believe, certainly not until I start looking. Consider prejudice. I repudiate prejudicial beliefs, and yet I find on reflection that I act on them. And when a man crosses the void on the bridge, that is stronger evidence that he believes it will support him, than any amount of confession.
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