One can most certainly change the way that they look at the world by virtue of changing the way they talk about it and/or themselves. One can do this deliberately. One can deliberately change they way that they behave as a means to change the way they feel. This can, in turn, change one's belief.

How is that deception? — creativesoul

Because it's intentional belief altering via coercive/irrational means. Is deception the intent to conceal or manipulate or is it the successful concealment/manipulation of objective truth? I'll satisfy both:

Lets say I'm at a singles bar looking for a date, and I know that statistically my chances of being successful are low... Consuming alcohol can make me go from believing it is true that I will likely fail to either forgetting or believing the opposite, even while it remains true that I will likely fail despite the statistical benefits alcohol may confer. — VagabondSpectre

Hey, I'm going to deceive you by telling you what I'm going to do, how I'm going to do it, and when I begin doing so.

You wouldn't be deceived, and neither would I.


The example above could also be explained as follows...

People become temporarily inebriated. Poor judgment is an effect/affect of inebriation. If I know that getting drunk increases my confidence level, and if some women like guys with confidence moreso than guys without, and I entertain these thoughts in close proximity to one another, I could then deliberately do something with a clear purpose and very well may increase my chances of success.

On the splitting of one into more than one...

One cannot intentionally misrepresent their own thought and belief to themself. That is, one cannot lie to oneself.

If a notion permits a meaningful account of "self-deception", it does so by virtue of either a lack of intention, or a plurality of self/mind. The former means is acceptable in light of the criterion above. The latter is not for those are negations of one another. Intentionally misrepresenting one's thought and belief requires a plurality as adequately argued heretofore. One is not a plurality.

Unintentional is accidental. Deception is on purpose. Unintentional self-deception is accidental. Intentional self-deception is on purpose.

:wink:

On second thought, neither case of self-deception is acceptable in light of the criterion for lying that we're working with.

That seems along the right lines to me. The "splitting of selves" approach (I think it goes by the term "psychological partitioning" in the literature) only makes sense if one tries to force self-deception into the model of one person being deceitful to another. In those cases the key point is that the deceitful person both believes/knows something to be the case and intends that the other should believe the opposite is the case. — jkg20

I think we're in agreement here.

We know what it is to deceive another. We know what it takes. We know some things that must be both present and not in order for it to happen. That's what makes it deception. This has been argued for heretofore. As before... it takes a plurality. One is not.

One cannot deliberately misrepresent their own thought and belief to oneself. Self-deception requires that. One cannot deceive oneself.

Self-deception does not seem like that to me, it is more like having a suspicion that something you wish to be true may not be true, but rather than pursuing the chain of reasoning that will decide the issue for you, you give yourself (perhaps bad) reasons for not pursuing that chain of reasoning.

We do indeed talk ourselves into and out of things. No one makes a mistake on purpose. Using bad reasoning is a mistake.

One cannot deliberately misrepresent their own thought and belief to oneself. Deceiving another requires doing so. Deceiving oneself is impossible if we hold to the criterion for lying that I've been working from...

One is not a plurality. — creativesoul

A heap is not a plurality of grains? A mind is not a plurality of thoughts? A brain is not a plurality of neurones? A body is not a plurality of cells?

I think our disagreement, then, is that for me self-deception exists as I described, but does not involve lying to oneself if we consider lying to oneself only on the model of one person lying to another. I agree that lying to oneself conceived on that model is just not coherent, it involves a contradiction. However, that needn't make self-deception impossible.

I think our disagreement, then, is that for me self-deception exists as I described, but does not involve lying to oneself if we consider lying to oneself only on the model of one person lying to another. I agree that lying to oneself conceived on that model is just not coherent, it involves a contradiction. However, that needn't make self-deception impossible — jkg20

It makes intentional self-deception impossible.

One is not a plurality.
— creativesoul

A heap is not a plurality of grains? A mind is not a plurality of thoughts? A brain is not a plurality of neurones? A body is not a plurality of cells? — unenlightened

One heap is a plurality of grains. One mind is a plurality of thoughts. One brain is a plurality of cells. One body is a plurality of cells.

One mind is not a plurality of minds.

One heap is not a plurality of heaps. A plurality of grains is not one grain. One mind is not a plurality of minds. A plurality of thoughts is not one thought. One brain is not a plurality of brains. A plurality of neurones is not one neuron. One body is not a plurality of bodies. A plurality of cells is not one cell.

It makes intentional self-deception impossible.

Why? The process I described looks intentional, but does not seem to involve any contradictions.

The process you described is nothing more than using inadequate reasoning. Using inadequate reasoning is a mistake. Mistakes are accidental. That which is accidental cannot be intentional.

So the example is neither intentional nor a case of lying to oneself.

What makes it self-deception again?

One mind is not a plurality of minds. — creativesoul

But it might be a plurality of awarenesses, a plurality of intentions, or one element of several of a person. You seem to be ruling out a division on the ground of calling it 'one'. As if someone called 'Honesty' cannot be dishonest.

Laing Wrote a book about the divided self; you may not agree with his psychology, but you really cannot rule it out a priori.

As I understand it, a self-deceiver is confronted with a choice to pursue a difficult line of reasoning which he/she suspects (but does not know) might lead to reassessing a cherished belief, but instead of following that line of reasoning finds comforting, probably superficial, reasons for ignoring that line of reasoning and just continuing to maintain the cherished belief. The truth or falsity of the cherished belief might not necessarily matter, incidently, maybe the belief that the self-deceiver cherishes is in fact true (constructing an example might be interesting - I'll have a think about it) but the self-deceiver is (arguably) at fault from the rational perspective for not having engaged in the ignored reasoning process. The thing about self-deception that is important is that at some level it is rationally blame worthy, there is something the self-deceiver should do but does not do, and this conception I am offering at least allows for the self-deceiver to be blamed in that way.

One mind is not a plurality of minds.
— creativesoul

But it might be a plurality of awarenesses, a plurality of intentions, or one element of several of a person. You seem to be ruling out a division on the ground of calling it 'one'. As if someone called 'Honesty' cannot be dishonest. — unenlightened

Non sequitur.

As if someone called 'Honesty' cannot be a plurality called 'Honesty'. Surely there are plenty of sensible ways to divide up one mind...

Ahem...

One mind is a plurality of thoughts... belief... emotions.

Can these be in conflict with one another? Sure.

Such conflict gives rise to uncertainty, insanity, confusion, disbelief, moral dilemma, solid ground for temporarily suspending one's judgment, and a host of other things too I'm sure.

As I understand it, a self-deceiver is confronted with a choice to pursue a difficult line of reasoning which he/she suspects (but does not know) might lead to reassessing a cherished belief, but instead of following that line of reasoning finds comforting, probably superficial, reasons for ignoring that line of reasoning and just continuing to maintain the cherished belief. The truth or falsity of the cherished belief might not necessarily matter, incidently, maybe the belief that the self-deceiver cherishes is in fact true (constructing an example might be interesting - I'll have a think about it) but the self-deceiver is (arguably) at fault from the rational perspective for not having engaged in the ignored reasoning process. The thing about self-deception that is important is that at some level it is rationally blame worthy, there is something the self-deceiver should do but does not do, and this conception I am offering at least allows for the self-deceiver to be blamed in that way. — jkg20

One cannot make a mistake intentionally. Mistakes are accidental. Blameworthiness doesn't belong here.

Can't mistakes be blameworthy when the person who makes the mistake should have known better?

Laing Wrote a book about the divided self; you may not agree with his psychology, but you really cannot rule it out a priori. — unenlightened

I don't even know what "ruling it our a priori" is supposed to mean. If it is impossible for one to deliberately misrepresent their own thought and belief to oneself, then any and all arguments which assume or validly conclude that are themselves based upon at least one false premiss.

Responsibility for consequences of mistakes belongs here(is in line with my position). Blameworthiness doesn't. Both are tangential enough to warrant another thread. This one is supposed to be about the notion of lying to oneself.

Is that a distinction with a difference in this context?

As I understand it, a self-deceiver is confronted with a choice to pursue a difficult line of reasoning which he/she suspects (but does not know) might lead to reassessing a cherished belief, but instead of following that line of reasoning finds comforting, probably superficial, reasons for ignoring that line of reasoning and just continuing to maintain the cherished belief. The truth or falsity of the cherished belief might not necessarily matter, incidently, maybe the belief that the self-deceiver cherishes is in fact true (constructing an example might be interesting - I'll have a think about it) but the self-deceiver is (arguably) at fault from the rational perspective for not having engaged in the ignored reasoning process. — jkg20

I think that this is a common form of self-deception (there are numerous different types). Let's suppose that I don't know with any degree of certainty that X is the case ([perhaps someone just told me X is the case and I believed it). So I believe that X is the case though I have no reason to be certain about this. Over time I will forget that I am truly uncertain that X is the case, remembering only that I believe X is the case. In this frame of mind, I may perceive hints of evidence that X is really not the case, but I may not act to reassess that belief because I deceive myself by thinking that I would not hold the belief, X is the case, without properly assessing it in the first place.

In other words, I falsely believe that if I hold a belief, that belief must have already been properly justified. The deeper the belief, the more fundamental it is, (like a Wittgensteinian "hinge-proposition") the deeper the self-deception is, that the belief is beyond doubt. So the self-deception involves telling oneself that such a deep seated belief cannot be doubted when in reality the person knows that it can and ought to be doubted.

So creativesoul holds the belief that it is impossible for a person to self-deceive. But clearly this is a belief which can and ought to be doubted. Creative self-deceives by refusing to look at the vast evidence presented, believing only the prejudice, refusing to doubt what ought to be doubted, merely insisting over and over again, that self-deception is impossible

As I understand it, a self-deceiver is confronted with a choice to pursue a difficult line of reasoning which he/she suspects (but does not know) might lead to reassessing a cherished belief, but instead of following that line of reasoning finds comforting, probably superficial, reasons for ignoring that line of reasoning and just continuing to maintain the cherished belief. The truth or falsity of the cherished belief might not necessarily matter, incidently, maybe the belief that the self-deceiver cherishes is in fact true (constructing an example might be interesting - I'll have a think about it) but the self-deceiver is (arguably) at fault from the rational perspective for not having engaged in the ignored reasoning process. The thing about self-deception that is important is that at some level it is rationally blame worthy, there is something the self-deceiver should do but does not do, and this conception I am offering at least allows for the self-deceiver to be blamed in that way. — jkg20

Setting aside this notion of blameworthiness, but taking on the rest...

One has a deeply held belief. That is, one has unshakable conviction that something is true, or is the case, or some such. One is confronted with a line of reasoning that places that belief in question. The truth or falsity doesn't matter...

Full stop. What else about the belief would be reassessed?

So here we are considering an example where a line of reasoning is being ignored that would have otherwise led one to reassess a deeply held belief. It's being said here that it's not so much the truth/falsity of the belief that matters. What matters more, according to this purported notion of self-deception is that that person ought to have done something that they did not.

So self deception is when one doesn't do what another thinks they ought?

:worry:

It's called "denial", refusing to consider the evidence.

For those who argue in favor of self-deception...

What is the difference between being mistaken and self-deception?

Looks like a situation where all examples of self-deception only have one thing in common that makes them so... they are all called "self deception". Like Witt's "game" situation.

Is that so though?

I mean surely self-deception is something in and of itself, right? In that case there should be something or some things that make it qualify. Ahem... a criterion.

Anyone here have one?

I mean surely self-deception is something in and of itself, right? In that case there should be something or some things that make it qualify. Ahem... a criterion.

Anyone here have one? — creativesoul

If I am mistaken about the fact that I am a good philosopher, and someone points out that my thinking is sloppy and my ideas confused, then on seeing the evidence I will correct the mistake. "I thought I was quite good at this, but I see I was wrong. No worries."

If OTOH, I am deceiving myself that i am a good philosopher, and the same thing happens, I will resist, my feelings will be hurt, I will get angry and dismissive, I will attack the evidence, make excuses, and so on. Folks will commonly die to maintain a false image of themselves.

I gave this criterion a long way back- "commitment".

So self deception is when one doesn't do what another thinks they ought?

There is something wrong in being self-deceptive, one is doing something one should not be doing. Note that there is a difference between one person being deceitful to another and one person simply deceiving another (magicians deceive people, but when they do so, they are not being deceitful). What in general that is added to deceptive behaviour in order to make it deceitful is that some social norms of acceptable behaviour are being violated. Self-deception retains from deceitfulness that aspect of its being wrong, and since that is based on social norms it would follow that when one is deceiving oneself it involves going against what others believe one ought to be doing/have done. Solitary self-deception probably makes as little sense as solitary rule following.

As for a criterion, let me have a stab at one (there may be others): refusal to engage in a rational process that one is aware exists, that one can engage fully in and where that refusal is motivated by the fact that it may undermine a cherished belief (might need to add that an alternative rational process is engaged in which provides - perhaps superficial - support for the cherished belief).

And I do for the moment at least stand by the idea that the truth or falsity of the cherished belief need not be relevant as to whether a person is engaging in self-deception. Suppose John is accused of murdering Janet. John's mother believes that John did not murder Janet. The evidence is stacked up against John - video surveillance, finger prints, motive, means, opportunity etc. Rather than examine the evidence for what it is, John's mother insists that she knows her Johnny, he's a gentle boy that she brought up and would not harm a soul and so he did not murder that man-eating Janet. Now, suppose that John really did want to murder Janet, and on the day in question went with malice of forethought to her appartment to kill her. Arriving there, Janet is already butchered, so John flees the scene after accidentally leaving some top quality finger prints, and is caught on camera entering and exiting the building. John's mother has a true belief that her son did not murder Janet, but she's still engaging in self-deception - at least arguably. Of course, unpacking the example might expose it as not showing what I think it shows, but examples have to start somewhere.

If I am mistaken about the fact that I am a good philosopher, and someone points out that my thinking is sloppy and my ideas confused, then on seeing the evidence I will correct the mistake. "I thought I was quite good at this, but I see I was wrong. No worries."

If OTOH, I am deceiving myself that i am a good philosopher, and the same thing happens, I will resist, my feelings will be hurt, I will get angry and dismissive, I will attack the evidence, make excuses, and so on. Folks will commonly die to maintain a false image of themselves.

I gave this criterion a long way back- "commitment". — unenlightened

Commitment isn't enough though Un. Necessary? Surely. Sufficient or adequate? Not even close. I think we agree.

We may get somewhere helpful thinking along these lines. I'm curious enough to see if I have this right(if I'm understanding your claims) and if the path will end up being a helpful one...



So, deceiving oneself is always being mistaken, but not the other way around. The difference between being mistaken and deceiving oneself is that one who is deceiving oneself takes being told that they're mistaken personally, so much so that they are incapable of correcting the mistake. This overly general parsing is good enough for now, I think.

On my view...

It is humanly impossible to knowingly believe a falsehood. We all have or have had false belief somewhere along the line. Belief systems(world-views) are self-contained. So, we cannot see our own mistakes. Correcting mistakes requires first seeing them. Seeing them requires an other. Thus, in order to even be able to correct our own mistakes, we must be capable of admitting our own fallibility(that we could be holding false belief), and we must recognize that an other is necessary. In addition, we have to place more confidence(trust) in an other than we do in our own thought and belief(the ones in question). One who cannot do this would meet your criterion for self-deception.

Agree?

There is something wrong in being self-deceptive, one is doing something one should not be doing. Note that there is a difference between one person being deceitful to another and one person simply deceiving another (magicians deceive people, but when they do so, they are not being deceitful). — jkg20

So not all deception is deceitful and...

What in general that is added to deceptive behaviour in order to make it deceitful is that some social norms of acceptable behaviour are being violated. Self-deception retains from deceitfulness that aspect of its being wrong, and since that is based on social norms it would follow that when one is deceiving oneself it involves going against what others believe one ought to be doing/have done. Solitary self-deception probably makes as little sense as solitary rule following. — jkg20

...what makes deception deceitful is when it breaks the rules of acceptable/unacceptable behaviour.

Install a real life scenario...

Politicians, in the States at least, are expected to lie to the people about their motives for holding elected office. That is to say that that is a social norm. Lots of Americans hold the view that all politicians lie.

Using the standard you've put forth, politicians that deliberately misrepresent their own thought and belief as a means to convince voters are not being deceitful.

Bullshit.

The fact that some deception is socially acceptable does not change the fact that it is deception. All deception is deceitful. That is precisely what makes it deception.

As for a criterion, let me have a stab at one (there may be others): refusal to engage in a rational process that one is aware exists, that one can engage fully in and where that refusal is motivated by the fact that it may undermine a cherished belief (might need to add that an alternative rational process is engaged in which provides - perhaps superficial - support for the cherished belief). — jkg20

Rational process can involve putting certain kinds of logic to use. Para-consistent logic qualifies. Para-consistent logic holds that a statement can be both true and false at the same time and in the same sense. This logic has the ability to render any statement either true or false.

Do you see the problem?

Yes, I think I agree with your parsing.

It is humanly impossible to knowingly believe a falsehood. — creativesoul

Right, I think I get what you are saying here. If one says out loud, "I believe X and X is false." there is an obvious contradiction. But folks can get very close: consider the cliche "I'm not a racist but ..." where what follows the 'but' is some obviously racist belief. One can believe things that are contradictory, just as long as one does not notice the contradiction.

But thereafter, I stop agreeing. I might believe I can lift up that rock, and all it takes to change my belief is trying and failing. I don't need anyone else.

I think your 'knowingly believe' is doing too much work. That is to say, I do not know everything I believe, certainly not until I start looking. Consider prejudice. I repudiate prejudicial beliefs, and yet I find on reflection that I act on them. And when a man crosses the void on the bridge, that is stronger evidence that he believes it will support him, than any amount of confession.

Yes, I think I agree with your parsing.

It is humanly impossible to knowingly believe a falsehood.
— creativesoul

Right, I think I get what you are saying here. If one says out loud, "I believe X and X is false." there is an obvious contradiction. But folks can get very close: consider the cliche "I'm not a racist but ..." where what follows the 'but' is some obviously racist belief. One can believe things that are contradictory, just as long as one does not notice the contradiction.

But thereafter, I stop agreeing. I might believe I can lift up that rock, and all it takes to change my belief is trying and failing. I don't need anyone else.

I think your 'knowingly believe' is doing too much work. — unenlightened

Point taken. Some false belief can be recognized by the believer without an other. So...

Self-deception is not being able to correct one's mistaken belief.

That is to say, I do not know everything I believe, certainly not until I start looking. Consider prejudice. I repudiate prejudicial beliefs, and yet I find on reflection that I act on them. And when a man crosses the void on the bridge, that is stronger evidence that he believes it will support him, than any amount of confession.

Perhaps. It would require having considered whether or not the bridge would support him at some time or other though, wouldn't it? A lizard crosses the bridge, but that crossing is not strong evidence that it believes that the bridge will support it.


How does this tie into lying to oneself or self-deception?