That's a selective truth when referring to the book, but misleading when referring to Putnam's stance on realism. As I said, he ended up defending naive realism.

That's a selective truth when referring to the book, but misleading when referring to Putnam's stance on realism. As I said, he ended up defending naive realism. — jkop

He started as a naive realist, moved on to internal realism, and then ended up defending natural realism.

As explained here, he still embraced conceptual relativity and pluralism and denied the description-evaluation dichotomy and the correspondence theory of truth, "think[ing] that the idea of conceptual schemes, or Wittgensteinian language games, could explain the divergences between differing, but equally correct accounts of what there is". He "steers a middle course between the philosophical 'phantasies of metaphysical realism' and the idealist tendencies of internal realism."

they'd have to find some alternative way to explain how our words are able to refer to mind-independent things. — Michael

Well, reference is simply having something in mind for a signifier--it's what an individual is taking a signifier to be "pointing to" or "picking out." That can be a mind-independent thing.

This lame argument quite obviously fails simply because there are real meteorites and a real Earth, whereas there are no real dragons. The notion of simulation loses any sense if you cannot show the real objects that are purportedly being simulated.

He started as a naive realist, moved on to internal realism, and then ended up defending natural realism. — Michael

..or in his own words: How to Be a Sophisticated "Naïve Realist" (2011)

But he says of his "naive realism" (notice his scare quotes) in that chapter "what we
perceive depends on a transaction between ourselves and the environment, and ... the properties
we perceive depend on our nature as well as the nature of the environment.”

Traditional naive realism, as explained here claims that "objects ... retain properties of the types we perceive them as having, even when they are not being perceived. Their properties are perception-independent."

The difference, then, is that Putnam's "naive realism" makes for the truth of "the apple is red" (assuming colour is one of those properties that depend on our nature) to be perception-dependent, and so relative to the individual, whereas traditional naive realism doesn't, and so it's either red or it isn't – for everyone.

So which naive realism are you talking about? Putnam's "middle ground between ... metaphysical realism ... and ... internal realism", or traditional naive realism? Because if you mean the latter then Putnam isn't a naive realist. And if you mean the former then you lose much of the mind-independence that realists love so much.

So which naive realism are you talking about? Putnam's "middle ground between ... metaphysical realism ... and ... internal realism", or traditional naive realism? Because if you mean the latter then Putnam isn't a naive realist. And if you mean the former then you lose much of the mind-independence that realists love so much. — Michael

I see it more as (a) admitting relativity, and (b) acknowledging that minds are part of relative "systems" or "equations" rather than losing mind-independence. The idea that either (a) or (b) are incompatible with "traditional naive realism" seems like a misunderstanding of naive realism to me.

The idea that either (a) or (b) are incompatible with "traditional naive realism" seems like a misunderstanding of naive realism to me. — Terrapin Station

Given that the naive realist view is that the properties we see things as having are mind-independent, and that our perceptions are only veridical if they show us this mind-independent property, how is it consistent with the view that the truth of "the apple is red" depends on our natures and how we each perceive the apple?

I see it more as (a) admitting relativity, and (b) acknowledging that minds are part of relative "systems" or "equations" rather than losing mind-independence.

How can it be both mind-dependent and mind-independent?

That's just a contradiction. If the truth depends on the system, and if the mind is a part of the system, then the truth depends on the mind. If you take the mind – the perception – out of the picture then it doesn't make sense to argue that the object retains the property that was perceived. So it's not naive realism.

That's a false dichotomy, for neither realism nor naive realism reject perception or its dependence to there being something with which we can perceive the world (e.g. a mind and certain background capacities). Realism (concerning ontology) states that what exists is not dependent on the existence of a mind. Naive realism (regarding perception) states that we perceive objects and states of affairs directly, i.e. not via some copy or picture conformed inside our minds. "Meanings just ain't in the head." with regards to Putnam. But one might add that without the head there ain't any perception.

That doesn't address the issue I raised, and that is on whether or not the apple being red is perception-independent. According to the traditional naive realist, the apple being red is a perception-independent fact, and it is only if we then see the apple as red that our perception is veridical. But this isn't the sort of thing that Putnam argued for (in his later years, which is what we're discussing).

on whether or not the apple being red is perception-independent. — Michael

Category error. Being is not seeing. Apples are seen as red. Naive realism is a theory of perception, recall, not ontology.

And its theory on perception is that, in the veridical case, the properties we perceive an object to have are properties that the object has even when we don't see them. That's what makes it naive.

If, on the other hand, the properties we see things as having are products of perception then we do not know what the world is like when we're not looking, and so our knowledge claims of it are unjustified – and remember that these theories on perception were attempts to address epistemological questions, with naive realism being an attempt to explain that our claims are justified.

This lame argument quite obviously fails simply because there are real meteorites and a real Earth, whereas there are no real dragons. The notion of simulation loses any sense if you cannot show the real objects that are purportedly being simulated. — John

So because the parts are real (meteors and the Earth) then we can simulate a whole that isn't real (an apocalyptic meteor strike on Earth)? Then using the same logic, because the parts are (or were) real (horses and horns, or giant reptiles and wings) then we can simulate a whole that isn't real (unicorns and dragons).

And besides, imagine that you're playing a virtual reality game and you're using a sword to kill a dragon. You'd say that the sword is simulated but that the dragon isn't, because dragons aren't real? That would be useless pedantry – and would completely miss the point that Putnam was making, which is that if the causal constraint on reference is correct then the words "brain" and "vat" as spoken by an envatted person wouldn't refer to real brains and vats but to these virtual-reality brains and vats, and given that we're not virtual brains in vats, our claim "we could be brains in vats" must be false.

Naive realism is a stance in philosophy of perception.

The very concept of perception is that of us being situated-beings-in-the-world, taking in data external to us by our senses, and processing it mentally.

So no naive realist has a stance that does away with mind. Perception is necessarily mind-dependent, otherwise we're no longer talking about perception. The question is then just what the relationship is between our perceptions and the world.

For naive realists, the properties that we perceive are normally accurate--those are properties that the things in question have, as they are perceived. Again, this does not make it that the perceptions are not mental. It's rather that the perceptions are accurate and direct--naive realists do not agree that something mental is normally "coloring" the perceptions and that we're only seeing the coloring, without any way of knowing just how that coloring correlates to the externals that led to the perceptions.

Relativism enters the picture because properties are factors of situatedness, too. They hinge on the materials, structures and processes involved, not only in the object-at-hand, say, but in the entire "system" relative to a given reference point. For perception, that reference point is us as perceiving beings. So properties depend on things like the angle between us and the object-at-hand, the atmospheric conditions between us and the object-at-hand, and so on.

For naive realists, the properties that we perceive are normally accurate--those are properties that the things in question have, as they are perceived. — Terrapin Station

Then what does it mean to have an inaccurate perception?

This account you offer of naive realism appears to be entirely vacuous, and certainly isn't like traditional naive realism, which does argue that the properties of things, e.g. their colour, do not depend on perception or any other mental process; the apple can be red even if we're not looking at it, and even if we all see it as orange.

Naive realism is a stance in philosophy of perception. — Terrapin Station

Which, again, seeks to answer the epistemological question of whether or not our perceptions can be used to justify our knowledge claims. The indirect realist will agree with the claim that, given this particular situation and given the constitution of both the external world and my sensory system, this is what I see. So that's not enough to count as direct realism. The distinction is on whether the features of this experience are just products of the perception or whether they're features inherent in the external world, with the indirect realist arguing for the former, and so concluding that our knowledge claims about the objective world cannot be justified by perception, and the direct realist arguing for the latter, and so concluding that our knowledge claims can be justified.

This "naive realism" that you're arguing for seems to just take the substance of the indirect realist's position but to nonetheless describe perception using the direct realist's language.

And its theory on perception is that, in the veridical case, the properties we perceive an object to have are properties that the object has even when we don't see them. — Michael

Its theory of perception is obviously not a theory about the properties we perceive an object to have but about the nature of perception: that it is direct.

For example, that when we see a red apple we're not seeing an intermediate representation of an apple inside our minds but the real mind-independent apple as it is. This does not mean that the apple would somehow have to appear red also when we don't see it, in the dark, for instance. If this is what you believe of realism, then you simply don't understand realism.

What is mind-dependent is perception: e.g. seeing the apple is to be consciously aware of its presence in your visual field, for instance, and its colour. It's possession of the colour, however, only means that it will reappear under the same or similar conditions which satisfy the possibility to see colours.

Then what does it mean to have an inaccurate perception? — Michael

For example, as I wrote, "something mental is normally 'coloring' the perceptions and that we're only seeing the coloring, without any way of knowing just how that coloring correlates to the externals that led to the perceptions."

This account you offer of direct realism appears to be entirely vacuous. — Michael

I'd have no idea how you'd define "vacuous" if that's your assessment of what I wrote.

For example, as I wrote, "something mental is normally 'coloring' the perceptions and that we're only seeing the coloring, without any way of knowing just how that coloring correlates to the externals that led to the perceptions." — Terrapin Station

I don't see how that's an inaccurate perception. An inaccurate perception would be something like "I see it as X, but it's actually Y". How would that work given your account? Or is such a thing impossible?

I'd have no idea how you'd define "vacuous" if that's your assessment of what I wrote.

You're just saying "if we see it as red then we see it as red". That's vacuous.

Its theory of perception is obviously not a theory about the properties we perceive an object to have but about the nature of perception: that it is direct. — jkop

A theory of perception is exactly a theory about the properties we perceive an object to have. That's what it means to have a theory about the nature of perception, and that's how we explain what it means for perception to be direct (or not).

For example, that when we see a red apple we're not seeing an intermediate representation of an apple inside our minds but the real mind-independent apple as it is.

What does it mean to see the real mind-independent apple as it is? Would it be, for example, that we see a red apple, and there's a mind-independent apple that's mind-independently red?

This does not mean that the apple would somehow have to appear red also when we don't see it, in the dark, for instance. If this is what you believe of realism, then you simply don't understand realism.

I didn't say that it would have to appear red when we don't see it. I said that it would have to be red when we don't see it. Because according to the naive realist, colour isn't just an appearance but a property that objects have even when they're not being seen. That's how the naive realist distinguishes between a veridical and non-veridical perception. If it's orange but it appears to you as red then you're seeing it wrong.

If the notion of being red as distinct from appearing red is incoherent, then you're not a naive realist (about colour, at the very least). So I think that you don't understand realism.

I don't see how that's an inaccurate perception. — Michael

Well, you don't know if it's accurate or not. The alternative of representationalism, for example, if that you only know something that's mentally "colored" and can't know something else. Under that view, you can't get to "It's really x" because that implies that you're directly perceiving what something is really like.

You're just saying "if we see it as red then we see it as red". — Michael

If only that had been what I said.

Well, you don't know if it's accurate or not. The alternative of representationalism, for example, if that you only know something that's mentally "colored" and can't know something else. Under that view, you can't get to "It's really x" because that implies that you're directly perceiving what something is really like. — Terrapin Station

I really don't know what you're talking about here. What I'm asking for is how non-veridical perception works under your account of perception. Is it possible to see a thing as red but for it to not be red?

If only that had been what I said.

You said "the properties that we perceive are normally accurate--those are properties that the things in question have, as they are perceived."

Which is saying that the properties we perceive are the properties that we perceive things to have. So you're just saying that when we see a thing as red we see a thing as red.

I really don't know what you're talking about here. What I'm asking for is how non-veridical perception works under your account of perception. Is it possible to see a thing as red but for it to not be red? — Michael

Then just ask that if it's what you want to ask. Yes, it's certainly possible to see a thing as red but for it to not be red. That could be due to something like color-blindness, or maybe it coincided with someone getting hit in the head, which caused unusual brain states, etc.--there are a bunch of possible reasons why something like that could happen. It wouldn't be possible to enumerate every scenario why that might happen, but it would be a large number of different things that would affect either our sense in question (sight, hearing, whatever) or that would be an unusual brain state.

You said "the properties that we perceive are normally accurate--those are properties that the things in question have, as they are perceived." — Michael

"As they are perceived" is stressing what I was saying about relativity: in other words, from a particular reference point, seeing the things involved as a system. There is no reference point-free reference point, so we always have to talk about properties from a particular reference point, as they're non-identical at each reference point.

Then just ask that if it's what you want to ask. — Terrapin Station

I did. I asked what it means to have an inaccurate perception.

Yes, it's certainly possible to see a thing as red but for it to not be red.

So whether or not a thing is red is independent of what I see. Colour is a perception-independent property.

"As they are perceived" is stressing what I was saying about relativity: from a particular reference point, seeing the things involved as a system. There is no reference point-free reference point, so we always have to talk about properties from a particular reference point, as they're non-identical at each reference point.

Then all you're saying is that, given this reference point, we see a red apple. This, alone, is consistent with both indirect realism and idealism.

I did. I asked what it means to have an inaccurate perception. — Michael

I don't like arguing about every single thing endlessly, so one thing at a time.

"What does it mean to have an inaccurate perception" is different than "Is it possible to have an inaccurate perception," isn't it?

I'm really not interested in arguing over the wording of my question. I'm interested in the fact that you now seem to admit that, according to naive realism, colour is a perception-independent property.

I'm really not interested in arguing over the wording of my question. — Michael

Then don't respond by arguing that what you asked re "is it possible" is the same as asking "what it means," okay?

I didn't say it was. Now, could you actually address the relevant issue rather than try to deflect?

Haha--you're still doing it.

I answered whether it was possible, which is what you asked at that point. And I said just ask me that ("Is it possible?") If that's what you want to know. You responded with:

I did. I asked what it means to have an inaccurate perception. — Michael

"I did," in context, would imply that they're the same question in your view. But they're not the same question.

And if we're having such incredible difficulty conversationally sorting out something this simple--you won't even concede that the two questions are not the same, how in the world are we going to tackle something more complex?

Sorry, but you're just wasting my time now. I'm calling it quits.

Sure. Again, trying to tackle anything more complex would be a waste of time anyway if we can't tackle something this simple.