That's a selective truth when referring to the book, but misleading when referring to Putnam's stance on realism. As I said, he ended up defending naive realism. — jkop
Well, reference is simply having something in mind for a signifier--it's what an individual is taking a signifier to be "pointing to" or "picking out." That can be a mind-independent thing.they'd have to find some alternative way to explain how our words are able to refer to mind-independent things. — Michael
I see it more as (a) admitting relativity, and (b) acknowledging that minds are part of relative "systems" or "equations" rather than losing mind-independence. The idea that either (a) or (b) are incompatible with "traditional naive realism" seems like a misunderstanding of naive realism to me.So which naive realism are you talking about? Putnam's "middle ground between ... metaphysical realism ... and ... internal realism", or traditional naive realism? Because if you mean the latter then Putnam isn't a naive realist. And if you mean the former then you lose much of the mind-independence that realists love so much. — Michael
The idea that either (a) or (b) are incompatible with "traditional naive realism" seems like a misunderstanding of naive realism to me. — Terrapin Station
I see it more as (a) admitting relativity, and (b) acknowledging that minds are part of relative "systems" or "equations" rather than losing mind-independence.
This lame argument quite obviously fails simply because there are real meteorites and a real Earth, whereas there are no real dragons. The notion of simulation loses any sense if you cannot show the real objects that are purportedly being simulated. — John
For naive realists, the properties that we perceive are normally accurate--those are properties that the things in question have, as they are perceived. — Terrapin Station
Naive realism is a stance in philosophy of perception. — Terrapin Station
And its theory on perception is that, in the veridical case, the properties we perceive an object to have are properties that the object has even when we don't see them. — Michael
For example, as I wrote, "something mental is normally 'coloring' the perceptions and that we're only seeing the coloring, without any way of knowing just how that coloring correlates to the externals that led to the perceptions."Then what does it mean to have an inaccurate perception? — Michael
I'd have no idea how you'd define "vacuous" if that's your assessment of what I wrote.This account you offer of direct realism appears to be entirely vacuous. — Michael
For example, as I wrote, "something mental is normally 'coloring' the perceptions and that we're only seeing the coloring, without any way of knowing just how that coloring correlates to the externals that led to the perceptions." — Terrapin Station
I'd have no idea how you'd define "vacuous" if that's your assessment of what I wrote.
Its theory of perception is obviously not a theory about the properties we perceive an object to have but about the nature of perception: that it is direct. — jkop
For example, that when we see a red apple we're not seeing an intermediate representation of an apple inside our minds but the real mind-independent apple as it is.
This does not mean that the apple would somehow have to appear red also when we don't see it, in the dark, for instance. If this is what you believe of realism, then you simply don't understand realism.
Well, you don't know if it's accurate or not. The alternative of representationalism, for example, if that you only know something that's mentally "colored" and can't know something else. Under that view, you can't get to "It's really x" because that implies that you're directly perceiving what something is really like.I don't see how that's an inaccurate perception. — Michael
If only that had been what I said.You're just saying "if we see it as red then we see it as red". — Michael
Well, you don't know if it's accurate or not. The alternative of representationalism, for example, if that you only know something that's mentally "colored" and can't know something else. Under that view, you can't get to "It's really x" because that implies that you're directly perceiving what something is really like. — Terrapin Station
If only that had been what I said.
I really don't know what you're talking about here. What I'm asking for is how non-veridical perception works under your account of perception. Is it possible to see a thing as red but for it to not be red? — Michael
You said "the properties that we perceive are normally accurate--those are properties that the things in question have, as they are perceived." — Michael
Then just ask that if it's what you want to ask. — Terrapin Station
Yes, it's certainly possible to see a thing as red but for it to not be red.
"As they are perceived" is stressing what I was saying about relativity: from a particular reference point, seeing the things involved as a system. There is no reference point-free reference point, so we always have to talk about properties from a particular reference point, as they're non-identical at each reference point.
I don't like arguing about every single thing endlessly, so one thing at a time.I did. I asked what it means to have an inaccurate perception. — Michael
Then don't respond by arguing that what you asked re "is it possible" is the same as asking "what it means," okay?I'm really not interested in arguing over the wording of my question. — Michael
"I did," in context, would imply that they're the same question in your view. But they're not the same question.I did. I asked what it means to have an inaccurate perception. — Michael
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