By the way, I'd argue against Heraclitus, and have. It might be interesting to flesh out the differences. I suspect that you'll take me to task on that. It's my burden.

In my opinion, the old sculpture and the new sculpture are sub-existences of a whole time sculpture. To say that the whole time sculpture seizes to exist due to one change seems absurd. — HuggetZukker

I agree that to say the sculpture ceases to exist would be absurd. I think that it can be the same sculpture and the sculpture prior to the box cannot be existentially dependent upon the box.

In your opinion, what thing(s) did Dennis 1967-2018 existentially depend on? You don't have to mention Adam and Eve and all that, just the most immediate non-trivial necessity or necessities.

In your opinion, what thing(s) did Dennis 1967-2018 existentially depend on? You don't have to mention Adam and Eve and all that, just the most immediate non-trivial necessity or necessities. — HuggetZukker

The question itself is conflating distinctly different time periods, according to your own example. Conflating different time periods loses the distinction between Dennis prior to the heart transplant and Dennis after. The outline is all about applying common sense to known temporal order(s) and arriving at knowledge of existential dependency(and vice-versa).

Aren't we looking for a counterexample which negates the outline?

We just disagree here Sam. Do you have any evidence from posthumous works that support the idea that Witt did not follow the conventional notion of JTB? It is my understanding that hinge propositions were meant to dissolve the issue of justificatory regress. It is also my understanding that Witt never found what he was looking for(a single hinge proposition). He called them "hinge propositions"... not hinge beliefs. — creativesoul

First, OC is not meant to support the notion of JTB. That's not to say there aren't examples of JTB in his notes. I don't know of any interpretation of Wittgenstein that thinks his writings are conventional in this sense, do you? Most interpretations think that Wittgenstein's writings are unconventional, and for the most part original.

Second, one could argue that Moore's propositions are examples of what many would consider propositional knowledge. Yet Wittgenstein is going against this notion, demonstrating that these propositions aren't propositions in the ordinary sense, which is why he calls them hinge-propositions. Hinge-proposition aren't epistemological at all, they are arational beliefs. Again, not just my interpretation, but the interpretation of many others who have studied OC.

I don't see how you can possibly think that hinge-propositions aren't beliefs. Wittgenstein starts out by critiquing Moore's propositions, which by definition are beliefs. My ideas of hinge-propositions go beyond what Wittgenstein said, in that I talk about prelinguistic beliefs. Wittgenstein stays within the bounds of language for the most part. There are many hinge-propositions that are linguistic, starting with Moore's propositions (I know this is a hand), are you saying this is not a belief? Wittgenstein's arguing that they are a special kind of belief, beliefs that fall outside the conventional understanding.

Two passages that I believe show the idea that hinge-propositions are beliefs, is the examples given in OC 284 and 285, but that they are beliefs there is no doubt. There are too many examples to list. Wittgenstein never denies that they are beliefs, he denies that they are pieces of knowledge, and knowledge goes beyond mere belief, in that they are beliefs that are justified in some way, according to particular language-games.

It's true that hinge-propositions solve the problem of infinite regress, but that's not the thrust of OC. His main goal is to come to grips with the nature of these kinds of beliefs, and this he never finished. My theory is that they are prelinguistic, and when language comes into the picture they become foundational beliefs that everyone swallows as part of reality.

By the way all propositions are beliefs. Thus a hinge-propositions could very well be called a hinge-belief. In fact, that may be a better way of talking about them.

First, OC is not meant to support the notion of JTB. That's not to say there aren't examples of JTB in his notes. I don't know of any interpretation of Wittgenstein that thinks his writings are conventional in this sense, do you? Most interpretations think that Wittgenstein's writings are unconventional, and for the most part original.

Second, one could argue that Moore's propositions are examples of what many would consider propositional knowledge. Yet Wittgenstein is going against this notion, demonstrating that these propositions aren't propositions in the ordinary sense, which is why he calls them hinge-propositions. Hinge-proposition aren't epistemological at all, they are arational beliefs. Again, not just my interpretation, but the interpretation of many others who have studied OC.

I don't see how you can possibly think that hinge-propositions aren't beliefs. Wittgenstein starts out by critiquing Moore's propositions, which by definition are beliefs. My ideas of hinge-propositions go beyond what Wittgenstein said, in that I talk about prelinguistic beliefs. Wittgenstein stays within the bounds of language for the most part. There are many hinge-propositions that are linguistic, starting with Moore's propositions (I know this is a hand), are you saying this is not a belief? Wittgenstein's arguing that they are a special kind of belief, beliefs that fall outside the conventional understanding.

Two passages that I believe show the idea that hinge-propositions are beliefs, is the examples given in OC 284 and 285, but that they are beliefs there is no doubt. There are too many examples to list. Wittgenstein never denies that they are beliefs, he denies that they are pieces of knowledge, and knowledge goes beyond mere belief, in that they are beliefs that are justified in some way, according to particular language-games.

It's true that hinge-propositions solve the problem of infinite regress, but that's not the thrust of OC. His main goal is to come to grips with the nature of these kinds of beliefs, and this he never finished. My theory is that they are prelinguistic, and when language comes into the picture they become foundational beliefs that everyone swallows as part of reality.

By the way all propositions are beliefs. Thus a hinge-propositions could very well be called a hinge-belief. In fact, that may be a better way of talking about them. — Sam26

So...

Witt has examples of conventional JTB in his writing(follows convention).
He denies that Moore's propositions are propositions in the conventional(JTB) sense(follows convention).
He denies that Moore's propositions are knowledge.
He always stays within the bounds of language(follows conventional JTB).
He denies the justifiability/dubitability of Moore's propositions(original as far as I know).
He claims that knowledge must be dubitable(original as far as I know).
He claims that all doubt is belief based(original as far as I know).
He never calls hinge propositions "hinge beliefs".
He never actually claims to have found a hinge proposition.
He does not call Moore's propositions "hinge propositions".
His notion of hinge proposition includes their being outside of the conventional understanding of JTB.
The conventional notion of JTB has belief as propositional in content(he seeks hinge propositions).
The conventional notion of JTB requires being justified in believing some proposition(he denies Moore's justification).
Everything he bangs on about uses JTB as the standard for what counts as knowledge.
A hinge proposition, if set out sensibly, would dissolve the problem of justificatory regress.
Justificatory regress is/was an issue for JTB.


He made himself famous as a result of dissolving historical philosophical 'problems' by virtue of showing how they were a result of language use negatively affecting one's subsequent thought/belief. It looks to me like his aim was to show that justificatory regress was just another example of the bewitchment of language by virtue of showing how some belief are beyond and/or are outside the scope of applicability with regard to justification. The consequence is clear. They cannot be knowledge(JTB).

Thus...

He denied that they were.

What more is necessary to warrant believing that Witt worked from the conventional notion of JTB?

Witt follows convention in several ways. He also never draws and maintains a distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief. That follows one of the most consequential conventional mistakes ever made in philosophy 'proper'... academic philosophy. Witt follows suit.

I have argued that true belief exists prior to language.

What I've argued here shows why it is the case that we ought not place too much unwavering importance upon the act of justification. If we do we will inevitably lose sight of the fact that it is just plain not necessary in order to form and/or hold justified true belief.

Not all justified true belief is existentially dependent upon language. Any and all positions that hold otherwise are just plain wrong. They work from utterly inadequate notions of thought and belief, notably that all belief is propositional in content. All reports of thought and belief are propositional in content. A report of thought and belief is not equivalent to thought and belief.

Witt follows that mistake. Hence, he did not ever look for hinge beliefs. He was himself, bewitched by language use.

Do not get me wrong Sam. I am not at all denying Witt's brilliance and/or the novelty of his thinking. There are entire schools of thought as a result of it. He clearly added to our understanding of how many different things can go into the attribution of meaning.

He was not without fault though, and he clearly expressed his hope that someday someone or other would pick up where he left off, to put it mildly.

I don't see how you can possibly think that hinge-propositions aren't beliefs. — Sam26

I don't think that there are such things as "hinge propositions" or hinge beliefs, at least not in the sense that all other thought and belief are grounded upon them. Some thought and belief are grounded upon actual events. Witt couldn't arrive at that because he worked from beliefs as propositions(having propositional content). He did not draw and maintain the meaningful distinction between thought and belief and thinking about thought and belief, and did not do so as a result of holding to conventional notions such as JTB.

Although I think we agree on some things. In terms of Wittgenstein and what he's saying, we are very far apart, especially on the idea of what hinge-propositions are, and their relationship to epistemology.

I did much on my thinking about OC on my own, and what I find interesting is how well it matches up with many of those who have studied Wittgenstein. Obviously there are other interpretations of Wittgenstein's thinking, but I think much of my interpretation fits rather well with what's being taught, and with what some of his former students have written.

The problem with what you're claiming is that it doesn't fit with the common ideas gleaned from his writings. For example, that "...all other thought and belief are grounded on hinge-propositions," he certainly didn't say that. It's true that hinge-propositions ground epistemological beliefs, but some hinge-propositions (beliefs) are bedrock, they have no ground except as our inherited background. In that sense they are the ground. And this notion that hinge-propositions aren't beliefs is about as far away from what Wittgenstein is saying as you can get. Moore's propositions are expressed beliefs, i.e., Moore makes the claim that he knows he has hands, and if this is not an expressed belief, then what is? Wittgenstein goes on to demonstrate that Moore's propositions/beliefs are hinge-propositions. It seems odd to me that you would suggest otherwise.

Where did you get this interpretation? Is it something you came up with on your own, or did you get it from what others have written, or both? It's a very different take, and of course there's nothing wrong with thinking outside the box. I did some of that myself.

That's quite clever. I laughed out loud! Thanks. — creativesoul

No problem. I'm glad you took it well :yum:

Well-received humor lightens a disagreement.

The outline is all about applying common sense to known temporal order(s) and arriving at knowledge of existential dependency(and vice-versa). — creativesoul

Is Dennis 1967-2018 a known temporal order? I already gave you the bullet points of his life.

Conflating different time periods loses the distinction between Dennis prior to the heart transplant and Dennis after. — creativesoul

I'm not asking for conflation of time periods or existences. The shorter time periods remain implicit under the existence of Dennis 1967-2018. I'm simply asking to consider an existence which isn't selectively chosen for its compatibility with the very propositions it is supposed to negate.

Dennis 1967-2018 is not just an arbitrary scramble, but the life of a person. What besides bias for the premises necessitates the sweeping of Dennis 1967-2018 under the rug in favor of smaller bites fitting conveniently in the mouth of the argument?

The question itself is conflating distinctly different time periods, according to your own example. — creativesoul

According to your own interpretation of the example. The example presents a mundane notion of an existence, and illustrates that the outline doesn't parse it. Is the existence of Dennis 1967-2018 a valid notion? Is the outline meant to deal with any and all valid notions of existence? If yes to both, Dennis 1967-2018 is a counterexample.

I no longer understand your objection. I've conceded that Dennis exists prior to and after the transplant. Nothing you have presented follows what I've put forth. It's quite simple.

That which exists prior to something else cannot be existentially dependent upon it.

You've provided Dennis, who had a heart transplant during his lifetime. Are you claiming that Dennis prior to the heart transplant is/was existentially dependent upon the heart transplant?

The example presents a mundane notion of an existence, and illustrates that the outline doesn't parse it. — HuggetZukker

This is quite the specious claim, my friend.

Pots and kettles.

Prior to the heart transplant, Dennis is/was not existentially dependent upon it. After the heart transplant, Dennis is/was. What's missing?

Where does your example effectively parse out these distinctions?

Is the existence of Dennis 1967-2018 a valid notion? — HuggetZukker

Sure. I mean it could be if it fits into some coherent scheme. All alone, strictly speaking, it cannot be valid. Validity is a measure of coherency/consistency. That requires following the rules of correct inference. Loosely speaking...

Sure...

Is the outline meant to deal with any and all valid notions of existence? — HuggetZukker

It does...

If yes to both, Dennis 1967-2018 is a counterexample. — HuggetZukker

Come now, you'll have to do better than this. The existence of Dennis 1967-2018 is not an example of that which exists prior to the heart transplant. It is an example of that which exists prior to and after the heart transplant. So, while the existence of Dennis 1967-2018 is an intelligible notion, it is not a valid counterexample to the outline.

What besides bias for the premises necessitates the sweeping of Dennis 1967-2018 under the rug in favor of smaller bites fitting conveniently in the mouth of the argument? — HuggetZukker

Gotta love the rhetoric! It's a shame that so many people are more persuaded by it than good sound reasoning...

Dennis 1967-2018 is not a valid counterexample. That's what...


Specifically, Dennis 1967-2018 is not an example of that which exists prior to something else, if the something else is a heart transplant that occurred in 2010.

There are two clearly defined variables - that which exists prior to something else, and something else. You've not satisfied those parameters. A valid counterexample must...

Wittgenstein goes on to demonstrate that Moore's propositions/beliefs are hinge-propositions. It seems odd to me that you would suggest otherwise. — Sam26

Does he?

Where at in OC does he clearly call Moore's propositions "hinge propositions"?

By the way, I'm not judging either way whether or not Witt himself held that hinge propositions were beliefs. It seems that he would have. I'm bit baffled why you would think that I've suggested otherwise. I merely pointed out that I cannot remember any of his notes including "hinge beliefs"...

What I clearly remember is his description of bedrock beliefs, and talk of the spade turning up. This fed into his expression of not being able to get beneath language. If hinge propositions are bedrock, and the spade turns up here, then given that propositions are existentially dependent upon language, it would seem that we cannot get beneath propositions(language). He then goes on to further bolster this notion by pointing out how all examples are linguistic/propositional.

That's my down and dirty quick review of his overall thoughts on the matter.

Here's my critique...

An example of thought/belief is a report thereof. A report is not always equivalent to what's being reported upon. JTB is inherently incapable of drawing and maintaining the distinction between beliefs and reports thereof simply because all knowledge claims accompanied by the act of justification are reports. JTB was originally meant to provide a useful outline for further discriminating between knowledge claims. The notion of belief is left sorely neglected. This is clear as JTB fails to draw and maintain the crucial distinction between thought and belief and thinking about thought and belief. One must believe a proposition... That's all the attention that was ever really paid to the belief aspect of JTB.

Witt was working on parsing this out, I believe. His talk of arational beliefs, and propositions falling outside the conventional notions, suggested that knew that some belief were not arrived at via rational/reasonable means such as argument, etc. I suspect he knew that not all belief were grounded upon other belief. There had to be an 'end' to justification. It seem that that would be at the beginning of thought and belief. However, because he delimited his own pursuits by staying within the bounds of language, he could not conceive that simple, rudimentary beliefs are not existentially dependent upon language.

By the way, I'm not judging either way whether or not Witt himself held that hinge propositions were beliefs. It seems that he would have. I'm bit baffled why you would think that I've suggested otherwise. I merely pointed out that I cannot remember any of his notes including "hinge beliefs"... — creativesoul

I guess the problem happened when you said the following: "It is also my understanding that Witt never found what he was looking for(a single hinge proposition). He called them "hinge propositions"... not hinge beliefs." In this quote you seem to suggest here that hinge-propositions are not equivalent to hinge-beliefs. All of Moore's propositions are by definition beliefs. If you were simply saying that he never used the phrase "hinge-belief," then I agree. It just seemed strange that you would say that if you weren't pointing out some difference between the two. For the most part they're equivalent.

Also, something that I forgot to say in reference to your statement above. You said that it was your understanding that Wittgenstein never found what he was looking for, viz., "a single hinge-proposition." His point was that all of Moore's propositions were hinge-propositions, which was why he thought there was something strange about using the word know in reference to his hands in response to the skeptic.

Where at in OC does he clearly call Moore's propositions "hinge propositions"? — creativesoul

If you want a specific passage, there is none, but the implication is so clear that virtually no one that I've read thinks otherwise. His whole effort in On Certainty has to do with the special nature of these propositions/beleifs.

What I clearly remember is his description of bedrock beliefs, and talk of the spade turning up. This fed into his expression of not being able to get beneath language. If hinge propositions are bedrock, and the spade turns up here, then given that propositions are existentially dependent upon language, it would seem that we cannot get beneath propositions(language). He then goes on to further bolster this notion by pointing out how all examples are linguistic/propositional. — creativesoul

Yes, but bedrock beliefs is just another way of talking about hinge-propositions, another way of describing their special nature. He also implies they're pre-linguistic as I pointed out in a previous post. I don't find your interpretation of Wittgenstein to be accurate on these and other points. I've already stated, it's not just that you're coming up with an interpretation that goes against my interpretation, but you seem to be going against much of what's said about OC. It doesn't necessarily make you wrong (although I do think you are), but it should make you suspicious of your own conclusions.

I don't know why you're emphasizing JTB in reference to OC, because it's not the main thrust, at most it's a very small side issue.

he could not conceive that simple, rudimentary beliefs are not existentially dependent upon language. — creativesoul

This is another of your points that doesn't follow from the text. I already partially pointed this out earlier, but there is much that contradicts this idea. The mere fact that beliefs are shown, as Wittgenstein points out over and over, demonstrates that these (hinge-propositions) beliefs are pre-linguistic and not dependent upon language.

I've asked at least twice where you came up with these ideas, but you don't seem to want to answer the question. The reason I ask, is that I was wondering if someone besides yourself wrote about these ideas.

By the way all propositions are beliefs. — Sam26

There is intelligent life out there in the universe.

I neither believe nor disbelieve this as the evidence and arguments presented so far are equally good on both sides. Pyhrro and Sextus made this into a philosophy to live by where all belief was allegedly suspended

Carneides famously went to Rome to argue eloquently one day on behalf of Roman justice, just to turn around the next day and and refute everything he said.

I don't know about suspending judgment in everyday matters, but you certainly can in philosophy, or with statements that are unknown, such as the existence of life beyond Earth.

I neither believe nor disbelieve this as the evidence and arguments presented so far are equally good on both sides. Pyhrro and Sextus made this into a philosophy to live by where all belief was allegedly suspended — Marchesk

Maybe I could word this a bit better. All propositional claims that something is or is not the case, i.e., that someone asserts as either being true or false, are beliefs. One can assert a statement without believing it however, but that just means that it's not a belief that you subscribe to, but that someone else subscribes to. You may even, as you pointed out, suspend your belief, but then it's just not your belief.

I think we do suspend belief in everyday matters. I may come to a fork in the road not knowing which way to turn; and as I listen to two of my friends give equally good arguments for turning left or right, I may just say, "I don't know, which is correct," thus I suspend my belief. Either assertion is not something you believe. They are propositions, it's just that you don't subscribe to either.

What about experience ? Experience exists prior to subsequent experience but is existentially dependent on subsequent experience .

Maybe I could word this a bit better. All propositional claims that something is or is not the case, i.e., that someone asserts as either being true or false, are beliefs. — Sam26

That's an interesting way to define propositions. I would have thought propositions were stating either the truth or a falsehood, and it was up to us to find reasons to believe, disbelieve or suspend judgement about any proposition.

So why make the content of propositions belief?

Obviously you have have propositions apart from beliefs, i.e., as a statement standing alone, which is why I said that it's a belief if I assert it as something I believe. You can think of a proposition as an object of belief, and it has the property of either being true or false. It may or may not be justified, i.e., it may be like an opinion, I just believe it. However, if it's a belief for which you have good reasons or good evidence to believe, then it's justified. My own view is that if it's justified, then it's more than a mere belief, it's a piece of knowledge. I can then say that I know that it's true, or at the very least you may just say there is evidence to support it. There are varying degrees of support for some beliefs, it may be strong or it may be weak support, as in an inductive argument.

We make the content of a proposition a belief if it's something someone believes, something someone asserts as true or false. One has to act on the proposition for it to become a belief. If I read a statement that asserts that X is either true or false, I have to to do something in relation to the statement for it to become a belief for me. So I may assert that it's true, or I may assert that it's false, then it's my belief.

I repeated myself for emphasis. Beliefs are an interesting topic. There are other kinds of beliefs that are pre-linguistic.

There are other kinds of beliefs that are pre-linguistic. — Sam26

Such as having two hands?

This thread is nothing more than a discussion about how we use words like "proposition", "belief", "justification", "knowledge'.

Of course it almost goes without saying that there is no ultimately correct way to use such words. Indeed, the whole discussion is simply about finding a way to use them that is more or less consistent.

The simplest grammatical structure seems to me to be that some strings of words are statements, and that those statements that can be either true or false can be called propositions.

Add to that, different statements can say much the same thing, have much the same use, such as "It is raining" and "Rain is falling", and that it is sometimes useful to say that these statements express the same proposition.

Further, an individual or group can adopt an attitude towards a given proposition, such that they hold the proposition to be true. We call this belief.

It's from here that the discussion should proceed.

All metacognition consists of pre-existing thought and belief. — creativesoul

It seems to me, and I have said it before, that Creative reifies thought and belief. I think that is an error; thought and belief are not things, but shorthand in a word game about explaining our actions.

Yes, they can exist in two forms, as propositions/statements, or as something prelinguistic. When they are prelinguistic the beliefs manifest themselves in our actions, i.e., our actions show that we believe we have two hands.

thought and belief are not things, but shorthand in a word game about explaining our actions. — Banno

Surely they are more than just actions. The stuff between our ears is what is responsible for our actions. It sounds like another form of behaviorism.

Are your beliefs to be found between your ears? I don't think so.

Dismissing this view as behaviourism might appeal to some; including those who are more interested in winning than thinking.

Dismissing this view as behaviourism might appeal to some; including those who are more interested in winning than thinking. — Banno

A swampman, a philosophical zombie, and a BIV go into a bar ...

Are your beliefs to be found between your ears? — Banno

Take an atheist in a devout Christian society. Wanting to avoid certain undesirable consequences, they go to church, confess their sins, and stay within acceptable conversation. Where would you locate their disbelief?

This thread is nothing more than a discussion about how we use words like "proposition", "belief", "justification", "knowledge'. — Banno

May I suggest that you re-read the first page?

:wink: