we don't have Objective access, so everything you say about "the world" is necessarily speculative, and will always be so. — Pattern-chaser

You have to define what you mean by "objective" before I can agree or disagree with the premise. As for the conclusion, it is clearly in error. As it is unargued, I can't direct my response to the cause of the error. So, please justify your claim.

So, please justify your claim. — Dfpolis

we don't have Objective access, so everything you say about "the world" is necessarily speculative, and will always be so. — Pattern-chaser

The justification is that we don't have Objective access to "the world". The uncertainty follows from that.

The question, then, is whether or not there is an analogous de dicto reading of "water is H2O" such that a counterfactual chemical composition of water is not a contradiction. Given that you've accepted that it's possible that scientists are mistaken in their claim that water is H2O, isn't that an acceptance of such a de dicto reading (else it would be as incoherent as suggesting that we could be mistaken in thinking that Donald Trump is Donald Trump)? — Michael

The mistake would amount to thinking falsely that 'H20' and 'water' refer to the same thing. Admittedly H20 is a terrible example, since it's not a canonical proper name, but a kind of description of the chemical composition of a compound.

So take a proper name example. Suppose you know about Donald, and about Mr. Trump. As far as you know, they could be the same guy, or they could not be. Scenario 1: they are, which means that 'Donald' and 'Mr. Trump' mean the same thing, and in learning that Mr. Trump is Donald, you learn that the words corefer (and that the sentence 'Mr. Trump is Donald' conveys a necessary proposition). Scenario 2: they aren't, which means that the words don't mean the same thing, and the sentence expresses a necessary falsity. Now you don't know which scenario you're in, so it 'could be' either. But this has to do with whether the words co-refer or not, which is a contingent matter. Given that they co-refer or not, they express necessarily true or necessarily false propositions. That you are unaware of which it is, and that this depends on the meaning of the words, is where the feeling of contingency comes from. For it is contingent whether the sentence expresses a necessarily true or necessarily false proposition.

most philosophers do not think that possible worlds are literally real worlds that they inquire about. They think of possible worlds as more akin to logically consistent stories about how things might be. — PossibleAaran

I have been thinking about this since I started the thread. In never thought of possible worlds as real, because what is merely possible is not actual. I did, however, think of them as numerically distinct modified replicas of this world. I have been told on this thread, by those more familiar with the matter than I, that this is not how Kripke thinks of them. If I understand aright, he thinks of them as this one world as it might have been.

That got me thinking of the Sea Battle problem in Aristotle, which is resolved by saying that the Principle of Excluded Middle applies to actual existents, but not to future contingents because they have no actual existence. This means that while multiple futures as possible, no present or past but those actually obtaining are possible.

My current definition of possible is:
p is possible with respect to a set of propositions, S, if p does not contradict the propositions of S..

S may be defined either explicitly, or as the set of propositions expressing a set of facts, F. This allows the definition to be applied to both factual and counterfactual situations.

Putting these pieces together, with respect to ontological possibility (meaning F is the actual world), no world other than the actual world (F) is ontologically possible. This is because altering some fact f, expressed by p, into f' expressed by ~p will invariably contradict p ∈ F.

But what about the notion of it could have been? This is expressed by the subjunctive mood, which can express imaginings as well as possibilities. Since we have just ruled out possibilities, we are left with imaginings. So, insofar as we we are considering what is possible with respect to the actual world, there are no other worlds are ontologically possible. Still, many imagined worlds are possible.

There is no reason why we cannot imagine another world just like ours, with objects called by the same name (rigidly designated), as long as we do not think they are ontologically possible.

Some philosophers think that Philosophy involves making "discoveries" about "possible worlds" — PossibleAaran

I think philosophy is the attempt to develop a consistent framework for understanding of all types of human experience.

I think possible worlds talk is usually intended as talk about logical possibility. I can't remember an article in which that isn't quite clear. — PossibleAaran

I had an exchange with Alvin Plantinga in the early 1990s in which he appealed to possible worlds to justify Bayesian probability.

philosophers will use technical language where plain language would do, and this has the effect of making philosophy seem incredibly convoluted to those outside of it, and even leads to errors for those within it. I think possible worlds talk is like this. — PossibleAaran

We agree.

The justification is that we don't have Objective access to "the world". — Pattern-chaser

So, I am to accept this as a faith claim? And, with no explanation of what you even mean by "Objective access to 'the world'" -- despite my explicit request that you tell me what you mean by "objective" so that I could address your concern?

As a faith claim, I do not find it worthy of belief.

Given that they co-refer or not, they express necessarily true or necessarily false propositions. That you are unaware of which it is, and that this depends on the meaning of the words, is where the feeling of contingency comes from. For it is contingent whether the sentence expresses a necessarily true or necessarily false proposition. — Snakes Alive

It seems to me that this analysis is incomplete. It's surely true that Donald Trump is Donald Trump, no matter what you call him. So, if you read the terms in "Donald is Mr. Trump" formally (as referring to the person), this is simply an instance of the Principle of Identity and so necessarily true. The problem is that is not the only reading. One could read it as "The name 'Donald' refers to the same person as the name 'Mr. Trump.'" In that case, it speaks of a contingent reality, for naming conventions are contingent -- this person could well have another name, like "John Smith" -- or even "David Dennison."

My current definition of possible is:
p is possible with respect to a set of propositions, S, if p does not contradict the propositions of S. — Dfpolis

That is exactly my approach. To say that something is possible or necessary without relating the statement to the reference set S is to say nothing at all. In ordinary speech the reference is omitted, but the implication is that S is the set of everything we currently know about the world and how it operates. That then leads to the definition I gave above that an impossible event is one such that, if I learned that it happened, I would be astonished and have to radically revise my worldview.

When philosophers pick up that habit of ordinary speech and assume that the omission of an explicit reference to S means that no S is implied, they get themselves tied up in all sorts of unnecessary difficulties.

A distinction is sometimes made between 'physically possible' and 'logically possible', and a possible world can be thought of as one that is logically, but not physically, possible. This distinction is easily handled in the above framework by changing S. For logically possible, S is the bare minimum - the axioms of logic. For physically possible, S is those axioms together with everything else we know about the world.

This distinction also feeds through to the degree of astonishment in my personal definition. The astonishment I would feel, and the severity of the revisions I'd have to make to my worldview, would be vastly greater if I learned that something I had considered logically impossible had happened than if I heard that something I had considered physically impossible had happened. In the former case I would need to try to revise every aspect of how I think, whereas in the latter I would only need to revise my beliefs about certain things.

Exactly. By specifying S we can easily define what we mean by possibility in various contexts.

...I do not find it worthy of belief. — Dfpolis

Oh my! :scream: I was hoping to convince you, so that others who are also in awe of your status and prestige might follow your attention, and maybe read my posts. What will I do now? I am bereft.

You might still convince me if you clarified what you mean by "objective" and provided a rational argument instead of a dogma to be accepted.

For me, being "objective" is being an object in a possible subject-object relation. As all knowing involves both a knowing subject and a known object, every act of knowing is both objective and subjective. Thus, it is an oxymoron to say knowledge is not objective.

It really does not matter what I believe, what matters is what it is rational to believe.

It seems to me that this analysis is incomplete. It's surely true that Donald Trump is Donald Trump, no matter what you call him. So, if you read the terms in "Donald is Mr. Trump" formally (as referring to the person), this is simply an instance of the Principle of Identity and so necessarily true. The problem is that is not the only reading. One could read it as "The name 'Donald' refers to the same person as the name 'Mr. Trump.'" In that case, it speaks of a contingent reality, for naming conventions are contingent -- this person could well have another name, like "John Smith" -- or even "David Dennison." — Dfpolis

That's right, but the two readings of the sentence correspond to two distinct propositions. Let us suppose that Superman exists. In the office where he works, he is known as Clark Kent; and only a few people know that Superman is Clark Kent. Someone, such a Lois Lane, who knows to whom the names "Superman" and "Clark Kent" refer to, may still ignore that Superman is Clark Kent. When she is being informed (or personally figures out) that Clark Kent is Superman, she thereby comes to know that both of the sentences (1) "Clark Kent is Superman" and (2) '"Superman" and "Clark Kent" are proper names for the same person' express true propositions. However, those two sentences still express two different propositions.

One easy way to see why the two propositions are distinct is to consider the range of counterfactual conditions in which those propositions would be false. Those ranges aren't the same. (One of them is empty, if Kripke is right, but I need not even assume this here). Clearly, it might have been the case that the proper names "Superman" and "Clark Kent" conventionally refer to two different people while the person who we actually know as "Superman" would still be the person who we actually know as "Clark Kent". In other words, it might have been that Superman would have been known by different proper names, in both his public and private personae (e.g. "The Man of Steel" and "John Doe", respectively), and that "Superman" and "Clark Kent" would have been the names of two different individuals, while the person called "The Man of Steel" still would have been the same person whom many people also know, in the actual world, either as Clark Kent or as Superman (or both).

I have no doubt that the two readings express different judgements (intentional existents). Still I have several questions.

Can one distinguish two identically written propositions without reference to the intentional states they express? If one can't, isn't linguistic analysis (formal or informal) derivative on intentional analysis? Alternately, to what does "proposition" refer, if not to judgements?

I think the underlying problem here is the assumption that proper names refer to things, rather than to intelligible aspects of reality. "Clark Kent" refers to Jorel's son in his guise of newspaper reporter, not to Jorel's son simpliciter. "Superman" refers to Jorel's son in his guise of the man of steel. By ignoring the aspect under which Jorel's son is designated, the notion of rigid designator distorts the intent of the designating agent.

It is not even true that Jorel's son in the guise of newspaper reporter is Jorel's son in the guise of the man of steel -- even though both designate Jorel's son. In other words, when one learns that Clark Kent is superman, the conditions of designation of each term change. What "Clark Kent" means to the speaker after leaning that Clark Kent is superman is more than what it meant before. So, while "Clark Kent" is materially the same before and after the revelation, it is formally different. This is seen by examining its scope of application. Before the revelation, the speaker would not apply "Clark Kent" to Jorel's son in the guise of the man of steel, but would after the revelation.

I conclude that the analysis of rigid designation is defective because it it mischaracterizes what proper names refer to. They do not refer to objects, but to intelligible aspects of objects.

Certainly part of what is communicated by the statement, in the broadest sense, is that the man has a certain name, or that the two names refer to the same individual. But this does not mean that there are two readings of the sentence. All we need is the ordinary reading, on which it states a necessary identity. However, the cognitive significance of a sentence, i.e. what we're capable of learning from the fact that the sentence expresses a true proposition, outruns its literal semantic content. From the fact that this necessary proposition is true, as expressed by these words in this context, we learn a contingent truth, e.g. that the two words refer to the same thing. For if they did not, then the proposition expressed by those words could not have been true. Therefore accepting that the sentence is true teaches us a contingent truth, but not because the literal content of the sentence expresses a contingent truth.

I have no doubt that the two readings express different judgements (intentional existents). Still I have several questions/

Can one distinguish two identically written propositions without reference to the intentional states they express? If one can't, isn't linguistic analysis (formal or informal) derivative on intentional analysis?

Alternately, to what does "proposition" refer, if not to judgements? — Dfpolis

I was thinking of propositions as Fregean propositions: or as ways the world (or aspects of the world) might conceivably be thought to be. Judgements are intentional attitudes that can have as their intentional contents the very same contents being expressed by sentences. Those contents are (Fregean) propositions. Of course, the very same proposition P can be the content of different sorts attitudes other than judgements, such as the hope that P, the fear that P, the conjecture that P, the antecedent of the conditional judgement that if P then Q, etc.

I think that the underlying problem here is the assumption that proper names refer to things, rather than to intelligible aspects of reality. "Clark Kent" refers to Jorel's son in his guise of newspaper reporter, not to Jorel's son simpliciter. "Superman" refers to Jorel's son in his guise of the man of steel. By ignoring the aspect under which Jorel's son is designated, the notion of rigid designator distorts the intent of the designating agents.

It seems to me that proper names (and every other sort of singular referring expression or device, such as demonstratives, indexicals, definite descriptions, etc.) can be construed both as referring to particulars and to intelligible aspects of reality. There is no way, on my view, to refer to any empirical object other than referring to it as an intelligible aspect of reality. So, when we "carve up" reality, as it were, into distinct persisting individuals (e.g. the substances of traditional metaphysics), it is always to intelligible aspect of reality that we are referring to. As I suggested in an earlier post, we can't refer to (or think of) a determinate object without subsuming it under some determinate sortal concept that expresses this object's specific criteria of persistence and individuation.

It is not even true that Jorel's son in the guise of newspaper reporter is Jorel's son in the guise of the man of steel -- even though both designate Jorel's son. In other words, when one learns that Clark Kent is superman, the conditions of designation of each term change. What "Clark Kent" means to the speaker after leaning that Clark Kent is superman is more than what it meant before.

That's true, but we could say, following Frege, that although the references of both names don't change (and still remain numerically identical to each other), the user of those names, who previously was using them with distinct senses, now comes to be able to (and indeed becomes rationally obligated) to use them both with the same Fregean sense since she can no longer rationally judge something to be truly predicated of one without her also judging it to be truly predicated of the other.

So, while "Clark Kent" is materially the same before and after the revelation, it is formally different. This is seen by examining its scope of application. Before the revelation, the speaker would not apply "Clark Kent" to Jorel's son in the guise of the man of steel, but would after the revelation.

It seems to me that you are using "materially the same" and "formally the same" roughly in the same way in which a Fregean would use "having the same reference" and "having the same sense", respectively.

I conclude that the analysis of rigid designation is defective because it it mischaracterizes what proper names refer to. They do not refer to objects, but to intelligible aspects of objects.

I am unsure how this follows since I don't hold the world (or objects) to be something other than the intelligible world (or intelligible objects). We don't have empirical or cognitive access to pure noumena.

However, the cognitive significance of a sentence, i.e. what we're capable of learning from the fact that the sentence expresses a true proposition, outruns its literal semantic content. — Snakes Alive

This seems a contradiction in terms. Semantically, we have a sign (the sentence), the interpretation (the intentional state elicited by the sentence), and reference (the object state intended by the intentional state). So, I do not see how it is possible to say that what we learn "outruns" the literal semantic content, when what we learn (the intentional state elicited) we learn from the literal semantic content. What cpuld you possibly mean by "literal semantic content" other than the intentional state that a literal reading elicits? It seems to me that any division of the elicited content is arbitrary and artificial, and not based on any facts of the matter.

Also, you did not comment on my key claim: that the reference of a proper name is not an individual simpliciter, but to an individual under a certain aspect (only to certain notes of intelligibility). Thus, the reference of "Clark Kent" is not the reference of "Superman" unless one knows they are the same person -- and learning that they are changes the reference of the terms.

This has been my point from the beginning, i.e. that "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" do not designate Venus simpliciter, but Venus as appearing at certain times. This is not explained by the distinction of sense and reference, because the reference is not an object, but only certain intelligible aspects of an object.

So, I do not see how it is possible to say that what we learn "outruns" the literal semantic content, when what we learn (the intentional state elicited) we learn from the literal semantic content. What cpuld you possibly mean by "literal semantic content" other than the intentional state that a literal reading elicits? I — Dfpolis

Consider the following example. If I know some Spanish, but am not fluent, and I hear someone say "El gato está durmieno," clearly referring to a cat, then I might learn from the fact that this sentence was truly uttered that the word "gato" means the same as the English "cat."

Does this sentence literally mean that "gato" means "cat?" No – it just means "the cat is sleeping." However, from the true utterance of that sentence in that context, I learn something other than the literal content of the sentence, viz. something about how the words used to express its literal content are used.

Likewise, even if "Donald is Mr. Trump" literally expresses a necessary truth, the contingent proposition that I learn (that these two words refer to the same individual) is as a result of realizing that this necessary proposition is literally expressed by those words. And indeed in saying such a thing, my primary intention may to to impart this information, not the (trivial) necessary proposition.

Sorry for the late response, busy few days.

This is like saying that a map with a misprint is not worth anymore than a possible map. — Dfpolis

Except that our justification about what's possible and what's not is usually grounded in the same thing as what we justify our belief about the actual world.

P is possible with respect to a set of facts or propositions, S, if P does not contradict S.

I do think "facts" should be restricted to intelligible reality. — Dfpolis

This makes total nonsense of everyday uses of modality. We don't always refer to possibility with respect to what is consistent with the world. So if I say "If the laws of physics were different, it would be possible to move faster than light", I'm very clearly talking about the way the world isn't, so the possibility claim is not made with respect to "facts about intelligible reality".

There is no claim of infallibility here. If you think there is, explain how.

The actual world is actual because it acts to inform us. Merely possible worlds do not act, let alone act to inform us. Instead, we inform (or perhaps misinform) them. — Dfpolis

Here's what you say in the OP:

First, it is unnecessary. As we can have no epistemic access to any world but our own, actual world, anything we can learn, we can learn from the real world.

Ignoring the fact that outside of modal realism possible worlds aren't postulated to be literal places, your criticism is clearly that lack of epistemic access to possible worlds is a problem for using possible world semantics. My point was that we don't have direct access to the actual world either. And furthermore, our claims of possibility are often justified by our experience in the actual world too. So if I'm eight years old and I say "I could be a doctor", this can be understood as saying that there is some possible world (however you understand those to be) where I am in fact an MD. And then say I eventually do become a doctor, meaning the actual world is one such possible world where my claim turned out true. Well that's perfectly obvious justification for my original modal statement being thought true. Nothing about the semantics of possible worlds makes this an issue.

We have no access to any possible world. We only have access to our imagination, which can easily be inconsistent. What we know of the actual world cannot "easily fail" if we exercise due diligence. It fails occasionally, but it is usually interpretations and constructs that fail rather than experiential data. — Dfpolis

I mean you can believe this if you completely ignore modal epistemology but then that's not a convincing argument. Whether it's conceivability or similarity or perception, there are any number of proposed ways one can access possible worlds. But again, "access" here is not causal, other worlds aren't "out there" acting on us in the actual world any more than other abstract objects act on us to give us access to them.

I said that a sensory object's modification of our sensory state is identically our sensory representation of the object. I said that the object informing the subject is identically the subject being informed by the object. — Dfpolis

So you did say what I claimed you said. There's no reason to suppose that our sensory representation of an object is identical to how our sense's are modified by the object in question. The rest of it is practically trivial. It's not identical, you're simply pointing out an inverse relationship. If an object modified our senses, then that is equivalent to saying that our senses are being modified by an object. But the point being made is there's absolutely no way to know that our representation of the small amount of sensory data our representational apparatus uses to construct our perception is infallibly done. Without that infallibility, we don't have even quasi-access to the world. That's the limit of our access to the world.

It is the name of the concept because the employment of the tool requires one to construct, or at least recognize, worlds that are possible. — Dfpolis

Oh my god, so your argument is, literally, that the world "possible" is there. OK, then my original point stands. If I call them "alternate worlds" then you have no objection. It isn't their designation as possible worlds that makes them possible. The (or at least a) minimum requirement of being a possible world is that the propositions true of a world must be consistent. There's nothing about that which uses "possible" in the definition, nor does the name "possible worlds" cause any issues.

This is inadequate as, unless P is actually true, there is no world in which P is the case. What you need to say is "P is possible if there is at least one possible world in which P is the case" -- and that is circular. — Dfpolis

You aren't making any sense. In modal logic, "truth" is always relativized to worlds in which the proposition is true or not. And if we aren't talking about possibility, that in no way requires that P actually be true (though it may we be). P being the case or not is a claim about the actual world. P being possible in PW semantics is about whether or not there's at least one world ("w*") accessible to "w" where P is the case. Nothing about that is circular, you do not understand PW semantics.

Still, they are not our world, as, if they are different in any way, they are not identical to our actual world. Any world that is not identical to our world is a different world. As each is a different world, each (actual or potential) object in them is a different object from any object in out actual world. — Dfpolis

The worlds aren't identical, that wasn't my claim. But the object with the name "Venus" is picked out by the same name no matter the world. "Venus" is the name of a particular object in the actual world, so it picks out the same object in any possible world. And since both "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" are just other names for that object, they pick out the same object on any world in which Venus exists. To say otherwise is to just deny identity statements as a whole. This is what Kripke is saying:

When I use the notion of a rigid designator, I do not imply that the object referred to necessarily exists. All I mean is that in any possible world where the object in question does exist, in any situation where the object would exist, we use the designator in question to designate that object. In a situation where the object does not exist, then we should say that the designator has no referent and that the object in question so designated does not exist — Kripke

Objects are individuated by the network of relations that contextualize them. If you change one relatum, you change the object's individuation conditions. So, the individuation conditions may not return the same object. E.g. if I am the oldest child in the real world and in the possible world I have an older brother, the individuation condition of being the oldest child will not return me. — Dfpolis

That is the exact misunderstanding I pointed out. "The oldest child [in a particular family]" is description, not a proper name, and therefore it's perfectly allowable for that to fail to give the smae object. Venus, Hesperus and Phosophorus are names for the same object. Being "Venus" entails being those other two as well, not because the names have inherent definitions, but because they're just names for the same thing in the actual world.

Counterfactual propositions can be judged on the basis of real-world potencies. Steve would have enjoyed the trip even if he did not go on it because he is actually disposed to enjoy such trips. If we did not know his relevant dispositions, we could not say whether he enjoyed the trip or not. So, there is no need for possible worlds talk to deal with counterfactuals. — Dfpolis

You did not do anything here. "Disposed" is a modal notion itself, meaning to be "inclined towards" or something one might do given their characteristics. It's a set of likely possible actions, basically. So as opposed to that circular modal definition, under possible worlds semantics "Steve would have enjoyed the trip" is understood as saying that there's some world in which Steve enjoyed the trip. And since we know Steve's actual preferences, the worlds in which he did enjoy them are similar to the actual world, which justifies our belief in the modal claim.

I was thinking of propositions as Fregean propositions: or as ways the world (or aspects of the world) might conceivably be thought to be. — Pierre-Normand

How would one distinguish Fregean propositions from judgements? If they aren't judgements, what reality do they have?

Of course, the very same proposition P can be the content of different sorts attitudes other than judgements, such as the hope that P, the fear that P, the conjecture that P, the antecedent of the conditional judgement that if P then Q, etc. — Pierre-Normand

Putting, "the hope that p" in the same category as p is surely an error. Why? Because <the hope that p> is a concept, while <p> is a judgement. Judgements make assertions about states of affairs and so can be true or false, but concepts make no assertions and can be neither true nor false, only instantiated or not. Thus, the judgement <p> has a very different logical status than the concept <the hope that p>.

We can correct this by comparing p to "I hope that p," which expresses the judgement <I am hoping that p>, where "am" is a cupola. The only way to put expressions of "propositional attitude" in the same category as p is to convert them into judgements that can be true or false -- judgements about attitudes toward propositions. While the content of p is, say, the reality of some world state, the content of "I hope p" is not the reality of that world state, but the reality of an intentional state.

So, the contents of these various forms differ. The are not elicited by physical states, but by intentional states so they do not reference the same state as p. Thus, they are not different "attitudes" they are different concepts actualizing different kinds of intelligibility in intentional states.

It seems to me that proper names (and every other sort of singular referring expression or device, such as demonstratives, indexicals, definite descriptions, etc.) can be construed both as referring to particulars and to intelligible aspects of reality. — Pierre-Normand

I would say intelligible aspects of particulars. My model of meaning is that a concept refers to the intelligibility that can properly elicit it. ("Properly" is meant to exclude psychological aberrations and the like.) This seems a simple and reasonable operational definition of reference.

Since, even under ideal circumstances, Jorel's son in the guise of the man of steel does not elicit the idea <Clark Kent> in one ignorant of the secret identity, "Clack Kent" does not designate Jorel's son in the guise of the man of steel. If one learns the secret identity, the eliciting conditions change, and with it the reference of "Clark Kent."

There is no way, on my view, to refer to any empirical object other than referring to it as an intelligible aspect of reality. — Pierre-Normand

Agreed.

we can't refer to (or think of) a determinate object without subsuming it under some determinate sortal concept that expresses this object's specific criteria of persistence and individuation. — Pierre-Normand

I agree that to communicate about an an object, we often need sortal terms to direct attention to this rather than that. I do not see them as absolutely necessary as we can just point at an object to indicate "this." In the same way when we have a unique new experience, we may not have any other experiences to group it with, and so no applicable sortal concepts.

I am sure how a sortal concept "expresses this object's specific criteria of persistence and individuation." Concepts do not imply existence, let alone persistence. Further, sortal concepts are universal, and so have abstracted away all individuating notes of intelligibility.

that although the references of both names don't change (and still remain numerically identical to each other), the user of those names, who previously was using them with distinct senses, now comes to be able to (and indeed becomes rationally obligated) to use them both with the same Fregean sense since she can no longer rationally judge something to be truly predicated of one without her also judging it to be truly predicated of the other. — Pierre-Normand

My point is that the reference of a name is not the object simpliciter, but those aspects of the object that elicit the idea associated with the name. So, as we learn more, the reference changes. "Sense" is, of course, different than reference. Reference spans all the instances that can elicit the concept. Sense is the intellectual analysis of the eliciting conditions. As eliciting conditions are not eliciting instances, these are distinct concepts. Still, nether requires that referenced objects elicit concepts simpliciter, but only according to the sense of the concept.

I think the difficulty here is the same as Descartes's in thinking that "body" and "mind" had to reference two things instead of two aspects of the same thing.

It seems to me that you are using "materially the same" and "formally the same" roughly in the same way in which a Fregean would use "having the same reference" and "having the same sense", respectively. — Pierre-Normand

No, these terms are different. A name materially considered is the name itself (the words), a name formally considered is what is named (its reference).

I am unsure how this follows since I don't hold the world (or objects) to be something other than the intelligible world (or intelligible objects). We don't have empirical or cognitive access to pure noumena. — Pierre-Normand

I addressed this in my 5th post on this thread. We have dynamic access to noumenal reality. The object informing the subject is identically the subject being informed by the object. So, there is no room to insert an epistemic gap. What we do not have is God-like, exhaustive access.

Does this sentence literally mean that "gato" means "cat?" No – it just means "the cat is sleeping." However, from the true utterance of that sentence in that context, I learn something other than the literal content of the sentence, viz. something about how the words used to express its literal content are used. — Snakes Alive

OK. That is quite sensible. I am not sure it is applicable here.

And indeed in saying such a thing, my primary intention may to to impart this information, not the (trivial) necessary proposition. — Snakes Alive

I would say that, in normal intercourse, the contingent meaning is the literal meaning. In fact, until the contingent meaning is grasped, the trivial necessary meaning cannot be grasped.

You have not commented on my claim that proper names need not refer to individuals simpliciter, but to individuals as known -- because covert guises do not elicit the idea expressed by the name.

Putting, "the hope that p" in the same category as p is surely an error. Why? Because <the hope that p> is a concept, while <p> is a judgement. Judgements make assertions about states of affairs and so can be true or false, but concepts make no assertions and can be neither true nor false, only instantiated or not. Thus, the judgement <p> has a very different logical status than the concept <the hope that p>. — Dfpolis

I am not subsuming the hope that P under the same category as P. The hope that P is an intentional attitude, as is the belief that P. P is the proposition that is the shared content of those two distinct intentional attitudes. For instance, if I hope that it will rain tomorrow and you believe, or, equivalently, judge, that it will rain tomorrow, then what it is that I am hoping for, and what it is that you believe will happen, are the very same thing: namely that it will rain tomorrow. That it will rain tomorrow is a proposition that I am hoping to be true and that you believe (or judge) to be true. Judgements don't make assertions. People make judgements and assertions, and they can assert the contents of the judgements that they are making. They can also assert the negation of a judgement that they are making, in which case they are lying.

I would say that, in normal intercourse, the contingent meaning is the literal meaning. In fact, until the contingent meaning is grasped, the trivial necessary meaning cannot be grasped. — Dfpolis

To someone who knows that 'Donald' and 'Mr. Trump' are co-referential, and has no need to access this other meaning, saying something like 'Donald is Mr. Trump' will indeed sound bizarre because it is trivial. The literal trivial meaning is therefore perfectly accessible – but we can also employ this trivial literal meaning for other ends.

Note also that literal meaning and 'primary' meaning, in the sense of the foremost meaning we intend to convey, are not the same thing. It can perfectly well be that the primary purpose of our utterance isn't to assert the literal trivial meaning. The literal meaning is the conventionalized meaning of the sentence in virtue of how the literal meaning of the words compose. This literal meaning can then be employed for any number of purposes, only one of which is to inform the addressee of that literal meaning. In cases where the literal meaning is trivial, we generally have other purposes for stating such sentences.

You have not commented on my claim that proper names need not refer to individuals simpliciter, but to individuals as known -- because covert guises do not elicit the idea expressed by the name. — Dfpolis

I don't see any reason to believe this. It's true that we are sometimes unaware of what names mean, and can't tell that two names denote the same person. But this is already taken care of if names denote individuals – it's not as if the names themselves bake into their meaning facts about whether you know who is who. That we can be confused about who is who, and which words refer to what, is already a trivial fact about language use when names refer to individuals anyway.

Sorry for the late response, busy few days. — MindForged

No problem some of these matters have waited decades or even millennia. A few days doesn't matter.

Except that our justification about what's possible and what's not is usually grounded in the same thing as what we justify our belief about the actual world. — MindForged

Good point. So, we can agree that the real world is logically prior to any possible world.

P is possible with respect to a set of facts or propositions, S, if P does not contradict S.

I do think "facts" should be restricted to intelligible reality. — Dfpolis

This makes total nonsense of everyday uses of modality. — MindForged

You misunderstand the "or" here is not a clarification, but indicates "alternatively." So, when you say "if the laws of physics were different," you are excluding from S any proposition specifying the actual laws of physics, the evidence leading us to them and their implications. Thus, my definition is perfectly suited to your example.

gnoring the fact that outside of modal realism possible worlds aren't postulated to be literal places, your criticism is clearly that lack of epistemic access to possible worlds is a problem for using possible world semantics. — MindForged

No. That is not my objection. I assume that we know what we imagine possible worlds to be (even though we can't know that they're self-consistent). My objection is that the construction of possible worlds does not add to our knowledge of the real world, which remains the same (except for our mental state) no matter what we imagine. In other words, imagining a possible world can give us no new data on the real world, which alone is relevant to understanding our experience consistently. So, while we have more factors to process, we have no more information than we started with.

Saying we have no epistic access to a possible world means that while we can inform it, and know how we are informing it, it can't inform us, because it does not exist. As a result we are tempted to to use imagined data as real data. My example is a possible world in which life evolved, but in which the physical constants are slightly different. The calculations underlying the fine tuning argument show such a world is not self-consistent -- even though it appears quite possible when we imagine it. The real world can surprise us and tell us that what we imagine is not so. Imagined worlds can't.

My point was that we don't have direct access to the actual world either — MindForged

I rebutted this objection, and you ignored my answer. If you are going to persist in asserting this dogmatic claim, please do me the courtesy of responding to my rebuttal. It is in my 5th post of this tread.

So if I'm eight years old and I say "I could be a doctor", this can be understood as saying that there is some possible world (however you understand those to be) where I am in fact an MD. — MindForged

Why bring in a construct of dubious ontological status? Why not be more parsimonious and say it means "I see nothing to prevent me from being a doctor"? What does the construct add to this besides an unnecessary discussion of the ontological status and semantics of possible worlds?

And then say I eventually do become a doctor, meaning the actual world is one such possible world where my claim turned out true. Well that's perfectly obvious justification for my original modal statement being thought true. — MindForged

Yes, but not in any essential way. Think of all the things we imagine that do not turn out. That some imagined possibilities become actual does not justify the claim that all imagined worlds are possible or self-consistent.

Whether it's conceivability or similarity or perception, there are any number of proposed ways one can access possible worlds — MindForged

None of these access possible worlds because you cannot "access" what does not exist. We can and do access our thoughts, including our imaginings. To call our imaginings "worlds" is misdirection -- precisely what I'm complaining about. They have no more epistic value than normal (non-modal) epistemology can give imaginings.

"access" here is not causal, other worlds aren't "out there" acting on us in the actual world any more than other abstract objects act on us to give us access to them. — MindForged

If you think knowledge is causally justified true belief, this should give you pause. I think knowing is awareness of dynamically present intelligibility, but the same conclusion follows on my account. The only thing dynamically present is our own thoughts, and so any knowledge garnered is of our subjective state -- not of the external world.

There's no reason to suppose that our sensory representation of an object is identical to how our sense's are modified by the object in question — MindForged

Yes there is: The Principle of Identity. A modifying B is identically B being modified by A. "Our sensory representation of an object" is just another name for the modification to our sensory state brought about by sensing that object. What else can it be?

It's not identical, you're simply pointing out an inverse relationship — MindForged

The inverse relationship is the reason for the identity. Lest you be confused, I am not saying A is identically B. I am saying the event (A modifying B) is identically the event (B being modified by A). So, my being informed (by an object) is identically the object informing me. Because these are identical there is no space for an epistic gap between the object's informing action and my being informed.

But the point being made is there's absolutely no way to know that our representation of the small amount of sensory data our representational apparatus uses to construct our perception is infallibly done. — MindForged

You are confusing two issues: The infallibility of the sensory datum, and the fallibility of consequent judgements. We perceive infallibly. The object necessarily has the power to present its self as it does present itself. That does not mean that we class the presentation infallibly. I mistook a horse for a dog once and it scared the hell out of me! That does not mean that i was wrong in perceiving something suddenly appearing over my shoulder.

Even if we suffer from delusions, there is something (say a trauma or intoxication) that is adequate to cause what we perceive. It is just a matter judging what kind of thing it is -- and that comes from experience. In A Beautiful Mind we see how John Nash learned to recognize his delusions as such, and so avoid being deceived by them.

Without that infallibility, we don't have even quasi-access to the world. — MindForged

Of course, this is blatantly false. It's like saying, if we have a noisy connection, we aren't talking to our mother. In other words, it's nonsense.

Oh my god, so your argument is, literally, that the world "possible" is there. — MindForged

Hardly! I've explained many times now that since they are not actual, possible worlds aren't "there." I've made it clear that their only existence is intentional -- the unparsimonious imaginings of overwrought philosophical minds.

P is possible if there is at least one world in which P is the case — MindForged
— Dfpolis

Still, they are not our world, as, if they are different in any way, they are not identical to our actual world. Any world that is not identical to our world is a different world. As each is a different world, each (actual or potential) object in them is a different object from any object in out actual world. — Dfpolis


The worlds aren't identical, that wasn't my claim. But the object with the name "Venus" is picked out by the same name no matter the world. — MindForged

This is inadequate as, unless P is actually true, there is no world in which P is the case. What you need to say is "P is possible if there is at least one possible world in which P is the case" -- and that is circular. — Dfpolis

You aren't making any sense. In modal logic, "truth" is always relativized to worlds in which the proposition is true or not.

My point is simple: Independently of whether or not there is such a thing as modal logic, only one world exists simpliciter -- ours. Thus, unless you do add "possible" to "world," consideration is restricted to our actual world. So, using your definition, if p is false in this world, it is impossible. Appealing to modal logic is irrelevant misdirection and distraction.

Still, they are not our world, as, if they are different in any way, they are not identical to our actual world. Any world that is not identical to our world is a different world. As each is a different world, each (actual or potential) object in them is a different object from any object in out actual world. — Dfpolis

The worlds aren't identical, that wasn't my claim. But the object with the name "Venus" is picked out by the same name no matter the world. — MindForged

Which means that "Venus" picks out multiple objects (one real, many imagined) and so it is a universal, not a proper name. The only alternative is to say that an imagined Venus is numerically identical with the actual Venus -- but to say this is to deny the difference between reality and fiction.

"The oldest child [in a particular family]" is description, not a proper name, — MindForged

I understand that. But, it may still be the condition that specifies to whom the proper name is assigned. If we are to pick out which object to call "Dennis" or "Venus" in a modified world we need a well-defined set of criteria. Lacking such criteria, who or what is designated by these names in some possible world is indeterminate. What if we imagine a new second planet; is it, or the third planet, to be called "Venus"? You may choose to ignore such niceties, but if you do, the possible worlds construct is ill-defined.

"Disposed" is a modal notion itself, meaning to be "inclined towards" or something one might do given their characteristics. — MindForged

Inclinations are not a species of modality. They are actual. They determine how an object will act in well-defined circumstances. They are no more "modal" than the laws of nature. If we bring two particles of the same charge next to each other, they will exert a repulsive force according to Coulomb's law. That is a fact about the contingent structure of nature which requires no reference ot possible worlds.

I am not subsuming the hope that P under the same category as P. — Pierre-Normand

I am glad to hear that, but it seems to me you did:

judgements are intentional attitudes ... the very same proposition P can be the content of different sorts attitudes other than judgements, such as the hope that P, the fear that P, ... — Pierre-Normand

In this account p, the hope that p, the fear that P, etc. are all equally in the category of attitudes. Have I misunderstood, or have you changed your position?

Judgements don't make assertions. People make judgements and assertions, and they can assert the contents of the judgements that they are making. They can also assert the negation of a judgement that they are making, in which case they are lying. — Pierre-Normand

This is a quibble over words, not a substantive difference. I agree that judgements are not agents, nor, in the sense I am using "judgement," need judgements be expressed; nevertheless, they can affirm, which is the first meaning of "assert." As language primarily deals with intersubjectively observable reality, in dealing with mental states we often use analogical predication. Such is the case here. "Assertion" is being predicated by an analogy of attribution as judgements are the source of linguistic assertions.

To judge <A is B> is to think that the source of concept <A> is identically the source of concept <B>, so the cupola in the proposition expressing a judgement expresses identity, not between A and B, but in the source of A and B. Similarly, to judge <A is not B> is to think that the source of concept <A> is not identically the source of concept <B>.

It's true that we are sometimes unaware of what names mean — Snakes Alive

I think here we come to the heart of the matter. On my model, which I think reflects the insights of Aristotle, Peirce and Frege, words mean the concepts they evoke, and concepts mean the intelligibility that evokes them. This allows for both reference and sense. A concept's reference is the set of intelligible instances that can evoke them. Its sense specifies the kind of intelligibility that will evoke it. .

Under this model, it is hard to see how anyone could not know, implicitly at least, the meaning of the names they know how to use.

I assume that you have a different model of meaning -- one that allows names to function when their meaning is unknown. Do you see the meaning of a term as having some kind of abstract existence? Or do you see proper names as having a different kind of meaning than other terms?

I see the meaning of terms changing as we learn more. The original concept of a planet was a wonderer in the sky. Today our concept of a planet has changed so much that we hardly think of them as wondering the sky. It the meanings of terms can change, there is no reason the meaning of proper names can't change as well.

In this account p, the hope that p, the fear that P, etc. are all equally in the category of attitudes. Have I misunderstood, or have you changed your position? — Dfpolis

The proposition P is the content of those various propositional attitudes (here expressed by means of a subordinate "that"-clause), so it's not in the same category as the attitudes themselves. If Sue hopes that P, Bob fears that P, and Joe believes that P, then what it is that Sue hopes, that Bob fears, and that Joe believes is that P. P is the content of those attitudes. Those three attitudes share the same content, but they have difference "forces", as Frege would say. Fearing something isn't the same as hoping for it, and both are different from judging it to be true. But it can be the very same thing (that P) that is being feared, hoped or judged.

it can be the very same thing (that P) that is being feared, hoped or judged. — Pierre-Normand

Yes. My point is that judging is not an attitude. It intends a real state in a way that the attitudes you enumerate need not.

To judge <A is B> is to think that the source of concept <A> is identically the source of concept <B>, so the cupola(sic) in the proposition expressing a judgement expresses identity, not between A and B, but in the source of A and B. Similarly, to judge <A is not B> is to think that the source of concept <A> is not identically the source of concept <B>. — Dfpolis

Here I would only object to your use of the term 'copula'. The 'is' of identity isn't the copula. The 'is' in the sentence "The apples is green" is the copula since its function isn't to signify the numerical identity between the references of "the apple" and of "green" but rather to predicate the general concept signified by "green" of the apple.

Regarding the main point, I can grant you that the proper names "A" and "B" can be construed as concepts of their objects and hence that when one asserts the identity of their objects by means of the expression "A is B" one is thereby identifying the "sources" (better: the references) of those concepts. The main issue is this: are the concepts A and B essentially dependent on the identity of their objects or aren't they? If they aren't, then they are better construed as something like definite descriptions and hence aren't rigid designators. But if they are object dependent, as Kripke argue is the case for proper names, then they are rigid designators and the identity expressed by "A is B" is necessary. So, you haven't even begun to argue against Kripke's thesis if you are construing the concepts A and B to be object independent. Kripke agrees that identity propositions of the form "A is B", where "A" and B" are general concepts (such as definite descriptions), are contingently true when true.

Yes. My point is that judging is not an attitude. It intends a real state in a way that the attitudes you enumerate need not. — Dfpolis

I'm unsure what work the word "intends" does here. If I judge that it is raining outside (because I looked though the window and saw that it is raining) then I am holding the proposition that it is raining outside to be true. That's one possible attitude that I can have towards that proposition. Other attitudes would be to judge it to be false, or to hope that it is true (in case I don't know it to be true). In any case, my attitude is intentionally directed towards the proposition that it is raining outside, and so the proposition is being "intended" in that sense. It's the intentional content of the attitude.

Pardon my mistyping "copula."

The 'is' of identity isn't the copula. — Pierre-Normand

I think you misread my claim. I am not speaking of the "is" of identity. I am saying the copula "is" of "The apple is green" expresses an identity not of concept, but of the source of the concepts. If the same object that evokes the concept <the apple> is not identically the object that evokes <green>, then the judgement is false.

What justifies predicating "green" of the apple, if not that the object evoking <the apple> is identically the object evoking <green>? If one object evoked <the apple>, while a numerically distinct object evoked <green>, the predication would be unjustified. The recognition of identity is essential to the judgement expressed..

its function isn't to signify the numerical identity between the references of "the apple" and of "green" — Pierre-Normand

This relates to the main point. The referent of "apple" is an ostensible unity (ousia = substance). The referent of "green" is an accident inhering in the apple. An accident does not inhere in a substance as a raisin in a pudding -- so that if we ate all the raisins we'd still have substance pudding left -- but as a subset of the overall, perceived intelligibility of the substance. The overall, perceived intelligibility of the substance evokes <the apple>, while a subset evokes <green>. These sets of notes of intelligibility are the referents of the corresponding concepts and terms. Obviously, the "green" subset is not identical to the whole intelligibility, but if were not a contained subset, the apple would not be green.

So, the identity here is that of the pool of intelligibility eliciting coupled the concepts. Of course, the notes of intelligibility have no independent existence. They are merely different aspects of an object.

But if they are object dependent, as Kripke argue is the case for proper names, then they are rigid designators and the identity expressed by "A is B" is necessary. — Pierre-Normand

I think I am attacking Kripke's claim directly.

Two things can be can be dependent on the same, singular object, but still depend on different aspects of that object. If so, then what they depend on may be physically inseparable, but logically distinct. We can't physically separate Clark Kent from Superman, or Hesperus from Phosphorus, but we can see that being a reporter is not being a man of steel, and that appearing in the evening is not appearing in the morning.

So being dependent on the same singular object is insufficient to establish conceptual identity.

I think I am attacking Kripke's claim directly.

Two things can be can be dependent on the same, singular object, but still depend on different aspects of that object. If so, then what they depend on may be physically inseparable, but logically distinct. We can't physically separate Clark Kent from Superman, or Hesperus from Phosphorus, but we can see that being a reporter is not being a man of steel, and that appearing in the evening is not appearing in the morning.

So being dependent on the same singular object is insufficient to establish conceptual identity. — Dfpolis

You are thus treating "Clark Kent" and "Superman" roughly as definite descriptions: as singular referring expressions that express, roughly, the general concepts under which "Clark Kent" and "Superman" are generally understood to describe their references as the objects that uniquely fall under them (or, as you say, describe "different aspects of their objects"). In that case, "Clark Kent" and "Superman" do not function in the way Kripke understands proper names to function and hence they aren't rigid designators. You have not criticized Kripke's account of proper names. You have rather changed the subject and you are making claims that Kripke would not disagree with.