I guess if you want to follow Pascal to the letter, you have to adopt the religion most likely to be the true faith. By popularity:

http://www.adherents.com/Religions_By_Adherents.html

Christianity at 33% is the popular choice, but does that make it the most likely to be true? Could we be safer with a personal religion based on rationalism?

Similar to Pascal’s wager:

- if you are evil and god is evil you are punished
- if you are good and god is evil you are punished
- if you are evil and god is good you are punished
- if you are good and god is good you are rewarded

So the only sensible choice is to be good.

The argument applies to god too (he does not know if there is another more powerful god out there somewhere so he has to be good too).

Pascal's wager is absurd on its face. It does not offer a single argument for the existence of any alleged God, and simply assumes one should be safe by randomly picking one to worship, without even taking into account that one may end up making the "real" God angry by worshipping the wrong one, so as a mini game-theory exercise, it does not even take into account all the possibilities. Moreover, it also does not address the absurdity of claiming that someone can automatically "believe" in an alleged God based on a risk-calculation. I don't believe in any God and even if I accepted Pascal's wager, I still wouldn't be able to believe in any alleged God.

Pascal's wager reminds me of the lovely old joke about the Irishman who lay dying, and a priest came up to give him the last rites. The priest asked

'Do you renounce Satan?'

to which the Irishman replied

'This is no time to be making enemies.'

For Pascal's conclusion to have any value certain assumptions must be accepted. One must assume a God can be fooled by a human mind making an assertion with the Cod having no means of verification but the assertion itself. The God must be stupider than the person making the statement and that seems rather unlikely. The second concept is that there is life after death and that, to me as an atheist, seems more unlikely than the existence of a supreme being.

'Do you renounce Satan?'
to which the Irishman replied
'This is no time to be making enemies.' — andrewk

:smile: :smile:

That was not an Irishman, it was Voltaire

I’m not arguing for the existence of God, I’m arguing for the presumption of theism. Insofar as Pascal’s wager is used as an argument for God I agree with you. But when we’re talking about if the burden of proof lies on the atheist or theist the wager gives a solid case in the theists favor. Other arguments such as the ontological or cosmological arguments can be used to debate God’s existence.

I think your comment about the “real god” being offended is covered in this discussion as well. I’m not arguing for any particular god, simply some type of god, some type of theism

Pascal’s wager has nothing to do with popularity, if it did we could just say that since most of humanity has believed in some kind of deity all throughout history then we should presume theism.

Out of curiousity, what would a religion based around rationalism look like?

I don’t understand what you’re saying. Why would God have to be fooled? Who said anyone was trying to fool God?

Out of curiousity, what would a religion based around rationalism look like? — lupac

Eternal Life

The USP of most religions is eternal life. The closest concept to that in main stream science is Relativity which implies the past and future are real and permeant. So perhaps a rational religion would claim we could experience all or part of our lives again. Edited highlights would be nice. Perhaps low-lights for sinners (IE Hell). This is similar to the Eternal Return concept popularised by Nietzsche:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eternal_return

Alternatively, Quantum Immortality proposes that on death our consciousness transmigrates to a living you in another universe:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_suicide_and_immortality

Creation Story

We could adapt the Eternal Inflation theory from Cosmology:
- God started inflation.
- Inflation was designed by God as a means of generating as many life supporting universes as possible.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eternal_inflation

Scripture

The tenets of the religion would be alterable to reflect new scientific research. That way the (not so) sacred texts of the religion would evolve over time and so remain relevant to new generations.

"we should at least be theists based around Pascal's wager and leave “what kind of theists” for another conversation."
To cover more bases, you should also accept Jesus Christ as your persona! savior (to meet Protestant conditions for etenal reward), and you should refrain from committing mortal sins, which Catholics believe sends you to hell. The latter also works for Islamic teaching as well.

To be on the safe side, I'd sacrifice lambs and offerings to the gods of Olympus, as well. Maybe also mutter, "Hare Krishna..." .

You may think that all of that sounds ridiculous, but what we are and are not willing to try comes down to just how much it matters, and how desperate we are. The whole "no atheists in fox holes" quip is not met to suggest that atheists are cowards, but just is expressing this insight, that the desperate try everything.

At the times I didn't know it, but the most desperate times in my life were always the most transformative. When one is most desperate is when they discover what they're really too good for, and not too good for, and when most terrified is when one discovers what really matters, and what doesn't.

The thing I think is ridiculous is the notion that we can choose our beliefs based on the potential for benefitting, rather than based on our usual methods for evaluating the truth of propositions.

I also think that that is silly, which is why it is difficult to know what one believes and doesn't, and particular states and circumstances are necessary to discover this. Without the desperation, without the terror, then we construct an image of ourselves pre-experience, based on what seems cool, inspirational, respected. We identify with feel good, positive things, and act them out to the best of our apprehension and appreciation. We are not at every moment transparent to ourselves however, and thus it requires tracking one's self through time, and various circumstances to get a true sense of what and who they are. To get to know themselves, as their own judging companion. A lukewarm existence though, won't reveal much.

The thing I think is ridiculous is the notion that we can choose our beliefs based on the potential for benefitting, rather than based on our usual methods for evaluating the truth of propositions. — Relativist

I'm right there with you, except that this is not a debate between evidence and evidence, this is a debate between two (supposedly) equal ideas theism and atheism. If we cannot tell for certain which is true, we should move on to other methods of decision making.
I think All sight's point about desperation is meaningful, when the options for traditional reasoning are all used up we have to move on and try something else, or we will be paralyzed

when the options for traditional reasoning are all used up we have to move on and try something else, or we will be paralyzed — lupac

We all do what we need to do to survive (and avoid paralysis), and I'm not judging anyone for doing that. But by that same token, I do what I do - and that is to seek truth, in the way I know how.

Pragmatic Encroachment and Pascal’s Wager

If knowledge is circumstantial, it is seemingly impossible to make a knowledge claim about atheism. Under the view that knowledge is circumstantial and subject to the stakes of the circumstance, atheism faces several problems. According to Pascal’s Wager, the belief in God is a high stakes situation. If God is real, then belief in him is infinitely rewarding and non belief is infinitely punishing, if he is not real then belief in God is slightly punishing and non belief is not rewarding or punishing. So in any case, belief in God is a high stakes situation. Pragmatic encroachment affirms that if the stakes are higher in a given circumstance, then more evidence is required to obtain a justified belief. This presents some problems for atheism. Since the stakes for atheism are greater than theism, it requires more evidence to claim knowledge of atheism given equal evidence. Granted that the evidence is equal, it is near impossible to have a justified belief in atheism.

If pragmatic encroachment is true, atheism falls short in the burden of proof debate. Since the stakes are higher for atheism it requires more evidence to be proven true, and the evidence is equal, so the burden of proof must fall on atheism. While atheism can still be true, it is far from justified under pragmatic encroachment, therefore it fails to be knowledge. — Dgallen

lupac: No, Pascal's Wager does not weigh in favor of the theist when it comes to the burden of proof. At least not under logic. Since there is no credible evidence for God, then there is nothing in favor of an alleged God existing. In fact, if we had a description of a God for which there is no evidence for or against its existence, then logic tells us we assign a 50/50 probability to the assertion that such a God exists. Pascal's Wager does absolutely nothing to alter this.

I would first caution you from using the term "according to logic", since in your response you vaguely relate mathematical statistics (which I believe to be fallacious) to the wager, and at no point you utilize propositional logic within your argument. As to your assertion that Pascal's wager is a purported argument for the existence of God is also an incorrect interpretation, in my opinion. The argument that Pascal's Wager tries to convey, from my interpretation, is the "burden of proof" argument - simply put, this is to say that, according to the wager, because the risk inherent in affirming atheism if there is a God (i.e. damnation is the result of this affirmation), the stakes are exponentially high; according to the wager, high enough to affirm theism. This interpretation is, of course, subject to the "many gods" objection - which is a much stronger argument, though I believe it has its faults - but to assert that Pascal's Wager is meant as an argument "for" the existence of God, and not the burden of proof being on the atheist rather than the theist, is a misunderstanding of the core argument.

Alistering: Please don't lecture me on logic and mathematics. Here are the facts: What I stated is correct. A proposition for which there is neither evidence for nor against is assigned a 50/50 probability. This is true both for basic logic, as well as statistics., Mathematics is basically applied logic, so there is no bright-line distinction between the two subjects. There is nothing about Pascal Wager that changes this because Pascal's Wager offers no evidence for the existence of any alleged God. In fact, it does not even take into account that if the majority of alleged Gods send people to hell for worshipping another God, then Pascal's Wager tells any rational person that they should not worship any God, because the probability of worshipping the wrong one is greater than the probability of worshipping correctly.

I believe you misunderstood my main point: Pascal's Wager should not be viewed as an Epistemological proof for the existence of God, which you seem to interpret it as. I instead view it as a "burden of proof" argument, upon which there is greater rewards for the theist (yes, I concede, if they choose to worship the "correct god") than the atheist, who, regardless of the verification of any religion, is choosing the losing side when taking the gamble whether or not one chooses to worship any god or gods. This is not a matter of statistics, which, according to your seemingly Evidentialist point of view (I say this because you reference a lack of evidence towards one side or the other, which is a faulty viewpoint in my opinion - though this is for another discussion), does not warrant a 50/50 split - and yes I maintain the belief that your view is wrong - on the grounds of Richard Price's Four Dissertations, whereby he utilizes Bayesian statistics to say that even if someone observes the tides coming in 1 million times the assigned 50% probability that the tide mysteriously does not roll in one day is between 1 to 600,000 and 1 to 3 million - which is utterly absurd; so let us please put this issue of statistics beside us; separately, Propositional Logic and Mathematical Theorems are vastly different - this I maintain as well (for reasons not only apparent to a Logician or a mathematician, but to a student of these subjects also). Let us return to the main argument, then: Let us assume there is no God, and one acts religiously, living virtuously and no engaging in revelry - upon death nothing happens to her, as there is no God and no eternal ramifications - likewise under the assumption that there is no God, and one believes as such, she engages in hedonism, pleasure without restrain, and upon death nothing happens. Here the atheist is better off having lived a pleasure-filled life, while the theist lacked in such regards. In the opposite direction, let's assume God exists - if one chooses the correct God and lives piously, they go to heaven - in the obverse, under the assumption that God exists, and the atheist maintains their atheism, upon death they receive eternal damnation. Here the disparity between due rewards is astronomically different than a life lived frivolously or not, given the assertion that there is no God. Even if one chooses the wrong god to worship, their chances of going to heaven upon death are greater than the atheists 0% chance. Here is why Pascal's Wager is an argument for the burden of proof and not an argument for or against God's existence: it is an argument for the reader to consider the ramifications of the presumption and acting out of Theism or Atheism.

A proposition for which there is neither evidence for nor against is assigned a 50/50 probability. This is true both for basic logic, as well as statistics. — LD Saunders

Please provide a citation. I have no evidence one way or t'other as to the presence of any nuclear attack submarines submerged in Cape Cod Bay. Do you mean to say that the chances of one being there are therefore 50-50?

Tim Wood: Go read Raymond Smullyan. Before he passed away he was ranked something like the third greatest mathematical logician of all time, and I know in one of his pop books he wrote for the general public, he mentioned this. You can also check out most basic books on statistics and probability. Or, you could use your common sense. This is a very, very, very basic aspect of logic and math so it always puzzles me when people like you can't grasp it. Just think it through: If there is a proposition, A, and there is more evidence against it than for it, then it would be rational to think it is probably not true. On the other hand, if there was more evidence in favor of it than against it, it would be rational to believe that the proposition is most likely true. So, what happens when there is no evidence for or against the proposition? It would be irrational to claim it's likely to be true, a situation where there is actually evidence in its favor, and it would also be irrational to consider the statement less likely to be trur, as there is no net evidence against the proposition either. A 50/50 is the logical position to take given no evidence.

As far as your example, this is not a very good one. While you personally may have no access to information regarding the attack, that is not to say that such information does not exist and is not known by those who deal with this topic involving national security. In many cases where a person is thinking that a statement has no evidence in its favor or against, there is actually evidence either for or against.

So you don't have a citation. Been simpler if you'd just said so. Ever in my experience people who cite things without the citation in hand almost always get it wrong. The exceptions are those who just plain know, don't need a citation, and it's clear they don't need one.

As to my example of submarines, it's not an individual lack of evidence, rather a general absence of evidence that matters. Clearly even if I do not know where submarines are, someone does.

It now becomes a question as to what qualifies as evidence - and this can be a matter merely of definition, although the definition ought to conform, more or less, with what is generally meant be evidence. Some institutions are exempt from this latter consideration with respect to god; they're called churches.

But do you argue we have no evidence? I'm trying to think of something about which we have no evidence, so far without success. Ah! Got one! I have zero evidence that anyone is going to give me a million dollars. Does that mean my local bank ought to be eager to lend me $250,000 against the security of a 50-50 possibility?

At best, this kind of 50-50 is default odds for a bet. Not that anyone in their right mind thinks the actual possibility is 50-50,but that 50-50 is a place holder until more appropriate odds are posted. In short. god is not and never was a 50-50 proposition. It's just the wrong idea attached to the wrong concept.

I have no evidence one way or t'other as to the presence of any nuclear attack submarines submerged in Cape Cod Bay. Do you mean to say that the chances of one being there are therefore 50-50? — tim wood

You have general experience to suggest that there is no good reason for a submarine to be in Cape Cod Bay. Its not like we are at war or anything. So you have evidence on this issue. You know the odds are very low. The point is if you knew nothing about submarines or Cape Cod Bay, you'd have to start with a 50%/50% assumption and then alter that assumption as you gather more evidence.

Lets try and make this simple for you. If you flip a coin, how likely is it to come up heads? Thats an example of a boolean question for which no evidence has been submitted. 50%/50% is your starting point and I going to refrain from going through elementary maths at this point...

No evidence or general experience on a coin toss? In the case of the absence of any evidence, I certainly would not assign any probability. I would instead suspend judgment pending. I won't argue that under a strictly Boolean model it should, or should not, be a certain way: the world is not a Boolean space.

I certainly would not assign any probability — tim wood

But if you had to assign a probability for some reason, what would you? Say we toss the coin 100 times and the person who guesses how many heads gets a prize. Would you:
- Guess 0 heads
- Guess 50 heads
- Guess 100 heads
?

For a coin, the answer is the obvious 50. But were not talking coins, are we.

But the principle is the same. We start with no evidence. Likelihood of God 50%

I think the big bang makes it 25% likely there is a God:

50% + 50% * 25% = 62.5% likely there is a God

And so on through the fine-tuning argument and the prime mover...