I fail to see why the set of facts that explain the set of facts that aren't self-explanatory can't include a self-explanatory fact.

As for the Barber Paradox as you have stated it, there is nothing to prevent someone from shaving all who do not shave themselves and shaving himself. If you want the premise to be the Barber shaves all the beards of those who do not save themselves and only those beards, that premise is provably false.

I fail to see why the set of facts that explain the set of facts that aren't self-explanatory can't include a self-explanatory fact. — Dfpolis

I meant to say, the set of facts that explain, and only explain, the set of facts that aren't self-explanatory.

As for the Barber Paradox as you have stated it, there is nothing to prevent someone from shaving all who do not shave themselves and shaving himself. If you want the premise to be the Barber shaves all the beards of those who do not save themselves and only those beards, that premise is provably false. — Dfpolis

I agree.

I meant to say, the set of facts that explain, and only explain, the set of facts that aren't self-explanatory. — Purple Pond

The problem is that to avoid an infinite regress, you need at least one self-explaining fact that explains all below it.

The problem is that to avoid an infinite regress, you need at least one self-explaining fact that explains all below it. — Dfpolis

Or you can have brute facts upon which all other facts rest on. Hence, modal logic?

If you allow brute facts you reject the PSR and with it the logical foundations of science.

The problem is that to avoid an infinite regress, you need at least one self-explaining fact that explains all below it. — Dfpolis

And why would we want to avoid an infinite regress?

Because it can be shown by mathematical induction that an infinite regress of concurrent causes can not be a complete explanation.

Why do we need a complete explanation?

It seems like you want to hold onto the PSR when that is the very contention that I am attempting to dismantle.

If you allow brute facts you reject the PSR and with it the logical foundations of science. — Dfpolis

You might well reject the PSR as a metaphysical principle (as most scientists do) while still doing as Hume suggested and retain it as an Epistemic principle.

You might well reject the PSR as a metaphysical principle (as most scientists do) while still doing as Hume suggested and retain it as an Epistemic principle. — MindForged

Putting aside your unsupported sociological claim, yes, some people are quite irrational. How can we know there is a sufficient reason if there is no sufficient reason to know?

It seems like you want to hold onto the PSR when that is the very contention that I am attempting to dismantle. — Purple Pond

All the PSR states is that every operation is the operation of something able to so operate. How can you dispute that? Do you claim that beings can perform operations they are intrinsically incapable of? Or do you claim that some operations are not acts of an operator? If you do, you are reifying non-being, because anything capable of acting in any way exists.

Putting aside your unsupported sociological claim, yes, some people are quite irrational. How can we know there is a sufficient reason if there is no sufficient reason to know? — Dfpolis

What a whomping non sequitur. The inability to know something does not entail there is no sufficient reason for why something is the case.

What a whomping non sequitur. The inability to know something does not entail there is no sufficient reason for something being the case. — MindForged

I think you have it backward. My claim is that that if there is no sufficient reason in reality, we cannot know that there is a sufficient reason. This was in response to your suggestion:

You might well reject the PSR as a metaphysical principle ... while still ... retain[ing] it as an Epistemic principle. — MindForged

I think you have it backward. My claim is that that if there is no sufficient reason in reality, we cannot know that there is a sufficient reason. This was in response to your suggestion: — Dfpolis

You have my point backwards, actually. You can demand that one must give a reason for what they claim to know because otherwise we would believe anything whatsoever. But that doesn't mean there will actually be a reason for why something is the case. An epistemic claim is not of a kind with the world. (Since you didn't see it probably, here was the update to my last post)

You seem to have confused my point. We can know X is the case despite there being no metaphysical explanation for why it is so. In fact, the PSR is inescapably being formulated in just this way.

A common justification for the PSR is that if the PSR were not true, then things would just happen at random for no reason at all. The obvious assumption here is that the reason this randomness doesn't occur is *because* of the PSR. Which is patently circular. The PSR cannot be extended to the... extent which would be needed to make it a metaphysical principle. Any attempt to do so will either be circular or will in fact invalidate the PSR from being a metaphysical principle (because the PSR ends up holding in virtue of nothing, which contradicts the PSR).

Thank you for the clarification.

Yes, one can deny that things occur for an adequate reason, but it is irrational to do so. How can anything come to pass if the conditions of its genesis are inadequate to produce it? Claiming that it can is making the absurd claim that what is inadequate is adequate

Randomness is completely irrelevant. The only relevant consideration is adequacy.