Where? "Flying like Superman" is shorthand for "flying like Superman is imagined to do in comic books, television shows, movies, etc."However, Superman is an actuality here. — Posty McPostface
As above, and as in the case of Hamlet, we would have to specify the universe of discourse.So, in your example, Superman is not analytic, yet, we talk about him as a synthetic a priori sense. So, is he a synthetic a priori conception of the human mind, only? I mean, he could exist in a possible world, no? Therefore has he become analytic? — Posty McPostface
It is obvious that we use language to express propositions. It may not be obvious that propositions represent states of affairs. It should be obvious that words represent all kinds of objects.So, how is it so obvious that a proposition represents states of affairs? — Posty McPostface
That's the mystical part! No? — Posty McPostface
As far as we know, nothing really flies the way that Superman is imagined to do in comic books, television shows, movies, etc. By all appearances, he simply wills himself to fly without activating any particular mechanism for physically doing so. I seem to recall that in the earliest comic books, he was portrayed more as jumping than flying - "leaping over tall buildings in a single bound" - which is perhaps more plausible.Why "like" being used here? Like denotes that nothing in the real world is representative of something idealized, like Superman? — Posty McPostface
We're wired to feel them (to take in stimulus, somehow parse it, and then learn via an output/input loop) but why do feelings feel like anything? — VagabondSpectre
As far as we know, nothing really flies the way that Superman is imagined to do in comic books, television shows, movies, etc. By all appearances, he simply wills himself to fly without activating any particular mechanism for physically doing so. I seem to recall that in the earliest comic books, he was portrayed more as jumping than flying - "leaping over tall buildings in a single bound" - which is perhaps more plausible. — aletheist
They're status of facthood. — Posty McPostface
1. Things are what are describable and can be referred to.
2. A fact is a state of affairs or a relation among things.
3. A proposition is a thing that is or might be a fact.
4. A proposition has a truth-value of "True" or "False"
5. A proposition has a truth-value of "True" if and only if it is a fact.
6. A statement is an utterance of a proposition. — Michael Ossipoff
That the fact that the cat is on the mat obtains just is that there exists the cat and there exists the mat and the cat is positioned on top of the mat.
That the fact that the cup is in the cupboard doesn’t obtain just is that the cup doesn’t exist or the cupboard doesn’t exist or the cup is not positioned within the cupboard.
So are you asking how things come to exist? Are you asking how one thing comes be positioned relative to another? — Michael
Do you use this notion of "facts obtaining"? — creativesoul
No, again, a proposition represents a purported state of affairs or a purported relation among things. A true proposition represents a real state of affairs or a real relation among things.A proposition is or might be a state of affairs or a relation among things? — creativesoul
"A proposition is or might be a state of affairs or a relation among things?" — creativesoul
No, again, a proposition represents a purported state of affairs or a purported relation among things. A true proposition represents a real state of affairs or a real relation among things. — aletheist
If facts are definite things... — apokrisis
, then they would have to obtain...
by being judged in terms of some metaphysical strength dichotomy.
We would need an essential distinction - along the lines of claiming some hard and sure contrast between facts of the mind and facts of the world.
This definition is fine, but a proposition is not itself a state of affairs or a relation among things, so a proposition cannot be a fact. Instead, a proposition represents a state of affairs or a relation among things; i.e., a true proposition represents a fact. In other words, 2c is correct (assuming bivalence) once modified to read as follows: A proposition is a sign that purports to represent a fact, and has a truth-value of "True" or "False," and does represent a fact if and only if its truth-value is "True."A fact is a state of affairs or a relation among things — Michael Ossipoff
A kitchen table is not a proposition at all, because it does not purport to represent a state of affairs or a relation among things, and does not have a truth-value. Even the English expression, "kitchen table," is not a proposition, but a term; it represents a certain general class of things, rather than a state of affairs or a relation among things. However, every proposition involves terms; for example, "some kitchen tables have four legs" is a (true) proposition.I don't know of any problem that results by letting a kitchen-table be called a false proposition — Michael Ossipoff
A proposition is or might be a state of affairs or a relation among things?
That can't be right. — creativesoul
This is what Peirce identified as the subject matter of mathematics - drawing necessary conclusions about hypothetical states of affairs, the universe of pure possibility. The problem with trying to extend it to the actual universe is what he called "the outward clash" - we constantly encounter resistance as we interact with other things; only some of our hypotheses turn out to be consistent with our experience. Inquiry is the process by which we distinguish truth from error - retroduction generates hypotheses, deduction explicates them, and induction evaluates them.I propose that the facts of the physical world are, ultimately, just abstract facts, like the other abstract facts. ...and that the describable realm (including the physical universes) consists of nothing other than abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things. — Michael Ossipoff
.”A fact is a state of affairs or a relation among things” — Michael Ossipoff
.
This definition is fine, but a proposition is not itself a state of affairs or a relation among things, so a proposition cannot be a fact. Instead, a proposition represents a state of affairs or a relation among things; i.e., a true proposition represents a fact.
.”I propose that the facts of the physical world are, ultimately, just abstract facts, like the other abstract facts. ...and that the describable realm (including the physical universes) consists of nothing other than abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things.” — Michael Ossipoff
.
The problem with trying to extend it to the actual universe…
.…is what he called "the outward clash" - we constantly encounter resistance as we interact with other things; only some of our hypotheses turn out to be consistent with our experience.
.”I don't know of any problem that results by letting a kitchen-table be called a false proposition “— Michael Ossipoff
.
A kitchen table is not a proposition at all, because it does not purport to represent a state of affairs or a relation among things, and does not have a truth-value. Even the English expression, "kitchen table," is not a proposition, but a term; it represents a certain general class of things, rather than a state of affairs or a relation among things.
.You are basically defining a fact as a true proposition, rather than as the object of a true proposition. This is inconsistent with defining a fact as a real state of affairs or a real relation among things.
.There is an important distinction between a sign (such as a proposition) and its object (such as a state of affairs); i.e., that which represents vs. that which is represented. There is also a third aspect, the sign's interpretant, which is the effect that it has on an interpreter.
You evidently have a very different definition of "hypothetical" than I and most others do. If everything is hypothetical, then nothing is actual.The suggestion that the physical world consists of the hypothetical setting of a hypothetical experience-story, consisting of a complex system of inter-referring abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things is entirely consistent with our experience of the things and events of our physical surroundings. — Michael Ossipoff
So did I - a proposition is a sign that purports to represent a fact, which is a real state of affairs or a real relation among things. A state of affairs or a relation among things cannot be true or false, only a sign can - specifically, a proposition. There are no "true facts" or "false facts," only true propositions (representing facts) and false propositions (not representing facts).No, I defined a fact as a state-of-affairs or a relation among things, and I defined “proposition” in terms of fact. — Michael Ossipoff
What you see as a benefit, I see as a mistake. Again, I think that distinguishing signs from their objects (and their interpretants) is very important in this context. YMMV.One thing I like about 2c is that it doesn’t need to bring in additional entities such as signs and interpretants. — Michael Ossipoff
.”The suggestion that the physical world consists of the hypothetical setting of a hypothetical experience-story, consisting of a complex system of inter-referring abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things is entirely consistent with our experience of the things and events of our physical surroundings.” — Michael Ossipoff
.
You evidently have a very different definition of "hypothetical" than I and most others do.
.If everything is hypothetical, then nothing is actual.
.”No, I defined a fact as a state-of-affairs or a relation among things, and I defined “proposition” in terms of fact.” — Michael Ossipoff
.
So did I - a proposition is a sign that purports to represent a fact, which is a real state of affairs or a real relation among things.
.A state of affairs or a relation among things cannot be true or false, only a sign can - specifically, a proposition. There are no "true facts" or "false facts," only true propositions (representing facts) and false propositions (not representing facts).
.”One thing I like about 2c is that it doesn’t need to bring in additional entities such as signs and interpretants.” — Michael Ossipoff
.
What you see as a benefit, I see as a mistake.
.Again, I think that distinguishing signs from their objects (and their interpretants) is very important in this context.
No, I'd just say that the cat is on the mat and the cup isn't in the cupboard. Might stretch to say that it's a fact that the cat is on the mat and the cup in fact isn't in the cupboard.
Why do you ask? — Michael
No, again, a proposition represents a purported state of affairs or a purported relation among things. A true proposition represents a real state of affairs or a real relation among things. — aletheist
You are basically defining a fact as a true proposition, rather than as the object of a true proposition. This is inconsistent with defining a fact as a real state of affairs or a real relation among things. There is an important distinction between a sign (such as a proposition) and its object (such as a state of affairs); i.e., that which represents vs. that which is represented. There is also a third aspect, the sign's interpretant, which is the effect that it has on an interpreter. — aletheist
...a proposition represents a purported state of affairs or a purported relation among things. A true proposition represents a real state of affairs or a real relation among things. — aletheist
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